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INTRODUCTION 
Austria-Hungary wae a miniature Europe, for she exper-
ienced the nationality antagonisms and diversity of interest 
that has vexed and still vexes the entire continent. The 
struggle for e. European Confederation appears to be an en-
largement of the problem of unity in the Habeburg realm. 
Di s solution of the state was a triumph for nationalism and, 
in fact, the fruition of a movement that had been nourished 
t hroughout the nineteenth century. 
Between the two World Wars, Eastern Europe 'lr.ras composed 
of many s mall sta.tes separated by political jealousies a.nd 
economic barriers; some were dispossessed powers and others 
newly constituted. Both groups turned to alliances for 
protection; they faced a perilous future inasmuch as a new 
Ruesia had emerged. in the ea.st filled with the missionary 
zeal of Communism, and a reconstructed Germany · beceme 
vigorous and militaristic in the thirties. A large eastern 
sta t e seemed necessary to provide stability a.nd maintain the 
bale.nce of power; prior to 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
had fulfilled this function. Its collapse had been the result 
of various f actors; in the dome s tic field fatuous policies 
had been prEJ.cticed and ethnic differences were emphasized 
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throu~h lack of conciliation. Foreign entanglements, however, 
had a definite role in the dissolution of the Empire, for 
World War I was the catelytic e.gent. Had Austria.-Hungary 
followed a different foreign policy her internal problems 
miv,h t have been solved for she possessed cohesive features 
a s well as centrifugal tendencies. Greet Britain wa s a 
logical European polver that could have made a complete 
rapprochement with her. An alliance or the two nations 
might have prevented the Dual Monarchy's dependence on 
Germany, ana. the Austro-German rapport certainly contributed 
to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Had Britain been 
an Austrian ally she might have successfully sought modera-
tion at Vienna. 
A military alliance between Great Britain and Austria 
wa s a recurring thought among the diplomatic circles of 
Europe. The reasons were obvious; a community of interests 
existed, namely, containment of Russia and preservation of 
st ability in Eastern Europe. It was abs olutely necessary for 
the Habsburg Empire to have the support of an ally which 
would deter Russia from an aggressive move in the Balkans. 
Views expressed by Count AndrB.ssy in 1872 emphasized this 
idea, that is--Austria required peace, and alliances were 
1 
essential for its preservation. 
1. Ii'. Leia.ner, Die Aussenpoli tik Osterreich-
Unga.rns 1870-1879 (Kiel: Edus.rd Klinz, 1934), P. 24. 
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In late 1871 Austria-Hungary approached Great Britain 
for some sort of an understanding, but the Foreign Off ice 
under Lord Granville had adopted a policy of isolation and 
2 
the overtures were not eagerly received or cultivated. 
Lora_ Odo Russell, British Amba.ssador at Berlin was awa.re of 
the Austrian desire. In 1872 he wrote that Andrassy regretted 
that English neutrality prevented an intimate cooperation 
3 
with Vienna. Sir Henry Elliot, British diplomat, and 
Ambassador to Turkey in 1867 and to Vienna in 1877, reoorted 
that 
••• an overture such as that spoken of by Andrassy 
was certeinly made through Lord Lytton, then in 
charge of the Embassy at Vienna, and was rejected 
by Lord Granville, who naturally hesitated to enter 
in what might prove an embarrassing alliance, 
although Count Andrassy assured me that he did not 
ask for an alliance, but merely for an engagement 
that the two Powers should act in concert in Eastern 
matters. 
4 
In May, 1874, Frederick Harrison, A prominent journalist, 
declared that Austria wanted a British alliance. 
It is notorious that she has of late sought 
to renew the ancient ties, and that these 
2. Ibid., pp. 14-19; also, The Political Corres-
l{ondence of Jvir. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868-1876 
Agatha Ramm-,-editor, London: Roya.l Historical Society, 
1952), II, Nos. 627 and 629. 
3. Slavonic Review, 8:703, March, 1903. 
4. Henry G. Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other 
Diplomatic Experiences (edited by his daughter, London: 
John Murray, 1922), p. 202. 
overtures have been rejected with alarm by our 
diplometic shopkeepers. 
5 
In 1878 when the Balkan situation was acute, the 
Government of Britain approved a long term a.llia.nce with 
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the Habsburg state. On January 21, 1878, at a meeting of 
t h e Cabinet, Beaconsfield made a proposal for an alliance 
and it was warmly adopted in spite of great opposition from 
6 
Lord Derby. The Earl of Carnarvon reported that on the 
twenty-first of January a desperate fight had occurred in 
the Cabinet concerning the suggestion of an Austrian alliance 
of long d.uration. Both Derby and Carnarvon opposed a policy 
of continental entanglements and after the meeting of 
7 
January twenty-third they retired from the Cabinet. The 
proposed defensive alliance came to naught, for there was 
distrust at London as well as at Vienna, and Austria did not 
want to antagonize Russia. 
During the years of the Balkan Crisis 1875-1878, the 
possibility of an Anglo-Austrian alliance was commented upon 
in British news organs. Vanity Fair remarked that Austria 
was the only Power able to check Russia. She had reorganized 
5. Frederic Harrison, "Public Affairs," Fortnightly 
Review, 21:700, 11ay, 1874. 
6. R. \v. Seton-Wa.tson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the 
Eastern Question (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd .• , 193'3'1'":" 
p. 295. 
7. Arthur Har<'Unge, The Life of Henry Howard Molyneux 
Herbert Fourth Earl of Carnarvon (edited by Elizabeth 
Countess of Carnarvon, London: Humphrey Milford, 1925), II, 
p. 375. 
her army, hs.d ample ms.n power, and simply required money 
which England could. adequately supply. "The Austrian 
Alliance, then seems to be the only one on which we can 
8 
count •.• " In 1878 the Morning Post indicated that Her 
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Majes ty's Government had made a mistake in not joining 
with Vienna to oppose Russian policy. Britain had been 
left without an ally and Austria had been placed in an 
isolated position. The paper decls.red that the two nations 
9 
were naturs.l allies. It was asserted in the Nineteenth 
Century ths.t an Anglo-Austrian alliance could compel Russia 
to wi thdrsw her troops across the Ds.nube and abs.ndon all 
her gains. As Austria was in the midst of unscrupulous 
neighbors, a reputation of military strength was vital to 
he r and it was an opportune time to establish it without 
tremendous risk • . The mere threat of war might be enough if 
troops were assembled on the border and the British fleet 
strategically placed. "War then, in firm alliance with 
Austria, would appear to be f a r from imprudent for England, 
10 
or a misfortune for the l'TOrld. 11 'l'he Daily Telegrs.ph in 
January, 1878, announced tha t in the then present crisis 
Anglo-Au strian interests were the same. "Let, then, Aust.ria 
8. "The Russian Alliance," Vanity Fair, 14:33, July 17, 
1875. 
9. Public Ooinion, Vol. 33, January 19, 1878, and 
February 2, 1878 . 
10. E. B. Hamley, "The Armi es of .A u stria and Russia, 11 
Nineteenth Century, 3:860, May, 1878. 
11 
and England act decisively together •.• " The Examiner 
declared that England could avert the catastrophe which 
slowly and surely ga.thered over the House of Habsburg; an 
offensive and defensive pact with Francis Joseph would 
give the Habsburg Dynasty an element of popularity which 
in the nineteenth century was so necessary to , every Royal 
family, and England would profit by securing a bulwark 
12 
a ge. inst Russia. 
The very next year in 1879, there again was definite 
talk of an understanding, at this juncture a Tripartite 
a greement including Germa.ny, Britain, and Austria. Con-
f e rences were unproductive, however, and the alliance did 
not materialize. Lord Salisbury foresaw that an alliance 
-vi-
might play into the hands of Bismarck who might use it to 
gain cherished objectives. Also , the position and attitude 
of Fra.nce had significance. Lord Beaconsf'ie ld discounted 
French apprehension and pointed out that France had made no 
objection to the Tripe.rti te Treaty and surely she would not 
object to English defence of Au stria. The Prime Minister 
stated that unquestionably Bismarck was playing a game but 
it mi ght be a favorable game for Britain, and as a matter 
11. "Austria and England, 11 Public Opinion, 33:129, 
February 2, 1878. 
12. "Europe in 1878, 11 Examiner, pp. 1 639-1640, December 
28, 18784 .also, "Count Karolyi 1 s Toa s t," Exa.miner, pp. 458-
459, April 12, 1879. 
-vii-
of fact Disraeli seemed rather enthusiastic about such 
a policy 
It might probably be hailed with something like 
enthusiasm in the country:--even if it were not so 
and the country rejected it, the Government would 
return from office as the representatives of a 
strong and intelligent policy--a reputation which 
would react later to the advantage of the party. 
13 
Disraeli was quite correct; support for a close understanding 
with Vienna was not a mere Governmental policy, for in 1878 
and 1879 a section of the British press favored a close 
tie with the Habsburg Empire. Public opinion and official 
views' were closely related. 
In the year following the Congress, English newspapers 
continued to advocate an understanding \'>Tith Austria. · The 
Pall Mall Gazette declared that France and Austria belonged 
on the side of England. "The same interest, the same objects 
animate the three countries; and united they would be able 
14 
to impose on Europe a lasting peace." The Morning Post 
also maintained that the close alliance of England and 
15 
Austria would guarentee stability in Eastern Europe. The 
Standard firmly asserted that alliance of Austria, Germany, 
13. Gwendolen Cecil, The Life of Robert Marauis of 
Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921} ,-
III, p. 366. 
14. "The Secrets of Diplorne_ cy, 11 Pall 1118.11 Gazette, 
February 12, 1879; also, "The Value of France to Europe," 
Pall Mall Ge.zette, March 13, 1879. 
15. Article in Pall Mall Gazette, January 7, 18?9. 
and England would be most natural and. would. provide the 
strongest guarantee for preservation of peace on the 
16 
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continent. And a few years later during the difficulties 
in Egypt, Saint James's Gazette editorially urged England 
17 
to closely bind herself to Germany and Austria. 
The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 negotiated ·by 
Great Britain, Austria, and Italy ai~ed to keep peace in the 
ea s tern Mediterranean; it was a pa rtial drawing together of 
the Powers that wished to prevent French and Russian na val 
domination of the Mediterranean. Britain's ConservP.ti ve 
Fo r eign Secretary did not interpret the agreements .with 
Aus tria as an iron-clad alliance. He saw no reason why 
Ger many and Austria should attach special importance t o them 
and believed Bri ta.in h ad not entered into any understanding 
18 
which had not previously existed. The arrangement actually 
did not have the force of treaty obli gations . Karolyi, the 
Aus trian rep resentative, wanted the agreements to bind fut ure 
Governments, but Salisbury doubted whether Gladstone would 
a dhere to any unde'rs tanding that aimed to preserve Austria 1 s 
place in Europe. Salisbury stated that military cooperation 
16. Article in Pall Mall Gazette, November 20, 1879. 
17. "How We Are Concerned in the War Alarms," Saint 
James's Gazette , December 19, 1882; also, "The State of 
Europe , " Saint James's Gazette, February 24, 1882; also, 
"How VJe Stand With Europe," Saint James's Gazette, August 
19 , 1882. 
18. Cecil, QQ.cit., IV, p. 87. 
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19 
·. coult'l not be guaranteed in advance by the English Government. 
After the formation of the Austro-German Alliance of 
1879, Germany 1 e foreign policy greatly affected British 
attitudes toward Vienna. Austrian relations had to be con-
sidered in the context of Bismarckian programs. How the 
German Empire fitted into the picture was a point that could 
not be neglected. The Hohenzollern Empire which would act 
a s an ally, a passive spectator, or an opponent, was a 
decisive element in Anglo-Austrian relations. Lord Randolph 
Churchill voiced his feelings when he wrote to Salisbury: 
Our action with Austria means war with Russia. 
Our action with Austria and Germany means peace. 
But I feel sure that our present niggling, 
meddling, intriguing, fussy policy is gaining for 
us the contempt and dislike of Bismarck every day. 
20 
By 1901 a feeling prevailed in high Conservative circles 
that an Anglo-Austrian Alliance .was entirely out of the 
question. In March, 1901, in discussions between Lansdowne 
and the German representative Eckardstein on the possibility 
oi en Anglo-German Alliance, the German diplomat desired 
English adherence to the Triple Alliance - and not just an 
agreement between Germany and Britain, and he also advised 
tha t further negotiations should proceed through Vienna. 
The British Government believed negotiations through the 
19. w. N. Medlicott, "The Mediterranean Agreements of 
1887," Slavonic Review, 568, June, 1926. 
20. Winston Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (New 
York : The Macmillan Company, 1906), II, p. 161. 
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Austrian capital impoesi ble; Pe.rliament would not agree to 
ally with the Habsburg Empire which was internally dis-
cordant. It was felt that relations between England and 
Russia would become more involved if negotiations were 
directed through Vienna. Events came to a clima.ctic point 
in May . Hatzfeldt urged Britain to Join the Triple Alliance 
and asserted that as a conditio sine £.!ill. !l.Q.!l s!'le would have 
to guarantee Austria, but the terms were not accepte_ble to 
the inner Cabinet of Salisbury, Lansdowne, Chamberlain, 
Balfour, Devonshire, and Hicks-Beach. Salisbury looked upon 
the fate of the Habsburg Monarchy as uncertain and refused 
21 
liability for its defense. 
After 1901 the opportunity for an Anglo-Austrian 
Alliance had faded away. Events on the continent drew 
Britain to France and Ruseia and. bound Austria and Germany 
more closely. To sum up, from 1866 to 1900, several abortive 
a.ttempts were made to arrange a pe rmanent underste_nding 
between Britain and the Habsburg state. A veiled inquiry by 
Austria in 1871 was allowed to lapse,. and the more fully 
outlined Anglo-Austrian Alliance of 1878 never ripened into 
fruition. By 1887 Great Britain negotiated a regional 
agreement with Austria-Hungary. But this partnership with 
Germany had become the weighty consideration to Vienna and 
the likelihood of a full alliance with Britain was principally 
through the latter's adherence to the Triple Alliance. At the 
21. Julia.n Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (Lond.on: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1951),IV-,-p. 155. 
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dawn of the twentieth century while an approach to Germany 
was supported by prominent people in Britain, there was no 
longer a willingness to ally with the Habsburg Empire, 
because its foundations were judged none too firm and it 
could. easily become embroiled with Ruseia. 
Seemingly, Britain hesitated to place full confidence 
in the peaceful intentions of continental states, wary of 
entanglements that would lead to unnecessary wars for land, 
wealth, and prestige, all of which she possessed in 
a.bundance. A British M. P. declared in 1868: 
A remarkable change has taken pla.ce in public 
opinion of late years, on the subject of treaties 
and alliances with foreign Powers. Instead of 
their being looked on as a source of strength, 
they are abhorred as possible causes of war. 
The high points of diplomatic relations between Austria-
Hungary and Great Britain ha.ve been the subject of study by 
such authors as Alfred. Pribram and Fritz Leidner, and the 
~~edi terranean Agreements of 1887 have been trea.ted by vl. N. 
Medlicott. 
This dissertation investigates British public opinion 
in regard to the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the last 
half-century of its existence. Historical research thus 
far has been focused on the official diplomatic relations 
between the Habsburg Empire and Gree.t Britain, whereas 
pertinent opinions of the various articulate sections of the 
British nation have not heretofore been made the subject of 
----- - ------------------------
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historical investigation. This study has been based upon 
the significant periodical material and books published 
from 1866 to 1918 which shaped British ideas concerning 
the Habsburg Monarchy. Considerable attention pas been 
given also, to newspaper comment; the London Times has been 
thoroughly covered, and. other newspa.pers have been 
referred to in key years. No doubt the material could. have 
been broadened by inclusion of more newspaper items, but 
it is q_uestionable whether it would have contributed to the 
value of the dissertation. All late nineteenth century 
British periodicals and books, together with a sufficient 
number of newspapers, are available in this country. The 
course of public opinion has been indicated by using material 
which the average Englishmen read from week to week and month 
to month and which represented the views of leading person-
ages, diplomats, and party politicians, of professional 
writers, newspaper correspondents and commentators, of 
travelers, military men, and other informants. However, 
a great many articles in British periodicals were anonymous 
so it was impossible to place emphasis wholly upon author-
sh ip; instead, stress has been placed upon the appearance 
of the idee in a major news organ which molded public 
opinion, and yet whenever possible an author has ·been 
identified. 
Each chanter permits some insight into the views of 
the British public on a particular aspect of the Habeburg 
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Monarchy, as well as the d.egree of concurrence and conflict 
in opinion, the existence or non-existence of opinion 
clusters according to general ideological or party align-
ments, and the persistence or change of prevalent vie~~oints 
over a period of time. 
An evaluation of the entire subject has been attempted 
in the Summary. The general questions, which naturally 
arise after a full presentation of the rna teria.l, concern 
the over-all trend of BritiSh public opinion regarding the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the degree of awareness in 
Britain of the problems of a multi-national empire in an 
age of increasing nationalism. Was the British public 
we ll informed? Was the formation of prevalent opinions 
based on a quantitatively and. qualitetively adequate su-oply 
of factual knowledge? Did the problems and prospects of 
the British Empire influence the perception and interpreta-
tion of the problems of the Austrian Empire? To what degree 
was public opinion swayed by changes in international power 
politics; by the then current ideas of Social Darwinism; by 
the growing sympathies with the aspirations of small nations 
to self-determination? What alternatives to Austria's 
pe.rtnership with Germany were envisioned? Finally, \'That is 
the evidence of a relationship between public opinion and 
government policy? 
- 1 -
CHAPTER I 
England And The Austro-Prussien ar 
The Austro-Prussian War was not a major conflict in 
dure.tion and ferocity yet it had deep consequences for the 
combata.nts. Austria emerged in a financially chaotic con-
dition with her found.ations shaken, and t he entire Imperi a l 
governmenta l structure was reconstituted on the basis of 
two component parts, Austria and Hungary. The Magyars suc-
cess f ully used military defeat as a means of prying autonomy 
from Vienna, but other ra.cial groups in the Empire v1e r e not 
s o f ortunate in the achievement of their goals. Nonethe-
less, in the afterma t h of the struggle, the most conspicuous 
autocratic features of the government were eliminated.. The 
Se ve n Week s' War affirmed the ' f act that Prussia was a first-
class mill tary pov1er and the nucleus of a f uture empire; 
conversely, it declared without equivocation the deplorable 
military cond ition of the Habsburg state. The struggle did 
not result in territorial changes, but it did upset the 
balance of power. 
I n the crisis which led to t he war and d uring the hos-
tilities Britain regarded the Habsburg nation with mixed 
fee l ings ; Austria's It a lian policy, t he spoliation of Den-
mark (18 63-1864), a s well as preconceived beliefs and some-
-2-
times prejudices had a significant part in the formation 
of public opinion. 
In December, 1865, Lord Augustus Loftus was appointed 
British Ambassador to Berlin. Upon arrival at his post, 
the diplome_t recorded the definite impression that Prussia, 
or more specifically Bismarck, would not forego any oppor-
tunity to take ovBr the Elbe Duchi es in their entirety. 
I found on my arri va.l at Berlin the political 
atmosphere "very loaded." 11 Il sentait la :QQ_ud_re, 11 
as a Frenchman would_ se.y ••.• The impression left on 
my mind after my interview was that Caunt Bismarck 
had determined to make final proposals to Austria 
for a definitive solution of the Elbe Duchies ques-
tion and to force her either into concessions ~r to 
war. 
1 
In March, 1866, the Li bera.l Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Lord Clarendon, wrote to the new Ambassador at Berlin, and 
concurred with the view expressed by Loftus a few months 
earlier: 
Many people think that Prussia will not push 
matters to extremities, and that Austria will, at 
the last moment, yield; but I e.m not of that 
number •••• Austria will face war rather t han the 
humiliation which Prussia seeks to inflict upon 
her; and in adopting that course I think she is 
perfectly right. 
2 
The British leader noted that Prussia could not accuse 
1. Augustus Loftus, Dip'lomatic Reminiscences 1862-
J&12.. (Lond.on: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1894), p. 39. 
2. Ibid., pp. 43-45. 
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Austria of maladministration of the Holstein Duchy, and in-
etructed Loftus to impress upon Bisma_rck that the British 
Government desired Prussia to wait, to negotiate, and to 
arbitrate the case, and he ended his communication with what 
seemed an underlying threat: 
I know not upon what means of resistance Aus-
tria_ ca_n reckon, ••• but I am sure that any griev-
ous injury to her ••• would be a misfortune for the 
rest of Europe ..• the more the question is consid-
erecl the more it seems that Prussia will array 
against her the public opinion of Europe, as an 
aggressive and unreasonable power ••• and it would be 
with deep regret that we should see her regarded 
as a common enemy, a wilful disturber of the peace 
of Europe; and still more if, in the course of 
events, we found ourselves compelled to take part 
against her. 
3 
Again, in March and April, Clarendon indicated his marked 
aversion to Prussia and contempt for the Prussia_n King, and 
stated that Austria had_ risen in public esteem by _her dig-
4 
nity and firmness. He informed the Queen that the Austria.n 
proposal to disarm ahead of Prussia was "generous and gentle-
manlike, 11 but that Berlin hact not responcled in a. simila.r 
5 
spirit. After the attempted assassination of Bismarck, 
Clarendon condemned Bismarck as responsible for the existent 
6 
crisis. However, the Foreign Minister enunciated a policy 
3. Ibid. , p . 47. 
4. Herbert Maxwell, -The Life and Letters of the Fourth 
Earl of Clarendon ( L(mdon :-Edward . Arnold, 1913), II, p. 310. 
5. Ibid., p. 311. 
6. Ibid., p. 323. 
-4-
of neutrality and withheld his support from Austria. The 
Viennese government, through its ambassador at London, 
requested Great Britain to intervene and seek moderation 
from Berlin and Florence; Clarendon replied that should 
Prussia press matters to extremities England would 
"preserve a strict neutrality." On the thirty-first of 
March, he wrote at length to the Queen against British 
participation in any Austro-Prussian dispute, and stated 
that England could not use 11 the language of menace which 
might entail the necessity of action. 11 And he added that 
7 
the Cabinet concurred in the policy of neutrality. 
Lord John Russell, Prime Minister and one of the most 
influential leaders, voiced sentiments that went beyond 
t hose of Clarendon: 
We can't go to war with Austria because she 
defends herself in Venetiai but we can promise 
her, in case she gives up Venetia for twenty or 
thirty millions sterling, to give her moral, 
diplomatic a.nd, if necessary, material aid in 
her quarrel in Sleswig Holstein. This would be 
a course spirited, prudent and honorable. 
Austria is wrong in Italy, right in Germany. 
. 8 
The aforementioned opinion expressed in May was a departure 
from his view in March, when he declined to agree with the 
7. W. E. Mosse, "The Crown and Foreign Policy. 
Queen Victoria and tne Austro-Prussian Conflict," Cambridge 
Historical Review, 10:206, May, 1915. 
B. Maxwell, QQ.cit., p. 312. 
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Queen's suggestion of interference by force against Prussia; 
in the concluding week of March he ha.d written to Victoria 
that it was to the best interest of England to preserve 
neutrality, and the Government 11 ought not alone to give any 
advice or interfere in any way with Prussia while Count 
9 
Bismarck is the Minister of the King. 11 
In late June, the Liberal Government fell on the issue 
of the Reform Bill, and 'in Parliament on July twentieth 
when the outcome of t~e Austro-Prussian conflict was clear, 
Lord Stanley, the Foreign Secretary in the new Government, 
outlined a policy of complete neutrality and uttered no 
condemnation of a Prussian policy. 
Stanley believed there was a unanimity of opinion both 
in Parliament and in the nation as a whole that Britain 
should not allow herself to be dragged into continental hos-
tilities. In regard to the European situation, he stated 
that the Government stood free, unpledged, and uncommitted 
to any policy whatsoever. Concerning the Government's at-
titude toltrard the establishment of a strong, compact North 
German Power, Stanley declared that such a state would not 
injure, menace, or be a deterrent to Britain's interests and, 
10 
in fact, her interests would not be affected at all. In 
reality, British diplomacy did not occupy an important place 
in the Seven Weeks' War. In 1867, a prominent jou~nalist 
9. Masse, loc. cit. 
10. The Hansard, 184:1252-1257. 
Frederic Harrison, wrote: 
The part taken by our politicians in the 
recent war in Germany may be passed unnoticed. 
It was so small and was known to be so unim-
portant, that it was not taken into account by 
the powers of Europe. 
- . 11 
-6-
The position of the Crown was rather interesting. In 
1863 Victoria had been inclined toward Prussia. and in a 
letter to her brother-in-law Duke Ernest, she lvrote: 
All the more would I beg you, as much as lies 
in your power, to prevent a. weakening of Prussia., 
which not only my feeling resists--on account of 
the future of our children--but which would surely 
also be contrary to the interests of Germany; and 
I know that our dear angel Albert always regarded 
a strong Prussia. as a necessity, for which there-
fore it is a sacred duty for me to work. 
12 
However, in March, 1866, the Queen obviously believed that 
Great Britain should enga ge her forces if necessary against 
Prus sia over the Duchies question, for Lord Russell wrote 
to Lord Clarendon, 11 I send you by the Queen 1 s direction a 
memorandum written at her desire. It proposes clearly an 
interference by force against Prussian designs in the 
13 
Duchies. 11 Victoris, 1 s son, the Duke of Cambridge, voiced 
interventionist feelings and criticized the neutra l spirit 
11. Frederic Harrison, 11 Foreign Policy, 11 Questions for 
~Reformed Parliament (London: Macmillan and Co., 18671, 
p. 250. 
12. Sidney Lee, Queen Victoria (London: Smith, Elder & 
Co., 1904), p. 340. 
13. Maxwell, QQ.cit., p. 1 
of the Derby Government. 
The complete overthrow of the Austrians in 
the battle of Sadowa is more and more confirmed; 
and the accounts from all quarters are most pain-
ful. I am afra id Lord Derby and Lord Stanley are 
going to carry the principle of non-intervention 
to .a very far extent. I deplore"tihis more than 
words can say. The position of affirs is fear-
ful to conte mplate and the line taken by England 
is painful in the extreme. It amounts to a total 
abstention from all interest in the affairs of 
Europe. 
14 
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Other opinions of the war reflected the prevalent view of 
Prussia 1 s iniquity. In June, Gathorne-Hardy, later Home 
Secretary in the Derby Ministry, fully supported Austria. 
11 The European war has begun, Prussia having entered both 
15 
Hanover and Saxony. My sympathy is with A us tria. 11 Or, 
the same vie'v expressed by another in a more picturesque man-
ner-- "my sympathy is with Austria and I should like to see the 
16 
Prussians 1 jolly well licked, 1 as we used to say at school." 
A British mill tari st, C. P . Beauchamp Walker who we.s 
a partisan of Prussia and served in the Prussian army during 
the Seven Weeks 1 War, commented on the British attitude 
toward the Empire: "I really cannot understand the enthus-
iasm for Austria ••• how a sober progre s sive English public 
14. George, Duke of Cambridge (Edgar Sheppard, editor, 
London: Longmans-:--rrreen & Co., 1906), I, p. 262. 
15. Gathorne-Hardy (Alfred E. Gathorne-Hardy, editor, 
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910), I, p. 187. 
16. The Hardman Papers (S. 1-1 . Ellis, editor, London: 
Constable & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 147. 
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can have such sympathy for a priest-ridden neglectful govern-
17 
ment like that of Austria ••• " 
During the few mon the prior to the outbreak of war, the 
London Times freely acknowledged that Prussia, under the 
guidance of Bismarck, pressed for a final settlement of the 
Schleswig-Holstein question·, that is, complete control of 
the area by Prussia. However, a corresponding deep sympathy 
with Aus tria was not appa_rent, because she was still r e-
garded as an accomplice with Prussia in the Danish episode 
of 1863-1864. The onus was still too recent to have been 
forgotten, and further the Austrian position in Venetia was 
believed untenable. 
The Economist clearly stated that Austria had peaceful 
intentions and defended the status guo while Prussia aimed 
at transgression, yet this '\'!eekly, in accord with the London 
Times, believed the Empire's false position in Venetia pre-
18 
vented a genuine feeling of compass ion for her. Bell~ 
Life in London, in an editorial, declared tha.t the two rogues 
had ouerreled over their loot. "In this auarrel between 
t hese two po tentates it is impossible to avoid feeling that 
neither of them, in this particular matter, ask for the re-
spect and confidence of any reasonable man • 11 It '\'Tas admitted 
tha.t Austria ¥ras the lesser of two evils for she adhered to 
17. C. P. Beauchamp Walker, Day4 of a Soldier's Life 
(London: Chapman and Ha ll, Ltd., _ 189 ), p. 238. 
18. 11 The Attitude ofAustria, 11 Economist, 24:672, June 9, 
1866. 
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19 
the forms of the German Federal Constitution. The Daily 
News editorially claimed that Prussia was the sole distur-
ber of the European peace and aimed to aggrandize herself at 
20 
the expense of Germany. Austria 1 s sincerity was not doubt-
ed and it was explained that the voice of Germany and public 
opinion of Europe supported her. About a month later, in 
May, 1866, the paper, like most English news organs, ap-
proved Italy 1 s desire for Venetia. but objected to her · acquir-
21 
ing the province through a Pruesian alliance. The Fort-
nightly Review clearly recognized that the war was caused 
by Bismarck. "On the present occasion, however, the world 
has not the slightest doubt as to which of the two parties 
22 
really threatens and desires to attack the other." But 
the monthly did not absolve Austria from all blame and re- · 
23 
ferred to the imperial madness of the House of Habsburg. 
Is it likely •.• that Count Mensdorff will be con-
verted in behalf of his imperial ma.ster to the view 
that retention of Venetia, which Francis Joseph has 
hitherto regarded as a point of honor, is neither 
expedient nor just? 
- 24 
19. Editorial in Bell's Life In London, June 16, 1866; 
elso edi toria.l June 23, 1866~- --
20. Editorial in Dail;y News, March 31, 1866. 
21. Editorial in Dail;y News, May 1, 1866. 
22. "Public Affairs, II Fortnightl;y Review, 4:628, April 
15, 1866. 
23. "Public Affairs, II Fortnightl;y Review, 5:105-118, 
May, 1866. 
24. "Public Affairs, II :fortnight l;y Review, 5:229-240, 
June, 1866. 
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The Record, an organ of Evangelical Anglicanism, declared 
that the war was just retribution to Austria and Prussia 
25 
for their spoliation of Denmark. Here again resentment 
is shown against Austria for her action in 1864in the 
Duchies question. In the diary of Henry Greville, an habitue 
of court circles, the same feeling is found: 
The quarrel between A.u,stria and Prussia over 
their plunder is growing very serious and rumors 
of imminent war are rife •.•• If it did not en-
a_anger the general peece of the world, one should 
be glad to see such e. thieves' quarrel well fought 
out. 
26 
At the time of the Seven Weeks' War various prominent news 
organs showed open hostility to Prussia. In the Edinburgh 
Review it was pointed out that moral guilt rested upon Prus-
sia and she alone was responsible for the war as she had 
taken the provocative steps to instigate it. It was made 
clear that Austria 1 s error was not in 1866, but in 1863 
when she joined Prussia in action a gainst Denmark. In the 
crisis of 1866 Austria was ,commended because she kept her 
temper, spoke with candor and dignity, and maintained her 
justifiable federal position. There was concern lest Prus-
sian despotism would control all of Germany. 11 Such a state 
would immolate at the feet of a Prussian Corporal the noblest 
25. Editorial in the Record, June 6, 1866. 
26. Leaves From the Diary of Henry Greville (Alice 
Countess of Strafford:-editor, London: Smith, Elder & Co., 
1905), 4th Series, p. 292. 
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elements of German society and reduce Germany to a bad copy 
27 
of the French Empire. 11 A similar view was expressed in 
28 
John Bull. 
'I'he Saturday Review believed that the moral difference 
between the two countries was slight, one strove against 
Prussian aggrandizement, the other for it, but the real aim 
was for national predominance and the immediate weapon 
whether it was liberation of Poland, independence of Hols-
tein, or the like, did not change the basic morals of the 
29 
dispute. The Suectator decided that Austria's motives 
were tinged with selfishness, for it \"las thought that she 
aimed to defeat Italy for the sake of prestige and then give 
up Venetia which was a sore spot. But after defeating Prus-
sia she would demand a portion of territory as compensation, 
30 
probably Silesia. The Pall Mall Gazette in an editorial 
expressed itself on the Austrian-Prussian imbroglio as fol-
lows: 
We should say that the only specific object of 
Austria in this war is to punish Prussia by wrench-
ing a province from her ••.• Austria takes up the 
cause of the Diet and the princelings not because 
27. "Interne.tional Policy, 11 Edinburgh Review, 124:275-
298, July, 1866. 
28. 11 The Alarms of \var, 11 John Bull, 46:304, May 5, 1866; 
also, 11 'rhe Alarms of 'Yiar, 11 John Bull, 46:404, June 16, 1866. 
29. Pall Mall Gazette, June 9, 1866. 
30. Lo c • cit • 
she serio usly intend.s to prolong the Diet and/or 
reestablish all the princelings. She needs a 
good legal "case" for striking hard at Prussia 
and she has got it. 
31 
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But the Telegraph wrote with co mpassion about Francis Joseph, 
a.nd appeared deeply concerned about the Austrian Empire which 
had been endangered by the antagonism and ambition of the 
Prussian statesman, Bismarck. The Morning Post indicted 
Count Bismarck as the sole author of the war and attributed 
32 
the casus belli to his insatiable desire for conquest. 
Also, the Star insisted that the war had been forced upon 
Austria by Prussia and prophetically noted that the Empire 1 s 
racial diversity would aid Prussia and prove as beneficial 
as her needle-gun, her full e~chequer, and Italian assist-
33 
ance. Apparently in July, Robert Lol.;e, a prominent poll-
tician, fully upheld Austria: 
On Sunday I met Lowe at Phinn 1 s, and I was sur-
prised at his decided talk against the Tories, as 
such, but he is going fast towards them in other 
points besides reform; e.g., he is altogether against 
Italy and for Austria. · 
34 
Therefore, in perusing the selections of printed material 
31. Editorial in Pall Mall Gazette, June 21, 1866. 
32. Editorial in Public Opinion, 9:635, June 16, 1866. 
33. Pall Mall Gazette, June 18, 1866. 
34. Spencer Childers, The Life and Corresoondence of 
RightHon. Hugh .Q.. E. Childers 1827-1896 (London: John :t-iUJ·"'ray, 
1901), I, p . 138. 
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t ha t appeared. just prior to the 1-,rar and actually during ho s-
tilities , it i s obvi ou s that t here were two general trends 
of t .b.ought--either outri ght sympat hy with the Ha.bsburg Emp-
ire, or a reluctance to support t h e state because of its 
previou s policy to "l'mrd the Duch ies. Englishmen who held 
the s econd view usua.lly felt tha t Austria was on the same 
mo ral level as Prussia, and a surprisingly large numbe r held 
such an opinion. Moreover, ho stility t oward Austria ante-
dated 1863, for in 1859 most Englishmen '\'Tere in ag reement 
with John Ruskin who h ad d.ecided that control of Italy by 
the Au s trians might h a ve been advantageous in the pa st, but 
its usefulne s s had ended; "t~eir power was like bituminous 
cerecloth wrapp ing her corpse-- it saved her from the rotten-
nes s of revolution; but it must be nnwound, if the time has 
35 
come for her resurrection." And the depth of the feeling 
vlaS aga.in shown in 1861. J. A. Roebuck Is suggestion that the 
British Government should prevent t he expulsion of Aus tria 
fro m Venetia caused remonstrations not only from his politi-
ca.l fo e·s but also from his friend s and canst i tuen ts; 11 he r an 
coun ter to national opinion, and scandalized many of his most 
36 
loya l actmirers." 
Bri t ain tended to view Austria and Prussia. as reaction-
a ry Powers. The internal organizations of both countries 
35. Letter to the Scotsman, July 20, 1859. 
36 Life and Letters of John Arthur Roebuck, With Chaoter~ of Autobiography TRabert Eadon Leader, editor, 
London: Edward Arnold, 1897), pp. 291-293. 
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veered toward absolutism; also, Austria b,y interference in 
Italian affairs, and Prussia by aggressive designs on an 
unwilling Schleswig-Holstein, had used absolutistic prin~ 
ciples in their foreign policies. The current interest 
in humanitarianism and the growing reform movement of the 
sixties caused Englishmen to criticize countries like 
Austria and Prussia which had not been affected by these 
ideas to the same extent. Perhaps this partly explains 
the absence of an overwhelming interventionist feeling. 
Many public figures were unmoved by events on the continent 
and contended that two autocratic governments had quarreled 
over land acquisitions and prestige, but the sympathy of 
the public was stirred by the plight of the German and 
Austrian people, the victims of warlike leaders. British 
enthusiasm for foreign wars found its greatest outpouring 
in the struggles of those who reacted against absolutism, 
as in Poland, Italy, Greece, and Ba.lkan areas under Turkish 
suzerainty. Romanticism eagerly sought in litera~ fields 
also found favor on the political stage. The Austro-
Prussian War was not the type of conflict to arouse intense 
feeling. Unquestionably public opinion determined the 
British Government's policy of neutrality. No British 
ministry would have dared to enter the Seven Weeks' War; 
it has been clearly shown that the nation was opposed to 
intervention and in fact was not united in sympathy toward 
Austria. 
In 1866, Count Bernstorff was Prussian Ambassador to the 
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Cour t of Sa int James's, and the letters and dispatches of 
h is f ami ly recorded very forcibly the hostility of British 
p oli t e society to Prussia and yet a remarkable readiness to 
a ba ndon the antagonism when she triumphed. Victory was the 
balm t hat soothed moral indignation. In April, 1866, Count-
es s Bernst6fff wrote to her son, "I hope that justice will 
b e done to us later on. Everything that is wrong is ascribed 
37 
to us n ow." She reported that Britain was convinced Prus-
c ia wa.nted war and Austria did not, and that BiEmarck 1 s dis-
mi ssal we.s earnectly desired for he was believed clever and 
able to goed Austria into v.rs.r. A few clays later she wrote 
a gain, 11 you cannot imagine how unpleasant our p osition i s . 11 
A month later sh e wrote about a dinner at Lord Ch elmsford's 
at wh ich the atmosphere vlas g loomy and. a growl from the Duke 
ot: Ca mbridg e WEt S heard abo u t Prussia. Countess Bernstorff 
de s cri bed Lord Derby as g reatly irritated for he avoided all 
political subjects. "We may say what v.;-e like about Bismarck; 
we s hall nev er con vert p eople here. You know, indeed, what 
38 
the Eng lish are, and how t h ey can hate, as ~rell as love. 11 
In July the entire scene took on a new appea rance as the ex-
tent of Pru ssia 1 s victory was recognized. Th e Bernstorff 
fa mily indicated tha t the Times had come out definitely for 
37. Ka rl Ringhoffer, The Bernstorff Papers (translated 
by Hrs. C. E. Barrett-Lenne.rd and H. W. Hopper, London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1908), II, p. 241. 
38 . Ioid., p . 242. 
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Prussia and public hostility rapidly disappeared. 11 Society 
be gins to think our success fine, but they do not congratu-
la t e us much, only in secret on account of the Court, which 
' 39 
is in favor of Austria. 11 In 1870 G18_dstone admitted that 
in Britain, prior to the Seven Weeks' War, the Prussian 
cour se had been condemned, but after the close of the war 
40 
opinion had greatly changed. 
The ideas of Sir Robert Marier, a British diplomatic 
representative at Vienna, had a definite place in the over-
all uicture. If ostensible facts had been the sole criteria 
for judgment, t he diplomat ad mitted that Austria's stand was 
completely justifiable. On the one hand, a profligate Govern-
ment aimed at territorial aggrandizement, crushed liberty, 
and exalted the prestige of an aristocratic reactionary clique; 
on the other hand, a Government turned from past errors, arose 
in defense of law and justice, and was willing to spend men 
and money which it did not possess in order to insure that 
might did not triumph over right. But on closer insn ection, 
Marier observed that the situa.tion reversed · itself beca.use a 
Habsburg victory would perpetuate the disunity of Germany. 
Austria h ad spent v!ealth and energy in a.n attempt to estab-
lish an unnatural dominion over the area from Brindisi to the 
Elbe; if she were nrevented from continuing the useless at-
39. Ibid., p. 244. 
40. · Outidanos, 11 Article IX, 11 Edinburgh Review, 132:559 
October, 1870. 
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tempt, liberal forces within the state woula. be able to ac-
tivate themselves. In short, he believed Austria should 
endeavor to stabilize conditions and mold her country into 
a great eastern Empire, and allow Prussia to perform a 
41 
similar f unction in Germany. 
The defeat of Austria had come as a great shock to the 
public of England. Confidence in the military prowess of 
Austria had remained strong even after Solferino. Matthew 
Arnold in 1859 had firmly asserted that the Army of Austria 
was vastly sup erior to · :the Prus sian a.rmed forces. 
Prussia is a great power only in name .••• 
Prussia, with neither territory nor population 
enough for her support as a great military power, 
can only have a large efficient army at the ex-
pense of having her finances in ruin. She sen-
sibly chooses to have her finances in prosperity. 
But her army, therefore, is a shadow. In her 
regular forces she has not a man who has served 
three years. The majority of her landwehr are 
respectable married citizens, fathers of families. 
To require such troops to repel a charge of Zouaves 
would be as reasonable as td make this demand of 
the Marylebone Vestry. French military men know 
this perfectly well. They speak with great respect 
of the Austrian army. • c I est ~ belle armee I I . 
they say of the Austrian army, 1mais elle est mal-
heureuse1; of the Prussian army they say 1CT'est 
une garde nationale.' 
- 42 
41. Rosslyn Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of the ~ight 
Honorable Sir Robert Marier (London: E. Arnold, 1911 , II, 
pp. 65-71. Sir Robert Y~rier, a career diplomat; from 
1853 to 1876 his appointments were in German c01mtries; 
British Ambassador to Saint Petersburg, 1884-1893. 
42. Robert H. Murray, Studies in the English Social 
and Political Thinkers of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: 
w:-Heffer & Sons, Ltd.,-r929T, II, pp. 166-167. · 
Justin McCarthy claimed that many English public school-
teachers had greatly underrated Prussian military power. 
Not many days before Sadowa, a leading London 
newspaper had a descri~ tion, half pitiful, half 
contemptuous, of the unfortunate shop-boys and 
young mechanics of whom t he Prussian army was 
understood to be composed, being hurried and driven 
along to the front to make food. foT· powder for the 
well-trained legions of Austria under t he command 
of the irresistible Benedek. 
43 
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Also, the Fortnightly Review was skeptical of the Prus s ian 
military system. 
Experience ha s shown that a Prussian Landwehr 
man who comes fresh from the counter or the d.esk 
very soon sinks under the lo ad of h is knapsack 
and musket when . he is on the march, while the 
regular and thoroughly drilled soldier marches 
on without difficulty. 
44 
Apparently, well - informed people had decided that standing 
armies were more efficient and capable than the Prussian 
short- service army. 
The Duke of Argyll observed that in England prior to 
t h e war t h e r e. had been confidence in Austr~a 1 s strength. 
11 There t he 1military authorities• were as a rule on the s ide 
of Austria, both in politics and in professional forecast for 
45 
the future. 11 The London Times, during the cris is that pre-
43. Justin McCarthy, History of Our 'rimes (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, publishe.rs, l"S'S"O),II, pp. 348-349. 
44. "Public Affairs, 11 Fortnightly Review, 5:232, June, 
1866. 
45. Duke of Argyll, Pas sages from the Past (London: 
Hutchinson and Company, 1907), I, p:-23s:-
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ceded the war, reported that in the event of a conflict it 
was not at all predictable who would be the victor, if any, 
for the combatants were considered equally matched. Never-
theless, the paper wisely observed that Austria had the 
greatest of reasons for preserving peace even if it meant 
sacrifices, for war would be ruinous and could very po s sibly 
bring about chaos and eventual dismemberment by reason of 
46 
debts, financial difficulties, and internal racial tur toil. 
The Daily News correspondent at Frankfort claimed that 
Prussia 1 s financial nosition was not stronger than Vienna's 
and her army was no match for Habsburg armed forces suppor-
47 
ted by the Diet. After the decisive battle in Bohemia, the 
paper reminded its readers that prior to the War Britain had 
perfect confidence in Austrian military strength and in the 
ability of Marshal Benedek. 
A fortnight ago public confidence in the mas-
terly generalship of Marshal Benedek and the high 
wrought efficiency of his countless battalions had 
the intensity as well as the ignorance of a supe~ 
stition. There was no undertaking to which they 
were not eQual. 
- 48 
In ~ate May, 1866, the Record alleged that Austria had sub-
stantial power and well-equipped armies, therefore if Prussia 
and Italy chose to oppose her unaided they would be defeated 
49 
by the Imperial armies under Benedek. The same idea was 
46. Articles in Lond.on Times, May 3, 1866 and May 11, 1866. 
47. News dispatch in Daily News, March 2, 1866. 
48. Editorial in Daily News, July 10, 1866. 
49. Editorial in the Record, May ·25, 1866. 
reiterated a few days later. 
We do not envy, accordingly the position of 
the Power which is permanently responsible for 
the present commotion in Europe, and which, in 
the probable event of an outbreak of hostilities, 
is pretty certain to be the first to suffer from 
the effects of her own folly and wickedness. 
50 
In the midst of the war in late June, the Pall Mall 
Gazette examined the military forces of both combatants 
and was unable to adjudge either as certain of victory; 
-20-
both had attributes which aided them. In the past Austria 
ha d s eemed able to subsist without means of life, there 
was no destroying her; "Frederick the Great used to say that 
the rest of the world he.d to scramble for divine favors, but 
51 
A us tria had. a Providence to herself. 11 About a week later 
the same paper declared thet the conflict apparently would 
be lon~ because of the dispersed armieo, the cautious cam-
uaign conducted by Austria and her allies, and the eouality 
52 
of streng th. The belief by military men in an Austrian 
victory wa.s alluded to in Colburn's United Service Magazine, 
53 
a periodical reflecting the viewe of army circles. In 
early July 1866, Bell's Life in London admitted, 11 a month 
50. Editorial in the Record, June 4, 1866. 
51. Pall Mall Gazette, June 26, 1866. 
52. Ibid., July 4, 1866. 
53. "The Seven Weeks' War," Colburn's United Service 
Magazine, p. 96, January, 1868. 
\ 
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ago everyone believed that Austria must conquer--that Prus-
54 
sia must submit •••• " At the same time the Examiner re-
ported that prior to the war the Austrians had an over-
weening confidence in their armies and generals, yet their 
self-assurance did not exceed British faith in Austria 1 s 
military ability. The weekly pointed out that responsible 
people had been convinced that the Imperial army was one of 
the finest in the world and its generals most capable. When 
the Prussians overran Saxony a.nd Hanover, it was thought the 
inaction of Benedek was but a profound piece of strategy and 
55 
that he '"'as luring the enemy to destruction. In December, 
1866, the London Times freely admitted that Benedek had been 
thought more capable than any Prussian commander and that the 
quality and fervor of Prussian troops had been much under-
56 
rated. The Morning Star stated, 11 a week ago every second 
Englishman one met insisted that it would cost Austria no 
57 
trouble to crush Italy and Prussia together." 
During the war there was general British confidence in 
the military strength of the Au strian Empire, but Sir Robert 
}.1orier who Was on the scene, wrot e to Lady Salisbury of actual 
54. Editorial in Bell's Life in London, July 7, 1866. 
55. "The War Begun and Perhaps Ended," Examiner, pp. 
417- 418, July 7, 1866. 
56. Editorial in London Times, December 31, 1866. 
57. Editorial in Mornin~ Star, July 7, 1866. 
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conditions at Vienna. He stressed the hope~ese condition 
into which the Empire had fallen, the endless red tape, in-
efficiency, and ever-present bureaucracy. M·orier related 
that even in war times silk fuses for shells were held up by 
Austrian official<'lom, ana the same situation was applicable 
to the manufacture of coastal defense guns. These were men-
58 
tioned ·as representative cases for which he could vouch. 
Two observations in regard. to the Austrian army ap-
pea.red repeatedly in British views-- complete confio.ence in 
the ability and leadership of Marshal Benedek, secondly, the 
tra inin~.and discipline of the Habsburg army. Inasmuch as 
the Prussie.n people did not desire ·war, it was thought that 
thei r s.rmy would lack spirit. Moreover, the importElnce of 
new tactics and. weapons was overlooked even by responsible 
Bri t i sh mili t ery authorities. Perhap s the high opinion of 
Austria 1 s mill ta.ry effectiveness can be explained.by the 1'act 
tha.t her true position had been concealed by the reflected 
glory of her past; it was o.if'f'icul t to believe that she was 
no long er the Habsburg Empire of two centuries earlier. Also, 
British unal.,rareness of Prussian mill tary might tends to sub-
ctantie.te the view so often stated, that the general public 
a.nd even so-called experts evelua.te and judg e by past stand-
ard s . Frequently there is reluctance to a.pprove new equip-
ment, innovations, and the like, until they have been tested. 
---- ------ ----
58. Wemyss, op.cit., II, p. 72. 
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Of course, the mill tary defea.t of Austria greatly im-
p res sed Englishmen and a reaction appeared in intellectual 
and political circles as well as in the ~ populi. As 
rep r e sentative of the latter, a pseudo-comic do ggerel in 
Punch contained the prevailing idea that Prussia and Aus-
tria were co-criminals; it also showed British interest in 
the need.le-gun as a. new decisive weapon of the future. 
Lo, when the thieves, in deadly fra.y, 
Strove for possession of the prey, 
What execution then was done 
Upon Austria by Prussia with the needle-gun! 
Oh, the. t unerring needle-gun! 
Trwt death-dispensing needle-gun~ 
It does knock over men like fun. 
What a formidable ·weapon is t he needle-gun! 
59 
Seemingly, the importance of the needle-gun became perma-
nently imprinted upon British minds; in 1876 John Rusk in 
as serted, 11 Koniggratz was only decisiv e by sudden e.nd ap-
. 60 
palling demonstration of the power of a new weapon." 
In September, 1866, to the dispassionate observer the 
Habsburg state seemed helpless and confused. 
Austria is literally like a water-logged ship 
lying on the bellows from the effects of a tre-
mendous sea, t h e helm knocked away, masts over-
board, and a fire in the hold ••. her crew and pa s-
sen~ers makin~ t he air ring with discordant ex-
clamations, un t il t h e individual who rises nearest 
to a practicalsuggestion for keeping afloat is some 
59 . 11 The Needle-gun," Punch, 51:31, July 21, 1866. 
60. Letter to Fraser's Magazine, July, 1876. 
old lady who dashes the contents of a teacup 
over the flames, and thinks with her petticoat 
to furnish sails to a jury mast, for which she 
innocently offers the cane of an umbrella. 
61 
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Defeat of Austria at Sadowa caused the British public 
to believe that her military machine had been completely dis-
organized and that, Prussia could have seized Vienna very 
easily and des~royed the Austrian army. A. J. P. 'I'aylor, how-
ever, disagrees with the idea that the Imperial army had be-
come ineffectual after Sedowa and maintains that it still re-
tained substantial powers of resi8tance. Further, he notes 
that the incompetent Benedek had been replaced by Archduke 
Albrecht, a capable general, with the result that the Empire 
62 
challenged Prussia to a long war. 
' In review, although influential British people were pro-
Austrian and regarded Prussia as the aggressor in the con- · 
flict, seemingly, official circles and the general public 
were unv.rilling to intervene. The smashing success of Prus-
sian armies in a lig~tning-like war reconciled Britain to 
Prussian victory and. its future consequences. · A concise 
63 
statement of Kinglake seems an appropriate keynote of the 
new trend in public opinion: 11 I was for Austria because I 
61. "The Future of Austria, 11 Spectator, 39?:989, 
September 8, 1866. 
62. A. J. P. Taylor, Tbe Habsburg Monarchy (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 126. 
63: Alexander Kinglake, author of The Invasion of the 
Crimea. 
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thought she could. make Germany; now I see she canrt, I go 
64 
over to Prussia." And an American periodical commented 
upon the shift in British sentiment-- 11 there is nol-l not a 
discordant voice ln the concert which salutes the Prussian 
policy • 11 It wae observed that the Standard, a Tory organ 
which had been completely pro-Austrian, reversed its edi-
torial policy and evaluated Prussia in the same manner as 
did Gladstone; English Conservatism had become like another 
voice of English Liberalism. It was recognized that Bri-
tain sharply criticized the manner in which Bismarck in-
stige.ted the war, "but cloes not injustice become justice 
65 
when it serves the intere·sts of Europe? 11 
A study of the London Review from March to July, 1866, 
reveals amazing and rapid changes in sentiment; e. large 
percentage of public opinion also followed an irregular and. 
veering course. In March, 1866, the weekly reported that the 
quarrel .between Austria and Prussia was 
••• the natural and just issue of the gross and 
foul injustice and treachery to which both were 
but two years ago parties, 1.-: e are bound to di a-
criminate in the blame •.. Austria has sinned through 
weakness, Prussia through covetousness. 
66 
64. Montstuart E. Grant Duff, Notes From~ Diary J:.lli-
1872 (London: John Murray, 1897), II, pp. 10-11. 
65 • . "French and English Opinions on the Effects of the 
German War, 11 Nation, 3:213, September, 1866. 
66. "Austria and Prussia, 11 Lopdon Review, 12:325-326, 
March 24, 1866. 
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And no real sympathy w:as shown to Austria ·durin~ April or 
May, for her false position in Venetia seemed to counter-
act her justifiable stand in Germany. However, in the first 
stages of the war Austria won minor victories in Italy, and 
the Review apparently satisfied with the turn of events, en-
67 
thusiastically supported Vienna. But after Sadowa the 
weekly made another departure: 
But now that the German nation has become or 
is fast becoming a reality, while the power on 
which we have hitherto relied as a counterpoise 
to France has broken down, it becomes us to recog-
nize ana. ino.eed to welcome the new order of things. . 
. 68 . 
And the journalistic world of Britain seemed in com-
plete accorCl.: The Economist which was not at all well-dis-
posed toward Prussia in the Spring of 1866, revised its 
opinion and decided that the North Germans, that is, the 
Pru ssia.ns, were educatea., civilized, ' filled with patriotism, 
and without any proclivities to plunder, while the Austrian 
state was semi-civilized, barbaric~ and comparable to a 
69 
province in India. A],so, in the a.ftermath of Auatrian 
defeat, the Daily News judged that consolidation of North 
Germany by Prussia would create a natural balance of power 
in Europe and it would guarantee European peace for it satis-
67. "The Austrian Victories," London Review, 12:717-
718, June 30, 1866. · 
68. "Reconstituted Germany, 11 London Review, 13:57-58, 
July, 1866. 
69. "The Fate of the Austrian Empire, 11 Economist, 24: 
881, July 28, 1866. 
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fied the Germans. The Star Gaid that Austria had received 
just punishment for past misdeeds in Germany, and that all 
liberal Englishmen should approve her exclusion from Germany 
rather than deprecate it. The means and the agents might be 
deplored but the outcome was inevitable. The paper thought 
tha t interference for reestablishment of Austria in Germany 
would place British support on the wrong side, for Russian 
and Turkish crimes against freedom paled. in comparison with 
71 
Austria 1 s transgressions. A parallel was drawn between 
the struggle of 1866 and the conflict that ended in the 
United States the previous year: During the American Civil 
War, Englishmen had viewed the Southern gentleman as a much 
more attractive figure than the Yankee trad.er, and in the 
Seven Weeks' War Britain had been similarly impressed by the 
polished manners and courtesy of the Austrians. Seemingly, 
72 
personal feelings had affected political judgments. The 
Advertiser believed that not a person outside of Austria's 
borders felt any sympathy for her, and at the end of July 
the Telegraph; still condemned Bismar·ck but freely confessed 
that the Prussian solctiers might well be the unconscious 
bearers of new li~ht and life. Bell 1 s Life in London did not 
-..:;;....;;;....;;--= - - =-=-== 
retract earlier criticisms of the Prussian King and Bismarck, 
but rejoiced at the over-all result; Prussia was basically 
70. Editorial in Daily News, July 10, 1866. 
71. Editorial in Morning Star, July 12, 1866. 
72. Ibid., July 18, 1866. 
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a constitutional state and it was simply a matter of time 
before the government would be forced to recognize the 
73 
fact. When the defeat of Austria became apparent the 
Times stated that it would be no surprise if Bismarck were 
elevated to the position of a demigod not only by the Prus-, 
sians but a.lso by all patriotic Germans. 11 What Piedmont 
we.s to Italy, Prussia, and Prussia alone, can te to Germany. 11 
After the war, in Colburn's United Service Magazine, an as-
sertion was mad.e that the increase of Prussian military 
power was advantap:eous to Britain as it curbed the aggres-
sive <'l.esigns of France, and the Government at London was 
advised to encourage Prussia to build a large navy that 
74 
could be allied to Britain's. The Examiner maintained that 
the hope for a regenerated Germany depended upon the Prus-
sie.ns who had proven their ability and spirit for leader-
75 -
ship. The 1furning Post declared that Prussia had the 
capa.c i ty to lead Germany and therefore her victory could 
prove a boon to Europe, sincQ the Prussians were inclined 
toward liberalism and their state was better ruled than 
76 
Auetria. The Morning Herald, in early 1867, reflected 
upon the military struggle of the previous year and stated 
73. Editorial in Bell's Life in London, August 18, 1866. 
74. 11 Foreign Summary, 11 Col burn 1 s United Service Magazine, 
p. 248, October, 1866. 
7 5. 11 Hohenzo1lern and Habsburg, 11 Examiner, pp. 433-434, 
July 14, 1866. 
76. Editoria.l in Morning Post, July 25, 1866. 
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that both the Pruseian population and the army had been rno-
tivated only by the highest and holiest objectives, the good 
of Germany and the suprerna.cy of Prussia. The paper decle.red 
that the leaders at Berlin could be charged with over-ambi-
tion, but the people were entitled to the laurels that they 
ha.d gained. In accounts of the Trojan and Greek Wars, the 
individual bravery of the combatants had been emphasized 
and the god.s who had encouraged the conflict were utterly 
disregarded. "People and army have done well, and richly 
77 
earned the coronet of golden leaves. 11 
And Algern·on Charles Swinburne who was causing a stir 
in Victorian literary circles, in 11 A Song of Italy" poe-
tically expressed English enthusiasm for Italian freedom 
. . 
and English distaste for Austrian interference in the 
Southern Peninsula. 
Strange travail and strong pains 
Our mother, hast thou borne these many years 
While thy pure blood ann tears 
Mixed with the Tyrrhene and the Adrian Sea; 
Light things l'rere se.id of thee, 
As of one buried deep among the dead; 
Yes, she hath been, they eaid, 
She was when time was younger, and is not 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
So men said sadly, mocking; so the slave, 
Whose life was his soul's grave: 
So, pale or red with change of fast or feast 
The sanguine-sandalled priest 
So the Austrian, when his fortune came to flood 
And. the warm wave wae blood; 
77. Editorial in Morning Herald, January 8, 1867. 
With wings that widened and with beak that smote, 
So shrieked through either throat 
From the hot horror of its northern nest 
That double-headed pest; 
78 
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In the summer of 1866, Gladstone publicly expressed his 
ideas concerning continental difficulties. Germany had been 
unable to assume her rightful place on the continent because 
two Powers had struggled for supremacy, and so he thought 
it would be most beneficial if one of them wi~lded complete 
control. The Liberal leader gave his tacit approval to 
Prussian prepond.era.nce in Germany, and to Austria which had 
been expelled from the region he offered a consoling argu-
ment, i.e., her internal strength would be enhanced by at-
tention to domestic affairs and abandonment of a fatuous 
policy in Germany and Italy. He also spoke highly of the 
ministry in Vienna as a new force for enlightenment. "Is 
there anything to prevent her con'~;inuing to be-~what she so 
long has been, and which I hope she will always remain--one 
79 
of the Great Powers of Europe?" 
In July, 1866, Goldwin Smith wrote to the Daily News 
that Austria was backward in civilization, had. intrud.ed 
into Germany, and had hindered the area from its natural 
development. He admitted that Bismarck had been unscrupu-
lous and insolent, but in opi te of all, Prussia was the 
78. Algernon Charles Swinburne, 11 A Song of Italy 11 
Songs of Two Nations (Second edition; London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1893), pp. 14-15. · 
79. The Hansard, 184:1244-1252. 
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Piedmont of Germany. This scholar felt that Prussia was 
behind Britain in constitutional freedom but possessed the 
11 Teutonic character 11 that had already produced freedom of 
thought, and in the end would. produce political freedom. 
He deprecated Tory congeniality to the torpid despotism of 
Austria and declared Liberal sympathy for Prussia. 11 The 
80 
cause of Germany and Italy is ours-- 11 
In the Fall of 1866 Leslie Stephen, the prominent 
journalist and author, wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes a 
stinging indictment of the Austrian Empire: 
1-'Iy general result, however, is expressible 
simply viz., that if there 1 s a rotten, cumbrous, 
effete and utterly useless and tyrannical insti-
tution on God 1 s earth, it is this same Austrian 
Empire. You used to talk great nonsense sometimes 
about the needle-gun; but this I w~ll admit, that 
to Ray that the need.le-gun was the cause of the 
Austrian defeat is lilce saying that Americans are 
a degraded race because t hey chew tobacco univer..:. 
eally; i.e., it is mentioning only one out of in-
numerable causes. The a.dministration was rotten, 
and the genera.ls were be.c1, and the officers bad, 
and the whole people discontented. If the war had 
la.sted another month, the whole Empire would have 
collansed. · 
. 81 
The Pall Mall Gazette summed up well its views and t h e 
views of many in the following observation: 11 Englishmen in 
F!:enera.l, have a mild liking for Austria, 11 for she had been 
England's ally and always had behaved in a dignified and 
80. Letter to Daily New~, July 17, 1866. 
81. Frederic William Maitland, The Life and Letters of 
Leslie Stephen (Lond.on: Duckworth & Co., 1906),p:-TI3z.- -
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gentlems.nlike manner, and while Engls.nd symps.thized with 
Hungary and Italy still she supported Austria in the · dis-
put~ with Prussia. 
And now we are beginning to like Prussia for 
her success. Austria appears to us somewhat as 
s.n impostor who obts.ined our awe under false 
pretences •••• And so we are coming to think how 
good it is that there should be a military State 
on the eastern frontier of France able to keep 
even that mighty power in awe. 
82 
The Fortnightly Review also asserted that it was to England's 
interest to have in Europe e. "strong, united, free-trading 
83 
Protestant Germany." The let t ers of Charles James Lever, 
a British Consul in Italy who was also a well known litere_ry 
figure, reveal a me_rked shift of sentiment. In late June he 
recorded tha.t Austria l-TOUld be wise to seize Silesia and 
make peace with Ite.ly by ceding Venice. At the news of 
Prussia's victory at Saaowa he stated: 
· I hope i t• s not true. 
boastful audacity , coarse 
self-sufficiency ·;· are the 
they have a success, will 
These Prussians, in their 
pretension, and vulgar 
Yankees of Europe, and if 
be unendurable. 
Yet three weeks later an entirely different view we_s pre-
sen ted: 
Now, Prussia. wa.s so manife etly in the wrong at 
first, and had contrived to be so unpopular with us 
besides, ana. Bismarck's views were so palpably false 
82. Pall Mall Gazey~~~ July 17, 1866. 
83. 11 Public Affe.irs, 11 Fortnightly Review, 6:250, Septem-
ber , 1866. 
and tricky , he could have no sympathy with us at 
all --and yet success (that dear idol of English-
men) has done fully as much as the best principles 
s_nd the purest ambit ion could, and we are rapidly 
becoming Prussian •... Beer-drinking, stolidity, and 
the needle-gun will do for the peace of Europe 
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more than Downing St. and. the homilies of the whole 
Russell femily. 
. 84 
The Duke of Argyll wrote to Lord John Russell in the late 
summer: 
I suppose you are well pleased with the results 
of the lete continental revolution. For you had 
an immoral le~ming toward_ Prussia long ago, it ha. s 
become also the object of general worship. 
- . 85 
Seemingly, in confirmation of Argyll's observation, Charles 
Kingsley wrote in November, 1866: 
My dear Max, what great things have happened for 
Germany, and what greet men your Prussians have 
shown themselves. Huch as I was wroth with them 
about Schleswig-Holstein, I can only see in this 
last campaign a greet necessary move for the physi-
ca.l safety of every North Germa.n household, and the . 
honour of every North German woman. To allow the 
possibility of a second 1807-1812 to remain, when it 
could. be averted by any amount of fighting, were sin 
and shame, and had I been a Prussie.n I would have 
gone down to Sadowa as a sacred duty to wife and 
child and fetherland. 
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84. Edmund Downey, Che.rles Lever: His Life in His 
Letters (London: William Bl eckwood and Sons~ObY,I'I, 
pp. 160-169. 
85. 'I'he Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell 
1840-1878~dited by G. P. Gooch, Lond.on: Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1925), II, p. 358. 
86. Charles KinWsley: Hie Letters and ~emoirs of His 
Life ( ed_i ted. by his ife, Seventh ed.i tion, London: He-nry 
s. King & Co., 1877), II, p. 238. Charles Kingsley [cont.] 
-34-
Edward Dicey who ha.d toured. Germany, wrote a volume 
on the ~r:ar and interestingly attributed Prussia 1 s success 
to the splendid physique of her sold.iery and their intensely 
religious spirit. He referred to the Prussians as "steady, 
orderly, God-fearing men," and stated that the success of 
Prussia and her future expansion would increase the intel-
87 
lectual vigor of Europe. A leading periodical commended 
Britain's change of sentiment as evidence of political 
acumen and maturity. 
It is gratifying to see that in this important 
juncture the political intelligence is stronger 
than her feeling, and than the sympathies •.• toward 
Austria at- the beginning of the war. 
88 
The following fel'l words of Richard Congreve may be used to 
summa.rize the mood of the British public in the autumn of 
89 
18 66: 11 \lle clapped ha.ncts over Sado'\'Ta--. 11 
Rapid reconciliation to Prussian success was natural 
in governing circles but it was also sanctioned by journal-
ists and by news organs. Educated Englishmen · and also the 
[ftn. 86 cont.J (1819-1875), prominent author, Professor of 
Modern History at Cambrictge (1859), Chaplain to the Queen 
(1860), and Canon of Westminster (1873)~ 
87. Edward Dicey, Th~ Battlefields of 1866 ( Lond.on: 
Tineely Brothers, 1867), p. 89. 
88. 11 Public Affairs, 11 loc. cit. 
89. Richard. Congreve, "Papers on Fre.nco-German War of 
1870-1871," Essays, Political, Social and Religious (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1874J, p. 217-.--
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Government were aware that recognition of continental reali-
ties was paramount for the nation and necessitated readjust-
ment of sentiment to realism. The spirit of Realpolitik 
dominated English public opinion. Beyond that, however, it 
is surprising that idees commonly associated with Social 
De.rwinism were part of the intellectual reservoir of Brit-
ish journalists already in the sixtiee. During that period 
the British read.ing public had been exposed to the influ-
ences of Carlyler The History or Frederick II. Eighteenth 
century Prussian history was viewed as a prognostication of 
nationalism and of unifying forces apparent in mid-nine-
teenth century Germany. Frederick was definitely connected 
wi th Prussia and the Hohenzollerns of Carlyle's era. The 
greatness and leadership of that country were impressed upon 
Britain and this formed a backdrop to the Seven Weeks 1 War. 
In July, 1866, Prussia seemed to have repeated former feats. 
Also, in this same work Ca rlyle aided in the spread of 
Social Darwinism for he seemed to say, might makes right, 
the outcome is the important object. Although he rejected 
Spencer's "survival of the fittest, 11 Carlyle's views a_p-
peered e.s a paraphrase. He noted the.t "righteousness will 
prove the mightiest force in the universe." In the highest 
social state the only might that will survive will be the 
might rooted in right. Of course, Spencer clearly applied 
the principles of evolution to society; ethics were the 
outgrowth of physical, biological, psychological end social 
phenomena. 
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The Darwinia.n concept of the inevitable struggle by 
which the strongest and the best came to the fore was . ap-
plied to national life by Ruskin, in an address in 1865. 
The common notion that peace and the virtues of 
civil life flourished together, I found to be wholly 
untenable •... I found, in brief, that all great na-
tions learned their truth of word, and strength of 
thought in war; that they were nourished in war, 
and wasted by peace, taught by war, and deceived by 
peace; trained by war, and betrayed by peace; in a 
word, they were born in war, and expired in peace. 
90 
Walter Bagehot clearly enunciated a philosophy of Social 
Dt?rwinism. 
First. In every uarticular state of the world, 
those nations which are strongest tend to prevail 
over the others; and in certain . marked particulars 
the strongest tend to be the best. 
91 
Thus, it is somewhat und.erstandable why journalists, editors, 
and the · like, evinced precepts of Social Darwinism in the 
aftermath of the Austro-Prussian War; they reflected current 
thought. 
Defea.t of the Austrian armies could ha.ve influenced. 
Britain in another sphere, i.e., the method. of recruitment. 
Austria, Russia, and Britain had retained the system of filling 
90. John RuskinJ 'l'he Crown of Wild Olive; l<'our Lectures 
on Industry and War ~New York, Charles E. Merrill & Co.~ 
18911 I PP • 123-1'2'4:" 
91. Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics, or Thoughts 
on the Aupli~ation of the Principles of "Natural Selection" 
and--rriheri t ance to PotTITcal Society TNew York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1948), p.-r6. 
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their army ranks by volunteers and militia. However, Prus-
eia the victor in the Seven Weeks' War, had adopted the con-
ecription type army. Stein and Scharnhorst had approved con-
scription for the nation after its success hacl been proven 
by the French in the Revolutiom:try era. Prussi~:m efficien,cy 
and organization in 1866 spoke well for this system , but in 
the mid-sixties Britain was most interested in broadening 
its democratic base; the mental clime was not conduci ve to 
conscription, and in principle it was especially repugnant 
to many nineteenth century liberals. Anti-conscrip tion 
feeling was strong, for thirty years later,. in the nineties, 
Spenser Wilkinson, the advocate of preparedness and a mili-
tary expert, believed that Britain could adequately attend 
to her military needs by a reinvigorated volunteer system. 
" The Volunteer force repr-esents the spontaneous 
effort of the people of Great Britain to fulfill 
that obligation of national defense which on the 
Continent of Europe is met by the system of com-
pulsory military service. The British method is 
peculiarly suited to the nationa.l character, for 
it is founded in self-help. 
92 
Also, H. o. Arnold-Forster a politician deeply interested in 
milita.ry affairs, did not endorse the introduction of com-
pulsory service. 
92. Spenser Wilkinson, The Volunteers and the National 
Defense (Westminster: 4.rchibald Constable &cro.~896), p. 
149. Spenser Wilkinson, mill tary journaliet and hi s toria.n, 
associated 1882-1892 with the Manchester Guardian, founder 
of the Navy League, became leader writer on military affairs 
to the Ivio rni!lli Post from late nineteenth century to the out-
break of World War I. 
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The British Army is a voluntary army, an army, 
that is, which is recruited by voluntary enlist-
ment. No other country in Europe dares to raise 
its sold.iers on this system •.•. The nation does not 
yet entertain .the conviction that conscription is 
either necessary or desirable. 
93 
It is very possible that the army reforms instituted 
by Cardwell a.nd the Liberal Party of Britain had been un-
consciously stimulated by the Austro-Prussian '/Jar. The 
British army was in a rather poor condition; it seemed in-
ferior to the continental armies and recruitment had be-
come difficult, the numbers fell short of the quotas. De-
feat of Austria would tend to attract the attention of Eng-
land to her own armed strength. For over fifty years con-
flagrations had been absent from Europe. The war notified 
Britain that her military and naval strength needed re-
invigoration. In 1867 Captain Hozier, a military authority, 
warned: 
England, in fact in 1866, hardly wakened up to 
realize that the Prussian army then was very dif-
ferent from that which at the beginning of this 
century was destroyed on tre fatal day of Jena .... 
\vould. that England now would take some hints for 
the organization of her army from the victors of 
Koniggratz, and would adopt the experience which 
93. H. o. Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906 (London: 
John Murray 1906), pp. 131-132. H. o. Arnold-F'orster, a 
prominent Llberali viewed as somewhat of an authority on 
military and nava affairs. He was both Secretary of the 
Admire.lty and Secreta.ry of State for War in the early 
twentieth century. 
ha.s been won on the plains of Bohemia, before 
military progress is forced upon her by a dis-
aster more fatal, perhaps than that of Klos-
tersevern. 
94 
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And. in September, 1866, George Henry Lewes, editor of the 
Fortnightly Review, noted that England had the finances 
and material for a splendid army, but "in spite of all our 
resources and energy our system of defence is far more 
95 
analogous to the Austrian than to the Prussian." Sub~e-
quently Lord Hartington in Parliament, aeserted that the 
Austro-Prussian War had clearly shown that an efficient 
soldier could be produced by short-term training; much of 
96 
the Prussian army had but a single year of intensive drill. 
Significantly Britain adopted short-service enlistment; prior 
thereto recruitment had been either for life or for twenty 
years. But the army in essence remained a rather small pro~ 
fe s eional org~nization that could be moved swiftly to 
colonial trouble spots. Englishmen rea.lized that their situ-
ation was different from continental peoples. 
94. Sir Henry M. Rozier, The Seven Weeks' War: Its 
Antecedents and Its Incidents TThird edition, London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1872), pp. 64-65; also George Hooper, 
"The Army," Questions for a Reformed Parliament (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 186?>:-
95. George Henry Lewes "Public Affairs," Fortnightly 
Review, 6:250, September, 1S66. 
96. Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, 
Eighth Duke of Devonshire TLOndon: LOngrnans, Green and Co., 
1911), I, p. 69. 
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By. 1866, two-thirds of the century had elapsed and 
Britain's own experiences had made her aware of the fact 
that the nineteenth century had brought grea t transforma-
tions in commP-rce and indust~y. Although not a combatant 
in the Austro-Prussian War, nonetheless the conflict im-
pressed upon her that continental military affairs had 
undergone many changes in fifty years, and politically a 
far-reaching realignment was in store for E11rope. 
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CHAPTER II 
'rhe Dynasty, The Emperor, The Heir 
The House of Habsburg had given enviable service to the 
Austrian Empire, but many times 1 t vJae thought that the 
Dynasty's heroic achievements had been in the medieval per-
1od and in the sixteenth century, and the immediate past 
which was not especially illustrious made the deepest 1m-
pression on foreign observers. After the Napoleonic era, 
Prince Metternich attempted to place the Dynasty in a domi-
nant position in both internal affairs and foreign relation-
ship s. The shallowness of Habsburg pretension was evinced 
in the internal upheaval of 1848-1849 and in military de-
feat in the Austro-Prussian War. 
Without doubt these events were noticed in Great 
. 
Britain, yet up to the outbreak of World War I there was no 
significant feeling that replacement of the Dynasty would 
reinvigorate the state. Instead it was maintained that the 
Habsburgs were necessary, for without them Eastern Europe 
would have been a series of republics or kingless states 
lacking the means, or, probably the desire for federation. 
After the Seven Weeks' War, the nation reeled from 
military defeat and the Dynasty was regarded as a source of 
strength. 
We belie ve that the inhabitants of the great 
middle basin of the Danube and its tributaries 
have common commercial and other interests suf-
ficient, in time, to weaken and finally ex-
tinguish national rivalities; and, finally, we 
know but too well that if the dynasty falls, 
Austria falls in pieces. 
1 
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The Specte.tor declared that various Slavic areas gravitated. 
away from the Empire--Galacia looked to Poland which it 
could. not join, the Czechs were an isolated. people like the 
Basques or the r~ltese, the Dalmatians were favorable to 
Italy, the Croats had a quarrel with Hungary, the Transyl-
vanians looked to Russia, and it was simply the Dynasty that 
2 
held these people and areas together in a single nation. 
A writer for the Fortnightly Review believed the Empire 
was a bundle of sticks held together by the single cord of 
loyalty to the House of Habsburg. "Should future circum-
stances cut this, the Austrian Empire will fall to pieces 
3 
and resolve itself into its constituent parts. 11 During the 
Balkan Crisis of 1878, Hungarian views differed. from those of 
the western section of the Empire, and. the Pall Mall Ga.zette 
considered the Habsburg Dynasty the tie that bound. the Empire 
1. 11 The War in Its Poll tical and Ivfili tary Bearings, 11 
Fraser's Magazine, 74:276, August, 1866. 
2. 11 The Evil Results of the Austrian Collapse," 
Spectator, 392:796, July 21, 1866. 
3. "The Present State of the Eastern Questi.on, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 15:30, January, 1874. 
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4 
together at such perilous times. H. o. Arnold-Forster, i n 
1884, wrote that there was · no substitute for the Habsburg 
Dynasty which alone preserved order, peace, and a fair 
.5 
amount of contentment. In the mid-eighties, even though 
the loyalty of the population had undergone rigors of de-
feat, neglect, and religious differences, the Spectator 
maintained that only the Habsburg Dynasty could hold to-
gether all the races of the Empire. Many times loyalty 
had lapsed for the moment and three times since the Reforma-
tion the Empire had been torn by armed insurrection. The 
periodical was confident, however, that the people were 
fully aware the Empire's existence was necessary for their 
security, and that Emperor Francis Joseph could place his 
throne before all the states in a plebiscite, certain of 6 ' 
approval in each of them. Unquestionably the races had 
criticized and had risen against the Dynasty, and yet it was 
pointed out that they had died for the Habsburgs. A Repub-
lican Federal Government could not replace the Imperial 
House, in the judgment of the w·eekly, because such a Gov~rn­
ment could not raise and rule the vast army, which unlike 
other Austrian institutions was not Federal but was governed 
4. 11 The Sick Woman, _11 Pall Mall Gazette, February 27, 
1878. 
5. H. 0. Arnold-Forster, "The Balkan Provinces, 11 
Contemporary Review, 4.5:415, March, 1884. _ 
1 6. 11 The Weakness of Austria, 11 Spectator, 60 :455, 
April 2, 1887. 
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by a corporation of fifty thousand officers taught as their 
first lesson that they formed a Military Brotherhood, with 
7 
the sacrosanct Emperor for a Grand Master. The observa-
tion was made that the Austrian Royal Family had produced 
able persons like Maria Theresa and Francis Joseph yet 
stolidity had been a draw-back to the Dynasty. It was 
cla imed that the Habsburgs had followed chosen paths so 
do@:gedly as to risk needle.es misfortune and, for the most 
part, they had not selected great generals or original 
statesmen; in short, they showed a trait of obstinacy 
which had been a fatal characteristic of the Stewart and 
Bourbon families. In the late nineteenth century the 
Emperor had to be a passionless referee who cared for the 
interests of all. Apprehension was widespread that after 
the demise of Francie Joseph his successor might not fulfill 
the requisites and that the Empire might topple. 
The existence of Austria as a Great Power is, 
in fact, indiepen~able to European Safety, and 
no one has ever suggested how, with~ut the bind-
ing influence of the Habsburg sceptre, lea.den 
sceptre though it be, the States which make up 
11 Austria 11 could combine themselves into a Great 
Power. 
8 
In 1900 the Tablet reported that loyalty to the reigning 
House of Habsburg was eo strong that it permitted the sov-
ereign to intervene in th~ Government which, of course, was 
7. 11 The Strength of the Habsburgs, 11 Spectator, 612 :1721, 
December 8, 1888. 
8. "The Latest News From Austria," Spectator, 80:852, 
June 18, 1898. 
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not allowed by doctrinaire theories of constitutional gov-
9 
ernment. George Peel and the Colquhouns stated that the 
Habsburg Dyne.sty had been the focal point in Austrian 
hi s tory even though it had committed blunder after blunder 
and had suffered severe defeats. And without doubt the 
House continued to exist and prosper chiefly because of the 
esteem and respect in which it had been held by the entire 
realm, and for that reason it wa s questionable whether any 
force could maintain peace among the conflicting races as 
v1ell as this family of ancient lineage. Further, Geoffrey 
Drage believed that devotion to the Dynasty was secure and 
10 
likely to survive any shocks. 
In 1913, H. W. Steed was convinced that the power of 
the Habsburg Dynasty was the strongest element in the 
Honarchy. 
Its power is still, to a~l intents and pur-
poses, absolute; but it is exposed to the danger 
that threatens all absolutisms •.• the danger of 
regarding their own existence as an end in itself. 
9. 11 Th e Emperor Francie Joseph and His Subjects, 11 
Tablet, 63:86-87, January 20, 1900. 
11 
10. George Peel, ·The Future of England (London: Mac-
millan end Company, 1911), p. 10; also, A. R. and E. Col-
quhoun, The Whirlpool of Euro~; Austria-Hungary and the 
HabsburgSTNew York: Dodd, lvleao_ and Company, 1907),p. 336; 
aleo, Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (New York, E. P. Dut-
ton and Co mpany, 1909), p. 269. 
11. Henry \iickham Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, (London: 
Conste.ble and Company, Ltd.il 1913), p. 295; also 11 The Balkan 
Danger and Universal Peace, 1 Round Table, 2:220, March, 1912. 
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The reign o.f Emperor Francis Joseph spanned the fate-
ful years for Austria-Hungary. Monumental internal prob-
lems faced the Crown and the racial question, economic, and 
financial difficulties plagued the various ministries. The 
forei gn situation was a.s ominous as the domestic, for a vig-
orous Slavic state on the border vied for honors in the Balk-
ans and even three.tened to wean away the loyal ties of Slav 
subjects. In such a situation, the man who occupied the 
throne deeply interested the outsider. An Englishman living 
in the nineteenth century judged a sovereign of Europe by 
the personality of Victoria, for the attributes which made 
her attrEJctive to an overl'lrhelming majority of he.r subjects 
were looked for in European rulers. Englishmen were se-
cure in the knNlledge that Victoria. adhered strictly to 
constitutional monarchism. As her reign lengthened she be-
came the maternal symbol of England. Her exemplary life 
and homely virtues set the standarcts for the nation. Devo-
tion to public duties· and a respectable private life were 
qualities that Englishmen desired. in any sovereign, and 
Francis Joseph seemed to closely conform to British stand-
ard.s. There appeared a d.efini te simila.ri ty between his 
course and that of Victoria, but she headed her Empire in 
an eminently successful era. while :B,r .c1ncis Joseph led his in 
an epoch of unhappiness a.nd lowered prestige. Furthermore, 
per·sonal sorrows burdened him in maturity and awakened much 
sympathy. In the mid-sixties his brother, Maximilian, was 
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executed after the French Fia sco in 'lexica; in 1889 the 
heir to the throne, Archduke Ru d.olph, d.ied under myster-
ious circumstances at Mayerling, and his wife Empress 
Elizabeth was assassinated at Geneva in 1898. Finally, 
just prior to World War I, Archd.uke :b,rancis Ferd.inand was 
assassinated. Beyond this, the Emperor's length of service 
cast about him an air of venerability. Victoria, Francis 
Joseph, a.nd Leo. XIII were the stalwarts of the European con-
tinent. 
British opinion of Emperor Francis Joseph seems to fall 
into two distinct periods; the first commenced in 1867 and 
ended in the mict-nineties, the second began in the late years 
of the century and was terminated by 1,'/orld Wa.r I. 
For twenty years after the establishment of Dualism, 
interest centered principally on his new position as con-
stitutional severe ign. Up to the Austria.n defeat of 1866, 
he ha~- b een largely rea.ctionary with a few sporadic tenden-
cies away from archconservatism. The first establishment of 
constitutionalism in Austria-Hungary and the Emperor's ac-
ceptance of the ne\'1 system was received with enthusiasm by 
Englishmen. Britain in 1867 had enacted a second franchise 
bill, and in the seventies the Liberals adopted administra-
tive reforms 1 such as the Ba_llot Act 1 Judica.ture Act, and 
other similar measures. In 1872 Disraeli 1·s Crystal Palace 
speech opened a new era of Tory democracy. In short, during 
the last third of the century, the nation refined its 
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internal administration and advanced the cause of democracy. 
The general public was interested in domestic reform and 
liberal le gislation and this interest was transferable to 
the internal condition of continental nations. In the late 
sixties, Austria enacted her own liberal legislation in the 
Ministry of Count Beust which paralleled the path of· Bri-
tain but, of course, in a lesser degree. British observers 
commented on the graceful acceptance by Francis Joseph of 
the altered situation in his Empire. In fact, he was credi-
ted with strengthening the liberal orientation of the Habs-
burg state; he made Beust chief minister and endorsed the 
latter 1 s legislative program. When the German Liberal 
Party fell fro m grace and the long 'l'aa.:ffe, ;.iinistry ( 1879-
1893) directed the affairs of the Empir e , conservative ele-
ments returned to the government. Ho1:1ever, a deceitful 
fac ade was presented--the Ministry claimed that its depen-
dence on the Slavs promoted racial harmony and equality, a 
great necessity for the Empire. Actually, the nation 1 s con-
stitutional system was kept going by the artful handling' of 
a skilful politician. It seems tha t during the Taaffe 
Mini s try much emphasis was placed upon Francis Joseph's sup-
posed impartiality to the various races of his Empire. 
British commentators were aware t h at the Monarchy required 
racial quiet and wise leadership to solve domestic problems 
and to prolong its existence. And the r e was a trend to con-
nect any praiseworthy acts of the various Governments directly 
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to the Emperor--liberalism (1867-1878), and Slav appease-
ment (1879-1893); on the other hand, he was seldom asso-
cie.ted with the unpopular features of the Ministries. 
Specific British comment concerning the Emperor is 
as follows: In 1867 an editorial in Colburn's United 
Service Nagazine asserted that he had manifested a pro-
gressive and enlightened spirit in all acts since the Austro-
12 
Prussian War. The Economist, early in the same year, 
declared that he exhibited energy, honesty, and a fair share 
. 13 
of ability. Baron Henry de Worms who wrote one of the 
very fel'/ studies of political conditions in the Habsburg 
state, reported that after the Emperor decided parliamen-
ta.ry rule was necesse_ry he consistently aio.ed that system 
of government and did not encourage the ultra-conservative 
14 
party. 
It seems unusual that up to the first deca.de of the 
twentieth century m penetrating volumes had been pub-
lished on conditions in the Habsburg Empire. The British 
I 
public had to depend on periodicals and newspapers for cur-
rent evaluation of conditions. 
12. "Foreign Summary," Colburn's United Service Maga-
zine, pp. 568-569, December, 1867. . · 
13. "Austria With Reference to the Doctrine of Na-
tionalities,11 Economist, 35:297, March 16, 1867. 
14. Baron Henry de Worms, The Austro-Hungerian Empire, 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1870~p. 36. Baron Henry de 
Worms related to the Rothschilds; a Conservative M.P.; 
Under Secretary for the Colonies 1888-1892; a frequent 
visitor to Austria and· a close friend of Count Beust. 
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The .Saturday Review, in the early seventies, maintained 
that the Emperor wanted to satisfy the discordant racial 
groups, and obtain a settlement compatible with constitu-
15 
tional freedom. In 1871, the Economist made the shrewd 
observation that he wished to establish a form of Federa.l-
ism which would leave the Habsburgs in possession of the 
centre.l power. But the weekly decided it could not be ac-
complished for the Czechs demanded a new central constitu-
tion es well as internal independence, and the Emperor 
withdrew. his support and accepted Hohenwart 1 s resignation. 
It was believed the strong magnetic force of Pan-Germanism 
on the minds of his German subjects, or his own German sym-
pathies, influenced his decision. Modern authorities agree 
tha.t Francis Joseph did not consistently support the Federal 
and Slav cause, but betra.yed the Hohenwart Ministry in 
16 
1871. Seton-Watson wrote in 1917: 
'l'he whole incident is the crowning example of 
that blind uncertainty, haughty disdain~ and per-
fidy which lay at the roots of Francis Joseph's 
character, far deeper than his undoubted good in-
tention~. 
17 
15. "Tht"! Crisis in Austria," Saturday Review, 32:510, 
October 21, 1871. 
16. "The Posi.tion in Austria, 11 Economist, 29:1331-1332, 
November 4, 1871. 
17. Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism 
and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), II, p. 233. 
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Arthur May states that Francis Joseph only grudgingly ac-
cepted constitutionalism and the.t his philosophy was au-
thoritarianism cloaked in institutions of parliamentarian-
18 
. ism. · Probably the basic philosophy that guided him was 
neither devotion to Federalism _nor constitutionalism, but 
rather to the principJ,.e of the undiminished power, pres-
tige, and g~eatness of his House and Empire. He used var-
ious means and philosophies to gain his objective. But 
many British observers of that era actually felt he had 
become a true constitutionalist. 
'l'he Austrian poet Grillparzer caught the spirit of 
the House of Habsburg in t~e following lines: 
l:[ein Haus wird bleiben, immerdar, ich weiss, 
Weil es mit eitler Menschenklugkeit nicht 
Dem Neuern vorgeht oder es hervorruft, 
Nein, well es einig mit dem Geist des All, 
Durch Klug und scheinbar Unklug, rasch und zogernd 
Den Gang nachahmt der ewigen Natur 
Und in deii! Mi ttelpunkt der eignen Schwerkra.ft 
Der Riickkehr harrt der Geister, welche schweifen. 
19 
The Saturday Review stated: "If ever a man grew, got 
wiser as he grew older, overcame prejudices, departed .from 
traditions .•• it is the Emperor Francis Joseph. 11 He had be-
come a constitutional monarch in reality and not just in 
name. · 'l'he periodical re marked that the Emperor loved mill-
tary life and pomp but had not allowed his inclination to 
18. A. J. May, The Hapsburg Monarch~ 186 -12!4 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univer ity Press, 1951 , p. 1 7. 
19.F. G~i1lparz~r, "Eip Brud~rzwist in Habsburg," 
Gril1oarzer 1 s Samrntliche Werke ( Stuttgart: J. G. Gotta 1 schen 
Buchhendlung, ~874), VII, p. 75. 
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become detrimental to the nation, and although personally 
a clerical he did not carry the sentiment into public af-
fairs. Yet in the final analysis he was not a great mili-
tary leader, statesman, or diplomatist. 11 But he has cha.r-
acter, he ha s sense, and he has honesty •••• For once at 
least in its modern history, Austria had an Emperor who 
20 
is the right man in the right place." Before 1879 Fran-
cis Joseph . did not inject his clerical sympathies into 
governmental policies, so the weekly was correct in its 
judgment. Such an opinion, however, would have been in 
error if applied to the Taaffe Ministry (1879-1893). The 
Pall Mall Gazette in 1878 reported that the goodness of 
Francis Joseph had become well recognized; he sincerely de-
sired to promote the welfare of his people and had none of 
the vices of despots, neither idleness, impatience, nor dis-
21 
soluteness. 
In 1882 the London Times pointed out that the Austrian 
sovereign, by consolidating his Empire, had paralleled the 
notable feats of his ancestors. "The present solidity of 
the bipartite Austro-Hungarian Empire is very greatly due 
to his personal qualities and scrupulous observation of the 
22 
Constitution. 11 A few y ears later · the Spectator asserted 
20. "Austria, 11 Saturday Review, 40:1, July 3, 1875. 
21. 11 The Sick \'loman, 11 .Q:Q.. cit . ; also, Standard, ~pril 
24, 1879. 
22. Editorial in London Times, December 27, 1882. 
l 
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that the Emperor was not an outstanding financier or ad-
ministrator yet he had the ability to get his subjects to 
work together. Apparently this observation was influenced 
by the Austrian political scene, for at that time Count 
Taaffe _was pursuing a conciliatory policy toward the Slavs. 
The weekly acknowledged that Francis Joseph was ambitious, 
but insisted that he would not use success for greater ex-
pansion. Already he had risen high in the estimation of 
23 
Europe. 
J.D. Bourchier, a Balkan correspondent, assigned to 
him t h e motto: "Justitia ergo omnes nationes est fundamen-
turn Austriae. 11 He stated that the Austrian ruler in ad-
vancing years hs.d not turned to conservatism. Such a state-
ment seems strange, inasmuch as the Taaffe Ministry was a 
return to conservatism and clericalism, from previous min-
istires · in which the German Liberal element had been pre-
dominant. However, by reference to a policy of justice for 
all ns.tionali ties, the writer emphasized the 'l'aaffe program 
of Slav a.ppeasernent. Bourchier also thought all rs.ces showed 
reverence and devotion for the Emperor, and that posteri~~ 
would acclaim him as his reign had benefited all groups. 
The Times informed the British public of the ruler's deep 
interest in the well-being of his subjects, and called 
23. 11 The Emperor of Austria, 11 Spectator, 602:1728, 
December 17, 1887. 
24. J. D. Bourchier, "The Heritage of' the Habsburgs," 
Fortnightly Review, 51:387, March, 1889. 
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attention to the regular general audiences he held so that 
anyone could confer with him. 
Of the acts of kindness, mercy, and charity 
shown, of the swift redress of wrongs, of the 
shrewd soldierly a_dvice given, and of the Im-
perial magnanimity, at all times no record can 
ha ve been kept except in the Emperor's own 
memory, if even there. 
25 
During the twenty-five years following the Austro-
Prussi an War, comments about Francis Joseph were not so 
extensive or frequent as in the last two decades of h is 
reign, perhaps explainable by the fact that during the 
seventies and eighties he was not considered an indi spen-
sable leader in Austrian politics. Consequently, up to 
the mid-nineties the basic concern of Englishmen was whe-
ther the Austrian Emperor had been a constitutional sover-
eign interested in the welfare of his subjects, and whether 
he had honestly enc1eavored to conciliate the races, unite 
the Empire, and lead it upon a progressive course of peace. 
The answer wa_s in the affirmative, with minor qualifications. 
Now, in the la t e nineties and in the opening years of 
the next century, a change occurred in the politics of the 
Empire which affected British attitudes. Ra cial disharmony 
increa.sed markedly; the Czech s beca.me more vociferous both 
in and out of Parliament and a disorderly group known as 
the Young Czechs came to the forefront. The Austro-Germans, 
2.5. Article in London Times, November 17, 1891. 
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formerly conside.red the cement of the Empire, were attrac-
ted to Pan-Germanism, e. disruptive philosophy. Hungarian 
demand for use of the Magyar language in the army, the long 
and bitte r imbroglio over renewal of the Ausgleich, and re-
surgence of a Magyar spirit of independence were disquiet-
ing symptoms of internal weakness. It thus appeared to 
foreign observers that certain circles of the Slav, German, 
and Magyar races were pulling the Empire apart, and disso-
lution which might easily result in an outbreak of hostili-
ties bece.me a haunting fee.r. \'lith the aforementioned con-
ditions as a background, judgments of the Emperor were shaped 
in the light of the dangerous domestic situation. British 
writers believed that he bad become the great bond, per-
haps the g reatest that held the Empire together, and such 
a view seemed to appear everywhere. · It was admitted that 
devotion was stronger to his person than to his office. 
There exigted a fervent hope, rooted in fear, that he would 
live until an equilibrium of some sort had been established. 
His mere presence on the European scene impe.rted confidence. 
Modern authorities on Habsburg affairs now agree that his 
prestige had been very substantial and therefore British 
opinion wes correct; Francie Joseph was one of the strongest 
26 
centripetal factors in the political life of the Empire. 
Sidney 1'/hitman, in 1893, maintained that "it is not diffi-
cult to believe that the great authority which the Emperor 
26. Kann, QQ.cit., II, p. 235. 
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27 
exercises is largely due to his own ·personal qualities. 11 
In 1895, the National Observer referr ed to him as the 
great good Emperor, the best statesman of the Empire whose 
28 
wisdom kept the nation together. Two years later·, the 
Speaker thought the Empire would face dissolution at his 
29 
death. At t he time of Victoria's Jubilee, Emperor Francis 
Joseph made a call on the British Ambassador at Vienna. This 
was appreciated by Englishmen as it wa.s an unprecedented step 
for an Austrian Emperor and displayed good-will. In Berlin, 
the German Emperor made no gesture whatos~ver to his grand-
30 
mother. The for egoing observation was indicative of 
another trend in public opinion--a s Francis Joseph rose in 
British esteem, Emperor William rapidly fell .• from grace. 
In the closing years of the century, the Times corres-
pondent at Vienna had complete reliance in the Emperor's 
friend s h ip for Great Britain: 
It me.y be re gard.ed as certain that the Emp-
eror Francis Joseph would not be disposed to 
27. Sidney vfuitman\ The Realm of the Habsburgs (London: 
William Heinemann, 18931, p. 124. 
28. 11Hungarian Stop-Gap, 11 National Observer, 13 ~ 257, 
January 19, 1895; also, 11 Hung arian Hash, 11 13:691, May 11, 
1895; also, 11 Felix Austria in Nubibus, 11 14:154-155, June 22, 
1895. 
29. 11 A Dissolving Empire, 11 Speaker, 16:649-650, December 
11, 1897. 
30. Austriacus, 11 The Dead-Lock in Austria-Hungary, 11 
Contemporary Review, 72:67, July, 1897. 
contract any enga gement detrimental to Great 
Britain. I have seldom made a statement with 
greeter confidence. 
31 
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An article in .the Contemporary Review pointed out that he 
was honest and his word was believed and trusted b.Y all. 
The fete of Austria and the peace of Europe depended .upon 
him, for apparently no other person could persuade the 
various groups to modify their de ma nds. If compromises could 
not be reached, there l'ras danger that the Germans would go to 
32 
the north1vest and the Slavs to the southeast. The National 
Review reported, friends of Austria-Hungary looked upon her 
difficulties with unmixed dismay, and the hope that she 
would weather threatening storms was based on faith in the 
33 
Emperor• s wisdom and influence. The Morning Advertiser 
stressed the importance of his life and explained that his 
reign, like Victoria 1 s, had been an example to monarchs all 
- 34 
the world over. The Daily Chronicle judged him to be a 
world statesman and predicted that his country would be faced 
35 
with catastrophe at his demise. The Statist reported that 
31. News dispatch in London Times, May 4, 1897. 
32. Austriacus, loc.cit. 
33. "Episodes of the Month, 11 National Review, 30:679, 
January, 1898. 
34. "The Jubilee of the Austrian Emperor, 11 Public 
Opinion, 74:73-74, December 9, 1898. 
35. 11 The Jubilee of the Austrian Emperor," loc.cit. 
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he had been a sincere contributor to world peace, and his 
36 
long life was important to all Europe. Also, Public 
Opinion and the Standard insisted the.t the Empire '.vas pre-
37 
served largely through the efforts of Francis Joseph. 
Friendship is much appreciated in times of adversity, 
and British e.ffection for the Emperor increased during the 
Boer \'iar, for he clearly reaffirmed his good-will toward 
Eng l a nd so often shown <.luring the previous twenty-five 
years. He took a public position that was contrary to the 
subetential Anglophobe sentiments which appeared in t h e Aus-
trien press. 
Coming up to me (the British Ambassador) in the 
officie.l circle preceding a great ball given at 
the Court in January, 1900--I had not had the honor 
of seeing him for some time--his Majesty at once 
addressed me, where I stood bet'\\reen the Russian and 
French ambassadors, with the wor-ds 11 Dans cette 
guerre k suis tout !!. fe.i t de cote de-iTAngk-
terre.11 · 
38 
In 1900, t h e L:mc1on Times editorially stated that Great 
Bri ta.in did not have a better friend in Europe than ll' rancis 
Joseph; vlh ile sovereigns of other countries approved bitter 
atta.cks on English policy in South Afria, he publicly voiced 
36. "Financial Notes," Statist, 43:938, June 24, 1899. 
37. 11 Austria, 11 Public Opinion, 76:645, November 24, 
1 899; also, Public Oninion, 77:321, August 24, 1900. 
38. 11 An English Tribute to the Emperor Fra ncis Joseph , 11 
National Review·~ 40:368, Novem ber, 1902. 
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39 
strong objections to such tactics. 
In 1901 and in the next few years, the Guardie.n, a 
weekly paper representing solid elements of the Anglican 
Church, indicated that his a.bili ty and skill had kept the 
Empire together, and personally he was considered 11 as 
possessing patience, sweet reasonableness and love of 
40 
peace. 11 Saint James 1 s Gazette and the Outlook regarded 
his life as a prime necessity for continuation of the Habs-
41 
burg s tate. Also in 1901, Lord Woolsely, special British 
Envoy to the Viennese Court to announce accession of Edward 
VII to the British throne, reported that the destiny of the 
Empire would appear most uncertain after the death of 
42 
Francis Joseph. "Beyond all is cloudland. 11 In the early 
years of the century, various British writers maintained 
the.t a resumption of the Emperor• s personal rule we.s the 
only way to se.ve the state. This wa.s a mazing, for it refuted 
constitutional monarchy in Austria which d uring the preceding 
39. Editoria.l in London Times, August 20, 1900. 
4o. "The Week, 11 Guardian, 56:165, February 6, 1901; 
also, 11 The Austrian Emperor and his Unruly Subjects, 11 
Guardian, 60:49, January 11, 1905. . 
41. Article in the Outlook, 10:88, August 23, 1902; 
also, "Public Opinion of Austria, 11 Public Opiniog, 79:73,. 
January 18, 1901. 
~2. Sidney Lee, King Edward VII (New York: Macmillan 
and Company, 1927), II, pp. 16-17; also, Francis H. E. 
Palmer, Austro-Hunga.rian Life In Town e.nd Country (London: 
G. P. Putnam 1 s Sons, 1903~. 295. 
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thirty-odd years had been advocated almost universally by 
Englishmen. 'l'his new iClea confirmed Britain's faith in 
the Emperor and emphasized the widespread conviction tha.t 
Austria-Hungary was in a critical condition. The Saturday 
Review thought the retirement of Graf Thun possibly was a 
facet of t he Emperor's program to establish a strong per-
sonal government. 11 But every loyal and patriotic subject 
as well es every friend of Austria must wish him strength 
to persist in his ~esent path so long as existing dangers 
43 
remain on either hand. 11 In the opinion of the weekly, the 
Cabinet had to be composed of the Emperor's men and whether 
they had important influence in the state mattered very 
little, for they were to be servants who would execute the 
will of 11 the one great Austria.n statesman, 11 Emperor Fra.ncis 
44 
Joseph. Another writer maintained that since the adoption 
of constitutionalism the sovereign had not imposed his will, 
to e.ny gree.t degree, on the ministers who conducted affairs 
of the Empire. Only warnings and encouragements h&d been 
issued by him. 11 Yet the knowledge and experience of public 
affa.irs he has stored up ••• could be compared orUy to those 
of the great Queen who has passed away from us recently." 
It wa s thought that a manifesto delegating full authority 
43. 11 Austria and South-Eastern Europe, 11 Saturday 
Review, 88:lHJ, September 30, 1899; also, article in 
Lonc.on Times, December 21, .1899. 
44. Loc.cit. 
to himself would have received hearty support throughout 
45 
the Empire. 
In surveying the internal and international 
position of the empire, sincere well-ldshers of 
the Dual Monarchy cannot therefore but feel that 
the unfettered action of the Crown is almost in-
dispensable to bring it safely through the present 
complications. 
46 
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Because of racial difficulties in 1901 and the intransigence 
of both the Czechs and Germane, the Economist decided that 
the Habsbur g state could. be saved only by abolition of par-
liamentary government and the assumption of complete power 
by a benevolent sovereign. "For a time, then, eo far as we 
47 
can see, a.bsolutiem must be revived in Austria." The 
Tablet observed that in the legisletive anarchy existent in 
Austrie.-Hungary a decisive step was necesse.ry, either enact-
ment of universal suffrage or assumption of personal rule b,y 
the Emperor, and the latter was the more probable alterna-
48 
tive. However, A. J. P. Taylor, the noted British his-
torian of the Habsburg Monarchy, disagrees with these fore-
going contemporary views; he believes the Crown assumed too 
much power, while at the same time the Ministers failed to 
45. A free Lance, "The Problems of Vienna," National 
Review~ J8:867, February, 1902. 
46. I bid., p. 868. 
47. 11 The Austrian Dilemma," Economist, 59 :Jl6-Jl7, 
Narch 2, 1901. 
48. "Race Conflicts in Eastern Europe, 11 Tablet, 45: 
45-46, January 12, 1901; also, Globe, January 16, 1901, and 
February 6 , 1901. 
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exercise their full rights. "They inherited from previous 
generations a reliance on 'authority, 1 and did not recog-
49 . 
nize t h at, once ministers they became 'authority' • 11 
The bitter struggle over renewal of the Ausgleich 
caused alarm, and English writers characterized the Emperor 
as the grea t conciliator. 
Fr ancie Joseph is loved and revered by s.ll hie 
people without distinction of religion or race. 
This fact--which alone today keeps the dual mon-
archy together-- • 
.50 
The Morning Post, in a survey of his lengthy reign, reported 
.51 
t hat a gre at deal of progress had been made. 
In the crisis of 1908, precipitated by the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary was consi dered a 
disturber of the peace and feelings became unfriendly toward 
her. However, public opinion was not deeply hostile to the 
Empe ror, i n stead, other men were accused of· instigating the 
rash policy. 11 Austria-Rungary vis-a-vis with the rest of 
Europe, was the model state •••• There were no anxieties, no 
.52 
unsettling misgivings where she was concerned. 11 'rhe 
49. A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy (London: 
Ha mish Hamilton, 1948), p.-r2.5 • 
.50. H. J.D. F. 11 The Hungarian Crisis," Westminster 
Review, 164:633, Gecember, 190.5 • 
.51. 11 Sixty Years A King, 11 Public Opinion, 93:617, 
:t>ia.y 1.5, 1908; also, 11 The Austrian Elections," Spectator, 
98: 821-822, May 2.5, 1907. · 
.52. 11 The Empe ror 11'rancis Joseph 1 s Jubilee, 11 Spectator, 
101:929, December .5, 1908. 
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Spect a tor t hought it strange indeed for her to tear up 
trea.ties and show disregard for obligations and honor, and 
cons equently Europe was reluctant to believe that the Em-
53 
peror was the author or originator of the annexation • 
••• but hope of a rapprochement may be found 
in the revival of the forces of peace in Vienna, 
headed by the venerable l<' ra.ncis Joseph--who was 
questionably misled as to the probable effects of 
the new forward policy--and who realizes his 
responsibility for the crisis precipitated by an 
Archduke in a hurry. · 
54 
William T. Stead reported it was impos sible to believe that 
. Francis Jo s eph ha d planned the ann exation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; instead, the move had been conceived by Archduke 
Fr ancis Ferdinand, and it clearly indicated that power was 
55 
slipping from the aged ruler. 
During the five years prior to World War I high praise 
of Fr ancis Joseph continued in the British pre s s. The 
Spectator noted that a s he a dvanced into old age he dlsplayed 
remarkable amenability to new ideas and accepted the principle 
53. Loc.cit. 
54. 11 Eoi sodes of the Month, 11 National Review, 522:545, 
December, l908. 
55. \H lliam T. Stead, "Austria-Hung ary Without Fre.ncis 
Joseph, 11 International, 4:88-89, January, 1909. 1•1r. Stead 
during the eightie s editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, and 
l a ter associa ted with Review of Reviews. Lord Esher de-
clared. that 11 no eve nts happened to the country since the 
ye ar 1880 which had not been influenced by the personality 
of Mr. Stead. 11 
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56 
of universal manhood suffrage. In 1910, the Telegraph 
declared that when he looked back over the sixty yea.rs of 
his reign, he should feel that progress had been immense, 
a great work had been done, 11 and that work has been mainly 
57 
his own. 11 The National Revie"' reported that the Dual 
Monarchy was probably the only Gree.t Power with which Britain 
had ma.intalned unclouded rela tiona for a whole genera.tion, 
11 and every Englishman is aware that the Emperor Francis 
Joseph has been a staunch friend of this country at more 
58 
than one critical juncture. 11 A writer for the Fortnightly 
Review, in comparing him with the deceased Victoria, paid 
him a compliment that had real significance for Englishmen. 
For the Emperor-King all Englshmen feel an 
affectionate veneration akin to the regard in 
which Victoria was held throughout Europe. They 
look upon his reign as a triumph not only for the 
monarch but for the cause of monarchy itself •.• 
59 
Sir Horace Rumbold, one time British Ambassador to Austria, 
was one of the Emperor's most ardent panegyrists: 
56. "The Emperor Francis Joseph's Jubilee," loc.cit.; 
also, editorial in London Times, May 14, 1907. 
57. "Eighty Years In Europe," Public Opinion, 98:196, 
August 26.l. _1910; also, "Lord Rosebery in Vienna, 11 Outlook, 
26:377-37~, September 17, 1910. 
58. "Episodes of the Month, 11 National Review, 52~885, 
February,l909. 
59. Sidney Brooks, "British Policy in the Near East, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 99:115, January, 1913. 
In Austria he has long been considered by the 
most sagacious of his counsellors to be the pal-
ladium of a much distracted monarchy its final 
resort, and its saving moderating influence in 
times of trouble ••.• Nevertheless, through its vast 
territories there should more than ever rise to 
Heaven the fervent, heartfelt prayer of Haydn's 
grand old hymn; for no sovereign on the f a ce of the 
globe can be more inctispensable than is the vener-
a ble and. revered Francis Joseph to his subjects of 
all creeds and races. 
60 
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Throughout 1913 the London Times, in editorials, maintained 
that he desired peace and worked for an equitable settle-
ment in the Balkans. Barely more than six months before the 
outbreak of World Wa.r I, 14aurice de Bunsen became British 
Ambassad.or to Vienna, and his evaluation of the Emperor 
summed up the prevailing view in official circles. 11 Yester-
d ay 1s audience went off perfectly. You can conceive nothing 
more simple and courteous than, that splendid old gentle-
61 
man." Even during the war a substantial figure · like A. G. 
Gardiner, editor of the London Daily News, characterized 
Francis Joseph as a liberal ruler. "His own tendency has, 
62 
on the whole, been distinctly liberal." 
Francis Joseph, in the . latter years of his reign, was 
admired. for poll tical sagacity and statesmanlike qualities. 
60. Hore.ce Rumbold ~ Francis Joseph and His Times 
(New York: D. Appleton ~ Co., 1909), p. 392.---
61. Edgar F. Dugdale, I\faurice de Bunsen, Diplomat 
and Friend (London: John Murray, 1934), p. 278 . 
62. A. G. Gardiner{ The War Lords (London: J. M. 
Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1915J, p. 111. 
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Early in his career these characteristics were very rarely 
applied to him. Probably his supposed love of peace, 
length of service, conciliatory spirit, and domestic popu-
larity contributed to his increased stature, but the com-
ma.nding element that shaped British opinion was the strong 
conviction that he had become the firm rock to which the 
Austro-Hungarian state was anchored. Above all, in the 
demands and counter-demands of the races and in the perilous 
foreign situation, he imparted stability and applied a 
ste adying ·hand to the reckless forces within the state. Un-
questionably official Anglo-Austrian relations were affec-
ted. by British writers and observers who · built up the 
Emperor's reputation. English politicians were inclined to 
listen to the judments of such people. 
Perfect confidence was placed in the aged Emperor, but 
not in Archduke Francis Ferdinand who became heir at the· 
death of Rudolph. The Archduke had shown traits of charac-
ter, and had enunciated opinions that boded a more positive 
policy than the one his uncle had followed, and this aroused 
fear as it was believed a delicate hand was needed to guide 
the state. The Archduke was accused of joining forces with 
le aCl.ers who advocated a vigorous Balkan foreign policy, and 
the charge was strengthened by the Bosnian annexation, for 
rightly or wrongly, he was s~en behind the rash move. Of 
course, Baron Aehrenthal appeared as the executor of the 
-67-
annexation because he had plainly s ponsored it. But on 
clos er scrutiny it was thought thBt the Austrian politician 
~Jould not s trongly endorse expansionism if it would end · 
with the death of Fra.ncis Joseph. He would not enda.nger 
his ca reer, unless he was assured that Francis Ferdinand 
. 63 
sanctioned the move. 
It is no secret that the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand ... is of the clerical reectionary 
school, a Habsburg of the old type; and his 
hand is visible in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
Catholic propaganda, which is ~ausing such 
bitter heartburning among the Musselmans and 
Orthod.ox. 64 
It wa s also believed that in foreign poli cy he and Baron 
Aehrenthal sho,.ved t hemselves in favor of]- 1 audace toujours 
65 
de 1 1 auclace. At this sa.me period, another period.ical was 
cleeply concerned about the intentions of Fra.ncis Ferdinand • 
. 
And as the end of t he 11 close time 11 for war ap-
proaches, and the fa.teful snows melt on the Bal-
kans, Baron von Aehrenthal, backed. by the Heir 
Presumptive to the Habsburg .throne, the Archduke · 
FrBnz Ferdinand--who is credited ~ri th aspiring to 
63. "The Policy of Austria-Hungary," Spectator, 101: 
981, December 12, 1908. 
64. Archibald Colquhoun, "The Near-Eastern Question," 
Quarterly Review, 210:671, April, 1909. Archibald Col-
quhoun extensive traveler, author, editor of United Empire, 
a special Times correspondent in various parts of the world, 
and employed by British Governm.ent on colonial missions in 
the Far East. 
65. Ibid., p. 672. 
make Austria the leading Slav Power--becomes an 
increasing anxiety to every country desiring a 
peaceful solution of the present crisis ..• 
. 66 
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Some people associated pro-Slav sentiment with expansionism, 
consequently Fre.ncis Ferdinand_ 1 s reliance on the Sle.vs and 
his aloofness to the Germans and Magyars could be inter-
preted. as a forc.e that impelled the Empire southward in an 
67 
effort to include more Slavs within the nation. He was 
accused by J. Ellis Barker, in the Fortnightly Review, of 
sponsoring an incres.se in Austrian armed strength and a 
venturesome program of naval expansion. The Archduke we.s 
the president of the Navy League, and newspapers and periodi-
cals under his influence such as the Oesterreichische 
Rundschau consistently favored expansion of Austria in 
Europe and overseas. It was claimed that domination of the 
Balkan Peninsula was his over-all objective, as was the ac-
68 
quisition of Sslonika. However, the German Chancellor 
Von Bulow (1900-1909), declared in his memoirs that the 
Archduke did not sponsor military expansion so eagerly sought 
69 
by Austrian military circles. 
66. "Episodes of the Mo.nth, 11 National Review, 522:876, 
Februa.ry, 1909. 
67. H. J. Danton Fraser, "Austria's Policy in the Bal-
kans," Westminster .Review, 171:118, February, 1909. 
68. J. Ellis Barker, 11 The Murder of the Archdukr--the 
Cause and Its Consequences, 11 F0rtnightly Review, 102 :227-229, 
August , 1914. 
69. Memoirs of Prince Von Bulow (F. A. Voigt, trans-
lator, Boston: Little;-grQwn and Company, 1931), II. 
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Two courses approved by the Heir received attention in 
England. One was his partiality to clericalism, the other 
his support of Federalism. The Guardian stated that the 
center of the clerical spirit was in the Archducal Palace 
70 
of Francie Ferdinand. It was widely reported that he had 
depended heavily upon the Church and on accession to the 
throne he would fully repay the debt by exceptional favors. 
To support this point, the claim was made that his most 
trusted circle of advisors had Social Christian tendencies; 
his personal friend, Prince Alois Liechtenstein, was a 
leader of the Christian Socialists in Austria, and Count 
Johann Zichy held the same position in Hungary. Francis 
Ferdinand 1 s wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg ~rae known as a 
zealous chamoion of the Church, and . the Archduke's paper 
Das Vaterland sponsored the objectives of Christian Social-
-71 -
ism. Furthermore it WF:s believed that he sought to de-
prive the Germans of predominance in Austrian governing 
circles, and to destroy Magyar hegemony in Hungary, by 
adoption of Federalism and reliance on the Slavs as chief 
prop of the throne. Contemporary students of Austria-
Hungary have decided that F'rancis Ferdinand was drawn to a 
form of Federalism that was based on a narrow outlook. R. 
Kann declares that he aimed not to weaken but rather to 
70. "The Austrian Emperor and His Heir," Guardian, 
58:217, F'ebruary 18, 1903. 
71. Barker, QQ.cit., p. 228. 
72 
stren~then the central power of the Crown. A. J. P. 
Taylor has s. similar viel',rpoint: 
r4oreover, the schemes of Francis Ferdinand 
d.id not envisage the co..:.operation of the peoples 
or advance beyond the 11 r.d.storico-poli tical in-
dividus.li ties 11 of Old Conservative clap-trap. 
73 
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Some Englishmen thought the future of Austria depen-
ded on a new ruler who would approach the problems with _a 
definite program. Especially was this true as the Emperor 
advanced into inactivity of old age. Federalism advocated 
by Francis Ferdinand could be considered a solution to 
demands by the Czechs and South Slavs for full participa-
tion in the Imperial Government. Moreover, a few years 
prior to his as sas s ina tion, Fra.ncie Ferdinand :b.ad taken a 
prominent part in reorganization of the military and naval 
forces of the Empire, and his dee.th was regretted by a minor-
ity who believed that he had followed a program which had a 
reasonable chance for success and probably would have ended 
the tensions within the Empire. Seton-Watson, the prominent 
British writer on Austria, felt that the Archduke 1 s ideas of 
triali sm h ad . been temporarily_ imperiled by his de at h. 
For the moment the loss of Francis Ferdinand 
seems irreparable, but to concede this, would be 
the worst insult to the dead man 1 s memory; for 
72. Kan n, Q.I2..cit., II, p. _196. 
73. Taylor, QQ.cit., p. 26. 
it would mean tha.t Austria 1 s hope of regenera-
tion rested upon a single life •..• The man may 
perish but the idea cannot. 
74 
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This well-informed observer had found Francis Ferdinand 
free from the easy-going complacency and resistance to 
change which was often associ pted with the Viennese and 
especially with the Habsburgs. He credited him with a 
strong and resourceful personality, and counted among the 
Archduke's accomplishments command of the army at · all 
grand maneuvers and the advocacy of a dreadnought policy 
for the navy. Seton-Watson believed that Francis Ferdinand 
was not ho s tile to Hungary but to the narrow oligarchy of 
Magyars and , in fact, he sought to save Hungary by rescuing 
75 
her from the small clique which ruled arbitrarily. Like-
wise, after the war began, an article in the Round Table 
pointed out that Francis Ferdinand had not been an ir-
responsible militarist. 
In short, Francis Ferdinand's policy was dynas-
tic and imperialistic and yet in many respects 
democratic; at least its fulfillment would have 
involved a vast step toward democratic ideals. 
- 76 
74. R. W. Seton-ivatson, 11 The1Archduke l',rencis Fer-dinand," Contemoorary Review, 106 :174, August, 1914. 
7 5. Ibid. I PP. 168-171. 
76. 11 'I'he Austro-Ser'bian Dispute, British and German 
Ideals, 11 Round Table, 6:94-95, 1-1arch, 1915. 
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British evaluation of Archduke Fra.ncis .li'erdinand was 
determined by several factors: (1) whether it was be-
lieved Federalism was a necessity for the Habsburg state; 
(2) whether the Slavic elements should have assumed a 
more po1-rerful place in the direction of the Empire; and 
(3) in foreign affairs, whether it was advisable for 
Austria-Hungary to have adopted a more forceful policy 
backed by a strong army and navy. 
CHAPTER III 
Austrian Society and Aristocracy 
In Comparison With British 
- 73-
Although the English aristocracy held the strategic 
positions in government, actual power was continually 
being relinquished to other forces in the state. The 
political power of the nobility was a voluntary grant by 
the enfranchised masses. The privileged group · had not 
become separated from the rest of the nation but steadily 
invigorated itself by absorbing successful elements of the 
commercie.l , mercantile, and industrial classes. Aria to-. 
crats married members of lowe r class families which had 
risen to financial prominence. The offspring of the privi-
le ged order were not a clique isolated from the economic 
life of the nation. Younger sons mingled with, marri ed 
into, and became a part of the expanding commercial and 
industrial elite. Politics did n ot prove the sole outlet 
for energi es and therefore p arasitic qualities were not 
identified with the nobility. The social demarcation line 
was definite but never became impassable, for members of the 
lesser aristocracy moved downward while wealthy commoners 
were able to acquire titles. 
In England, far from seeking to separate it-
self from the bulk of the nation, the aristocra-
cy is ever plunging .into it. It is from the 
notables of every kind and of every condition 
that it is recruited. From the moneyed class it 
called for the- opulent personage who is now ad-
dressed as Lord Overstone; from the literary 
class it summoned the illustrious historian who 
died Lord Macaulay. 
1 
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Class antagonism never has been a significant feature 
of English social life. The lower classes in varying de-
grees envied the nobles, gently cavilled and sometimes 
ridiculed them, but extreme bitterness was definitely 
absent. The nobility was within the reach of all. "Acces-
2 
sible to everyone; it is subject to offence to no one." 
The German Chancellor Von Bulow readily admitted that "there 
3 
is no more democratic aristocracy than the British • 11 
English aristocracy recalcitrated against the reforms 
that swelled up from the financially powerful middle clB.ss, 
but yielded gre.cefully when the inevitability of demands 
was realized. Moreover, many members of the privileged 
order assumed a place .in the vanguard of reforms. 
It must also be acknowledged that the English 
aristocracy is the most intelligent aristocracy 
that has ever existed. It never compr6m1se8.. by a 
blind obstinacy the power of resistance i t r eally 
possesses. It knows when to give way. 
4 
1. Louis Blanc, Letters gn England (London: Sampson, 
Low, Son, and Marston, 1867), II, p. 190. 
2. Loc.cit. 
3. Memoirs of Prince Von Bulow, F. A. Voigt, translator 
(Boston: Little,~rown, an~ompany, 1931), I, p. 368. 
4. Blanc, .QQ.cit., p. 35. 
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The Enfranchisement Bill of 1867 introduced a new era 
of reform, and the position of the aristocracy in this period 
is of immediate interest because its status influenced Eng-
lish evaluation of Austrian nobility. 
During the sixties, two men assumed the unquestionable 
leadership of the Conservative and Liberal Parties respect-
ively. Benjamin Disraeli directed the Tory Party. He was 
of Jewish ancestry, a commoner, and possessed 'only a modest 
fortune. Thus, the Conservative Party which comprised the 
landed gentry, the families whose noble lineage extended 
back at least to the Tudor period, if not the medieval era, 
was led by a man with a be.ckground entirely different from 
the people he represented. 
It was in the great drawing-room of this grea~ 
hou s e that Lord Beaconsfield sat down one memorable 
evening after his return from Berlin, with the Star 
of the Order of the Garter bla.zing on his breast 
and the Duchesses doing homage before him. The 
felicity which he deemed highest on earth. was his. 
5 
These facts delineated the type of society that was 
present in Great Britain. A parvenu was not grudgingly 
accepted, but in time captured the affection 'and admiration 
of the most prominent groups in society. 
The Liberal Party which represented the wealthy entre-
preneurs as well as the traditional Whig families was led by 
5. George W. Smalley, London Letters and Some Others 
(Ne\or York: Harper and Brothers, 1891), II, p. 15. 
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W. E~ Gladstone who eould boast of no great noble fore-
bears. Moreover, some political leaders, i.e., Joseph 
Chamberlain and Lloyd George were sons of artisans. Lord 
Rosebery, who assumed the scepter of Gladstone for a few 
years, married Hannah Rothschild a member of the famous 
Jewish international banking family. All members of the 
English Rothschild family not only possessed financial 
prestige but also had access to the sacrosanct social 
circles. The Prince of vlales formed a lifetime friendship 
with Nathanial, Alfred, and Leopold de Rothschild and was 
a freouent guest of Ferdinand, a cousin of the above-men-
6 
tioned three, at his manor at Waddesdon. Between 1880-
1886 Ba.ron l', <; rdinand entertained as his regular guests Lord 
Rand.olph Churchill, Arthur Balfour, Joseph ChB.mberle.in, and 
Lord Hartington the Duke of Devonshire, and he could number 
as his intimate friends both the poll tica.l and socia.l elite 
of England_. 11 Lady Rothschild opens her gilded doors to the 
sma.rtest people in Lond.on; there are no better parties, 
7 
none more beautiful ••• " At the death of a member of this 
family the Duke of Cambridge, one of the Roya.l Fe..mily, ex-
pressed himself thus: 11 Heard last ni ght of the dea th of my 
d.ee..r old friend Sir Anthony Rothschild ••• it grieves me 
sadly, for he was a dear old fellow, and. the kindest of 
6. Sidney Lee, King Edward V.II, A Biography (New York: 
The 1'-lacmillan Company, 1925 ), I, p. 176. 
7. Ibid., p. 211. 
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8 
friends to me • 11 The foregoing facts concerning the English 
RothschilD. family indicate the unl1m1 te'd social hor1 zon of-
fered to the commercial and f1nanc1e.l elite of the country. 
In Vienna the social position of the Austrian Rothschilds 
was restricted. 
or course, Great Britain had become highly industrial-
ized which he.d e.n impact on society and the nobill ty. The 
aristocracy rubbed shoulders with the new industrialist, 
business man, and banker, and a number of these became en-
nobled, but a title did not make a tremendous difference for 
9 
the wall between birth and wealth was so often vaulted. 
Therefore, not only in the late Victorian era and in the fol-
lowing reign had a cosmopolitan society been established, but 
also in the years when political and social reforms were 
kindled and slow·ly nourished, precedents were set for the 
tre.nsformation of Edwardian England. 
Poor Mrs. Hudson, the wife of the railway king 
••• may have been the atrociously vulgar woman 't-rhich 
she was discover~d to be after her fall. But in the 
greet house, to-dey the French Embassy at Albert 
Gate, she entertained every notability of the time, 
British or foreign. 'The great Duke of Wellington, 
with h1s white waistcoat, broad blue riband of the 
Garter, and his ble.ze of minor decore.tions, formed 
8. George Duke of Cambridge: A Memoir of His Private Life 
Based on the Journals-and Correspondence of His Royal HighneSS 
(~dgar Sheppard, editor, London: Longmans, Green ~Co., 1906), 
II, p. 40. 
9. "English Society in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth 
Century, XIII The Parvenu," Vanity Fair, 17:Jll-Jl2, May 19, 
1877. 
the center of a little group of lesser royal-
ties in the drawing room. Palmerston snd Peel 
were occasional guests. Ambassadors and other 
high diplomatists were as plentiful as at the 
Paris Rothschilde of the day. 
10 
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By . the opening of the new century, what had been the oc-
casional in society became the common, and so in the Ed-
wardian erB., "society ••• was rapidly assimilating itself 
to a table d 1hote, wheres_t all who pay the entrance fee 
11 
can take their place~" 
In the rural areas society was still a closed circle, 
but this was expected in a region where financial position 
remained stationary, genealogical pride strong, and a 
11 family 1 s place in the world" not so much determined by an 
increase or decrease of material affluence. But the agr1-
cultural depression had taken its toll, and the avocation 
of country gentleman which appealed to the nouveau riche 
contributed to tearing down barriers. 
So it comes to pass that you can rarely de-
termine whether an Englishman be of noble or of 
gentle blood or no, without the most careful in-
quiry, which nobody cares to make. Has a man a 
certain position? That is our first inquiry; 
and in a rich country I suppose it must be so, 
for rich and poor man cannot well live on terms 
of so cial equality, or at least their wives can-
not; Etnd in the second. place, we ask, is he a 
gentleman? or an educated civilized man? And the 
rest may take its chance. 
12 
10. T. H. s. Escott, K1ng Edward and his 
T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1903 , pp. 209-210.---
Court (London: 
11. Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
12. Archer Gurney, 11 Reminiscences. of Vienna," Macmillan's 
Magazine, 14:442, October, 1866. 
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In both England and Fre . nce the fashionable world broa.d-
ened its base, became less exclusive and more progressive, 
But Britain looked in vain at Austrian society for a com-
pars.ble development. British observers were aware that 
the Austrian way of life and manner of approaching nine-
teenth century problems were unlike their own. Austro-
Fiunge.rian society had experienced very little poll tico-
economic changes which generally alter the social fabric of 
a state. An opportunity for dra~tic reorientation of the 
Empire appeared with the infiltration of revolutionary ideas 
spre~td by the victorious Napoleonic armies. However, Met-
ternich, the guardian of the status guo, prevented sbandon-
ment of autocratic principles. And in 1848-1849 the chance 
' for revalus.tion of the Empire 1 s program was quickly stifled 
even though a change in the Emperor and Ministers occurred. 
Therefore, not until 1866 was there a complete swerve from 
the uninterrupted course of centuries, and before it reflec-
ted in society many decades had to elapse. Moreover, the 
Habsburg Empire did not experience a great industrializa-
tion, and so there was no destruction of a society of birth 
which usue.lly accompanies rapia industrialization. No up-
heaval took place ·in society, hence the be-au: ~onde continued 
with small alteration to World War I; the few changes were 
not deep enough or o·f sufficient duration to affect the 
civilization basically. · 
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From 1866 to 1918 British wri ter.s held a uniform opin-
ion in regard to Austrian society; improve~ents and altera-
tions were minor and so went unnoticed. For that reason the 
period can be treated as a unit. Observers and travelers 
disliked the qualities associa.ted wlth .Austrian society; it 
was regulated by inflexible laws, and the proper genealo-
gical tree was a requisite· for admission to Court. A Brit-
ish· diplomat asserted tha t Court society or Hoffihige was 
separated from the other classes by custom and prejudice. 
Aristocratic and citizen cla.sses existed in the ·same city 
and yet were unknown to each other, for they had entirely 
different privileges and interests. Burgherf?,who in respect 
to wealth and educs.tion stood high est in the country , were 
arbitrarily excluded from Court ' society and this caused 
13 
bitter feelings. 
On my observing to Princess Metternich, .• how 
injudicious, to say the least of it, the raising 
of this wall of sep'aration was, and the bitter 
feeling which I had observed amongst the excluded, 
of whose existence she had lived in total ignor-
ance, when upon her · own showing it was most neces-
sary to rally round the Throne every conservative 
element that could b3 scraped together, her deeply 
philosophical answer was, 'Ah! Nos salons ~ 
seraien t 12.§& a sse z grands pour admettre la F'inance. 1 
- 14 
People like the Rothschilds and others renowned in finance, 
13. Rosslyn Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of the Right 
Honorable Sir Robert ¥~rier (London: E. Arnold, 1911), I, 
p. 1 30. 
14. Loc.cit. 
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commerce, and industry ,were not socially acceptable; the 
Roth schil.ds grudgl·ng:I,y p-ained social standing but simply 
on limited sufferance. The following story may not have 
been true, yet it was published in Britain: The Emperor 
apolo gized to two members of the higher nobility for not 
having received them in a.uclience ahead of the Rothschild 
scion who had a definite appointment. The new nobility, 
·, 
members of learned professions, authors, artists, finan-
ciers, bankers, and merchants could never penetrate the 
15 
highest social class. . Viennese society was regulated by 
admission to the Imperial Court. In Austria the Court con-
I 
sisted of two sections; the general group attended the 
great balls in the Ritter Saal of the Burg, public spec-
tscles, and dinners, and a small second group was privileged 
to attend the Chamber balls and parties given by the Emperor 
and Empress and the members of the Imperial House. Those in 
the first group were Hof-fahig; in the second, Kammer-fahig. 
If a married man of low degree attained renown in the Gov-
ernment, he could receive the right of attendance at Court 
functions, but his wife and family were exclud.ed. The posi- · 
tion of Anton Ritter von Schmerling as Premier,w9.s an il-
lustration. The ladies of his household were not accepted 
A . 16 
at the palace or by Viennes.e society. The Pall Mall 
15. "Balls in Vienna, 11 London Society, 11:50, January; 
1867; also, George Buchanan, ~Mission to Russia: And 
Other Diplomatic Memories (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 
1923) , I, · p. 18. 
16. 11 Good Society in Vienna, 11 Cornhill, 14:689, Novem-
ber, 186 6. 
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Gazette stated that it seemed incredible to Englishmen that 
Schmerling 1 s daughter we.s not received at Court although 
her father controlled the destinies of the Empire. She ac-
companied him to one or two dances but was utterly ignored; 
17 
the daughter of a Baron was looked upon as a nobody. In 
the op inion of Henry Drummond Wolff, a British diplomat, 
to become a Minister in Austria in 1878 a political and a 
social majority were necessary. 11 You could not count noses, 
18 
nor turn society into the ' division lobbies. 11 
Two consp icuous boxes on the grand tier have 
been persistently filled by persons whose ap- _ 
pe arance was painful to eyes polite. The worst 
case was the presence of individuals whose pedi-
gree did not quite go back to the days of Tilly 
and Wallenstein. The late Austrian Premier and 
· his Mi nister of Marine, with their families, were 
accus tomed here safely to contemplate the aris-
tocracy of their country; for no existing law for-
bids a plebeian to inspect e noble through an 
opera-glass. 
19 
The London Times reported that the capital of Austria had no 
reel society like London, Paris, Rome, and Saint Petersburg. 
There were m drawing-rooms w·here the enlightened class could 
17. "Occasional Notes, 11 Pali Mall Gazette, February 
3, 1867. 
18. Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908), II, p. 162. Sir 
Henry Drummond Wolff, Conservative M.P., during the seven-
ties and eighties, and diplo~at associated with Near 
Eastern Affairs. 
19. 11 Music in Vienna., 11 Cornhill, 15:30, January, 1867. 
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mix on equal terms. Diplomats of foreign countries were ig-
nored by the aristocracy. The paper declared that profes-
sional celebrities were most rare; lawyers could achieve 
fam'~ only by defending criminals; the accomplished in 
science had but poorly paying professorships and hoped for 
patronage from noblemen, although they never could expect 
their friendships. It was doubted that history could be 
wrltten truthfully in a coun'try where even critic ism of de-
ceased members of the Imperial Family could result in im-
prlsonment and where press censorship of books, plays, and 
20 
the like, limited accomplishments in the li tera.ry field. 
The preceding remarks by the Times seem harsh and rather 
bie_sed; Professor May does not agree that the exclusive-
ness of society prevented artistic, literary, and s61enti-
fie achievements. 
Vienna of the late nineteenth century, in sum, 
stoo·a. out as one of the noblest cities on the 
face of the globe. No matter what one's inter-
est, whether business or finance, whether scholar-
ship or music, whether the arts or the sciences, 
the old Ha.psburg capital had accomplished repre-
sentatives in that field •••• 
~ay further states: 
Talent. in literature, in music, in painting, and 
in scholarship was diversified, abundant, and 
steadily replenished by newcomers attracted to the 
capital as by a magnet. 
21 
20. Article in London Times, September 26, 1888. 
21. Arthur J. May, The HaPsburg Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 322. 
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Severity of Court etiquette impressed Englishmen un-
favorably,. especially the treatment accorded the wife of 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Upon the marriage of Countess 
Sophia Chotek to the heir Francis l:i,erdinand, Emperor 
Francis Joseph created for her the title Princess of Hohen-
burg. She belonged to the minor Czech nobility and was con-
sid.ered outside the marriageable sphere for a Habsburg, 
therefore a morganatic marriage had to be the final settle-
ment. Aus trian social life was so rigid that at public 
functions all of the thirty-odd Archduchesses, including the 
most youthful, took precedence over the wife of the next 
Emperor. Consequently, Archduke Ferdinand chose to curtail 
22 . 
hls social life. · Furthermore, the older Archdukes were 
not free to associate with whom they wished except on state 
oecasione. lady Paget who was well acquainted with the dip-
lomatic circles of Europe, related tha t one of the Archdukes 
possessed a fine art collection which was of interest to . her 
and yet he d.ered not openly invite her to lunch, but suggested 
23 
that she come in the carriage of a third person. Such a 
22. R. W. Seton-\vatson, 11 T~e Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand," Contemporary Review!.. 106 :167, August, 1914; a.lso; 
l~dgar Dugdale, Maurice de tsunsen, Diplomat ~ Friend 
{London: John Murray, 1934), pp. 276 and 287; also Seven 
Years in Vienna: A Record of Intrigue (London: Con~table 
'and Company, Ltd_.-:-1916), pp. 30-32. ~ 
23. Lady Paget "Austria and Prussia," Nineteenth 
Century And. After, a12 :1099, May, 1917. 
' 
.I 
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situation wa s almost unbelievable to the English public. 
In other European countries, ambassadors were accor-
ded the right of association with the crowned head of the 
country to which they were accredited. In France, Prince 
Met'ternich had friendly relatione with the B,rench Emperor 
and Empress, and at London Count Apponyi ha.d greater rights 
than an English nobleman, but at Vienna it was thought that 
amt,assad o rs from France and Great Bri ta.in were not deemed 
24 
worthy of frien dly associations with the Habsburg family. 
And so British writers criticized the Austrian social sys-
tem : 11 I n Austria there is a most strongly marked line drawn 
between rank and rank, and there was then very little hope 
of pas sing from one side to the other. A fearful system 
25 
th~s! 11 Again, thirty years later, similar sentiments were 
expressed in a leading British periodical, 11 the Austrian 
nobility forms a narrow, intensely exclusive and bigoted 
caste, whose only political interest is the maintenance of 
26 
its own cla.se supremacy. 11 Matthew Arnold insisted t hat 
the Austrian nobles were probably the most genuine aris-
tocrats in Europe as . they had huge estates, perfect sim-
plicity , and bonhomie, "but impenetrably exclusive, so ex-
24. "Good Society in Vienna; 11 QQ.. cit., p. 6 31. 
25. Gurney, QQ..cit., p. 14. 
26. "The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary," Edinburgh 
Review, 188:13, July, 1898; also, W. H. H. Waters, Secret 
a.nd Confidential: The ExPeriences of a Mill tary Attache 
·(Lon don : John Murray, 1926), p. 148."-
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elusive that even the diplomatic body .•• are not admitted to 
any real intimacy vJi th them. 11 Arnold remarked: 
In Austria one reels that there is some truth 
in the talk which in England sounds such rubbish 
about the accessibility of our English aris-
tocracy, but what is r eally the strength of Eng-
land is the immense ~xtent of the upper class--
the class with much the same education and notions 
as the aristocracy. 
27 
Obviously Great Britain had an accurate knowledge or 
social conditions in Austria. This is understandable be-
cause diplomats and _travelers are usually very interested 
in the social atmosphere of a foreign country. Trends in 
poll tics, industry, e.nct commerce are less discernible to 
the casual observer. 
It wa s hoped that the political changes within the new 
Aul3tro-Hungarien Empire in 1867 would be paralleled by a 
muoh need.ed social reorga.nization. An English woman who 
visited Austria in the late sixties stressed this point: 
Let us hope, therefore that gradually this 
discernment of worth e.nd talent In people not 
born with the blue blood of countless generations 
may extend to the army and general society, so 
that the ignorant prejudice a.nd na.rrow-mind.ed ex-
clusiveness which he.s kept Austria so backward in 
her position amongst nations, may, with the days 
of t he Concorda.t, soon come to be smiled at as a 
memorial of the cte.rk e.ges or this empire. 
28 
27. Let t ers of l.fatthew Arnold 1848-1888 (George Rus-
sell, ed.itor, New York: Macmillan and Co., 1895), I, p. 354. 
28. Lizzie Selina Eden, .!:!I, Holiday in Austria (London: 
Hurst and Ble.ckett, publishers, 1869), pp: 158-1.59. 
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This observation made in the aftermath of the Seven 
Weeks 1 War 'implied the_t the nobility WA.s responsible for 
much of the Empire's misfortune. With the knowledge that 
the upper class had exclusive control of Austrie.n affairs, 
the generalization was freely made that its leadership was 
detrimental rather than beneficial. The extent of its 
activity had been large enough to endanger the state, as it 
was believed t hat the privileged order had a weakness in 
concepti on and in action. And a writer in the Cornhill 
remarked t hat treason which came from l ~ck of intelligence 
was worse t t .an that which came from gold, and those who 
lac:ked intellectual depth, 11 as the weakest, of necessity go 
29 
t o t he wall. 11 And so even in British evaluation of soc l al 
AuBtria current Darwinian ideas came to the fore. 
Another writer familiar with Viennese aristocrats depre-
ca ed their intellectual depth-- 11 the mildest minimum of thought 
30 
is too heavy a tax on the Vienna brBin. 11 The Pall Mall 
---
Gazette believed 11 the focus of the geogre.phical expression 
which we call Austria has always been the nadir of Western 
thought and intelligence." Vienna was absorbed with dancing, 
31 
festivity, ar~ fun. A prominent correspondent wrote a 
scathing indictment of the upper class. 
22, 
29. "Good Society in Vienna, 11 QP..cit., p. 64o. 
30. 11 Ba.lls in Vienna, 11 loc.cit. 
31. "The German Austrians, 11 Pall 1-l:all Gazette · January 
1867; also, Seven Yeere ~Vienna, on.cit., pp: 37-42. 
The Austrian nobility must, therefore, be 
held more or less responsible for the creation 
and prevalence of the national type known as 
the 11 Trottel 11 --a type of pinched-brain dolt, 
something like what the Ruseiane call the "Krugom 
durak, 11 the all-round ninny--from center to the 
circumference solid in asinine qualities. 
32 
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Probably the Austrian aristocracy was viewed as unintelli-
gent because Britain believed tha t it had n ot taken a me.jor 
or progressive part in nineteenth century affairs. Ite 
mill tary . reputation had been unctermined, archconservatism 
seemed to be its motivating politicel philosophy and, ae a 
matter of fe.ct, the upper class had not taken a prominent 
part in new economic ventures or even shown originality in 
the development of traditional agriculturs.l pursuits. 
Social conditions in Victorisn England were not com-
parable to seventeenth century society personified by a 
country squire, uneducated, extremely parochial, self-
satisfied, and tending toward boorishness. The upper class 
had become s. cultured, urbe.ne, educated group. The typical 
Auetrian noble was believed to have had a totally different 
background and environment than the avera.ge British aris-
tocrat of the nineteenth century. 
His mind is callous to the smiles ot nature, 
incurious to the wonders of science and art, 
empty of the memories which make Europe great. 
At home he has the best of horses, the fattest 
of pheasants, the gayest of ballets, the clear-
est of beers; the rest is toil, the rest is 
32. Sidney Whitman The Realm of The Habsburgs (London: 
William Heinemann, 1893,, p. 136. 
superfluity, the rest is trouble ••• if he is 
seldom the stuff of wh ich heroes are madei if 
he is too willing to pase his days, as Sa lust 
says, with his gaze on the ground, he is often 
the pattern of a chivalrous and scrupulous man 
of honor. 
33 
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The English nobility was fully aware of world problems and 
had built up substantial fortunes by foreign investments; 
in many cases ite eons had become administrators in remote 
colonial areas. Darwinism, science, and political occur-
renee s were discussed and debated and were common topics of 
con·versa tion. 
Viennese society in conversation never mentioned 
poli tics, religion, art or sciences, and this was 
possibly the case with the whole of the Empire •.•• 
If when ~taying at shooting parties in one of the 
great houses one happened to mention some burning 
political question, eyes of blank astonisment met 
the remark, and one almost felt as if one had com-
mi tted a solecism. 
34 
Although the u oper stre.ta of Austrian society were con-
s idered exclusive and narrow, it was a.dmi tted that they p re-
sented pleasant qualities of warmth, gaiety, and complete en-
joyment of a distinctive manner of life. 11 Everywhere reig ned 
Liederlichkeit, Lumpenhaftigkeit, GemUtlichkeit; tolerant, 
35 
good-for-nothing easy-goingness, incalculable inconsequence." 
33. Loc .£1!. 
34. Lad.y Paget, "Austria's Doom,11 Nineteenth Century and 
After, 81:562, Naron, 1917. 
35. J.D. Gregory, On the Edge of Diplomacy, Rambles 
!!.!ld. Reflections 1902-1928 (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 
192sT, p. 36. 
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Viennese society was as frothy and lilting as a Strauss 
wa.l tz. High Austrian society could be most charming and 
hospitable to foreigners but they had to have the requisite 
36 
background, i.e., sixteen quartering a. As admission to 
soclety was not gained but inherited, it was thought that 
intellectual ability was rare, but as compensation, good 
manners and the art of behavior had been finely developed. 
One writer suggested that mingling of the British ano_ 
Austrian populations might have been advantageous; the Aus-
trit:l.ns could have acquired new ideas, while the British 
37 
could have picked up excellent manners. As newcomers were 
barred from t he highest circles of Austrian society, forms 
of social defense such as snubbing and cutting were not 
38 
neetd.ed. Viennese life was out of touch with English so-
ciety and yet it appealed because of a graciousness not found 
in many sections of Europe. "Life goes easily and smoothly 
in the main, the impression made is agreeable; more so, we 
39 
think than in any other of the grea.ter countries of Europe. 11 
Baroness Bloomfield stated, "the Viennese manners are very 
36. Lord Frederick Hamilton, The Vanished Pomp) of 
Yesterday (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1920 , pp. 
50-51. 
37. "Balls in Vienna," loc.cit. 
38. "Good Society in Vienna, 11 ,QQ.cit., p. 632. 
39. 11 The Austrian Paradox, 11 Spectator, 82:744, :March 27, 
1899. 
different from those in North Germany, and there ie an 
4o 
absence of stiffness in them which strikes one." The 
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son of Ambe_seador Buchanan fondly recalled his experiences 
in Vienna. 
But despite some of its old world ways and 
customs, I shall always retain the pleasant-
est recollection of Austrian society, of its 
kind and generous hospitalities, and of its 
Gemutlichkeit. 
41 
An <;> ther Englisr_JJ}an familiar l'Tith Austria and Hungary ob-
served that British people associated sports, pleasant 
manners, elegance in dress, and romance with both of these 
42 
countries. A similar opinion was voiced by a Brit i sh 
diplomat but his view was threaded with criticism: 
When the time came for my departure, I felt . 
genuinely sor~ at leaving this merry, careless 
music and laughter loving -town, {Vienna) and 
these genial, friendly, hospitable incompetents. 
I feel some compunction in using this word, as 
people had been very good to me. I cannot help 
feelin~ though, that it is amply warranted. 
43 
And the regular correspondent for Truth wrote: 
The Viennese are a.n easy-going pleasure-loving 
people rather out of running in the present go-
ahead age ••• their aspirations are limited to a 
4o. Bloomfield, l~ci1L 
41. Buchanan, QQ.cit., p. 3. 
42. Gregory, .Q:Q..cit., p. 50i also, John L. C. Booth, 
Trouble in the BalkanS"TLondon: .tiurst and Blackett Ltd., 
1905), pp. 6-10. 
43. Hamilton, QQ.cit., p. 66. 
desire that a sufficient number of them should 
learn to play the fiddle so that music may never 
fail them. 
44 
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During World War I the care-free spirit of Vienna was noted 
by a major British newspaper. Society was almost .completely 
detached from the momentous events of the war. It was 
thought unusual that cafes were regularly filled, also the 
opera, theatres s.nd cinemas, 'and that all discussiom con-
. . 45 
cerning the war were forbidden. 
The Habsburg Empire and Victorian England therefore 
were completely different in both social structure and public 
interests; one was an industrialized nation that had achieved 
political democracy while the other had barely started an up-
46 
hill struggle. 
Nowhere, perhaps in the years preceding 1914 
was the old world so much itself as in Vienna. 
There, not merely a nineteenth-century, but al-
most an eighteenth-century atmosphere reigned, 
unclouded. Austria, notorious for its complete 
indifference to realities, was drifting to the 
inevitable penalty of its indifference; and Vienna 
still danced. 
47 
44. "A Visit to Vienna," Truth, 30:571-572, September 
17, 1891. 
45. "Contrasts in Austria," London Times, June 2, 1915. 
46. Article in London Times, September 26, 1888. 
47. Gregory, loc.cit. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Austrian Clericalism 
Since the triumph of the Reformation in England the 
clerical forces of the Roman Catholic Church were looked 
upon with undisguised hostility. In 1829 Catholic emanci-
pation was achieved only after sharp protestations. In the 
thirties and forties, the Oxford Movement aroused antago-
nism for it signaled a recrudescence of Catholicism among 
the educated classes, and the reestablishment of the Brit-
ish Catholic Episcopate in 1850 was received with apprehen-
sion. These domestic factors had a reaction, consciously 
or uncon s ciously, upon an Englishman 1 s judgment. In addi-
tion, the association of the Catholic Church and its func-
tionaries with Irish nationalism awakened animosity. 
In tbe sixties and seventies, the British nation seemed 
to have entirely abandoned Conservatism as defined in most 
countries of Europe. Consequently there was an inclination 
to criticize the policies of clerical forces on the conti-
nent; their programs were viewed a s an antithesis to the 
principles that guided Gre a t Britain. The Syllabus of Errors 
(1864 ) and t he promulgation of papal infallibitlity at the 
Vatican Council (1870) were particularly obnoxious. 
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In the closing decade of the century, the anti-clerical 
forces rose to the top in the ferment of the Third French 
Republic, and France turned away from the Papacy. Unifica-
tion of Italy by the House of Savoy created difficulties, 
that is, the Papacy existed within a new country with which 
it refused to have contact. The Austro-Hungarian Empire 
remained the only significant Catholic country of Europe on 
which the Pape.cy could rely, and Francis Joseph se'emed to be 
the only sovereign who was obedient and loyal to Rome. 
Englishmen were greatly alarmed at the strength of 
Austrian clericalsim, and they seemed to be in complete agree-
ment l'li th the cry of Gambetta, "le clericalisme viola 
1 1 ennemi. 11 
British opinion of Austrian clericalism can be separa-
ted into two distinct periods. The first period began with 
the appearance of Count Beust on the political scene and 
ended with the rise of Count Taaffe in 1879. During this 
twelve year period the Catholic Church was on the defensive. 
Various pieces of legislation were enacted which controlled 
and curtailed the oower of the Church, the Concordat of 
1855 was abrogated, and an assault was made on parochial 
education. Britain warmly greeted the limitation of Church 
activity and thought it indicated a new era for the Empire. 
The Duke of Argyll, a prominent nobleman, made the 
far-fetched statement that Austrian clerical forces were 
responsible for the Seven Weeks' War. His view represented 
the widespread hostility of the British public toward 
ultramontanism. 
It was the Ultramontane party at Vienna that 
precipitated. the war. They drove the Emperor on 
to it, thinking Austria secure of victory, and 
wishing for the support, the preponderance in 
power in Germany of a Roman Catholic state would 
give to the cause of their Papacy. 
1 
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With the defeat of Austria in 1866, the Record, an organ 
reflecting the views of the Low Church Group, militant 
Evangelical Protestantism, de scribed the Empire as a country 
"which he.s been for nearly three hundred years the grand 
instrument of the Jesuits in arresting the progress of the 
everlasting Gospel in Italy and Gerrnany. 11 It maintained 
that recent Austrian history, the.t is, the period insti tu-
ted by the Concordat of 1855, had been animated by the spirit 
2 
of Wallenstein and Tilly, the spirit of plunder and massacre. 
The constitutional system established after the Austro-
Prussian War won the approval of Britain, as did the sub-
sequent policy enacted by Count Beust which aimed to weaken 
the influence of the Catholic Church. By the Concorde.t of 
1855, it was thought Austria had given undue respect to the 
Church of Rome and had surrendered rights which should have 
3 
been retained by the state and the individual. 
1. Duke of Argyll, Passages from the East (London: 
Hutchinson and Company, 1907), p.-z56. 
2. Editorial in Record, July 18, 1866. 
3. Eugene Oswald, Austria in 1868 (London: Trubner & 
Co., 1868), p. 7. 
Let the dead body of the Concordat be buried 
out of sight in as decent and decorous a manner 
as may be; its departed spirit will no longer 
vex the soul of any friend of freedom and jus-
tice. 
4 
The efforts of Count Beust to invalidate the Concordat 
were greeted with unqualified praise by Baron d.e Worms, 
in his volume on Austria-Hungary. 11 He placed himself in 
the foremost rank of the defenders of these salutary re-
f orms, •.• The self-sacrifice at the shrine of social and 
5 
religious liberty was not left unrequited." The educa-
tional reforms were received with enthusiasm and some 
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people connected them l'Tith events tha t transpired in Great 
Britain, for the schools in Austria were placed in the hands 
of secular authorities and religious instruction was not 
compulsory . The law in Austria was similar to the English 
6 
Educ a tion Bill sponsored by the National Educational League. 
A correspondent for the Pall Mall Gazette congratulated a 
national meeting of Austrian schoolteachers for their cri-
ticism of clerical influence in the schools. "Such self-
devotion in the cause of liberty and enlightenment deserves 
7 
recognition, and promises well for the future of Austria." 
4. Loc.cit. 
5. Henry de Worms, The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 
Policy of Count Beust. A political sketch of men and events 
from 1866 to 1870. ~ an Englishmal! (Lond.on: Chapman and 
Hall, 1870~ p . 257. 
6. Loc.cit. 
7. Pall 1'4all Ge.zette, September 20, 1867. 
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The break between Austria and Rome v.ras thought by some as 
8 
irrevocable, and thus a triumph for religious liberty. 
11 The Pope's pretensions were an anachronism, and the 
struggle only interests us as illustrating one of the main 
intellectual movements which characterized the age in which 
9 
we live." And Gladstone was highly pleased that Austria 
had shaken oft the "intolerable yoke of this unhappy in-
strument." He believed that the spirit of the Concordat 
still remained in the rural population and in the priest-
hood, and consequently was a disintegrating factor that 
10 
prevented a true unification of the Empire. After defeat 
of the clergy · on the issue of the Concordat, a traveler in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire sharply condemned clerical 
activity. "Already the clergy are rising up like a swarm 
of angry bees; and not only is their buzzing heard but 
their stings e.re felt throughout the length and breadth of 
11 
the land. 11 
The Economist, a weekly devoted to the interests of 
the commercial, banking, and industrial clas·ses, t n the year 
after the war, pointed out that nowhere in Europe had 
8. "The Beust Regime in Austria," Macmillan's Magazine, 
18:422, September, 1868. 
9. "Austria Since Sadowa, 11 Quarterly Review, 131:10.5, 
July, 1871. 
10. Outidanos (Gladstone), "Article IX, 11 Edinburgh 
Review, 132:.5.54, October, 1870. 
11. Lizzie Selina Eden, ~Holiday in Austria (London: 
Hurst and Blackett, 1869), p. 82. 
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ultramontanism such a pernicious effect as in Austria . 'l'he 
cry against clerical control wa s called. a hopeful sign of a 
ch ange that would_ awaken intellectual freedom which had been 
12 
st.ifled. The Pall Mall Gazette and the Examiner were 
highly 9lea sed. t hat the post-war North German Federation 
"t<rould. be unte_inteo_ by the ultramonte_ne spirit which had in-
13 
fected Austria. Further, t h e Examiner commended Austria 
for finally passing a Civil Marriages Bill, and warned her 
not to entrust her future to men who had prevented enact-
ment of such legislation at an ee.rlier date. 'rhe weekly ao_-
vised the Emperor and his Ministers 11 to burn what they have 
14 
adored, and to honour what they have formally burned.. 11 
The London Review also expressed approval of the transforma-
tions brought about in the Empire such as a Civil Marriages 
Bill, emancipation of education from religious supervision, 
elimination of the close ties between the Church and civil 
affairs, e.nd severance of the bonds 11 which binds the Empire 
1.5 
to the footstool of the Papal throne. 11 
When Federalism was supported by elements of the cleri-
ce.l party it became suspect. The Spectator declared t hat 
12. "The Consolidation of Austrian Power in the East of 
Europe, 11 Economist, 26:.59, January 18, 1866. 
13. Pall Mall Gazette, July 31, 1866; also, 11 :r.'!eclievalism, 11 
Examiner, pp. Sii-b-.5~ September 1, 1866. 
14. "The Austrian Civil I.Jfarriages Bill, 11 Examiner, p. 193, 
March 28, 1868. · 
1.5. 11 Austria, 11 London Review, 16:29.5-296, March 28, 1868. 
-99-
liberalism which endorsed Federa.lism was only a shFm liber-
ality, and this had been made cleDr by the vigorous en-
couragement gi~en the doctrine of federal union by Count 
16 17 
Thun and his followers. An article in Colburn 1 s United 
Service Ivfagazine stated that the Austria.n hierarchy he.d en-
de avored to impose its will on all Governments, continue 
authority and influence which it had long abused, and use 
Slav grievances as a. battering-ram to topple the Liberals 
18 
from power. 
Some people hoped t hat the Dual Monarchy would shake 
off the influence of Rome. At the time of t he declaration 
of papal infe.lll billty, the SaturdEiy Reviel'r was convinced 
that Austria desired to save the Holy See from the effects 
of its own ruinous imprudence. However, if she had to 
choo s e between the Sylla.bus and. political cession from Rome, 
19 
11 there will be no heal tatlon in preferring good to evil. 11 
The weekly rejoiced that Austria had r efused to join with 
the Pope in a protest against the loss of his temporal power, 
and t hought it indicated. the.t Austrian policy was not to be 
determined by clerics. "Austria. will appear as the champion 
16. Count Leo Thun a prominent political leader of the 
clerical forces within the Austria.n Empire. 
17. 11 The Future of Austria," Spectator, 392 :989, Septem-
ber 8, 1866. 
18. Captain Spencer, 11 The Future of Austria and Her 
Milita r y Forces, 11 Colburn 1 s United Service Magazine, pp. 
333-334, Iv!arch, 1872. 
19. 11 Austrian Difficulties, 11 Saturday Review, 29:529, 
April 23, 1870. 
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of civil liberty and of secular ideas, in the eyes of all 
Germans 1-1ho dread or dislike the rea.ctionary strength and 
20 
tendencies of Rome." 
A second period opened in 1879. Count Taaffe assumed 
control of the government and inaugura.ted a return to con-
servative ideas. The Examiner, and, in fact, most British 
news organs realized that the Taaffe Ministry would rely on 
21 
the reactionary elements in the Empire. Clericalism re-
surged in both politica.l life and in the field of ea.ucation. 
Britain recognized that clerical forces arose in a new guise 
supported by many elements in the Empire. In 1882 en-
fra.nchisement of the "five-gulden men 11 ge.ve clerica.lism a 
new reservoir of voting strength, for the new voters con-
8isted of peasantry, sma.11 · tradesmen, and the petty bour-
22 
geoisie. In the mid-eighties the Christian Socialist Party 
emerged and took advantage of latent clericalism. 
The London Times asserted that the leading Austrian 
Roman Catholic leaa.ers had not manifested an enlightened 
philosophy. The Austrian Catholic Congress of 1899 was be-
lieved opposed to constitutional liberties and Dualism, but 
Hungarian Catholics approved both and also tolerated Free-
masonry. 11 It is evident that most of the members of the 
20. "Austria," Saturday Review, 30:702, December 3, 1870. 
21. "European Politics, 11 Examiner, pp. 1174-1175, Septem-
ber 13, 1879. 
22. A. J. l-1ay, The Haps bur~ Moo:archy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951), p. 214: 
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Congress are men who have learnt nothing from history, and 
23 
are blino_ to the realities of the age in which they live. 11 
Leading Roman Catholics had an entirely different perspec-
24 
tive than had the highly educated persons in the state. 
The Times remarked that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was 
one of the major strongholds of ultramontanism. Hungary 
had freed herself f:rom this influence, to a large extent, 
through an enlightened governmental clase and a Protestant 
minority, but Austria had remained under the sway of the 
Pape.cy which was thought pa.rtia.lly responsible for domestic 
2.5 
difficulties .. 
In the nineties and in the years prior to World War I, 
attention was focused on the new Christian Socialist Party. 
In 189.5, the Speaker recognized that the clerical forces of 
the Empire he.d broadened their program in ord.er to appeal 
to the urben proletariat, and had organized a party that 
was more or less Socialistic in spirit. Moreover, through 
the efforts of the landed aristocra.cy, clericalism still 
held the support of the peasant class and in addition ab-
sorbed t h e smell bourgeoisie, thereby creating a single 
political unit. It had arisen to threaten the existence of 
26 
German Liberalism. A few years later, the same periodical 
23. News dispatch in London Times, ¥my 2, 1899. · 
24. Ibid .• , NOvember 8, 1899. 
25. Ne\'JS dispatch in London Times, November 8, 1899. 
26. "Austria. and Hungary," Speaker, 11:509, Ma.y 11, 189.5; 
also, 11 The Difficulties of Austria, 11 Speaker, 11 : 621-622, June 
8 , 189.5. 
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thought that ultramontanism had used racial discontent to 
reduce Austria to impotence. It maintained that after the 
establishment of Dualism, clericalism not only had come 
forward in its tre.di tional reactionary role but also had 
appeared in a revolutionary guise. Christian Socialism had 
appee.led to the passions of the masses. 11 It has been the foe 
27 
both of progress and order. 11 This sentiment was recorded 
at the end of the century when the Czechs had . become very 
discontented. Apparently clericalism wns blamed for racial 
separs.ti sm. 
In Austria loyalty is to Rome; and the policy 
of the church is to identify itself with the na-
tional aspirations of every race except the Ger-
man. "Alle nicht-deutschen Nationen Oesterreichs 
besitzen eine national-geeinnte Priesterschaft, 11 -
as a pamphleteer has justly remarked. 
28 
Many Englishmen believed that the Slave of the Habsburg state 
were clericals, and this wae sufficient reason to stifle a 
general endorsement of their objectives. The Speaker ex-
29 
plained that Slavic influence was anti-liberal and Catholic. 
The Tablet, a newspaper of English Catholicism, observed 
that the Czechs, Poles, and Slavs he.d been collectively 
27. "The Austrian Elections, 11 Speaker, 23:395, J anue_ry 
12, 1901. 
28. Francis Hirst.~. 11 A Dissolving Empire," Fortnightly 
Review, 70:58, July, 1~98. Francis Hirst editor of the 
Economist 1907-1916, a Governor of London School of Eco-
nomics, Secretary of the Cobden Club and prominent e.uthor 
specializing in economic subjects. 
29. "Difficulties of Austria, 11 loc.cit. 
30 
classified as clerical. 
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It was reported in the Edinburgh Review that Christian 
Socialism derived its appeal from the opposition of small 
tredesmen and handicraftsmen to increased competition from 
large Jewish shops. It directed its attack not only at 
conditions but also at a group and classes andthereby found 
31 
a response in the 1meducated electorate. H. W. Steed 
wrote that the Christian Socialist program of Lueger 
endeavored to protect 11 the economically unfit against the 
32 
most glaring evils of unrestricted capitalistic enterprise." 
These last two observations showed keen insip:ht and pre sen ted 
basic ingredients of Christian Socialism. 
Attention turned to Dr. Lueger, the leader of the 
Chri stia.n Socialist Party and Mayor of Vienna. The British 
public was informed that he was anti-Semitic and anti-
Magyar, and was admired most especially by small tradesmen 
of Austria. Lueger espoused a positive program for the 
capital, viz., municipalization of the natural monopolies. 
When, if ever English journalists come to 
realize that municipal enterprise and anti-Semitism 
are almost synonymous terms in Vienna, they will 
begin to mod.ify their strictures on a Cleon whose 
good qualities are minimized and obscured as care-
30. "Religious and Party Politics in Austria-Hungary," 
Tablet, 65:842-843, June 1, 1901. 
31. 11 The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary," Edinburgh 
Review, 188:1617, July, 1898. 
32. A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy (London: 
Harnish Hamilton, 1948), p. 155. 
' fully as his vices are magnified and multi-
plied by a press that is almost entirely in 
the hs.nds of his bitterest opponents. 
33 
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One commentator characterized Dr. Lueger as a ma ster of 
34 
coarse invective and. disorderly conduct. In 1902, the 
Times Vienna correspondent reported that his ability and. 
audacity were prominent factors in the electoral triumph 
of clerical forces. He was called a bold and unscrupulous 
3.5 
demB.gogue. Thirty.-odd years after his death, Seton-
Watson described Lueger e.s a leader of real ability and a 
near genius, but a born demsgogue who could sway the 
masses by his appeal to passion. History has treated 
fairly well the municipal socia l ization program of Christian 
Soc ialisrn. ~1unicipal acquisition of public utili ties 
resulted. in lo·w·er rates, e.nd schools, orphanages, and 
hospitals were enlarged and new ones built. School children 
were provided with milk and a wide number of welfare services 
were offered to .the public. Arthur May states that Lueger's 
program established social welfare reforms unsurpassed in 
36 
any city, and in the long run, taxation was not increased.-
The Austrian elections of 1902 brought victory to the 
Christian Socialist Party, consequently Britain again com-
mented on the political p£rty. The GuQrdiQn observed that the 
33. Hirst, QQ.cit., pp. 60-62. 
34. A Free LQnce, 11 The Problems of Vienna, 11 Ns.tionQl 
Review, 38:8.59, February, 1902. 
35. News disnatch in London Times, October 30, 1902. 
36. May 1 OP .'cit. 1 p . . 312. 
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blows against clericalism by Count Beust had not destroyed 
it, but simply had aroused clerical forces to more resolute 
action. Prior to 1866, the clericals had. been an aristo-
cratic group, but by 1900 they had become organized on 
democratic lines, had changed tactics, adopted different 
methods, a_nd thereby controlled the rural population and 
the majority of town workers. The Guardian complained that 
the Emperor was more liberal and tolerant than the people 
J7 
over whom he reigned. The Morning Post stated that a 
remarkable phenomenon in Austrian politics was the alliance 
of clerical aristocra.cy, ultramontane priesthood, agricul-
tural peasantry, and town workers; when the clerical forces 
rea.li zed their power had slipped in education and government, 
they found new power in the press and in the discontent of 
38 
workingmen. In this same period the Times judged that 
clerical domination of Vienna was partially responsible for 
the crisis in trade and industry. The clericals had at-
tacked Jewish industrialists and by vigorous denunciations 
had discouraged investment of foreign capital; also the pro-
gra.me of municipal ownership had ca.used anxiety. 11 No well- . 
wisher of this country can witness without apprehension the 
consolidation of clerical reaction in the heart of the 
39 
Empire. 11 However, by 1907, when Christian Socialism still 
37. "Th e Emperor of Austria and the Ultramontanes, 11 
Guardian, 58:1397, October 8, 1902. 
38. "The Austrian Outlook, 11 Public Opinion, 82:612-613, 
November 14, 1902. 
39. News dispatch in London Times, October 30, 1902. 
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showed electoral strength, a significant change had taken 
place in the attitude of the Times. The Christian Social-
ist Party wa s recognized as a thoroughly Austrian party, 
loyal to the dynasty and state, "and might well be a safer 
arbiter of Austria's destiny than parties whose 'Liberal 
4o 
programme 1 is a thin cloak for Pan-Germanism. 11 Thus, 
German expansion came to be feared more than clerical re-
action, and, above all, there was concern for the preserve.-
tion of Austria-Hungary. Most students of the Habsburg 
state would agree with the opinion of the Times in 1907, 
t nat in spite of many faults the Christian Socialist Party 
was a powerful centripetal force in the Empire. 
The Christian Socialists were the heirs of 
the decaying Liberals to the extent that they 
stood unconditionally for the maintenance of 
the empire, with the main difference that their 
policy was based on a broa.d popular support, 
which the Li bere.ls, who o1<red their parliamentary 
strength to the franchise restrictions of the 
1870s .and 1880s had never really possessed. 
- 41 
The Outlook was disappointed at the success of Christian 
Socialism in the elections of 1907 because Lueger was ac-
cused of anti-Magyar sentiments. The watchwords of the party 
were s-aTd to be--down with the Jews and Los m Ungarn. "Their 
weapons are billingsgate and high sounding phrases." The 
4o. Editorial in London Times, May 14, 1907. 
41. Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism 
and Na.tional Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 TNew York: Columbia University Press, 1950), I, p. 102. 
l 
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success of the party was feared as a menace to peace be-
42 
tween Hungary and Austria. The periodical obviously de-
sired preservation of the Habsburg Empire, and Magyar 
treatment of the minority races censured by Christian Social-
ism was a subordinate consideration. The few years prior to 
1907 h.g_d been marked_ by turmoil caused by renewal of the 
Ausgleich, and therefore Britiin wished to prevent another 
breach of· relations between the two sections of the Empire. 
Consequently, the Christian Socialist Party, one of the 
major political forces in the Habsburg Empire, gained very 
·little British favor. Its leader, methods, and program were 
severely criticized. However, it was acknowledged that the 
party had a strong appeal and had become a decisive element 
in Austria. 
Austrian foreign policy was believed to have been in-
fluenced by clericalism, inasmuch as statesmen in Vienna 
had attempted to propagate Catholicism at the expense of 
Orthodox Christianity. Devotion to Catholicism wae con-
~idered an obstacle to any peaceful penetration of the Balkans 
43 
by Austria-Hungary. The Catholic Church was considered an 
alien institution in the Balkans and therefore a deterrent 
to Austria_n expansion to Salonika. Gladstone had adhered to 
the foregoing views. "Austria, on the other hand, is a Roman 
42. 11 Hungary and the Austrian Elections, 11 Outlook, 
19:685, May 25, 1907. 
43. Article in London Times, February 11, 1896. 
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Catholic Power and has used her predominance in Bosnia and 
44 
Herzegovina as an opportunity to proselytize this religion." 
The Orthodox Church received sympathy from England, espe-
cially from Liberal circles, as the Church was an agency 
through which Balkan peoples gained independence and 
achieved their manifest destiny. Besides, the Orthodox 
Church was recognized as a sister to the Anglican Church 
and both were equal branches of the Universal Christian 
Church. 
Darwin's evolutionary doctrine had a mighty impact upon 
the religious beliefs of the British intelligentsia. It be-
came the vogue to criticize traditional religion as reac-
tionary. The intellectual aba ndonment of Christianity by 
influential circles, in addition to long established anti-
clericalism, intensified dislike of political Catholicism 
in Austria.. Public opinion judged it a relic of the Met-
ternich system which clung to the state, acted as an under-
tow, and prevented a liberal and progressive tide. 
44. Outidanos, "The Triple Alliance and Italy 1 s Place 
In It," Contemporary Review, .56:481, October, 1889. 
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CHAPTER V 
The MP..gyars 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Vienna 
made energetic but sporadic efforts to closely control 
Hungarian affairs. The Dualistic agreement of 1867 was the 
key that unlocked the gate of political power for the 
Magyars. From 1867 to 1918 they completely dominated the 
politicQl, social, and cultural life of Transleithania, 
and with the functionaries at Vienna they had. an equal share 
in the determination of over-a.ll Imperial matters such as 
foreign affairs. In the late sixties, it appeared that 
equality and justice might become the guiding principles in 
Hungary, b u t the liberal spirit of Deak and Eotvos was 
eclipsed by ardent nationalism which led to oppression. 
The Hun~arian Slavs had no real voice in the government, for 
their numerical strength was disregarded in the apportion-
ment of rep resentation. The role of the ~gyars was highly 
important, because during the fifty years prior to V<i orld. 
War I the decisions ma.de, policies undertaken, and opportuni-
ties lost contributed greatly to dissolution of t he Empire. 
For examnle, the spirit of the 1<1agyar s aliena ted the minority 
racial groups and quickened their nationalistic yearnings 
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inasmuch as their language, culture, and native customs 
he.d no chance for development and suppression caused 
bitter resistance. Beyond this, the almost independent 
Hunge.ria.n state established in 1867 possessed a sta.tus 
that was envied by the Austro-Slavs. They realized that 
their cherished ctream of Imperial fec1eration had been 
thwarted by the r ulers of Hungary, and their jealousy grew 
into animosity. In the early twentieth century, the 
Empire was weakened_ by the incree.sed deme.nds of the Magyars, 
for in sp ite of their privileged place, a sizable political 
group endeavored to obtain independence. Louis Kossuth 
in 1878 wrote in the Contemporary Review: 
Austria is a weakness, not a strength to 
Hungary. And at this moment I rece.ll to memory 
tho se other words of mine. "The traditional 
policy of the Cabinet of Vienna will make of 
Hungary a funeral pile, on which the Austrian 
eagle will be burnt by Russia." Let Hungary 
beware lest these words too become the words of 
a Cassandra ••.• And the Magyar will stand his 
ground; this too .I know. But like as that Norman 
of old, who to the query of St. Ola.v, 11 In whom 
dost t h ou trust and believe?" answered, 11 In 
myself"- - so l.'J'e, too, can very nearly only trust 
and believe in ourselves. 
1 
But in rep:ard to foreign affairs, it now appears that -1agyar 
opposition to expansionism was a wise policy which might have 
preserved the Empire. 
1. Louis Kossuth, "What Is In Store for Europe," 
Contemnorary Review, 31:564, February, 1878. 
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With the adoption of Dualism, ma.ny Englishmen believed 
that the rulers of Hungary had replaced the Austro-Germans 
in Imperial leadership, and naturally English -.rri ters pon-
dered upon the new situation and its future ramifications. 
The London Review, in 1867, feared that the Magyars would 
push the Germane into the background and asserted, "today 
2· 
Hungary is at the front of the Austrian Empire. 11 'l'wo 
years later an article in BlP..ckwood.1 e Edinburgh Magazine 
acknowledged ~hat Hungary had a national history, institu-
tions, and language, end her pretensions for independent 
existence might have been just, but it wa s an entirely 
different matter \'lhen she dictated to Austria and decided 
the Empire's foreign intercourse. Austria-Hungary was under 
the normal headship of Beust but the writer believed it 
3 
really was led by a few Hungarians. Yet another suggested 
that the Hungarian h alf of the Empire had become stronger 
and had brighter prospects tha.n Austria, a.nd t herefore was 
entitled to its new position. It was stated in a leading 
periodical that Hungary a.ppe.re ntly had. satisfied her minor-
ities anc'l. had solved the distressing Croatian problem. Her 
2. "Austria and Hungary, 11 London Review, 15:367-368, 
October 5, 1867. 
3. Cornelius 0 1 Dowd-, 11 Austria and Company, 11 Blackwood 1 s 
Edinburgh_ Magazine, 106:361, September, 1869. Cornelius 
0 'Do-.rd, p seudonym of Cha rles James Lever, well-known nove l -
ist and journalist, associe.ted with Dublin Mage..zine and 
Blackwood's Edinburgh ~mgazine, Consul at Spezzia (1857) 
anci_ at Trieste ( 1867). ' · 
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rule wa.e popular and her commerce and manufacturing flour-
ished, a.nd with t h e completion of Hunga.rian roads and rail-
ways the future seemed promising. The western half of the 
Empire "i'ras considered in poor condition; the governmental, 
system '\'!Je.s unpopula.r, fina.nces were in a sorry state, and 
the area in general was a seething mass of discontent. "In 
the natural course of things, the •western half 1 must dis-
appear, the German provinces joining the united Germany of 
4 
the future and the rest being attached to Hungary. 11 
In the mid-seventies Britain was much concerned with 
the Habsburg Empire. Lepel Griffin wrote in the Fortnightly 
Review t hat the l--'iagyars had obtained more power than Home 
Rulers in Ireland ever de manded, and tha.t Austria appeared 
as an adjunct to Hungary. Further, the !•fa.gyars aimed to be 
the Empire 1 s policy makers, and. it was believed that if this 
5 
beca.me a re a lity Austria would lose her German provinces. 
In Parliament, on July }1, 1876, Gladstone r eferred to the 
6 
Magyar influence a s dominant. And English Conservative 
leaders were perplexed. a bout the strength of the Magyars in 
Imp erial councils. In 1878, Sa l isbury thought perhaps t he 
proposa.l for Austrian · occupation of Bosnia would reveal 
4. 11 The Beust Regime in Au s tria," Macmillan 1 s Nagazine, 
18 :424, Sep tember, 1868. 
5. Lepel Griffin, "The Present State of the Eastern 
Question, 11 Fortnightly Review, 15:29, January 18, 1874. 
Sir Lepel Griffin was a prominent Anglo-Indian administra-
tor throughout the last_ third of the century. 
6. The ansard, 2}1:183. 
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7 
their actual power. Sir H. Drummond Wolff, a diplomat, 
recognized Hungary -as the stronger partner in the Dual 
Monarchy, for in the common Parliament her member.s were 
brought together in delegations, while Austrian repre-
eenta tion was g~ouped under nationalities. 'rherefore, 
whenever a a i vision occurred., Hungary obtained a majority 
by voting solid_ a.nd alienating one or two of the Austro-
8 
German sections. In 1878 an article in the Nineteenth 
Century ol:;lserved that , 'Hungary had greB.tly profited by 
J 
Austria's vanquishment at Sadowa, ano_ since that time hao. 
. 9 
held the upper hand in diplomHcy. A Liberal, in listing 
Disraeli 1 s omissions, claimed that t he Prime Minister had 
fa.iled to foresee that Hungary would d.ominate the Habsburg 
10 
Empire. 
Political conditions in the Empire 1866~1878, no doubt 
caused widespread British belief that t he Magyars had 
attained a predominPnt _oPition in Imperial affairs. The 
German Liberal Party which controll~d the Austrian political 
scene -became closely allieo. with the Magy8.rs, and in the 
7. Gwendolen Cecil, ·The Life of Robert Marquis of 
Salisbury . (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921), II, 
p. 248. 
8. Henry Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections 
(London: Macmillan & Co.,. Ltd., 1908), II, p. 190. 
9. John Lemoinne, "The Situation," Nineteenth Century, 
3:569, March, ·1878. 
10. A \'lhig, 11 Lord Beaconsfield: Why Vle Disbelieve in 
Him, 11 Contempora.ry Revi~w, 36:691, . December, 1879. 
seventies, the ~$gyar nobleman, Julius Andrassy, became 
Foreign Minister of the Empire and attracted European 
at tent ion. 
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In the eighties the same ideas were "presented. William 
T. Stead believed that the :tviagyars were the only compa.ct and . 
important element in the Dual Monarchy; they were five 
million in number but were more influential than thirty 
11 
million of their fellow subjects. Al~o, the Economist 
and Scots Observer indicated that the Empire's center was 
shifting to Bud.ape st, away from the traditional capital of 
12 
Vienna. In 1893, a member of Parliament publicly 
declared that Hungary had become stronger than Austria, "the 
stronger country released itself from the bondage of ' the 
13 
weaker country. 11 
At the end of the century and in the opening years of 
the next, Hungary demanded greater concessions as a con-
di tion for renewal of the Ausgleich, . · and again Ivlagyar 
"\ 
importance in the Empire -'t.,as observed. In 1898, the Sta.tist 
reported that since the Seven Weeks' War Hungary had 
14 
virtually guicled Imperial policy. In the same year the 
11. William T. Stead, Truth About Russia (London: 
Cassell and Company, Limited, 1888), p. 68. 
12. "The Prominent Position of Austria, 11 Economist, 
45:1526, December 3, 1887; also, "Louis Kossuth," Scots 
Observer, 1:626, April 27, 1889. 
13. Report in London Times, April 7, 1893. 
J 
14. "Financial Notes," Statist, 42:280, August 20, 1898. 
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Speaker reported that the Hungarian half of the Empire once 
15 
again established itself as the major partner. The 
Saturda.y Heview regretted that 11 the imminent menace of 
Austria is always Hungary, which, like Ireland, aims at 
playing the predominant partner and at t he same time burking 
t he burdens of predominance. 11 Hungary hacl occupied the 
16 
important position too long to the detriment of Austria. 
Further, the weekly ma.in tained that Hungary had not 
developed naturally but had assumed an arrogance and 
commercial greed that had not helped her secure or retain 
friends, and, as a matter of fact, outwa.rd vigor hid 
internal decay. She had received unca.l led for concessions 
by coercion, and then he.d added to Austrian difficultie·s 
with the hope of obtaining additional grants, and in so doing 
17 
had been una.ware of her own downward course. 
It was claimed that Transleithe.nia 1 s financial con-
tribution to the Empire had placed her in an advantageous 
position, because she paid only t h irty-two per cent of the 
Imperial expenses while Austria. contributed sixty-eight 
per cent. If population had been the regulative factor, 
the proportion would have been fifty-six to forty-four per 
cent. In e.ddition, the Imperial Government was criticized 
15. 11 The Hungarian Victory, 11 Speaker, 18:221-22~, 
August 20, 1898. 
1.6. "Austria and South-Eastern Europe, 11 Saturday 
Review , 88:413, September 30, 1899. 
17. "Austria Infelix, 11 Saturday Review, 87:772, June, 
1899. 
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for too often .acceding to the demands of Hungary, with the 
result that Austrian interests had slipped into a subor-
dinate place and in a short time the Empire could be called 
11 Runge_ry-Austria. 11 Pressure by Hungary, for a separate army 
and reduction in Imperial financial contributions, was con-
sidered just a surface manifestation of the independence 
movement, and if a separate ermy \'!ere extorted from Austria 
the slender tie of dynasty would be broken before long. 
"The day of Hungary 1 s independence will be the day of revo-
lution for the nations subjugated by her; from that day she 
18 
will date the beginning of her downfall. 11 The Edinburgh 
Review, in 1898, reviewed conditione in the Habsburg 
Empire and exple.ined that the Hungarians exercised a decided 
supremacy in the actual formation of policy and in Imperial 
affairs. Delegates to the common Parliament were chosen by 
both Hungarian Houses, and as the Magyars dominated these 
two bocUes e.ll except five delegates vrere Magyars. The 
Austrian d.elegation was selected by a diversified group of 
hostile persuasions. Therefore~ the joint Ministry naturally 
19 
relied unon the stable group, the Magyars. '!'he Times, in 
1899, believed that Hungary had a vigorous government, and 
20 
that Budapest actually controlled the Empire. The 
18. 11 The National Conflict in Austria-Hungary, 11 
Quarterly Review, 194:394-395, October, 1901. 
19. "The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary, 11 
Edinburgh Review, 188:4, July, 1898. 
20. News d i8na tch in London Times, January 7, 1899; also, 
11 The Week, :n Guardian, 58:1662, November 4, 1903. 
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Spectator he a rtily agreed that Transleithania had become 
the predominant p a rtner and attributed the meteoric rise 
21 
of the Ivie.gya.rs to economic and poll tical factors. In 
1905, after the Habsburg state had experienced a prolonged 
governmental deadlock, the Saturday Review pointed aut that 
:Magyar nationa.lists lacked all foresight and their objectives 
were pla inly disastrous, for if the Empire were divid.ed into 
two wholly independent sections both would be easy prey for 
22 
enemies. 
In the early twentieth century, it is understandable 
why Britain viewed the I•Iagyars as the most important group. 
For years Imp erial action appeared paralyzed because of 
their intransigence. Their irreconcilable spirit wa s visible 
in the army language question and also in the extended 
disturbance concerning renewal of the Dualstic agreement. 
Budapest became the capital of an autonomous Hungary 
in 1867, and British travelers began to scrutinize conditions 
in the city. It was evident that the Magyars had made a 
feverish attempt to construct in their capital magnificent 
public buildings, mansions, and the like, so much associated 
with the great cities of Europe. In 1866, an observer noted 
that a visitor to Budapest soon became a.ware that he had been 
deceived by the first i mpression of the city. It was true 
that a few beautiful blocks of pretentious houses had been 
21. 11 Hunga.ry and the Austrian Crisis, 11 Spectator, 83: 
434-435, September 30, 1899. 
22. 11 The New Pha se in Hungary," Saturday Review, 100: 
515, October 21, 1905. 
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built in the Palatin and several great streets, but a close 
examination of the city showed that the overwhelming number 
of houses and stores were low one-story buildings and a 
majority of them could be classified as third-ra te. 11 Every-
thing is untidy; nothing is completely finished; the streets 
are wretched.ly paved. 11 Yet Budapest did not appear decadent 
23 
but presented an air of prosperity and growth. Sir 
Charles Edward Trevelyan who toured Hungary in 1869, 
acknowledged that an extreme effort had been made to erect a 
city wo rthy of ~~gyar history and pride. Dualism had given 
an impetus to Magy a r nationalism. He stated that solid 
masses of buildings were arising at Peeth, and a stranger 
felt that an energetic spirit pervaded the entire Hungarian 
realm; it was instinct with new life. 11 It has been for 
Austria to attach a new and higher sense to the old maxim, 
24 
'Divide et Impera' • 11 In the early seventies an Englishman 
who was acquainted with Budapest, wrote in Macmillan's 
Magazine that the city was modern, but there were very few 
fine buildings except on the river Esplanade, and in f act 
many structures were reminders of the period. when the city 
23. "Glimpses of Magyar Land, 11 Macmillan's l~agazine, 
13:380, }Jiarch, 1866. 
24. Sir Charles Trevelyan, 11 From Pesth to Brindisi," 
Recess Studies (editor, Alexander Grant, Edinburgh: 
Edmonston and Douglas, 1870), p. 55; e.lso Henry Ecroyd 
"From Vienna to Pesth," Temple Ba.r, 19:324, Feb!"uary, 1B67. 
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25 
was insignificant. In 1875 Robert Rose visited the city, 
and noted that it was undergoing a great buildi~~ program 
and appeared in a. "very progressive condition. 11 And the 
next year Lord Hartington who traveled through Budapest, 
reported: "The place appears to be making extraordinary 
progre s s since the granting of the Constitution some years 
ago, e.nd the building both there and at Vienna is something 
27 
wonderful. 11 Even though the Hungarian capital had been 
invi~orated, the land and development were judged not 
comparable to the Viennese capital. One was an area and city 
built up over centuries, a slow development of culture and 
architecture that coincided with the growth of western 
civilization; the other consisted primarily of nineteenth 
cen tury styles and innovations. 
And, on such a traveller, the one predominant 
impression, left by such a journey as I made, must 
be the extraordinary difference in material develop-
ment between Hungary and German Austria. Of all the 
co untries I am acquainted with, there are few in 
which civilization is more perfect, or the external 
evidences of prosperity more general, · than the 
German provinces of the Austrian empire. Vienna 
25. 11 .A Run to Vienna and Pesth, 11 Ma.cmillan 1 s Magazine, 
28:251, July, 1873. 
26. R. H. Rose, Rambles in Istria, Dalmatia and 
Montenegro (London: Hurst and~lackett, Publisher~l875), 
pp. 32-35. 
27. Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, Ei~hth 
Duke of Devonsh ire (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911 , 
I, D. 180. 
itself is one of the most luxurious of European 
caoitals; and yet, the moment you had cross~d 
the Ivfarch, you seem to have gone back a century. 
28 
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Vienna was a city of music, of opera, and a thriving center 
of entertainment. Budapest was reminiscent of an English 
provincial town; it lacked the type of entertainment and 
29 
culture tha.t geve Vienna and Paris their individuality. 
As s oon a s Hungarian autonomy was proposed, various 
En~lishmen became concerned about the unfortunate racial 
eituation, i.e., the !~gyars had ignored the claims of 
severe.l minority Slav groups for an equi t B ble share in the 
government. As a matter of fact, the ruling clique had 
actually suppressed Slovak, Ruma.nian, and. Croatian e.ttempts 
at self-determination. In the decisive year 1866, a writer 
for the Fortnightly Review reported that in Hungary minority 
representation was entirely disregarded. "Indeed, all 
Hungarie.ns with whom I have spoken on the subject, look 
upon· wuch representation e.s a superfluous and irra.tional 
30 
complication." In November of the same year, the Herald 
turned its attention to the Slavs of Hungary, and d.eclf!red 
that t he Magyare would be powerlese and ieole_ted if they 
28. 11 Glimpees of Magyar Land, 11 .Q:Q_.cit., p. 378; also, 
Rancloluh Hodgson, Vla.nd.erings Through Unknown Austria ( Lond.on: 
Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1896), p. 3. 
29. ~-, p. 381; also, Letter in Pall Mall Budget, 
November 1 . , 1874. 
30. -Arthur J. Patterson, 11 'l'he E).ectoral Laws of Hungary, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 5:11, May, 1866. 
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surrendered a fraction of the rights that Vienna had granted 
31 
to them. The next year, a writer for the Westminster 
Review maintained that it was customary for English writers 
to view Hungary as a homogeneous country, zealous for justice, 
freedom, and a constitutional government. He believed she had 
a brilliant future, but to attain it the Magyars had to reverse 
their policy, a.nd instead of stirring up enmity, endeavor to 
win the symnathy and cooperation of the Slavs. Certain hope-
ful steps had been taken, such as suspension of the law re-
quiring use of Magyar in public assemblies of Comitate. It 
was admitted that injustice and oppression were difficult to 
. ' 
remove for the ultra Magyar party was powerful. Also it was 
' 
alleged that the press of Vienna and Pesth, by incessant 
reference to the Germans a.nd Magyars as the only cultured 
people of the Empire, and by alluding to the Slavs. as barbar-
ians and rude ma sses, unintentionally stimulated an active 
32 
Pan-Slavism with Russia a.s its champion . 
The Croats had desired an int ima te union with the rest 
of the Empire but their homeland had been attached to Hungary, 
and the :Magyars had r efused a close connection with the 
western ha.lf of the Monarchy. Consequently, Count Beust 
was criticized for his determination to sacrifice the rights 
of Croatia and make the area wholly subservient to the 
Magyars. In 1848-1849, the Croatians had loyally supported 
the Empire and the Habsburg Dynasty. Twenty years later it 
31. Pall 4all Gazette, November 27, 1866. 
32. 11 Dualism in Austria, 11 Westminster Review, 32:438, 
October, 1867. 
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was obs e rved tha t they still remained loyal but in return, 
their Diet had been dis so 1 ved and_ those who insisted upon 
rights for t heir country had. been persecuted. Bishop 
Strossma yer had been forced 1nto exile and Venus So!evich 
was compelled to resign. The 14agyars were warned that 
coercive measure s would only anta ~onize the minority groups 
a n~ sprea d discontent among the m, with the result that the 
South Slavonic area s would become a thorn in the side of 
Hunge ry. Th e following etatistics were published to show 
33 
Slavic strength: 
Germane 
Sla ve 
Ma.gyars 
Rumanians 
Al banians, Greeks and Armenians 
Jews 
Gyps ies 
7,890,000 
15,027,000 
4,947,000 
3,074,000 
22,000 
1,050,000 
146,000 
At the inception of Dualism, Grant Duff commented in 
the North British Review t hat any manifesta.tion of B.n ultra 
lvlagya r spirit would make the Ruma.nia.n s and Ru thenians 
intractable a.nd unr.rilling to a ccept laws from Pesth, and 
it we s doubted tha t t h ey would accept a Magyar ascen -ency 
34 
even if beneficent. A writer on tm staff of Blackwood 1 s 
Edinburgh Magazine reasoned th a t t he t h irty-odd million in 
t h e Habsburg Empire who had not received any concessions, 
33. Ibi d . • , p. 439. 
34 .M. Gr ent Duff, "AustriB," North British Revi ew , 44:55, 
Me rch -, 1866. 
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favors, or benefits, ne_ture.lly would be dis sa tiefied 
because ev8rythin~ had. been yielded to a minority of Me~yare 
in Hungary. 
I remember an old Irish farmer who once rode 
from Athlone, to Dublin, eome sixty odd Irish 
milee, in one day, on the eame wretched horse. 
He never halted to feed the beast, nor gave her 
corn or water during the journey, but stopping 
at his last stage Maynooth, h e tossed off a 
g l ass of whiskey saying as he remounted1 "Let us see if ye won't g o after that!" Ien t this 
very like wha.t t he Hungarians are now saying to 
Austria, with the applause of all Europe, and 
· the h earty "Godepeeds 11 of the '\vhole press of 
Eng land to encourag e them? 
35 
In 1867, the Pall Mall Gazette reported tha t England had 
' not fully re a lized tha t t h e Megyars were only one racial 
group in Hungery, and not a majority. Their severe 
treatment of the Croatians and Rumanians we. s reported as 
very similAr to Austria 1 e harsh po licy tov1ard the Magyars 
prior to 1866: 
.•• tha t is, they endeavored in the hars hest 
and most arbitrary manner to override the 
separRte rights of these people, to prohibit 
and destroy their language, to subordinate and 
control their Diets a nd other institutions, and 
in fact to subjugHte where they could not fu s e 
or absorb. 
36 
In December, 1866 , the Time s Vienna correspondent detailed 
the Magyar attempt to encroach upon and crush the nationa lities 
of Hungar y, and he showed ma rked disfavor to eucha policy. 
35. Cornelius 0 1 Dowct, 11 Baron Beust 1 s Voyage of 
Discovery, 11 Blackwood 1 e Edinburgh Magazine, 103:753, June, 
1868 . 
36 . Editorial in Pall Ma ll Gazette, October 29 , 1867 . 
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The Times judged that the Magyars had adopted a pro~ram 
which would cause a break-up of the Empire. Later, 
although t h eir policy was unchanged, the paper considered 
them as p reservers of the Empire, a thin film which covered 
a mass of nationalitie s with centrifugal tendencies. 
About the same time, Colburn 1 s United Service Maga.zine 
stated that Vienna had granted equal rights to the Ma gyars, 
who in turn had. denied simile r privileges to the Rumanians 
end otb er ra.cia1 groups. ~he Ruma.nia n population in 
Transylvania WB.s quoted as 1,104,322, all the rest amounted 
to 800,000, yet nearly all the land was owned by the 
Hungarians; so it vl a.s understandable "Ihy t r1e Diet voted for 
37 
union with Hungary. 
A writer who evaluated conditions in 1868, indicated 
t na t the Na gyars hPd a prominent part in determining the 
fate of the Empire but, like the Germans, they hB c3 to 
concilia te various races to prevent Pan-Slaviem. If they 
turned to an isolated ~~gyarism , Austria-Hungary would be 
de strayed. 'rhe writer deplored Magyar insistence on 
retention of Cro a tia since a great majority of t he inhabitants 
did not favor union with Hungary; also the Croatians objected 
to i mposition of the Iviagyar language on Slavonian d.eputies 
38 
at Pesth . Cornelius 0 1 Dowd (Charles James Lever), asserted 
37. 11 Foreign Summary, 11 Col burn 1 s United Service Magazine, 
u. 251, February, 1867. 
38 . Eugene Oswald, Austria in 1868 (London: Trubner & 
Co., 1 868), p. 30. 
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that the Magyars had displayed pure selfishness in their 
struggle for liberty and attainment of it. Everything 
ha.d been for Hungary, and the desire of Bohemia, Galicia, 
Illyria, or CroHtia, for like status, had been ignored 
39 
and no aid had been furnished. The Examiner, in 1872, 
repeatedly stated that the Croatians had not received 
fair treatment from the l1Iagyars, and that an overwhelming 
majority of Croatian~ wanted local autonomy, and a better 
political and. administrative distribution of South Slavs 
in the central ad.rninistration of the Monarchy. The Magyars 
· were indicted as relentless tyrants who held Croatia 
solely by bayonets. They numbered five million in a total 
population of fifteen million, yet it was claimed that in 
4o 
every district and province they were supreme. 
In the early seventies, the Fortnightly Review 
maintained that up to 1848 the Magyars had persecuted the 
Slavs in the name of the Habsburgs, and since then had 
continued the oppression for their own benefit; in addition, 
they had a.ttempted to wipe out the Slavonia.n la.nguage, 
abolish all Slav rights, and had tried to make the Slavs, 
Magyar. Their policy had been similar to the Russian program 
41 
in Poland. In the same period, in Fraser's 1-fagazine 
39. O'Dowd, ou.cit., D. 362. 
40 • 11 Hungary and Croatia., 11 Examiner, p. 64, January 
20, 1872; also, "Hungary and Croatia," Examiner, p. 616, 
June 22, 1872; also, "The Hunga.rian Elect ions, 11 Examiner, 
PD. 714-715, July 20, 1872. 
41. Griffin, QR.cit., pp. 29-30. 
appeared a similar indictment of the ruling class of 
Hungary--the Ma gyars ha.d exercised a tyranny over all 
other racial groups. 
The Slovaks, 1,800,000 in number who live 
chiefly in North-west Hungary ••• are a good 
natured, industrious race, humble to servility, 
and endowed with allthe virtues and vices of 
t he Sl avs . TyrHnnized over, misused and r obbed 
by the Magyar lesser nobility and officials, 
they live in sad resignation to their fate. 
42 
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In 1876 the question of ~4agya.r persecution was brought 
into the legislative ·halls of Great Britain. Vx. G~_ dstone 
remarked t b. a.t he had heard of the dreadful oppression which 
the Slevs of Hungary were undergoing, but believed the 
sta t ements had been exaggerated.. He admitted that without 
doubt a jealousy existed between the Magyars Qnd the Slavs 
which affected the conduct and policy of Austria, but he 
felt sur e no reRl compleint could be made agains t Austria 
43 
or Ru s sia.. In t h is sHme debate Mr. Ha.nbury, M. P., 
stated t hat the Slavs of Hungary suffered e.s much persecution 
from the Magya r government as their broth ers had experienced 
44 
uncter Turkish a.dministra.tion. 
Aga in in the Fortnightly Review it was observed that 
the l'i.tagyars, like the Turks, dominated and rna.ladministered 
42. "Austria and Turkey, 11 Fraser's Magazine, 14:7, 
July) 1876. 
43. The Hansard, 231-182. 
44. I bid. , p. 145. 
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45 
a l a rge Slav population. Sir George Campbell, M. P., 
expres s ed a similar sentiment, namely--it was a fallacy 
to compa re the squirearchy of England with that of Hungary, 
one we.s a ruling caste while the other was both "a ruling 
and race caste." He clas sified :Ma gyar nobill ty with the 
Turki sh; both were minorities and both ruled subject peoples 
46 
that were eager to cast off the yoke. Again in the mi d-
seventies, another commentator called attention to the 
oppre ssive rule. 
To a.ll intents and purposes, her fi:fteen and 
a-half millions of peoples are composed of the 
oppres sors and the oppressed, and only a few of 
the former are rich. Political power and social 
status belong to the Magyar or Hun conquerors of 
the kingdom; and in all that appertains to 
civilization, the general population is most 
backwar d . 
47 
Lo r d Edmond Fitzmaurice wrote that the Cro a t viewed the 
Hungaria n as an ene my from whom he wished to free himself. 
But the Mag yars were determined to keep the La.ntag at 
Agram in a. subordinate position to prevent the overthrow 
of a f avorab le di stribution of power; not content with 
politica l repression, they foolishly had attempted to i mpose 
45. Ralph A. Earle , 11 The Eastern Situation, 11 Fortnigh tly 
Review, 26:663, November, 1876. 
46. G·eorge Campbell, 11 No. 4-- 'l're Races, Relig ions and 
In s tituti ons of Turkey and the Neighboring Countrie s ," 
Papers Q!!. the Ea s tern Question (London: Ca ssell, Petter and 
Galp in, 1887T, p . 27. 
47. 11 Austria and. Turk ey, 11 loc.ci t. 
-128-
48 
their langu age on the CroatsA 
It i s very obvious tha t during the sixties and seventies 
when e a stern Europe attracted attention, ma.ny prominent 
writer s a nd politicians were aware of and commented upon 
racial conditions in Hungary. Di verse news organs conta ined 
ma t erial concerning the Magya.r policy. It may be assumed, 
therefore, that a su bs tantial number of educated English 
pe ople were cognizant of racial d.iscrimination in Hungary. 
A majority of the criticisms were unfavorable to the Magyar 
program a s it had become clear that t he constitution of the 
Habsburg Empire ha.a. been disregarded, and Englishmen 
re spected the law and disliked evasion of it. Language and 
cul t ural oppre s sion naturally wo uld be criticized, for the 
ha rsh tre 2 tment of the Poles by Russia and Germany wae 
unpopular in Britain, a.nd the l"lagye r policy appeared very 
s i milar. I n spite of the publicity, in 1880 Lord Salisbury 
wa s puzzled abo ut the alleged oppression of the Rumanians 
in Tran sylvania, and wae inclined to regard it as a 
"recently-got-up question 11 by which the Rum~n ians hop ed to . 
49 
obtain conce s sions. 
The sta tus of the Hunga rian Serbs was not overlooked, 
for in 1880 it we. s reported tha t the Na gyars had tried hard 
48. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, "Hunga ry and Croatia," 
Me cmillan 1 e Magazine, 36:41-42, :Hay, 1877. 
49 . H. Suth erland Edward s, Sir William vlhi te, For Six 
Years Amba ssador at Consta.ntinople: His Life and Correspondence, 
(Lond on: John Murray, 1902), p. 185. 
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to assimilate them. For two centuries attempts had been 
made to suppress all eviclences of' Serb nationality, to 
crush Serb churches end schools, and to a_epri ve the racia.l 
group of' civic privileges and rights guara.nteed in the 
50 
Imperial diplomas. In feet it was thought that violated 
promisee, oppressions, and persecutions went back as far 
es 1481, and throughout the Empire 1 e history the Imperial 
Government usuallyyielded and allowed the Jviagye.rs to 
oppress t h e Serbs who, despite such e.buse, remained loyal 
to the Crown. 11 The bitterness of nearly four hundred years 
of bondag e and ill faith, of ineffectual repression, ha~ 
borne the logical fruit in an animosity which is a.s deep as 
51 
life." 
Af'ter fifteen yea.rs of Dualism, E. A. Freeman the 
Engli sh historian, reported that the system had not 
fulfilled his expecte.tions. However, he confessec_ that 
the Hungarian Corona.tion of 1867 he.d been deceiving because 
he anticipated that the King of Hungary would. become the 
champ ion of the Slavonic majority in his Kingdom and 
libere. te southee.stern Europe. 11 I, and any others who thought 
e.s I did, had hardly taken in that freedom of the Magyar 
meant the prolonged and deepened bondag e of the Slav. 11 He 
main te ined that the 1vfagyars had become friendly wi t :r~ ·· the 
50. vv . J. Stillman, 11 Austro-Hunp:ary, 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 33:790, June, 1880. 
51. I bia •• p. 791. 
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52 
'rurks a.s both of them oppressed European peoples. Arthur 
J. Eva.ns,son-in-la'\-1 of E. A. Freema.n, announced that the 
~~gyar s wi shed to recreate the Hungarian Kingdom of the 
Belas, but had forgotten that old Hungary had been composed 
of many na.tionali ties which had received generous treatment 
from the Crown. Benevolence toward foreign colonists had 
assisted in the rise of medieval Hungary.. 'r he various 
languages and usages were respected. King Stephen I , wrote 
to his eon Emmeric: 
The colonists from different countries bring 
us their various languages and customs, they 
te a ch us a variety of arts and supply us with a 
variety of arms •••• A king dom wh ich has only one 
languag e and_ one code of custome is unstable and 
easily broken. 
53 
Eva.ns advi s ed the 1'1 8.gyars of the nineteenth century to e.a.opt 
a. conciliatory policy and abandon all oppreseion. He added 
that their treetment of the Slave wa_s inconceiva.ble to anyone 
who had not observed it. The ad.age, "let the NB.gyar be free, 
ana. the whole world serve him, 11 summed up well their spirit. 
They had. an utter contempt for the subject people . a-rid ·the 
saying, "whenever a Slav epeaksr a dog yelps," represented 
their limited outlook. Eva.ns declared that the Germa.ns of 
52. E. A. Freeman, "The Position of the Austrian Power 
in South-Ea.stern Europe, 11 Conte rnporfir.Y_ Review, 41:738-739, 
May , 1882. 
53. Arthur J. Evans, "The Austria.n Counter-Revolution 
in the Balkans, 11 Fortnightly Review, 33:499, April, 1880. 
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Bungary who might ha.ve expected better treatment had been 
discriminated against and ha.d experienced. forced 
Magyarizetion. The Government of Hungary wae the tyranny 
of a n a ristocratic caste which used a. real but one-~ided 
54 
constitution as the instrument of its oppreseion. J. D. 
Bourchier, an extensive traveler in the Balka.ns, supported 
the contention that the Sla.ve were detested by the Na.gyare 
who had a seumed a predominance disproportionate with their 
number s ; six mil l ion Magyars controlled the destiny of ten 
million Slavs. Thie commentator reported that an 
aristocretic society still existed, and nothing was ·. thought 
. 55 
of flo gging peasants or setting man-traps for poachers. 
11 The Slovaks in northern Hungary are as a rule little more 
t h en serfs to the great 1ungarian landlords, but their 
56 
political development will come in time." A contributor 
to t he Edinburgh Review called attention to the true state 
of affairs in Hungary: A restricted suffrage, the practice 
of oral voting , and an arbitrary arrangement of voting 
district s ha.d aided the 1'-Tagyars in maintenance of their 
eupremacy. It wa. s stated that the Rumanians resisted, but 
it vl e.s useless for t hem to reme.in away from elections ae the 
54. ~., p. 498. 
55. J. D. Bourchier "The Heritage of t he Hapsburgs," 
Fortnightly Review, 51: 3~6 !•larcr. , 1889; also, William T. 
Stead, Truth About Russia (London: Cassell and Company, 
Limited, 1888), p. 68. 
56. Bourchier, loc.cit. 
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Magye.rs always could_ bribe enough peasants to win. 11 It 
is possible to sympathize not only with nations rightly 
1 struggling to be free 1 , but also with nations rightly 
struggling for mastery." Political tradition and common 
sense were thought to offset o·bvious imperfections. "All 
57 
but fanatics of nationalism must wish for their success." 
In the aforementioned views Social Darwinism can be 
detected. Implice.tion was ma.de that t h e Ma.gyars d_eserved 
a dominant position and the manner of its acquisition was 
not p a ramount. All life struggled before bowing to the 
superior form of the species. 
In the mid-nineties, the National Observer acknowledged 
that the Magyars had used arrogant intolerance toward the 
subject people, and it was thought that the Hungarian state 
could b e preserved only if the Magyars proved tractable. 
'l'he weekly outlined conditions in Hungary; the Rumanian s 
a.s well as the other Slavs had. all the exigencies of 
citizenship, but were deprived of a voice in the administration 
of affairs and the use of their own language in schools, in 
public meetings, and_ the like. 'l'he Magyars were a minority 
who lived on sufferance. It wae admitted that they possessed 
qualities of bra_very and self-assurance, but their chivalric 
virtue looked. better at a distance t h an on close scrutiny. 
11 More than anywh ere else if possible their cry for 1 Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity' proves to be '.ill! eonge entre deux 
57. "The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary, 11 on.cit., 
pp. 5-?. 
58 
rnensonges 1 • 11 
The Eco norni st, in 1898, explained t hat hostility 
between the l'f!.B.gyars and the Slavs ha.d not be en visible 
-lJJ-
beceuse t h e l8,tter were uneclucated and somewhat submissive; 
ye t t h e feeling bad been as bitter as the German-Czech 
animosity, and was more de.ngerous because the Slav pea.eantry 
desired land which coula_ be obta inect if the gagyars lost 
59 
their ascendancy. Five years later the same news organ 
a gain exposed the ra.cial situation, a_eclaring that the 
Magyars were tyrants who kept the Rumanians and all Slavs 
in subjugation; freedom of speech had. been greatly curtailed 
60 
and trial by jury had become almost a farce. At the turn 
of the century, the Quarterly Review reported that Austria 
had displayed a marked willingness to make concessions to 
various nationalities, but Hungary had pursued an opposite 
program. "Intolerance is its principle, bitter intolerance 
of everything that is not :t-1agyar. 11 A bitter struggle took 
place within the country which was said to have been unknown 
outsid e t h e realm. "There is no country in the '\vorld. where 
the ruling race dares to behave with such tyranny and 
58. 11 Hunp;Bris.n Hash, 11 National Observer, 13:690-691, 
Nay l 1, 1 895; also, 11 Austria Capita l<'erum, 11 Na tions1 
Observer, 14:35-36, Ma_y 25, 1895; also, "The Magyar 
Milennium, 11 Nationa.1 Observer, 15:281-282, January 18, 
1896. 
59. "The Growing Trouble in Austria., 11 Economist,-
56:866-867, June 11, 1898. 
60. "New Troubles for Austria, 11 Economist, 61:954, 
May 30, 1903. 
intolerance as in Hungary, the le.nd of liberalism and 
61 
freedom. 11 An indictment wa s made of the forcible 
assimilation program of the Magyars. 'Ihey had not been 
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content to make their language the officia.l tongue of the 
nation but had forced its employment even in unofficial 
usage, and, be sides, they tried to root out all other 
lan~uages. They had felt most resentful of the German 
language because of its educational superiority and its 
officia.l status prior to 1866. As a result, German had 
been removed from the echool eystem, and .even German plays, 
with difficulty, r eached a Hungarian stege. However, it 
1-ras explained that the Germans had n ot shown the strongest 
resistance to the program; instea.d., the Rumania.ns and Croats 
vigorously and tenaciously struggled to preserve their own 
62 
distinctive culture. The Magyars used the school system 
to inculcate their traditions. K6r6si, a Hungarian 
etatistician, reported that at Budapest t he school system 
instilled ~·Iagya.r culture into sixty-two per cent of the 
Slovak children and thirty-six per cent of the German 
63 
children. 
61. 11 The National Conflict in Austria-Hunga.ry, 11 
op . cit., P~ . 389~ 
62. Ibid ., D •• 391-393. 
63. Rowland Blennerha sset, 11 The Austrian Anxiety, 11 
Na tional Review, 37:361, May, 1901. 
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During the first ten yeare of the twentieth century, 
British writere made a more complete ana]¥sie of the racial 
situation. ConcUtions within Hungary had become so obvious 
as to cause concern in Britain, for the Magyare were 
outspoken in Slavophobe sentiment and applied vigorous 
measures against the minority groups. Racial riots, 
oppressions, and proposals to restrict univereal e~ffrage, 
after Austria had granted a complete franchise, made the 
situation crystalline. A change of views occurred in 
several newe organe which formerly had consictered the Magyars 
a sta.bilizing force t hat preserved the Habsburg Empire arid 
gave it direction and firmness. In 1888, the London Times 
reported that Hungary had remained compact, free, and 
thriving because nationalism and clericalism had been 
64 
pushed into the background. In the nineties, this 
newspaper did not favor the aspirations of the Hungarian 
minorities; in fact, no mention was made of Magyarization. 
Instead, the correspondent at Vienna presented the l~gyar 
viewpoint: '11he rulers of Hungary .were level-hee.ded 
politicia.ns ana. ps.triote worthy of the position they occupied 
65 
in the Monarchy. They possessed the characteristics of a 
ruling ~roup, a. resolute d.etermination to maintain supremacy 
without regard for political theories, and their qualities 
66 
contributed to preservation of their lead.ership. In 1900, 
64. "Why The English Shun Austria, 11 London Times, 
September 26, 1888. · 
65. News dispa tch in London _Times, November 15, 1892. 
66. Ibid., Je.nue.ry 18, 1899. 
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the Times correspondent called the Hungarians gallant, 
hospita.ble, and liberty-loving, in contre.st to the 11 :rrotley 
coalition of Pan-Germanists, Anti-Semites, Reactionaries, 
67 . 
and Social Democrats," that attacked England. The next 
year the correspondent at Vienna stated that the most 
important task of the Magyars was peaceful assimilation of 
the natione.li ties, and quoted at length Count .Apponyi 1 s 
68 
·fevorable views on the Magyarization process. However, 
by 1906, the paper a.pproved the demand of the Slovaks for 
equal treatment guaranteed to them by the Nationalities 
Law of 1868, and criticized the ~~gyar use of judicial 
power to conceal injustice. 
It is with sincere regret that friends and 
admirers of the l~gyars see them prepare for 
themselves a troublesome future of racial 
· intolerance and persecution ••.• The Nationalities 
Law of 1868 breathed Deak 1 s spirit but it has 
been consistently trodaen under foot. 
69 
It was explained that they tree.ted the Croats as inferior 
beings, and tha.t eight million Magya.rs haa. three hundred 
• 
seventy representatives in the CbB.mber while ten million 
70 
non-Magyars had but forty members. Thus qy 1908 a marked 
shift had occurred; the Magyars were severely criticized 
67. Ibia .• , July 24, 1900. 
68. Ibid., November 4, 1902. 
69. Ibid. I November 20, 1906 .. 
70. Ibid., December 10, 1907. 
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for persecution of Slavic races and for forcible Magyariza-
tion, 1r1hich d.rove the Slavs to the Greater Austria. Party 
and to Pan-Germanism. The Times believed that power had to 
be shared with the Slavs in order to break Pan-Gerw~nism 
and re move the threat of PQn-Slavism. The paper wa s 
convinced that the Magyars and ·Slavs would have to join 
forces in orcler to p reserve the Empire, and a continuation 
of Austria-Hungary was the primary consideration. 
During the nineteenth century the .Saturday Review had 
neither noticed Slav grievances nor suggested that a new 
dietribution of power was requisite in Hungary; but in 
1905 the r'iagyar trea tment of the Slavs was cri tici-ze!d. I t 
acknowledged. that the Na gyars were less than one-half the 
populati on and yet controlled ninety-seven per cent of the 
legisletive representation. Although they were the best 
educated and most advanced group, in the Kingdom, it \vas · 
believed pure folly for them to withhold the franchise from 
one-half t he land owners and tradesmen and eighty per cent 
· of the workers. The politica.l discrimina tion was condemned, 
and it was held respoh.sible for the ~rowth of Socialism in 
71 
Transylvania. 
In 1908 , Magyar racial supp ression was documented in 
Racia l Problems in Hungary, . by Seton-Vlatson. This work 
definitely recorded th.e injustices inflicted upon the 
71 . "The New Phase in Hungary, 11 Satur day Review · 
l oc, cit . 
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SlovB.ks since the establishment of Dualism. Discrimina.tion 
extended from administration and representation to educational 
fBcilities, to language, and to culture, and the treatment 
culminated in forcible Magyarization. It wa s Atated that 
other minorities in the .Hungarian state were in a similar 
position. A few years later Seton-"\IJBtson presented t he 
Croatie.n CB_se in Absolutism in Croatia a.nd in The Southern 
Sle.v Question and the Habsburg Monarchy. His exposes were 
difficult to refute. However, material in this chapter has 
clearly shown that the position of the Slavic peoples was 
definitely known in England; .critical comments appeared in 
the press at the onset of Dualism and continued in volume 
throughout the latter pert of the nineteenth century. A 
subs tantial number of British writers had a clear and 
accurate knowledge of conditions. Seton-Watson focused 
attention on the subject and provided necessary documentatio n. 
The Slovak position was described in the Westminster Review 
in 1908, by the historian H. W. V. Temr,erley, who a lso 
alluded to the Croats• plRce in Hungary and outlined their 
72 
success in resisting Magye.rization. From 1908 to the 
outbreek of World War I, conditions in Hungary were clearly 
recognized and idea_lization of the Magyars sharply declined. 
The full -light of publicity had. been turned. on Hungary and 
no doubt Britain would. have heartily endorsed Cromwell 1 s 
72. H. vi. v. Temperley) 11 Ra.cial Strife in Hungary) II 
Westminster Review, 169:1-12, January, 1908. 
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observetion: 
Every sect saith: 1 0h give me liberty! 1 But 
give him it, and, to his pow~r, he will not yield 
it to anybody else. Liberty of conscience is a 
natura.l right; and he that would have it ought 
to give it. 
Events in Hungary made Magyar oppressions more obvious to 
news organs in England, but another factor also shaped 
opinion. The Cons~rvative Party a~ the news organs which 
supported its progra_ms always he.d been keenly interested 
in strengthening the Habsburg Empire so it could resist both 
German and Rus sie_n pres sure s. For twenty-five to thirty 
yea_rs a.fter the establishment of Duelism, the lfJ.B.gyars 
a.ppeared a.s a strength to the Empire. During those years 
Slav discontent had been effectively stifled; the ruling 
caste expanded public works, displayed a solidarity a_nd a 
decisiveness in their legislative chambers, and Hungary 
seemed to have been in an improved. economic position. Now, 
in the years immediately preceding and following 1900, there 
was an upswing of Sla.v na.tionalism; the Magyars refused to 
increase their financial support to the Empire, the ruling 
clique pressed for more concessions from Vienna, and demand 
for use of Me.gyar in the army showed a tendency to sepa.ratism. 
Also a growing party within the nation spqnsored Hungarian 
independence; in short, a more reactionary spirit seemed 
to pervade the politics of the nation, and much of the past 
economic vigor was attributed to foreign loans. In this 
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period then, Conservative Britain appeared more cri tia'al 
of the Magyars as it was recognized that they pursued a 
disruptive course--harshness to the Slavs could bring 
a bout disintegration of the Empire and result in a Balkan 
conflict. _ 
It is important to understand just why the Magyars 
had ap pealed to certain circles in Great Britain. The 
r eason is most obvious. Up to 1866 the l~gyars had 
struggled a gainst absolutism and had loudly proclaimed their 
devotion to constitutionalism. Moreover, Protestantism had 
a strong foothold in the country, in contrast to the 
universality of Catholicism in Cisleithania. 
No men imbued with the tradition o:f English 
freedom will ever rea d the story of the heroes 
and romantic struggle which has been carried on 
by the Hungarians in the cause of civil and 
religious liberty without ·. the we.r mest wishes for 
the future prosperity and glory of the Hungarian 
crown. 
73 
Besides, Hungary had a history of martial deeds ana. capable 
fi~hting :forces that contributed to the preservation of 
Europe. "It may never be forgotten that but for Hungary the 
Horsetails would have danced in triumph from the Arno to 
74 
the Seine." The l agyars had suffered oppression and 
ultimately had triumphed by courage. 
English nobility and the Magyar aristocracy had a 
73. Rowland Blennerhasset, "Grea t Britain and the Dual 
Mona rchy, 11 National Review, 35:554, June, 1900. . 
74. George Henry Lewes, 11 Recent Austrian Policy," 
Fortnightly Review, 3:74, November, 1865. 
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similarity of interests and manners. In the mid-years of 
the nineteenth century, Kossuth had .been a most attractive 
figure and had made a fine impression as a representative 
of Magyar aristocracy. Such English sports as horse-racing 
and fox-hunting had been introduced into Hungary and had 
been adopted by the aristocracy. After a trip to England, 
a servant of a Magyar gentleman was asked if he had seen 
Englishmen, and he r eplied, "I have seen many English, but 
75 
not one so English as my master. 11 After traveling on the 
continent, Viscount Bryce wrote that Englishmen were not 
too welcome among European politicians and were considered 
selfish, trade-loving people, content with insular prosperity, 
and proud of aloofness from continental wars. Germany, 
France and Austria had developed prejudices; Hungary, r ov1ever, 
76 
always had welcomed Englishmen. An English diplomat · reported 
that country life a.nd the great estates of Hungary re sembled 
rural Britain and for that reason delighted English 
77 
travelers. In 1874, a writer for a leading periodical 
re marked that inasmuch as the Magyars admired Britain, ehe 
75. Arthur J. Pntterson, The Magyars Their Country and 
Institutions (London: Smith, Elder a.nd Compa.ny, 1869), p:---J'l; 
also, Francis H. E. Palmer, Austro-Hungarian Life in Town 
and Co1mtry (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 190~pp. 'b'J=b4. 
~76. Viscount Bryce, Memories of Travel (New York: 
The l•1acmillan Company, 1923), p. 107. 
77. Lo l:"d Hovrard of Penri th, Theatre of Life 12Q.i-
1.212. (London: Hod.der and Stoughton, Ltd., 19~ II, p. 153. 
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could acquire an ally without conditions if they ever fully 
78 
controlled the foreign policy of the Habsburg Empire. 
Some writers admitted the faults of the Magyars, and yet 
described them as a handsome group, the most cultured and 
79 
chivalrous aristocrats in Europe. 
The Eighty Club of England, a Liberal organization, 
visited Hungary in 1906, and its report summarized the 
idealization of Magyar liberality which was difficult to 
obliterate: 
Between England and Hungary there is little 
call for mutual explanation; we need no inter-
preter to e ach other. I have heard it said that 
Hungary is the only country in Europe where an 
Englishman i s liked, whatever qualities he may 
possess, or in - spite of many qualities he may 
possess, simply because he is an Englishman. We 
have indeed great things of national life in 
common--an ineradica.ble love of freedom; an 
ancient monarchy broad-based upon the people's 
will; seven centuries of constitutiona l history. 
We have our Magna Charta; you have your Golden 
Bull. We have our Westminster; you ha~e your 
Field of Rako s. 
80 
78. Griffin, .Q.Q..cit., p. 37. 
79. Bourchier, .Q.Q..cit., p. 387. 
80. Hungary Its People, Places and Politics: The Visit 
of the Eighty Club in 1906 {London: ~Fisher Unwi~Ltd., 
190?T':"" p. 96. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Slavs 
The Habsburg Empire was co mpo sed of many distinct 
Slavic areas, yet British a.tten tion centered upon Bohemia. 
The Czechs "Jere a most progressive Slavic racial group and 
had 1mdergone a re markable renascence of cultural grov1th 
in the nineteenth century. They possessed a compact location 
in the heart of Europe and utilized their com:rrercial and 
industrial potentialities. In addition, they were vociferous 
in demands for autonomy--Home Rule, for their past was not 
lo st in shadows; on the contrary, in the medieval period 
they couhl_ boast of a proud history which somewhat riva led 
that of the Magyars and Poles. The Czechs, together with 
the Slovaks and Moravians, in the fifty years prior to 
World War I, increHsed from approxima.tely three and one-hp.lf 
million to six and one-half million. Besides, the Czechs 
showed e.ggress i veness and determination, and_ were g ifted 
with able leeders in various fields who made Europe aware 
of their homeland. 
The Polish nationality w ~ s conspicuous because of its 
illustrious past and cosmopolitan nobility. Throughout 
the first f ifty years of the nineteenth century the Poles 
• 
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had shared in the epoch-making events. They had played a 
notable part in the Napoleonic scheme of settlement and in 
the Congress of Vienna, and in the thi~ties and sixties 
they had tried to oost off Russian rule. It was -difficult 
to overlook their place in the Habsburg Empire and their 
hopes for a unified national existence. Like most Slavic 
racial groups, their number increased sharply, from about 
two and one-quarter million in 1866, to almost five million 
in 1914. 
The Austro-P~ussian War was the signal for the various 
Slavic groups t·o raise their nationalistic standards. At 
the exclusion of the Empire from the German Confederation, 
the question was raised whether European ana. Austrian 
interests would be served by granting additional power to the 
majority Slavs and by directing attention to the East. Also, 
the strength and objectives of the Pan-Slavic movement in 
the Habsburg Monarchy became all important. Whether the 
Slavs listened to alluring words from Russia and believed 
it expecUent to ·join a large Slavonic Empire under her 
guidance, was a subject frequently discussed. And if granted 
a separate government and autonomy, would they merely intrigue 
for dissolution of' the Ha.bsburg state, or would they remain 
loyal, satisfied with local independence within the f'ramework 
of the Empire? To Britain, these were vital questions, for 
she did not want a growth of' Russian power in the Balkans, 
the gateway to the Near East. Moreover, opinion varied in 
-145-
regard to culture. Some observers maintained that the 
intellectual life woukl improve by continuation of German 
and Magyar domination; yet others suggested that the Slavs 
who possessed a distinctive blend of Eastern and Western 
ideas should develop the aesthetic life of the nation. The 
British people who rP-spected the tried and true and were 
apprehensive of rapid change seemed startled by the intensity 
of the deman ds and counter-demands. After eliminating 
superfluous argumentation, however, the situation seemed to 
resolve itself into the basic question, whether or not 
Englishmen placed their faith in democracy and majority rul8 
under the most adverse conditions--vast differences in 
education, culture, and outlook. In short, should the 
government of the Habsburg state be based upon the principle 
of qualitative or quantitative rule? The intellectual appeal 
of Social Darwinism was used to champion the former principle, 
and the emotional tide of British domestic politics supported 
the le.tter. 
There viere two strong trends in British public op inion 
pertaining to the Slavs; one was favorable to their demand:s 
and the other hostile. The Sl~vophile sentiment will be 
analyzed first. A few months after the close of the Seven 
Weeks' War, Edward Dicey, a journalist, reported that people 
seemed. quite ready to pred.ict a promising future for 
Austria-Hunge.ry but, in truth, the pre-l>rar Empire had received 
a fatal blow. The nation could prosper only if a ruler of 
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great ability arose, abandoned German inclinations and 
transformed the Ivfonarchy into a Slavonic state. 11 But the 
task would be one of Herculean difficulty; and the Habsburgs 
1 
are not Na.poleons. 11 
About the same time, the Pall Mall Gazette indicated 
that Austria could not be invigorated until a sweeping 
chan~e had been brought about. The various peoples were 
loyal Austrians but i-Tere not German, and the system which 
subordinated_ all of the state to its most insignificant 
2 
pa.rt had to be replt:tced by a more substantial union. A 
resume of Austrian constitutional histo~ during 1866-
1867 is not germane to this study. It is sufficient to 
say that alon~ with Hungarian demands for autonomy and 
Dualism, a Federal solution was sugg~sted whereby Bohemia 
would secure a position analogous to that proposed for 
Hungary; the leading governmental proponent of the latter 
settlement WR.s Count Belcred.i. Adoption of F'ederalism 
appeared very likely, as delegates favorable to such a system 
had been selected in Bohemia, Moravia, Galicia, and Carniola. 
At the decisive time, however, Count Beust, the German 
Liberals, and the Magyars reacted against -the proposed system, 
1. Edward Dicey, 11 The Campaign in Germany, 11 Iv'.lB.cmillan 1 s 
Magszine, 14:394, September, 1866. Edward Dicey was at one 
time correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, and editor of 
the Daily News and the Observer. 
2. 11 Austria on the Adria tic, 11 Pall 1-1all Gazette, 
October 11, 1866; also, 11 'I'he Situation in Austria, 11 Pall 
lvl:all Gazette, January 9, 1867. 
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and with the fall of Belcredi and Federalism, the Ausgleich 
was launched. 
Much interest was shown by Englishmen, in the cause of 
the Czechs and in their demands for recognition of the new 
governmen t al system being formed. In 1866 , an article in 
t he Westminster Review sympathized with Czech asnirations, 
and expressed full confidence in their loyalty to the 
Habsburg state. It vras admitted that Slavonic members in 
various Diets, beyond a doubt, had forcefully expressed their 
wants and m.d displayed injured nP..tional feelings, but they 
had demanded only fair play a.nd justice, and in truth he.d 
manifested statesme.nlike viel:s,. They had asked for self-
government but did not act against centripetal force, 
consequently, it was maintained that the Sl avs had voiced 
Austrian sentiments, loyalty to the Crown and the Empi r e . 
A member of the Styrian Diet stated, "it is ·union, not 
unifo rrni ty we require. 11 The Review quoted_ an excerpt from 
a speech by Dr. Rieger, the Czech leader, which clearly 
presented Slav feelings: 
Although the Czechs were different in race from 
others in Austria, yet they were reedy to unite with 
all in a central council to deliberate on the more 
important affairs of the realm; 'i.rhilst in a ne.rro"tver 
sphere each nation could follow that path ,.rhich would 
best lead to the development of its material and 
spiritual welfare. Whichever nation in this struggle 
for improvement should prove itself possessed of the 
gre P. test capacity and wisdom would of necessity obta in 
the greRtest influence. 
3 
3. "The Situation . in Aus tria, 11 Westminster Revie'ttT, 
29:358- 389, April, 1866. 
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Count Belcredi was commended for his conciliatory _policy 
toward Slavs who h d reacted againet burea.ucre.tic 
. 4 
centra liza tion, the poli.cy of h is predecessors. · It was 
recognized tha t he strugg led against many Vienna Liberals 
and 1Jiagye.rs at Pe sth who were eager to accept Dualism; the 
Liberals wished to keep the leoser Reichsrat as the 
legi slative body · for t he \'!estern half of the Empire, and 
a llmv t h e unf?:P..rian Diet. to perform t he same function in the 
Eastern half. Thus, the "inferior Slavonic race" could be 
Germanized or :vlB.gyarized. Howev er, it was thought highly . 
improbable t hat this policy could be CB. rried out, for the 
Sle vs a.moun t ed to fifteen million a.n d va rious g roups , 
especially the Czechs, had become a-v1are of their own i mpor tance 
.5 
a.nd he.d. begun to cul ti va.te t heir native tongue e.nd literature. 
In 1868, a contributor to 1acmillan 1 s Magazine de p recated 
the means used to secure the constitutional settlement as 
well as the settlement itself. The Slavic nati onaliti es 
through lo ce.l Diets hP.d strongly oppo sed t he arrengement. 
The writer declar ed t hat Baron Beust had disregarded t he 
expressed wishes of the majority; he called for new elect i ons 
. 
in w1ich the fu l l weight of t h e Government was used to re turn 
representa tives who would support t h e o fficial position. As 
the Czech members of t he Bohemian and l orevian Diets refused 
t o at tend t h e Reichsrat, four and one-ha l f million Czech s 
4 . Loc.cit • 
.5 • Lo c • cit • 
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6 
¥ere unrep resented. It wr s predicted in the Westminister 
Re view that the "narrow-minded.ness and racism11 of the Auetro-
Germans established a dange rous pr ecedent--Pan-Germani sm 
begot Pan-Blavism. The Austro-Blavs were loyal to Austria 
but we.n ted self-~overnment e.nd equality for Bohemia, but 
inesmuch as their wishes h ~C· d become difficult of fulfillment, 
eighty lee ders haft attended e.n exhibition in :tvloe cow and 
Saint Petersburg where they were f e ted and complimented and 
7 
Sletv unity was stressed. The Czechs he.d we.rited primarily 
to enjoy national customs and language and control their own 
loce.l aclmin-istration. Although a completely separate 
administration had. been demanded, it was thought they could 
be placa.ted. by employment of Czech officials, use of the 
Czech languag e in loca.l departments, autonomy of t h e Bohemian 
Diet over lo cal matters and fin ance, and appointment of a 
repre sen t ative at Vienna to protect Czech intere s ts. Similar 
concessions would satisfy the peoples of Galicia, and the 
Slavonians of Istria, Carinthia, et cetera. And it was 
suggested t hat probably Baron Beust had not realized the 
future of the Wes t e rn half of the Empire depended on the 
Slavonian element, and that by bas ing it on the German he 
8 
simply insured dis solution of ·the state. 
6 . 11 The Beust Regime in Aus-tria, 11 l'•1acmille.n 1 s Magazine, 
18 :418, September, 1868. 
7. 11 Dualism in Austria, 11 1-vestminster Revi§!!., J2:LljJ, 
October, 1867. 
8. 11 The Beuet Regime in Austria, 11 QQ. cit., p. 425. · 
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In the same year, in Colburn's United Service ~~gazine, 
it was asserted that Bohemia contained nix million people, 
and her demand for equal privileges which represented the 
9 
sentiment of the majority could not be denied. The Examiner 
viewed appeasement of the Slavs as a necessity considering 
the fe et that they had Russian aid e.s an alterne.tive. The 
Poles had experienced Russian rule and would never turn 
East, l:ut the other Slavs mi gh t gravitate to Saint Petersburg. 
Furthermore, a gra.nt of equal rights to them had been approved 
10 
by a me_jority of the Empire's voters. But ten years later, 
the we ekly reproa ched the Slavs for disruptive policies. 
As e. rule the Slav element both in Hungary and 
in German-Austria. rep resents poll tical and clerice.l 
reaction, aristocratic feudalism, and general lack 
of cu lture. 
11 
The drestic political change may have heen partia.lly 
r espon s ible for the shift in opinion. Count Taaffe relied 
hea.vily on clericals and the Slavs. The Sl.e. vic group we.s 
CRlled indolent and unable to see more than an inch in front 
12 
of its nose. 
9. il Foreign Summe r y , 11 Col burn 1 s United Service Maga zine, 
p. 106, September, 1868~ 
10. "Hungary and Croatia, 11 Examiner, pp. 63-64, J anue.ry 20, 
1872; also, "Poland and the Partitioning Powers," Examiner, 
pp. 195-197, February 20, 1872. 
11. "Austria," Examiner, PD. 856-857, July 5, 1879. 
12. 11 The Heart of Europe," Examiner, pp. 712-713, June 12, 
1880. cr. post pp. 227-228. 
In 1869, the harsh treetment of the Czechs w~s 
criticized in Vani t1. Fair: 
As regards liberty of the press, t he right of 
public meeting, a.nd the new fundamental rights 
-151-
of personal freedom ••• not the faintest reflex of 
these good things has as yet extended to the Czechs. 
According to the article, the Viennese Government had 
disregarded and neglected their r1~hts so that finally their 
loyalty to the Empire became undermined. It was stated 
that the Czechs were Qn essential and a natural part of the 
nation and their devotion had saved the nation once; but it 
was uncertain whether it could be relied upon if discrimination 
13 
continued. In t he year follo'\'Jing . the Austro-Prussian \var, 
the Lond.on Revie\<! outlined Slavic desires, their hope for 
self-determination within the Empire untrammeled by either 
the 1-iB.gyars or the Ge r mans, in other words, autonomy for all 
sections. 
The entire Ivfagyar ra.ce of Austria numbers 
scarcely five millions. If they persist, a~ 
seems too probable, in their demands of a more 
personal union with Austria, and of hegemony 
over the ot her countries pertaining to the 
Hungarian Crown, the day may be not far distant 
when t h ey will have to repent thei r short-sighted 
policy. 
The prediction was made that wars of religion were past, but 
14 
wars of na t i onalism were in the future. 
13. Pra:~rda, 11 The Da rk Side of the Austrian Question, 11 
Vanity Fai r, 1:357-358, May 15, 1869~' · · 
14. 11 Austrian Constitutional Difficulties, 11 London 
Review, 14:106-107, January 26, 1867. 
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During the Hohenwart ministry the Tablet, an organ of 
English Catholicism, asserted that the Slavs of the Empire 
had to be placa.ted. It wa.s absurd for the Germans, who 
amoun t ed to only one-third of the Austrie.n population, to 
believe they could rule the state alone and treat the Slavs 
as serfs. The weekly suggested that the Czechs and other 
Slavs combine and_ abandon pe.rliamentary abstention and by 
cooperHtion ~ecure their rightful pla.ce in the centre_l 
government at Vienna. Perhaps the sympathy of English 
Catholicism, to the Slavs of t he Habsburg Empire, was _ based 
upon the belief that they were more .loyal to the Church than 
15 
were the Austro-Germans. 
In 1879, Count •raaffe became Premier, and the IvJ:orning 
Post h ighly praised Taaffe's statement that his Ministry was 
equally concerned with the interests of the Slavs and Germans. 
The daily criticized the Austro-Gerrnan attitude of superiority, 
16 
and v.ras convinced tha.t the Slavs were loyal to the Empire. 
In 1883, the Tablet examined conditions in Bohemia, and 
compared the suppression of the Czechs in 1867, by the German 
Libera.ls, to the BCtion of Cromwell's troops in Ireland . The 
week~ condemned t he political oppression that had continued . 
for twelve years, in other words, refusal of electoral reforms 
15~ 11 The Crises in Austria," 'tablet, 6:549-550, October 
28, 1871; also~ 11 The Crises in Austria," Tablet, 6:613-614, 
November 11, 1~71~ 
16. Article in Pall Mall Gazette, December 10, 1879. 
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and free use of the Czech language. 11 Do those blindly 
f a.na tica_l G-erman Liberals in Bohemia really mee.n that there 
17 
is to be no p lace for the Slavs in Austria? 11 
Sir Che rles Dilke, the prominent Liberal, indicated 
that Austria had become tardlgrade, and because of immense 
difficulties was timid and weak in the constitutional 
sphere, and if she expected to fulfill her destiny, she had 
- 18 
to become a Slavic power. A decade earlier, Thomas 
Carlyle held_ the similar vie't-rpoin t that in the future the 
19 
Slavs and Hunf!:arians had. to predomina te in the Empire. 
In 1887, in a l e tter to the London Times, Edwa rd Freeman 
wrote sympathetically of Slav demands! ' 
'I'he only thing to complain -of is that a number 
of other land s which are neithe r Hungaria_n nor 
Austrian are unnaturally tied on, some to the 
kingdom, some to the archduchy. It is for t h ese 
lands that I and those who feel as I do ask for 
Home Rule and something more. 
20 
Glads tone did not agree wi th t h e t wo Libera.ls, Freeman and 
Dilke, concerning tra.nsforma.tion of t he Habsburg state into 
17. 11 'l'he Czech Question in the Austrian Emp ire, 11 Tablet , 
62:242-244, August 18, 1883; also, 11 The Vivisection of · 
Bohemia," Tablet, 62:1002-1003, Dece mbe r 29, 1883. 
18 . Sir Che..rles Dilke, The_ Presen,1 Posi_!;ion of European 
Politics, Q£ Europe i n 1887 1London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 
1887), p. 192. 
1 9 . Letter to London Times, November 28 , 1876. 
20. Lette r in Londo~ Times, Sentember 27, 1887. 
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a Sla.v Pov-.rer. 11 I regard t he effectue.l transformation of 
Austria. int o a. Sls.v Power as imposcible, and_ t he .efforts 
21 
a s most unwise and formida.ble for herself • 11 Some 
En~lishmen were convinced that the Empire had re a ched the 
ste.ge ~Then confederation was necessary, otherwise a 
complete assimile.tion had to take place, but the latter 
cnurse did not see m feasible as nationalism wa s in ascendency. 
Austria was composed of a myriad of local and separate 
organisms which at some time had enjoyed corporate existence. 
She had gathered together over twenty of these organisms~ 
benefiting many and acting as a deterrent to the destiny of 
ot hers. Russia and England played simil~r roles, Englaqd in 
Ino_ia and Russia. in Central Asia. However, Austria was at 
t h e fina.l stage and had to f ace the prblem without 
22 
eQuivocation. And right up to the fateful year 1914, 
Englishme n were troubled about the Slav question. At the 
assa.ssination of Francis Ferdinand, the Specta tor recorded 
that 
.•. at least t here is one ~reat and obvious cure 
for the perennial weakness and the most crying 
scandal of the Empire, and t hat is that the South 
Slavs sha ll not be allowed anywhere to re main the 
sport of a Magyar or a Teutonic domination. 
23 
21. Paul Knaplund, ~ladstone 1 s Foreign Policy (New York: 
Harpe r a.nd Brothers, publishers, 1935}, p . 158. 
22. W. Stillman, 11 Austro-Hungary, 11 Fortnightly Review, 
33:787, June 1880. 
23. 11 The Political Effects of the Archduke's Murder," 
Suectator, 113:5, July 4, 1914. · 
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And it seems pro-Slav writers placed their faith in the 
principle of majority rule which was so ardently championed 
by nineteenth century liberals. 
Before examining the Slavophobe sentiment, an important 
facet of the over-all question must be understood. English 
writers were much interested in Slavic numerical strength; 
t h e Czechs rapidly extended their influence by assimilation 
of the German population which existed in their midst, and, 
in fact, the Slavs as a whole expand.ed at a much greater 
rate than the Germanic element. One writer shrewdly pointed 
out that the Germans were scattered throughout the country 
in islandc surrounded by Slavs and were gractually absorbed. 
Pla ces v-1hich were German in the previous generation had 
become almost completely SJa v, and year by year the numerical 
ratio in mixed districts favored the Czechs. In Prague, in 
1856, there were seventy-three thousand Germans and fifty 
thousand Czechs. In 1893, however, not a single Ge~man was 
on ~ the Town Council mr a German representative of the 
c1ty 1 s electoral districts in Parliament. In Pilsen, in 
1856, the German element was ~reatly in majority; less than 
forty years later it had become a minority without political 
power. The Germans reproduced at the rate of 5.17 per 
thousand, the Slavs at the rate of 7. 73, and the Northern 
24 
SlRvs at 10.17 per thousand. Arthur J. Evans who t ,reveled 
24. E . B. Lanin, 11 Count Taaffe and Austrian Politics, 11 
Cont emporary Review, 63:299-300, February, 1893. 
through the Empire in 1875, stated that earlier in the 
·century Marburg had been considered a German tov-m but 
obviously it had become Slavonized. Both the tradesmen 
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and upper classes spoke Slovene rather than German, and 
since the Austro-Prussia.n War the schools had adopted the 
Slovene language. The population increase of the Slavs 
25 
would inevitably turn Austria-Hungary into a Slavonic state. 
In 1 889, in s.nswer to an inquiry by Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice, t h e British Ambasse.dor to Constantinople gave 
an interesting reply which indicated lively interest in the 
so-called Slavonization of the Empire. Sir William White 
believed that the Slavonization of Austria was an exaggeration 
spread by the Austro-Germans, in an effort to impress the 
authorities at Berlin. IJ:'he diplomat observed that Austria 
'\-rould not jeopardize her German character by making essential 
changes, in order to preserve her existence and. satisfy her 
I 
Slav sub jects. 11 A Parliamentary government in a country like 
Austria where the Germans are a minority, must be constantly 
doing something to satisfy ~~e various nationalities 
constituting the majority." In 1893, a well-informed 
observer noted that the elimination and submergence of the 
25. Arthur J. Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina 
QQ Foot (London; Longmans, Green & Co., 187b), p. 2. 
2.6. Henry Sutherland Edwards, Sir William White (London: 
John Murray, 1902), p. 209. 
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German nationality and language was going on throughout 
27 . 
the entire Habsburg realm. More than a decade later, 
William T. Stead reported: 
It is enough to keep p ouring the wine of lusty 
Slavonian life into the worn-out leather bottles 
of the Austrian re~dm to secure the ultimate 
triumph ••. certain victory is· assured if they will 
but await the reinforcements, creating those new 
new battalions of the future which are night and 
dBy being born into the Sla.vonian world. 
28 . 
In 1899, the Spectator recognized that the Slave had 
conquered the Habsburg Empire and Eaetern Europe b.y reason 
of a h igh birth rate, and with prophetic insight asserted 
that in the ne~T century they would control the entire 
continent; 
••• it is more to the point to say that, whatever 
the future political forme of Europe may be, her 
actual population will be largely, if not pre-
dominately, Slavonic, and that this fact may mean 
a different Europe from that known in history. 
29 
Consequently, educated Englishmen who were much interested 
in science, took into account biological reality as well 
ae political philosophies. 
Four idee.s seem to be at the base of British objections 
to the Slavic progra.m. First, the Slave, and even Czechs who 
27. Sidney Whitma~( The Realm of the Habsburgs (London: 
William Heinemman, 1893J, pp. 23-26. 
28. William T. Stead 11 The Arrival of the Slavs, 11 
Contemporary Review, 95:14, January, 1909. 
29. 11 The Slav in Europe," Spectator, 8):486-487, 
October 7, 1899. 
-158-
were the most advanced Slavic group, .were characterized by 
many observers e.s ignorant and backward. A most consistent 
cond.emnation of their position was found in the Saturday 
Review. Emphasis was placed upon Bohemia 1 s lack of develop-
ment which was considered a sine qua non for independent 
rule, and her reactionary tendencies were stressed. It was 
remarked, in 1868, that the Czechs had no real complaints, 
and agitated simply because they thought 11 that the really 
Czechish thing is for the Czechs to s ay they are Czehcs," 
JO 
and to be unhappy until this is som~how recognized. 
Moreover, there was no validity to Bohemia 1 s demand for the 
type of government that had been granted to Hungary. It was 
one thing to divide the Empire between two natural entities, 
and_ another to sp.li t it into fragments. The weekly stated 
that the Hungarians had received confirmation of laws and 
privileges which had existed for centuries, and, in fact 
had been ratified twenty years earlier. Although the 
Magyars were a minority, the entire Hungarian population 
supported the venerable Constitution; in Bohemia, however, 
31 
the large German population wanted close ties with Vienna. 
In 1869, a contributor to the North British Review maintained 
that the Czechs had received ample autonomy by the constitu-
tional agreement hammered out in the aftermath of the Seven 
30. 11 Austria, 11 Saturday Review, 26:476-477, October 10, 
1868. 
31. "Austrian Difficulties," Saturday Review, 32:415, 
September 30, 1871. 
-159-
Weeks' War. 
But Bohemia can never become a vital question 
like Hungary. The position of the Czech party 
lacks both truth and justice. It is a struggle 
of the lovTer against the higher civilization, and 
of the prejudices of race against the modern idea 
of State. It is an alliance with Moscovitism 
against Western progress. 
32 
An article in Colburn's United Service Magazine asserted 
that the Slavs of Austria and Hungary were not entitled to a 
separate existence any more than the Bretons or Flemings of 
France, or the Celtic tribes of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. 
The prospect is a black one, .rendered still 
blacker by the s,hadow c·ast by the state of the 
Austrian Empire, when we behold all sorts of 
petty and semi-civilized nationalists threatening 
to rend the state into fra gments ••• and to deliver 
themselves up as a flock of sheep to the wolves and 
bears. 
31~ 
In 1879, the Pall Mall Gazette stated that the Czechs 
might have sincerely desired constitutional freedom, but many 
of the less advanced Slavs, that is, the Rumanians, Serbians, 
Slovaks and others, really did not v-rant poll tical 1i berty, 
as t h e spirit of nationalism dip. not guarantee a genuine 
devotion to political democracy. The paper doubted that the 
32. ~The Constitutional Development of Austria," North 
British Review, 51:170, October, . !869. 
33. Captain Spencer, 11 The Future of Austria and Her 
Nili tary F'orces," Col burn 1 s United Service Magazine 1 p. 337, 
March, 1872. 
34. W. T. Jones, 11 Europe and the Military PO\'Iers in 
1871," Colburn's United Service Magazine, p. 540, December, 
1871. 
33 
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peaceful practice of constitutional freedom would obliterate 
racial jealousy. "The historical factf\ which seem to bear 
out the theory of unification through .. comtnon freedom are 
35 
but few • 11 
E. B. Lanin, of the Contemporary Review, rejected 
Slavic aspirations and explicitly indicated that even though 
the Czechs outnumbered the Germans, the minority, if it were 
the enlightened section, could and should determine policy. 
He ste.ted that the Czechs were less prosperous, less 
cultured, and less instructed than the Germans, and in 
politics they were Federalists who desired to break the 
Empire in to autonomous factions, each with more independence 
than the constituents of the German Empire. In short, the 
Slavs might have been a versatile group but Lanin insisted 
that they lacked political tact. "Though always treated 
with fairness, they were never loved or respected by their 
German fellow citizens who honour their patrotism but 
36 
abhor their te.ctics. 11 He maintained that the Czechs were 
reactionaries and clericals, and had not developed enough 
culsturally to safely guide themselves. · 
In 1896, the Saturday Review again condemned the Slavs 
of the Empire. "We see Croats, Ruthenians, Poles, Servians, 
Wallachs and the rest of the half-barbarous hordes cutting 
one another's throats when they are not combining to insult 
35. 11 Austrian Difficulties, 11 Pe.ll Mall Gazette, April 7, 
1879. 
36. Lanin, QQ.cit., p. 283. 
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37 
the civilized Hungarians and Germans." However, three 
years later, the paper had somewhat altered its continuous 
stand of opposition, and. supported the SlRV position. It 
pointe·d out that Austria had two paths open to her. She 
could either assume the 1e adership of a Balkan confederation 
and thus control the Peninsula, or could declare herself 
Slav and depend upon · the support of SlQvs in and outside of 
the na.tion, and in this way "take up cudgels which Russia 
ha.s seemingly allowed to drop . 11 The weekly declared it was 
impossible to please all f a ctions which should have' been 
38 
patent to the Austrian Government. 
The second objection to the program of the Slavs was 
based on the as-soci'ation of this racial grouo with clerical 
forces. No d oubt in certain limited areas, aims were 
similar; that is, Federalism was desired by both clericals 
and Sle.vs. And the Taaffe Ministry which was clerical 
relied upon Slav support. But a wrong impression was 
cre a ted by some Eng l ish writers who classified all Slavs 
as clericals; in fact, the Czechs were not ardent 
clericalists. The South Slavs and Slovaks were much more 
inclined to church parties. 
The third objection grew out of the Irish auestion 
\rJhich IoTas the source of constant turmoil in British domestic 
37. 11 Austria in Extremis, 11 Saturday Review, 81:.519, May 
23, 1896. 
38. 11 Austria and South-Eastern Europe " Saturday Review, 
88: 414, September 30, 1899. - ' 
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politics, and which to some people appeared comparable to 
the Bohemian situation. The Irish issue influenced 
attitudes toward racial problems on the continent, for · 
Englishmen who considered Irish Home Rule a disruptive 
movement, the vigorousness of Irish tactics as intemperate, 
and feared for the Protestant minority, found surface 
conditions in Bohemia amazingly similar. 
They say what is good for Hungary is good for 
them. They are Czechs, and have quite as legendary 
and uncomfortable ancestors to boast of as the Irish 
themselves. They think themselves humiliated by 
being classed among the Cis-Leithan subjects of 
Austria. They want to have a fine noble independence 
of their own, and to be ~eft to talk their wild 
language without German interference. It is obvious 
that, if they got this, the Austrian Empire would 
crumble to pieces. 
39 
The increase of Irish nationalism, in the eighties and 
nineties, tended to sharpen the feeling against the desires 
of the European minorities, in particular the Czechs. Some 
who sponsored Bohemian Home Rule tried to dissociate the 
Habsburg province from Ireland, apparently believing that 
public feeling would turn against the Czechs if the two 
areas were thought alike. One writer stated that Bohemian 
autonomy was not at all comparable to Home Rule for Ireland, 
for the latter would mean separation from the British Empire, 
as the leaders in the movement actually strove for indepen-
dence; on the other hand, Czech lea<ie.-rs: · had expressed 
39. 11 Austria., 11 Saturde_y Review, 29:5,. Janua.ry 1, 1870. 
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4o ' 
complete loyalty to the Habsburg Empire and its Dynasty. 
Yet Glad.stone 1 in defending his progrEtm of Irish Home Rule, 
had pointed to Austria-Hungary a s a country where a similar 
. 41 
policy had proven most successful. But when the Young . 
Czechs begs.n to cause trouble the political opponents of 
Gladstone, with sa.ti sfaction·, pointed out that "an outbrea.k 
of di s turba.nce within the Empire ••• attests to the grossness 
of bi s a.elus ions on this subject (Home Rule) 1 and so power-
42 
fully reinforces their exposure. 11 And John Norley, an 
advocate of Irish Home Rule, stoutly maintained: 
I may rema rk that the hatred of the Czechs would 
be much too formidable for Germa.n composure, if the 
Czechs did not happen to possess a provincial charter 
e.nd a special constitution of their own. If the 
I rish had t h e s ame, their national dislike-~co far 
as it exists--mibht be expected to become as bea rable 
as the Germans have found the feeling of the Czechs. 
Harley's ste.tements were r e.ther ambiguous , for appa.rep.tly he 
imp lied that Bohemia had achieved an enviable semi-independent 
40. Rorrland B. Blennerhasset, "The Aus trian Problem," 
~tnJghtly Review, 77:607, April, 1905. Rowland B. 
Blennert.asset was a. libera.l Catholic, a close friend of 
Lord Acton, and one of the founcters of the Chronicle. He 
was intensely absorbed with foreign policy and familiar 
with trends and leaders on the continent. 
41. G. R. Herbert, Political Letters and SI(eeches 
of George 13th Earl of Pembroke_ e.nd M"''iltgomeryLond.on: 
Richa.rd Bentley and Son, 1896), pp. 112-113. 
42. 11 A Check From Bohemia, 11 Saturday Review, 76:321-
322, Sep t ember 16, 1893. 
sts.tus. On local matters the a.rea may have had some 
latitude, but4 in reality it was an integral part of I 3 
Cislei thania. · In 1888, when Count Taaffe appeared to be 
swinging tow·ard federalism by the inclusion of Count 
Frederick Schonborn in his Cabinet, the London Time~ 
correspondent at Vienna decla.red, "Count Taaffe has, 
there fore, unexpectedly embarked on a course exactly like 
that on which Mr . Gladstone rushed when he declared for 
44 
Home Rule in Irelapd.~~' · And a few days later, the Times 
editorially stated: "The Czech question is upo~ t~e country, 
- 45 
with all the r eality of o.ur own Irish question." At the 
turn of the century, the paper reported: 
Th e Czechs are a troublesome populatiori to 
govern. Like the Irish Nationalists they are 
alway s declaring that there is noth ing they 
desire more than peace, but it is always peace 
on their terms •. 
46 
And in the same year the Speaker compared the Bohemian 
47 
question with the situation in Ireland. In 1901 i n the 
Saturday Review, forceful repression of nationalities was 
43. John Morley, "Some Arguments Considered, 11 Hanfibook 
of Horne Rule: Being Articles on the Irish Que~tion TJarnes 
Bryce, editor, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1887), p. 280. 
44. News d ispatch in London Times, October 1~, 1888. 
45. Editorial in London T~mes, October 18, 1888. 
46. "The Austria~Hungary Problems," Public Opinion, 77: 
68-69, January 19, 1900. 
47. "The Austrian Peril, 11 Speaker, 23:33-34, October 13, 
1900. 
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advocated as the best means to handle the problem; the 
Empire seemed. at a standstill, subject to great internal 
discord. In dealing with her nationalities Austria had 
pursued the policy of partial Home Rule which was 
considered a program of weakness. Prussie_ and Russia had 
crushed the demand for inctependence in Poland. 11 Ca.n it be 
doubted that this has been a process that promises better 
48 
results •.• ? 11 
The fourth o'bjection to Slav self-determination was 
British fear of Russian influence under the guise of Pan-
Slavism. In England, as early as 1848, Count Krasinski 
gave an interpreta_tion of Pan-Slavism that built up 
apprehension among Englishnen. 
This feeling of national ity has now become 
stronger and more universal than ever a.mongst the 
Slavonians, as well as the belief that one race 
is destined to assume a position in the world 
proportionate to its numbers and the extent of 
lts- territory ••.• The strong intellectual movement 
animating all the branches of the Slavonic race is 
attended by a growing tendency towa.rd a union of 
all these branches amongst themselves, as well as 
their separs.tion from nations of a different origin, 
with whom me_ny Slavoniane are now poll tically united. 
Eugene Oswald. noted the.t the Czechs, being Slavs, belonged 
to e group which for the most part resided outside the 
Ha.bsburg Empire; a.nd he concluded: "The acropolis of the 
48. "Austria and Home Rule, 11 Saturday Review, 91:166, 
February 9, 1901. 
49. W. B. Foster-Bovill{ Hungary and the Hungarians, 
{London: Methuen & Co., 1908J, p. 345. 
49 
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Magya.rs is Bud.a.pesth, within the monarchy; but the Czechs 
have their kebla in the Czar• s d.omain--Moscow and Saint 
50 
Petersburg are their Mecca. and Medina. 11 During the 
Franco-Prussian war the British Consul at Trieste wrote: 
Now, I know that if Austria were to move to-
morrow, her Slavic population, quite entirely in 
the hands and some in the pay of Russia, would 
rise and dismember the empire. 
51 
And there was a. prevailing anxiety that the Austro-
Slavs might ally with ·Russia.: 
This, then, is the Slavonic Menace, as far ·as 
concerns the pea.ce ·in Europe. The doctrine of 
Nationality applied to Slavs cannot attain its 
end without the destruction of the Austro-Hungarisn 
Empire~ 
52 
The aforementioned observation appea.red in the Quarterly 
Review (a staunch Conservative news organ); apparently 
substantial members of the Tory Party felt that the Slavs 
were a source of weakness to the Dual Mona.rchy. 
During the mid-seventies, anti-Russian feeling inten-
sified, and it was widely held that Russia and Slav committees 
within the Empire were actively engaged in conspiratorial 
Co., 
SO. Eugene Oswald, Austria in 1868(London: Trubner & 
1868), p. 31. 
51. Edmund Dot-mey, Charles Lever: His Life in His 
Letters (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1906T, II, 
p. 301. 
52. 11 The Slavonic Menace to Europe, 11 Que.rterly Review, 
149:547, January-April, 1886. 
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action against the Habsburg state. The purpose was to 
undermine the loyalty of the Slavs. Consul Holmes, in 
1876, reported, "their desire is eaid to be a wish ••• to 
53 
embroil Au£tria in hopeless internal difficulties.M 
Captain Hozier, who had knowledge of the Eastern question, 
suggested that the Sls. vic population remained a. threat for 
it had not been assimilated and Russian intrigue was at 
work. He believed Belkan states under Russian protector-
ehip would attract HQbsburg Slavs to a great Pan-Slavic 
54 
empire and result in disruption of Austria-Hungary. And 
Sir George Sinclair, who ~ras most favorable to Russia, 
wrote that in case Austria attacked Russia the Slavs of 
the Habsburg Empire "might very probably rise in arms on 
55 
the other sid.e." 
Baron Henry de Worms felt that the Empire 's Slav 
population was loyal, yet he maintained that if a large 
Balkan Empire were forged by Russia the Sla.v provinces 
56 
11 would be irrisistibly dr8Wn into the orbit of Russia. 11 
53. Lord Robert Montagu, Foreign Policy: England and 
the Eastern Question (London: Chapman and Hall, 1877), p. 
Ibb. 
54. The Russo-Turkish War: Including an Account of the 
RiRe and Decline of the Ottoman Power, and the History of 
the Eastern Question-rGaptain H. M. Rozier, editor, London: 
Willia.m l-1-acKenzie, 1877), II, pp. 324-325. 
55. Sir George T. Sinclair, A Defense of Russia and 
the Christians of Turkey (London: Chapman and Hall, 1877), 
~14. --
56. Baron Henry de Worms, England',e Policy in the East 
(Second edition, London: Chapman and Hall, 1877), pp. 9-10. 
-168-
J. D. Bour9hier admitted that the Sla.vs were very 
capable soldiers but he questioned whether they would 
support the Empire if the enemy were a Slavic group. They 
had been devoted to the Habsburg Monarchy, but by 1889 
their loyalty had been tested_ by defects in the Dual system, 
and the commentator believed that their patriotiAm probably 
57 
would not withstand a conflict with Russia. Another 
observer remarked that Czech hegemony resulting in absorption 
of the German element would mean subordination of Austrian 
58 
interests to the whims of Russian diplomacy. William 
Lecky wrote tha.t the "doctrine of races 11 wa s destined to 
be a great disturbing factor in the world, and probably 
the Pan-Slavist movement was its most dangerous manifestation 
59 
as it s objective WE!.S t he break-up of both Turkey and Austria. 
I 
Some Enp;lishmen had a. more . complacent outlook toward 
Pan-Slavism. Sir Charles Eliot wrote: 
Pan-Slav;istn is much ·· talked of in the Austrian 
Empire; but it is rather a means of extorting 
concessions from the Government than a serious 
project of disruption. 
60 
57. J.D. Bourchier 11 The heritage of the H~J;sburgs, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 51:3~5, Ma rch, 1889. 
58. Lanin, QQ.cit., p. 298. 
59. William E. H. Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (New York: 
Longman s , Green and Co., 1899), I, pp. 500-501. 
60. Odysseus (Sir Charles Eliot), Turkey in Europe 
(London: Edwa.rd Arnold, 1900), p. 259. 
l 
I 
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Geoffrey Drage did not believe that Pan-Sla vism was a great 
threat to the Habsburg realm. He quo-ted both Palacky and 
Havlicek who had deplored the political aspect of Pan-
Slav ism. Havlicek stated: "To be good Slavs, we must .above 
all seek the welfare of our nation~" In 1908, Dr. Krama~ 
maintained that the movement was cultural and not political 
. . 
and was not dangerous to Austria. Drage repor~ed: 
11 Federa.lism and not secession is the plicy of' the na.tionali-
61 
ties." In short, in the twentieth century, Englishmen 
seemed less concerned about Russia ~nd a Pan-Slavic threat. 
Pan-Germanism had become the potentially dangerous movement. 
J. Westlake, Professor of International Law at Ca.mbridge 
University, stated: 
So far as I can hazard an opinion, Panslavism 
appears to me to differ from Pangermanism in that 
its aspirations do not alwa.ys and ne.cessarily 
point to any one stat~ as representing it, not even 
to Russia. Pangermanism can have no meaning apart 
from the German empire and i'ts future. · · 
- 62 
And in the same year the London Times correspondent at Vienna, 
after many years experience and deliberation, h~d ' decided 
that Pan-Germanism was much more da.ngerous to Austria-Hungary 
· 61. Geoffrey Drager Austria-Hun~ary (New York: E. P. 
Dutton and Company, 1909), pp. 548-5 9. Geoffrey Drage . 
M.P ., and author primarily interested in economic matters 
(agriculture, trade, a.nd 1 abor problems). . 
62. J. Westlake," Introduction to the International 
History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 11 Lectures Q.!!. 
the Hi~~~~ ~r the Nineteenth Century (F. A. Kirkpatrick, 
editor, Cambrio.ge: at the University Pres's, ,1902), p. 53. 
63 
than Pan-Slavism. 
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At the present time historians are still divided over 
the question of Slf1v loyalty to the Habsburg Empire. A. J. 
P. Ta y lor believes that the Slavs were strongly devoted to 
Austria-Hungary, and Carlton Hayes holds a somewhat similar 
64 
position. Professor Pribram has interestingly outlined 
this controversy, in Austria-Hungary and Great Britain 
65 
1908-1914. 
A consicl erable number of Enp:lishmen in the nineteenth 
century bitterly complained of the assertiveness of the 
Czechs and their political agitation; however, according to 
the Da_r winian ideas of Balfour, such actions were ma.rks of 
p rogress. 
It so, then the conclusion would seem to be 
that some kind of widespread exhilaration or 
excitement is required ln order to enable any 
community to extract the best results from the 
raw materia l transrn i tted to it. by na.tural 
inheritance. 
66 
63. News article in London Times, October 8, 1902. 
64 . A. J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 238; also, Carlton Hayes, 
A Generation of Materialism (New York; Harper & Brothers, 
publishers, 1941), pp. 284=285. 
65. Alfred Francis Pribrarn , Austria-Hungary and Great 
Britain 1908-1914 (translated by Ian F'. D. Morrow :--r:ondon: 
Oxford_ University Press, 1951), pp. 228-229. 
66. A\thur James Balfour, Decadence: Henry Sidgwick 
Memo ria l Lecture (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1908), 
p. 62 . 
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T:hroughout the fifty years- prior to World War I, . the 
Czechs were restless and vigorously struggled for the 
adoption of a Federalist system, but the Poles were considered 
a Slavic people possessed of a certain stability. Apparently, 
the latter ethnic group had decided upon a policy of 
cooperation with the central government at Vienna and 
cherished dreams of independence were deferred, althotigh not 
forgotten. As a result, favors were conferred on the Poles 
by Vienna; to foreign obseTvers they were more depend.able 
than the Czechs. In 1868, a periodical reported that the 
Poles had become fond of Austria; they anticipated that the 
Emperor would_ protect and become an advoca.te of all Polish 
people. They were not in a hurry like the Czechs, but 
hoped tha.t in a future period the Ernpe ror would make their 
67 
wishes a reality. In this same period. another news orga.n 
printed the viewa of Prince Ladislas Czartoryski, the leader 
of the aristocratic section of the emigration--only Austria, 
the· possessor of Ga.licia., could sponsor a revival of Polie:h 
nationality. He pointed out that freedom existed in Galicia, 
a.nd Vienna hac. granted a sizeable amount of autonomy. 
Significantly, he recognized that the Austrian position had 
been macle difficult bece.use the area contl.'tined two groups 
eque.l in size, Poles a.nd Ruthenia.ns. This division in the 
population did not make Ge.licis. a.n ideal center of Fl nro-
67. 11 Austrie, 11 Saturday Review, ~; - cit., p. 477. 
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Polish movement. In 1879 the elevation of Count Taaffe 
to poll tica.l prominence drew attentiop to the Poles, and 
the Morning Post commented upon the fe.vor shown the Polish 
nationality in Galicia by Vienna, with the result that 
Emperor Francis Joseph enjoyed. unbouncled popularity among 
69 
his Polish subjects. 
As early as 1867 the Morning Herald cogently observed 
that the Austrian governors in Galicia supported the Poles, 
to the neglect of the Ruthenian subjects who were of Russian 
origin, and thirty-odd years later the unfavorable position 
of t b e Ruthenians in Galicia was still being commented 
70 
upon. It wa.s pointed out that they were down-trodden 
and Polish la.nc1lords hpd kept them in a semi-servile state, 
economically and politically. The seven million i nhabitants 
of Galicia a.nd Bukovina consisted of Poles and Ruthenians 
in almost equal numbers, yet the population was represented 
in the 11 Abgeordnetenhaus 11 of the Reichsrat by sixty-eight 
71 
Poles and only eleven Ruthenians. In the words of another, 
"the Poles of Galicia enjoy a liberal autonomy, and have 
68. "Austria in Poland, 11 Littell's Living Age, 197: 
823-824, June, 1868. 
69. Article in Pall Mall Gaze-tte, November 21, 1879. 
70. Article in Mo rning Herald, January 11, 1869. 
71. Francis Hirst, 11 A Dissolving Empire," l',ortnightly 
Review, 70:66, July, 1898. 
-173-
72 
even the gratification of domineering over another race." 
A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out that the Poles did obtain 
majority ste.tus in Galicie. In 1846 there were about two 
million Poles and two end one-half million Ruthenians, but 
by 1910, at the last Imperial census, there were four and 
three-quarter million Poles and only three million 
Ruth enie.ns. The Poles accomplished what the 1·1agye.rs had 
73 
failed to do, yet without their ruthlessness and dishonesty. 
At the end of the century, there was general agreement 
that the Poles, by supporting the Viennese Government, had 
become the principal determinant in Galicia. Their reward 
"'as a moderate a.mount of local autonomy, employment of 
Polish as the official language, and control over the 
Ruthenia.ns; and the Poles ~ven exercised a decisive role in 
the Empire's deliberations, although they did mt form an 
74 
integral part of the Atistrian nation. The situation was 
amplified a fe'\'/ years later, for it was pointed out that 
the Poles enjoyed their own native customs, theatres, and 
opened their own schools. However, they were heavily taxed 
for this privileged autonomy, and the area was poor as the 
land wes not fertile, husbandry not well developed, and 
there was very little industry. Polish nationalism was 
72. Bourchier, ~.cit., p. 391. 
73. Taylor, QQ.£ll., p. 149. 
74. 11 The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary, 11 Edinburgh 
Review, 188:17, July, 1898. 
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more strongly cultivated in Austrian-Poland tha.t in Congress 
Poland, 11 1t has more of a maturity and intellectual power .• " 
It was maintained that Cra.cow \\7as not as rich as We.rsaw, 
but in· many v1ays more advanced; it could boast of many more 
11 tera.ry men, scientists, sculptors, and painters. 'l'he 
Ja gellonian University a.nd the University of Lemberg were 
75 
outstancl.ing cultura.l centers. In 1902 the London Times 
correspondent at Vienna asserted that the Austro-Poles 
76 
were one of the most loya.l groups in the Empire. And two 
years later the Quarterly Review contained the statement 
that the Polish poll tica.l parties had not a<lopted the 
negative and obstructionist attitude of many other political 
circles, instead, political maturity had been shown and 
attempts hBd been maa.e to eliminate chaotic condi tiona in 
77 
ParliBment. 
No doubt Englishmen were correct in their judgment of 
Polish loyalty; the Polish nobles remained stalwart and 
reliable supports of the Dynasty until dissolution of the 
state. They were satisfied with their privileged place 
within Galicia. And in addition to political pm-1er, their 
nationalistic ve.ni ty had been soothed by flattering conGe ssions 
75. News report London Times, April 26, 1902. 
76. 11 The Polish NB tion, 11 Quarterly Review, 200: 4·13..:. 
414, October, 1904. 
77. Arthur J. Ma.y, The_ Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 
(Ca_mbridge: Harvard. University Press, 1951), p. 215. 
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such as the use of Polish language on Galician railways, 
and the title of Prince granted to the Primate of Polish 
78 
Catholicism. 
Thus', durinp; the fifty years prior to dissolution, the 
Slavs who had been far in the backp;round elbowed themselves 
to the forefront. British attention wa s drawn to this 
racial group, for its culture, numbers, and political power 
became decisive elements in the Dual Monarchy. 
It has been shown that continental and domestic politics 
affected the views of the general public toward the Slavs. 
When the Irish Home Rule agi ta.tion increased in the eighties 
and nineties, a para.llel was drawn between the Irish 
situation and the Czech; and in foreign e.ffe.i.rs, as fear 
of Russia receded, less emphasis was placed upon Pen-
Sle.vism. However, it seems that fundamental political, 
cultural, and. even relip;ious convictions had as much a part 
in . she.pinp; opinions e.s transient domestic and foreign 
occurrences. Such conflicting ideas as centralization vs. 
decentralization, full democracy vs . limited democracy, 
Western culture vs. Ee.s tern, and clericalism vs. liberalism 
influenced British opinion toward the Slavs and. their 
political grievan6es. 
78. Taylor, QQ.cit., p. 99. 
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CHAPTER VII 
The Austro-Germans 
Before 1866 the Austro-Germans had occupied the center 
of the stage in the Habsburg realm a.nd had a monopolistic 
hold on the bureaucracy and cultural life of the nation. 
Austria wae considered a Teutonic Empire that faced the West 
and led the multi-states of Germsny. Germa.nism had become 
associated with the development and advancement of the nation. 
The Seven \veeke 1 War wa.e recognized as a convulsive struggle, 
for the reason that it isolated the Austro-Germans from 
their brethren across an arbitrary line and gave the Slavic 
population a new outlook and a chance for ascendency. 
Naturally, Englishmen began to · re-evsluate the national 
ouest ion, but traditional vi ew·s and i deas were difficult to 
abEtnd.on. Pro-German sentiment wa.s strong and writ ers often 
called attention to the superiority and cohesive quality of 
the Austro-Ge rman element. The Spectator scored the Czechs 
of Bohemia for their bitter dislike of the more civilized 
Germans, who comprised about one-third of the population 
an d who for a hundred years had restrained the Czechs from 
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1 
an impossible course of nationalism. It was believed that 
the Germans held the state together and they, like the 
English, had to rule if associated with a civilization lower 
than their own. In short, Austria without the German ele-
2 
ment would leek the civilizin~ - influence • . In the Saturday 
Review the assertion was mad.e that if Austria became a 
Sle.vonic and Magyar power, she would·~ cut herself off f-rom 
the West. Although the Hungarians had definite political 
and mill tary ability, and the Czechs probably were a.ble to 
improve, the Germans were celled the true bearers of 
3 
civilization in Southeastern Europe. A British diplomatic 
representative at Vienna voiced a firm faith in the primacy 
of the Austro-Germans. He declared that e. strong a.nd 
hea.l thy Austrian Empire was essential for the welfare of 
Europe, and likewise the Germanic provinces were necessary 
for the Empire 1 e existence. He thou~ht the German ethnic 
group, even in its least developed eohdition, was the 
highest element in the nation and grea.tly superior to the 
Magyars ., Slavs, or Rumanians. The Germans lvere the single 
group that had been diffused through the whole Empire and 
had formed the industrial and bourgeois class. Therefore 
it was impossible for Austria to achieve success without 
1. 11 The ~vil Results of the Austrian Collapse, 11 
Spectator, 39 :796, July 21, 1866. 
2. Loc.cit. 
3. 11 Austria., 11 Saturday Review, 31:758, June 17, 1871. 
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4 
the use of this element as the keystone. Viscount 
Strangford believed in the superiority of Germanic culture 
in the Habsburg Monarchy. He firmly insisted that the 
Austro-Germans made the Empire a civilizing power on the 
Lower De.nube, and he feared that they had become less 
import en t. The rising Slavonic nationalities assumed the 
p lece of the superior racial group and Austria had to be 
. 5 
German in order to remain European. 
Immediately after the Seven Weeks' W~r, the London 
Times was convinced that in . order for Austria to exist, 
she had to have a German base, and the supremacy of German 
over non-German inhabitants had to be reestablished. 
Although the Pole or Hungarian might have had brilliant 
qualities, it was German civilization that should penetrate 
the Eastern regions~ The paper declared that as long as 
the Empire remained Germe.n and absolute, it had been hailed 
as a beneficial and civilizing foree, but it hed been 
brought to the verge of ruin by previous e.ttempts to introduce 
. 6 
representative government and recognize national claims. 
The Examiner, in 1866, recognized that the Slavs were a 
4. Rosslyn Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of the Right 
Honora b le Sir Robert Marier (London: E. Arnold, 1911), II, 
D. 75. 
5. A Selection from the Writings of Viscount Strengford 
(editor Viscountess Stre_ngford, London: Richard Bentley, 
1 869), I, n p . 99-100. 
6. Edi toris.ls in London Times, August 4, 1866, and 
October 8, 1866. 
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ma.Jori ty but sta.teo_ that the Germane were the intellectual 
7 
and educated group. 
The Germans were regarded ae the better cultural 
ingredient in the Empire even by writers who ad.voca.ted 
that the Sla.vs should_ receive poll tical power commensurste 
with their numbers. A forcible assimilation was considered 
unwise. To one commentator, A11s tria was a test case for in 
that country two trends of thought met, one wae a trend, 
consciously or unconeciously, planned or unplanned, toward 
a centralized social organization, absorption of t he '\-Teak 
by the strong, ·arid an inclination to view things in terms 
of size and quantity. The second was a tendency to 
recognize the rip::h ts of' nat iona.li ty and to sympathize with 
people who strove for justice. If it were inevitable that 
the stronger should triumph over the weaker in every nation 
and that uniformity be established, then it was maintained 
it ought to come slowly and without oppression. The Austro-
) 
Ge~mans 1 self-love and desire for domination might have 
been gratified by oopression of less advanced ethnic groups, 
and admission was made that this treHtment might have 
offered ps.lpable and immediate adva.ntages , but in reality 
I 
the wiPP.r course would. have been to elevate the backwa.rd 
8 
peoplee . by educa.tion. . Another periodical held a simila.r 
view thn t by denying minority rights, especia.lly to the 
7. "Hungary," Examiner, p. 770, December 8, 1866. 
B. "The Situation in Austria," Westminster Review, 
29:386-387, April, 1866. 
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vi~orous Czechs, the Germans in Austria permitted love of 
dominance to becloud an accurate asseseme~t of the situation. 
Although unity of langua~e and political institutions were 
advantageous, a forcible unity would destroy its purpose. 
No more flagrant contravention of Nature 1 e 
principle of selection can be imagined, than a 
system of persecution which, instead of gra.due_lly 
substituting higher for lower forms of life, 
kindles in the decaying forms an artificial 
vigour, and so counteracts the process which it 
is its aim to further. 
9 
Social Darwinism seemed to play a part in British 
suggestions that the Austro-Germans should dominate Austria 
regardless of their rninori ty sta.tus. They were believed 
culturally suuerior to the Sle_vs and more highly educated; 
they were fitted by nature to impress their way of life on 
the Slavs. Besides, had not Germanism trrumphed in the Austro-
Bungerian Vla.r of 1849, confirming its physical a.nd. rna teria.l 
( 
sup eriority? After inspecting the En~lish social scene, 
such views seem rather natural for German ideas had affected 
British culture. Historiography was vitally influenced by 
the Ranke school. Lord Acton was a di.sciple of the German 
method as wer~ other English historians. Oarlyle · was 
especially in teres ted in German li tera.ry sava.nte, Goethe in 
p articular. 11 He is the only healthy mind of any extent · that 
I have discovered in Europe." The educational reforms of 
9. 11 Austria. Since Sadowa, 11 Que,rterly Reviel>r, 131:108, 
July, 1871. 
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Stein were widely acclaimed, and the universities of Germany 
attracted Englishmen in large numbere. German music was 
greatly admired in Britain, and in the realm of speculative 
though t the ideas of Hegel and other German thinkers carried 
considerable weight. 
In 1869 11a. tthew Arnold exure ssed. a high regard for the 
German people. 
I believe no country of Europe is so fitted to 
be a republic as Germany; I believe her O.ifficul-
ties are from h er Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs, and 
noth ing else. I believe she will end by getting 
rid of these gentry; and that till that time comes 
the world. will never know of what real greatness 
she is capable. 
10 
.And two years earlier in surveying the European literary 
scene, he wrote, 11 our only first- ra.te body of contempors.ry 
poetry is the German. 11 In 1876 John Bright declared: 
We are one of the historic allies and friends 
of Germany. Germany is Protestant a s we are , and 
that has something to do with our sympathy with 
Germany. 
11 
Furthermore, the Royal .B'amily was thoroughly German in. 
background which had an impact on society . .And during the 
Victoria.n .Age the old idea. of Anglo-German comradeship-in-
arms wa.s respected by the public--the Wa t erloo tradition 
10. Matthew .Arnold, Culture and Anarchy and Friendship's 
Ga.rland (New York: :tvracmillan & Co., 1869), pp. 238-284. 
11. John Bright, Public Addresses (James E. Thorold 
Rogers, ed.i tor, London: 1~acmillan & Co., 1879), p. 313. 
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was strong. 
In 1878, an article in the Westminster Review firmly 
declared. that the Germans bore the torch of civilization 
in the Ea.s tern Monarchy; liberalism and every kind of 
progress had. a. stronghold a.mong the Austro-Germa.ns and the 
Magyars, and yet both had to struggle against reactionary, 
clerical, feudalist, and_ centrifugal forces mainly of Sla.v 
12 
origin. And a fe-..1 years later the Daily Te legrap.g. 
remind ed its readers that the ruling House and guiding race 
in the Dual I>fonarchy were German. 
Science, literature, progress a.re marked through-
ou t the Austrian dominions by Teutonic control and 
langua g e; they recede as it retreats. Nor can the 
advanced enthusiast for the righ t of each race to 
self-rule regret the maintenance of A us. trian 
do mination over the scattered provincial populations 
of this wild and broken-up be.ck garden of Europe. 
13 
The Saturday Review continued in the Germanophobe vein 
and in 1885 advocated German dominance and deprecated an 
increase of Slavic influence in the Empire. The weekly 
cle.imed that the Germans and Magyars unquestionably had 
d.isplayed outstanding physical ability and desire to work 
14 
and act together, in face of t hreats from Slavic ~spirations. 
During the same period the London ~irnes alleged ihat the 
12. 11 The Situation in the Ea·st an d the F'uture of 
Ru.ssia., 11 Nestminster Review, 4:483, October, 1878. 
13. Article in Pall Mall Gazette, December 27, 1882. 
14. 11 Austria, 11 Saturday Review, 59:603, ) ay 9, 1885. 
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German- Austrian c who had held complete power until 1878 
were a liberal force, in contra st with Count 'l'aaffe who 
had allied with the Czechs. In the opinion of the Times 
correspondent at Vienna, the Liberal Party of Germa.n-
Austrians was mo s t progressive and promoted unity in tbe 
Empire by re s istin~Z, i ncurs ion·s ·of clerical and nationalistic 
f orces. 
In contra s t to pro-German expre s sions from quarters 
wi th Co nse r vat ive leanings, other publi shed material 
asses s ed conditions differently , :tm_in t a ining the. t the Sl av s 
woul d be a majority in representation on the basis of com-
plete e quality. It wa s said that the Germans were the 
privi l eged group in Cisleithania, and that the German 
functione.ries ha~ occupied the principal position in Slavonic 
province s and had made the German language mandatory. In s. 
Congres s of equal representation the Slavs would modify such 
a dominance , and in a settlement they would control the 
Government. With their strong inclination to military affairs 
the Crown could. rely upon them against the Magyars or 
15 
German s . It should be made clear. t hat the Austro....:Germans 
were not admired by all. The Pall Mall Gazette contended 
t hat if euphe mi sm s were e~iminated, the Aus tro-Germans hac. 
t o te ca l l ed a dul l , lazy people . The polish that they 
poss~sse d a nd which charmed foreigners came from their 
1 5. 'lj. Sti llman, 11 Austro- Hun5ary , :I Fo rtnigh_~~- Revie , 
33;792 : J ui:te, 1880 . 
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contact with Hungarians, Poles, and Italians. If examined 
closely, distinguished persons of the Empire were from the 
' groups which the Germans had ground underfoot. 11 From the 
throne downwards those who rule and administer are empty 
of the knowledge and. arts whereby kingdoms are kept happy, 
16 
prosperous and great. 11 
By the end of the century, it had become a. widely 
accepted opinion in Britain that any attempt by the Germans 
to maintain exclusive hold on the Government WJuld be un-
successful, and that a new age was in the offing. Well-
informed observers clearly sa\'lr that a Germanization of the 
state had failed. After centuries the tide had finally 
turned against the Germanic stock. As was pointed out in 
the Contemporary Review, the Germans still adhered to the 
principle that they were the supreme people in the Empire, 
11 not only prima inter nares but princep~." They had 
attempted to bully other races and create the impression 
that they alone were loyal Austrians. It was remarked that 
the German government of Hussar and Schmerling had practised 
absolutism and repression of the first order, and under their 
administration Austrian credit reached its nadir. It was 
the period when the other ethnic groups of the Empire were 
considered and treated as Helots, and the time of 
17 
unfortunate "frTars (1859 am 11866). Although well-disposed 
16. 11 The German-Austrians, 11 Pa.ll Mall Gazette, January 22, 
1867. 
17. Austriacus, "The Dea d-Lock in Austria-Hungary, 11 
Con temporary Review, 72: 61-65, July, 1897. 
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toward Germ5.ny, Sicl.ney Whitman was convinced that the Au·stro-
Germans had failed miserably in their miss ion of lead.ership. 
In thie matter of character, the German-Austrian 
is inferior not only to the Bohemian Czech, but also 
to the Hungarian ...• He does not, however, himself 
possess either the cohesion, the strong national and. 
race feeling, or the subordination of his whims and 
hobbies- - in a word, the community offeeling 
(Gemeineinn)--that characterizes the Czech and the 
Hung;arian. The Germans ere divided into half s. 
dozen groups, and e.re drifting to pieces even more 
e.nd more. 
18 
In 1899, the Spectator indicated that the Austro-Germans 
were a superior group and had a great civilizing potential, 
but class ascendency was inconsistent with parliamentary 
institutions. "The only method in bilingual or multilingual 
countries is to acknowledge the legality of every tongue 
under all circumstances and let the strongest absorb the 
19 
others." 'l'he Darwinian 11 survival of the fittest" 
appeared once again in British thought. 
A contributor to the Quarterly Review believed that 
as far as mental training and industry were concerned, the 
Germans of Austria were sUPerior to the other ne.tionali ties. 
The nation had a. Germe.n-based culture, yet it was stated 
that German influence could not maintain itself in t he whole 
of Cisleithania; the various Slav segments had to be granted 
autonomy and allowed to withdraw from Vienna. Galicia, 
18. Sidney Whitman~ "The Realm of the Habsburg~ (London: 
William Heinemrnan, 18931, p. 31. 
19. "News of the Week, 11 Spectator, 83:553-554, October 
21, 1899. 
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Dalmatia and the Polish area, if detached from Cisleithania, 
would :Leave t he enlightened and progressive Germans to 
20 
reign supreme in their own area. The loss of leadership 
by the Austro-Germans was attributed to manifold divisions 
within their racial group, lack of a single directed program, 
and their assumption of an arrogant Prussian manner not 
native to the Austrian friendly, gemlitlich disposition; 
na.tura.lly the other nationalities resented · their imperious 
21 
a ttl tude. ~·nth the in traduction of universal suffrage in 
1907, the Spectator thou12:ht that the final blow had been 
de lt the German nosition. 
The -ore sent elections ba ve broken the pmver of 
the Germans •••• It hardly matters whether the Germans 
prosner or fail in the long run, for they have 
governed by prestige, . and their prestige disappeared 
with their defeat at the first ballots. . 
22 
Throughout the period 1870-1918, British writers 
firmly believed that the Austro-Germans were attracted to 
Pan-Germanism and to 1 ts exponent, the new German Empire, 
but more attention was given this trend. as Anglo-German 
hostility increased. In 1866, immediately following the war, 
several periodicals contained variations of the following 
id.ea: 'l'here was a resemblance between the position of the 
20. "The Austrian Empire," Quarterly Review, 188:285-
286, January, 1899. 
21. A Free Lance, 11 The Problems of Vienna," National 
Revie~, 38:870, February, 1902. 
22. "The Aus t rian Elections," Spectator, 98:821-822, 
l-1ay 25, 1907. 
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Germans in the Habsburg Empire and the British in India; 
both had ruled an alien group by dint of superior talent, 
energy, and culture~ As a matter of fact, the Austro-
Germans had reveled in their dominant position because it 
gave prestige and contributed to their primacj in Germany. 
But Prussia had a.ssumed leadership of the German Confederation, 
and without dou'bt the Austro-Germe.ns would feel · well-disposed 
to that country; it was a questio~ therefore, whether 
Austria could keep the m loyal and at the same time become 
23 
a great non-Teutonic state. 
Her German provinces, the mainstay of her power, 
the chief source of all her grandeur and her in-
fluence in Europe, are inclined, it is said, to 
waiver in their allegiance ••.• They can get at once 
glory and safety and a career by bidding goodbye to 
those ardent and disputatious savages, and retiring 
into the bosom of a united Germany. 
. 24 
Although Grant Duff, in 1871, believed that the existence 
of Austria as a great Danubian Power was desirable, he 
asserted that in the event Dualism shouJd not work, it 
would be natural for the German provinces to unite with 
25 
the rest of the fatherland. 
Again in 1871, the Saturday Review predicted that 
23. Edward Dicey, "The Campaign in Germany, 11 Ma.cmil1an 1 s 
Magazine, 1L~ :394, September, 1866; also, 11 Austria, 11 I;JC)ndon 
Review, 15:367-368, October 5, 1867. 
24. "Austria and Hun gary," Saturday Review, 23:38-39, 
January 12, 1867. 
25. Mountstuart Grant Duff, El~in Speeches (Edinburgh: 
Edmonston and Douglas, 1871), p. 1~; also, Edmund Downey, 
Charles Lever: His Life in His Letters (London: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1906~ II, p. 303. 
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Slavic agitation could easily cause the Austro-Germans to 
seek alliance and protection from their brethren across 
the border; especially was this true in Bohemia, for they 
were a large minority and the Germane within the Hohen-
26 
zollern Empire had become interested in their fate. In 
the same year, a writer in another periodical expressed 
concern over the inclinations of the Austro-Germans. It was 
thought that the link between this racial group and the 
Habsburg Empire was not overly strong, but a majority of the 
Austria.ns might heel tate to change their allegiance for the 
rigid and iron governmental system of Berlin. Moreover, 
Bismarck was on amicable terms with Austria and did not seem 
27 
inclined to foment a separatist movement. Five years 
later, Ralph Earle insisted that the triumphs of the Germans 
in lH66 and 1e70 had an effect on the patriotism of the 
Austro-Germans; a certain amount of loyalty shifted from 
Vienna to Berlin, and Russian preponderance in the Balkans 
28 
would serve to increase and accelerate the movement. In 1876 
Thomas Carlyle felt Austria should expect that her nine mil~ion 
German subjects would increasingly gravitate to their kinsmen 
29 
in the German Empire. In 1878 Hungary appeared to have a 
G6. "Austria, 11 Saturday Review, 31:757-758, June 17, 1871. 
27. "Austria Since Sadowa," .QQ.Cit., p. 112. 
28. Ralph Earle, "The Eastern Situation," Fortnightly 
Review, 26:251-267, November, 1876. · 
29. Letter to London Times, November 28, 1876; also, 
Eawara ~~ltland, England and Islam: ~~ The Counsel of 
Caiaohas (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1877),p. 507. 
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weivhty place in the councils of the Empire, and it was 
feared that in case the Monarchy took ' on too much of a 
Magyar character, "that very day the Germa.n provinces of 
the ol d empire would fly to the northern centre of attrac-
30 
tion, to the great German agglomeration." Equal 
renresentation of the Germans and the Czechs in a national 
asse mbly would be abhorrent to the Austro-Germans, and it 
was pointed out that possibly equality would not be accepted 
because they had an alternative-- union with Germany. It 
was not doubted that a fusion of the two areas artificially 
s ep.!'lrated was simply a matter of time, and. would be hastened 
by German fear of being overwhelmed by a sea of Slavs. Also, 
the end of the Kulturkampf would. advance the movement; the 
Church would be content for it would have a majority in the 
German Empire, and fearful of a Republican France and an 
anti-ecclesiastical Italy it would regard Germany as a strong 
31 
con serve. ti ve nation and. a secure protector. And lf18.ttb e~J 
Arnold, in 1886, thought it was quite possible that in t h e 
32 
future the Austro-German a.rea would unite 'i'Ti th Germany. 
As Britain became ~ aware of danger from Germany her 
intere s t in the Austro-Germans quickened. The Habsburg 
30. John Lernoinne, "The Situation," Nineteenth Cen:t;ury, 
3:569, March, 1878. 
31. Stillman, 11 Austro-Hungary," .Q.Q..cit., p. 790. 
32. Letter to Lond.on Ti~e§_ , April, 1886. 
-190-
Empire euueared weak, and influential groups in Berlin 
predicted that a Greater Germany was on the horizon. 
Therefore, it was quite reasonable for Britain to comment 
on the possibility of an organic union of like elements, 
of the stron 12:er and the w ea~e r. Besides, as more pressure 
was exerted on the Germans of Vienna for political reforms, 
they became uneasy about the rapid weakening of their 
position. One writer remarked that they were dangerous to 
Austria-Hungary as they had not abandoned all thou@:hts of 
German unity. Furthermore, they had noticed the n:e. terial 
advencernent of Germany since 1870, her vigorous pressure 
into colonial areas ana. the Near Ea_st, and her support of 
German products in foreign markets. Significantly, the 
Austro-Germa n school tet?.chers were a.ccused of spreF.?.ding Pan-
German ide&.s which made gains in troublesome periods. It 
was admitted that the number of people which advocated 
outright a.nnexetion to Germany wa.s not large, yet latent 
support was present. In a future Europe with pressures 
an~ anxteties unleashed, the desire for a greater Germany 
could easily envelop the entire Austro-German population 
33 
in an attractive guise ana bec9me a reality. A commentator 
declared that it was erroneous to believe the entire German 
party desired a union with Berlin but a. definite group held 
that view, for as early as 1878 a German memr~r of the 
Austrian Pa.rlia_ment had declared that an incessant cry came 
33. 11 The Internal Crisis in Austria-Hungary," 
Edinburgh Keview, 188:33-34, July, 1898. 
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from the German areas, "if only we belonged already to the 
German Empire. 11 The section which formerly had railed. 
against the Slavs for obstructionist tactics used the same 
34 
method to keep business from being executed in Parl iament. 
The Speaker insisted that the Germans of Austria were 
driven into disloyalty and a desire for union with the 
German Emp ire, because the Slavs had become importe.nt and 
35 
had allied with clericalism. The Outlook maintained 
I , 
thB.t t he Pan-German movement ~re_s one of the disintegrating 
forces a.t work in Austria-Hunga.ry, while the Statist 
believed the_t the Germans had been unwilling to satisfy 
even reasonable Slavic claims because the possibility of 
36 
joining Germany was ever present. Ro'\vland Blennerhe_s set 
reported tha t t he Pan-German Party in Parliament had gro~m 
from five members in 1900 to twenty-five in 1901, composed 
nrincipally of Germans from Bohemian districts; the Party 
had ~reat strength in all German towns except Vienna, and 
would have b een even strange~ if it had not been for its 
connect ion with the 11 Los von Rom 11 movement. And · so in e.reas 
like Salzburg the town vote was swamped by peasa.n ts who did 
not support its religious aims. As many German teachers 
34. Austriacus, "The Dead-Lock in Austria-Hungary," 
Q:Q..Ci,l., p. 66. 
35. 11 The Disintegra.tion of Austria, 11 Speaker, 16: 
5~?-528, November 13, 1897. 
36. Article in Outlook, 3:308, April 8, 1899; a lso, 
"Austria-Hungary," Stetis t, 43:953, June 17, 1899 . 
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37 
supported Pa.n-Germanism, its ootential influence waa great. 
Thus, Bri t ain seemed to identify the Austro-German school-
teachers with Pan-Germanism which in a later period 
developed into the assGCiation of German schoolteachers 
with the Nazi movement. The 'l'ablet stigmatized Pan-Germanism 
a8 an anti-religious movement combined with treasonable and 
anti-nationalist propaganda which transcended constitutional 
38 
limits. In 1902, the paper announced that the Pan-German 
movement was a serious threat to the integrity, of Austria-
Hungary. Its aim was dis1'uption of the state and incorpora-
tion of the Austro-German area into the German Empire. 'l'he 
Tablet was hostile to Pan-Germanism for it became associated 
39 
with the Los von Rom idea. In the same year the Quarterly 
Review believed tha.t Pan-Germanism was dangerous to the peace 
of Europe and had become a question of Europea.n importance, 
for its object W@S termination of Austrian independence and 
relegation of the Empire to the position of Saxony and 
Bavaria. 
If the Pfln-Germans, in the blindness of the 
me galomania, imagine that Europe would sit still 
anO. tamely look on while the German Empire was 
37. Rowland Blennerhasset, "'l'he Austria.n Anxiety, 11 
National Heview, 37:366, May, 1901. 
38. "The Archduke lt~rancis lt 'erdinand and the Church, 11 
Tablet, 65:641, April 27, 1901. 
39. "Religion and Politics 1n Austria," Tablet, 99: 
244, February 15, 1902. 
being extended to the Adriatic et Austria's 
expense, they a.re very greatly mistaken. 
40 
One-third of the Austro-Germans or about three million 
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were j11dged as Prussophiles. "It is inevitable that the 
Ge r mens of Austrie. ••. should, sooner or later, show signs 
41 
of a desire to reunite themselves with the German Empire." 
The attra.ction of the Austro-Germa.ns to the Hohenzollern 
Empire was attributed by various writers to Germany's 
rising position -in European affairs which overshadowed the 
Habsburg state. This fact was illustra ted when Austria 
cop ied German mili tacy techniques and adhered to the 'l'riple 
Alliance in w·hich Germany was the chief partner. It was 
noted thRt for the first time in Austrian history, the 
German element seriously considered a dissolution of the 
42 
Empire. Francis Palmer, in 1903~ reported that the 
Austro-Germans \'lrere being drawni to the p rogressive German 
Empire, and that the Pan-German mo~ement had made rapid 
40. 11 Pan-Germanism, 11 Quarter1l:_ Review, 196:172-173, 
July, 1902. 
41. Pierre d~ Coubertin, "The Problem of Central 
Europe, 11 'F'ortnightly Review, 76:606-610, October, 1901. 
42. Va_tes , "The Policy of the German Emperor, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 79:585, April, 1903; also, The Pan-
Germa_n Doctrine: Being A Study of German Poll tical Aims 
and_ Aspirations (London: Harpe r and Brothers, 1904), 
pp. 62-104. 
43 
strides in an amazingly short time. 
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It is understandable why the Germans of Austria declined 
in British esteem. A vociferous Pan-German party led by 
Schonerer oversha.dowed other Austro-German poll tical 
organisms. The Party approved of a strong central govern-
ment and opposed Federalism. Consequently the GermRn 
Nationalists and National Liberals, by supporting centralism, 
unin tent iona.lly gHve the irnpre ssion of joining ranks with 
Pan-Germanism. The Liberals, who had been prominent from 
1866-1879 and under whose direction beneficial legislation 
had b een enacted, slipped into the bacl{ground, a.nd in their 
pla ce a turbulent party appeared which disrupted the Empire 
and bore forth the ~nner, "without Juda, without Ho me, we 
' . 44 
shall build the German dome~" 
In summary, after the Seven Weeks' War, opinion was 
widespread that the Germans were the most cultured and 
i mpor tant ethnic element in the Empire; they had spread 
Western civilization throughout the nation, yet predictions 
1,.rere made that Pan-Germanism had potential strength as a 
result of Austrian defeat in 1866. However, as the century 
closed, the Austro-Germans might have been judged more 
43. Francis H. E. Palmer, Austro-Hungarian Lif~ in 
Town c:md Country (London: G. P. Putnam 1 s Sbns, 1903), pP. 
233.:234. 
44. Robert Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism 
and National Reform in the Ha.bsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), I, pp. 97-100. 
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highly cultured than other nationalities, but political 
trends had proven to important circles in England that 
this racial group should not and could not completely 
direct Imperial affairs. In order to insure the Empire 1 s 
survival, political control had to be shared with the 
Sla.vs, but it was thought the Austro-Germans were not 
cooperative, and in fact, many were suspected as agents 
of the German Empire. Condemnation of Germany was not 
confined entirely to journalists and politicians but also 
included academic people. Henry Sidgwick, the philosopher, 
looked askance at German standards of morality: 
This seems to be especially the case in 
Germany where men of letters have in recent 
times taken the lead in advocating the 
em~ncipation of the statesman from the re-
straints of ordinary morality. 
45 
The situation had changed, German culture was no longer 
praised. Englishmen who had emphasized the cultural and 
educational contribution of the Austro-Germans became 
less concerned with this factor and. more alarmed about 
their political phil?sophy and German nationalism~ 
45. Henry Sidgwick, 11 Public Morality, 11 National and 
Interna·tional Right and Wrong (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1918), p. 24. 
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CHAPTER ·VIII 
Dualism or Federalism 
Througnout tne period 1866-1918 the Habsburg Monarchy 
was faced with many serious problems. Its governmental 
structure caused discussion and dissension, for animosity 
among the nationalities was partly a ramification of basic 
political grievances. Rising nationalism had made various 
Slavic groups aware of their own particular culture and 
history and had created a desire for self-determination •. 
They were attracted to Federalism as a system which offered 
local autonomy. Foreign observers heard rumblings of racial 
discontent and believed they affected the nation 1 s foreign 
policy, its armed forces, its future, and its effectiveness 
as an ally, and so struggles for an alteration in the 
Imperial governmental system became important to all Europe. 
Britain had solved many of her own problems b.Y acceding 
to the wishes of her subjects in all parts of the world .• 
Nationalism appe ared in many colonial areas and the mother-
, 
land showed a willingness to co mpromise and fulfill the 
desires of overs eas dependencies. Of course, complete 
internal autonomy was granted to people who, for the most 
part, were racially and cul ture.lly akin to the population 
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in the homela.nd. These grants did not lessen the bonds 
of loyalty and confid.ence was placed in a Federal solution. 
Turbulence in Ireland, however, produced an opposite feel-
ing because Britain firmly believed that Irish Home Rule 
would lead to full independence. Salisbury maintained 
that there was 11 no middle term between a government at 
1 
Westminster and the independence or Ireland." Consequently, 
some Englishmen were uncertain as to the value of Dualism, 
Federalism, or any form of decentralization. Such an idea 
ce_used J. A. Roebuck, a great friend of Austria, to decide 
that the Empire was unable to subdivide its governing and 
2 
executive powers and still remain strong. Hugh Childers, 
a prominent Liberal, visited Vienna in the seventies, and 
reported that the Austrian constitution was not "wise"; it 
prevented swift and.decisive action. 11 What wouJd England 
be if the action of her fleets depended on the good-will 
3 
of a Parliament in Dublin as well as in London?" 
The Habsburg governmental system adopted in 1867 was 
unsatisfactory to various racial groups because it was 
1. London Times, April 15, 1886. 
2. Life and Letters of John Arthur Roebuck (Robert 
Eadon Leader, editor, London: Edward Arnold, 1897), p. 293. 
3. Spencer Childers, The Life . and Correspondence of 
Right Ron. H)gh .Q.. E. Childers 1827-1896 (London: John · 
Murray, 1901 , I, p. 200. Hugh c. E. Childers, First Lord 
of Admiralty in Gladstone's first administration; Secretary 
of State for War ( 1880), and Cha_ncellor of the Exchequer 
(1882). 
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merely a division of central power between Vienna and 
Bude:oest. Hun~ary was granted a separate ministry; the 
Hun~arian Diet received full authority to enact legisla-
tion on all matters except those pertaining to war, 
finance, and foreign affairs, which were regulated by a 
dele gation equally divided between Austria and Hungary. 
Immediately after the Austro-Prussian War, Dualism 
found support in Britain both as an effective governmental 
structure and as a means to check disruptive elements. The 
Spectator congratulated the Empire for its abandonment of 
the Federal scheme whereby each little Slav community would 
have become equal to the Germans and the ~~gyars. The 
weekly indicated that a German and Magyar ascendency in the 
two divisions of the Empire (Austria. and Hungary) was 
necessary, if the Habsburgs were to continue their rule over 
4 
Slav populations. Federalism was considered a device of 
Metternich diplomacy which aimed to break opposition into 
fragments and thus make it harmless. Ir the principle of 
nationality were exalted, representative institutions would 
be ne~ated; provincial estates would be broken one by one 
5 
"like sticks in the fable when not bound to~ether." Yet 
the Spectator ten years later, in 1877 and again at the 
turn of the century, expressed an entirely different view--
4. 11 The Future of Austria, 11 Spectator, 392 :990, 
September 8, 1866. 
5. Loc.cit. 
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~ 
the adoption of federalism was a necessity for the survival 
of the Empire. "If Austria is to survive, it must be a free 
6 
and almost Federal State.M Again, at the end of the 
century, the same thought was reiterated: 11 And we also 
think that the ultimate solution will involve a large 
extension of State autonomy, so that Austria-Hungary will 
7 
develop into a kind of Federal Empire. 11 
Anti-Russian feelings affected opinions concerning 
autonomy for the Habsburg Slavs. It was suggested that 
Slav pretensions threa_tened disruption of the state as 
confederation could have no other interpretation; die-
satisfaction had been nourished and magnified through 
8 
Russian intrigue. An article in Colburn's United Service 
Magazine declared that Count Hohenwart not only led the 
Federal Party but the ultramontane despotic party as well. 
The adoption of an Austrian Federal system resembling the 
governmental structure of the United States of America was 
deplored as folly, for the nineteenth century was an age 
of unity, and forces needed to be consolidated in order to 
preserve the Empire's independence and insure the population 
6. "'l'he Bribe to Austria, 11 Spectator, 511 :400, March 
30, 1878. 
7. "The Austrian Paradox, 11 Spectator, 82:744, 1'1ay 27, 
1899. -
8. C. O'Dowd, "New Measures and Old Men," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazine, 107:243, February, 1870. 
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9 
against external dangers. And in 1873, in the Saturday 
Review, it was asserted the.t Cislei thania had. been gran ted 
too much local rule; instead the area should have been 
unified with a single Parliament exercising full control, 
10 
and loca.l Diets e.bolished. In the nineties, Dualism 
found. a defender in E. B. Lanin (E. J. Dillon), of the 
Fortnightly Review., who was well acquainted with European 
affairs especially Russie.n poll tics. He viewed the Empire 1 s 
governmental system as an unwieldy but necessary barrier 
against the assaults of hostile forces. It was necessary, 
for no other barriers existed, and Dualism performed the 
same function as the complica.ted system of dykes a.nd dams 
11 
in Holland.. Dillon 1 s primary concern was preservation of 
the effectiveness and strength of the Triple Alliance and 
the continuation of a solid front against France end Russia. 
He stated: "In a word, the main unswerving supporters of 
the policy of the Triple Alliance in the He.bsburg Mpnarchy 
are but two, the Emperor and the Hungarian people." Dillon 
9. Captain Spencer, "The Future of Austria and Her 
Mill tary Forces," Colburn 1 e United Service Magazine, pp. 
333-334, l-'Iarch, 1872. 
10. "Constitutiona.l Changes in Austria, n Saturday 
Review, 35:2-3, January 4, 1873. 
11. E. B. Lanin (E. J. Dillon), "The Triple Alliance 
in Danger," Fortnightly Review, 61:125, January, 1894. 
E. J. Dillon, philologist, author, and journalist; 1887-
1914 correspondent of Daily Telegraph in Russia, monthly 
contributor to Contemporary Review, also wrote articles 
for Fortnightly Review, and Review Q[ Reviews. Advisor 
to Count Witte at Portsmouth Conference (1905). 
readily admitted that the great bulk of the people ,.,ere 
either clericals, Sla.ve, or democrats, and in a truly 
representative Austro-Hungarian Parliament based upon 
universal su.ffra.ge, genere.l agreement would be found on 
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12 
one point, namely, destruction of the Dualistic system. 
Support for D1Jalism occurred principa.lly in the few 
months after the Seven Weeks' War and did not continue 
in volume throughout the period. After many years of 
absolutism there was a. natural feeling to endorse any 
constitutional step. Dualism received some sustained 
· support seemingly based on the idea that the Austrian Slavs 
would conspire with Russia. In the eighties and nineties, 
the Triple Alliance was still considered a force for main-
taining peace in Europe; if the directing forces were 
changed at Vienna it was fea.red that the Alliance might fall 
apart. For that reason Englishmen whose prime concern wa.e 
peace and containment of Russia. might have felt that Slav 
autonomy could result in dissolution of the Empire. People 
who thought that the Germans and Ms.gya.rs possessed a 
superior culture would be inclined to support Dualism; it 
was the structure that ha.d perpetuated the better fitted 
groupe in power. 
But even putting aside the danger .of foreign 
aggression, and looking solely at the greatest 
liberty of the grea test number, it may be doubted 
12. Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
whether the ce.use of intellectual freedom and 
indi vidua.l independence would not be sacrificed 
to something qualitatively inferior. 
13 
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In short, those who lacked confio.ence in the Slavs would 
likely suspect Federalism. 
In 1866 the London Times editorially stated that the 
governmental sy s tem of the Habsburg state had to remain 
in the hands of one ethnic group, to the detriment of the 
others, and axiomatically no approval was shown to 
confedera.tion or personal union for the Empire might crumble. 
The Times also stated that Dualism would be the first step 
in the establishment of independent states, and if power 
shifted awa.y from the Austro-Germans, surely it would not 
go to Pesth. In the event of e struggle for predominance 
in Hungary, it was likely that the Rumanian element would 
14 
emerge victorious. However, when Dualism was seen as 
inevitable, the paper expressed hope that the Magyars in 
their half of the Empire, and the Germans in theirs , would 
15 
be able to hold divergent groups together. The uppermost 
consideration of the Times therefore was preservation of the 
Empire, if possible through the dominance of one national 
group, otherwise through Dualism. 
13. Francis Hirs t'- 11 A Dissolving Empire," Fortnightly 
Review, 70:71, July, l d98. 
14. Editorial in London Times, December 14, 1866. 
15. Ibid., F3bruary 20, 1867. 
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Federalism peceived strong support from English writers 
from 1867 to the outbreak of World War I, and it seemed to 
increase at the 1;urn of the century when Slavic agitation 
for constitutionEtl reform intensified. 
In early 1867 the Morning Herald declared that 
Hunga.rien dernande. ha_d to be fulfilled, and yet observed that 
the Slave were important a.nd if the various Slav groupe 
appeared in the F.eichsra.t the new governmental arrangement 
would tend towa.rd Fed.eralism. In May, the paper indica.ted 
that the peoples of Croatia and Dalmatia. were reluctant to 
become part of the Hungarian Kingdom. When the final 
governmental system was formed, the Herald believed it was 
16 
funda.mentally based on the principle of federa_tion. Adam 
Gielgud, a. contributor to the Fortnightly Review, asserted 
that Austria had to direct all her efforts to conciliate 
her Slav subjects and for that reason the adoption of 
17 
Federalism was imperative. The Morning Star, during the 
early months of 1867, doubted that the Slavs would consent 
to full Hungarian rule, and when Dualism we.s on the point 
of adoption the paper noted Slav resistance to it in both 
18 
Austria and Hungary. In the few months after Austria.' 1 s 
16. Editorials in Morning Post, January 4, 1867, May 
24, 1867 and June 12, 1867. 
17 • .Ada.m Gielgud, "European Turkey and Its Subject 
Races," 6:605-619, Fortnightly Review, October, 1866. 
18. Editorials in Mornin~ Star, February 22, 1867, 
May 23, 1867, ana_ June 19, 18 7. 
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disastrous defea ·G , the Morning Post stEl,ted that the Empire 
might regain som1~ of its past glory if the various 
nationalities go,rerned themselves, for then Austria could 
become the centrnl authority of a confederation. The paper 
significantly adcled that what was conceded to Hungary could 
19 
hardly be withheld from other areas. It ale.o declared 
that the German E!lement in Austria could no longer retain 
a place of ascenc.ency but had to share power with the other 
20 
racial groupe of Cieleithania. However, during 1867, the 
Morning Post seerred to qualify its views. It admitted that 
to fully placate the Hungarians would offend the Bohemians 
and other ethnic groups, but it was thought Hungarian 
satisfaction was worth any trouble. Further, the people of 
Transleithe.nie. should enjoy the rights gua.rD.nteed in the 
Hungaria.n Constitution, but the principle of na.tionali ty 
could nevP-r be carried out in Au~:; tria; she would cease to 
exist. Conse.quently, the rights granted to Hungary could 
21 
not be extended tJ all the Imperial provinces. Again, 
in the same year, the Chronicle asserted that some form of 
Federa.lism wae a necessity. It suggested a Federal 
Parliament. 11 Abs,)lute dualism is an impossi bill ty in a 
19. Edi tori a:~ in 1-foming Post, November 19, 1866 .• 
20. Edi toria :. in Morning Post, January 28, 1867. 
21. Edi toria:.s in Morning Post, February 21, 1867, 
June 3, 1867, and June 10, 18 7. 
22 
great empire. 11 
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In Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine it was maintained 
that even though Austria had been despoiled of her Italian 
provinces and fopced to abnep;ete her position in Germany, 
she could re~ain her strength through the establishment of 
an Imperial FedePa.tion. 'l'he lancts that stretched from the 
Adri'atic to the Black Sea could be included in such a 
23 
system. When Dualism was in the process of evolvement, 
justice for the Blavs of the Empire was actively sought. 
The Econom1Ht editorially urged the adoption of a 
Federal union, sE1parate legislatures for each province, and 
a Diet for the wt~le Empire. 11 In short, a constitutional 
system, somewhat resembling that of the United States, with 
an Emperor instet:Ld of a President, at its head. 11 Dualism 
was considered a danger because it could gain only surface 
unity; the Slavs would wait until the state was thre a tened 
24 
and then enforce their demands. In April, 1866, an 
article in the WE'stminster Review stated tha.t the outlook 
would not be briE:ht, if the constitutional question which 
vexed the countrj were resolved through establishment of 
Dua.lism. For the sake of a united Empire, the Diet of 
Hungary had to give up separatist claims and allow the 
22. "The Hungarian Settlement," Chronicle, 1:274, June 
15, 1867. 
23. 11 Allison 1 s Hi story of Europe 1815-1852, 11 Blackwood 1 s 
Edinburgh Magazine, 100:476, October, 1866. 
24. "Austria With Reference to the Doctrine of 
Nationalities," ~conomist, 25:297, Ma .. rchl6, 1867. 
Diets of all arelts to consider and decide the consti tu-
~~5 
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tional question. And several months later in this same 
magazine, it was a.lleged that the future of the Empire 
could be made sec:ure by peace and economy, and by the 
adoption of a moc.ified federative system, something simi-
lar to Prince Albert•s suggestion for Germany. Such a 
26 
program would giYe justice to all nationalities. Further, 
it was pointed out that the Emperor had. promised that the 
representatives C•f the Crown lands would be consul ted 
-before a constitution was adopted. The Diets of Galicia, 
Bohemia, lv!oravia, Croatia, Carniola, and the Tyrol die-
approved of Duallsm. An Imperial Patent was issued for the 
assemblage of an Extraordinary Reichsrat on February 25, 
1867, and electicns were held. However, Beust, who had 
been elevated to leadership, was accused of giving complete 
sway to the Germsn Liberals and of surrendering to the 
Hun~ariane. In rlace of the Extraordinary Reichsrat, the 
Constitutional Reichsrat was aseembled, to legislate for 
the western half of the Empire and to accept the settlement 
. 27 
already concludea. with Hungary. 
The Central Government was indicted for establishing 
25. 11 The Situation in Austria, 11 Westminster Review, 
29:389, April, 1E66. 
26. 11 Dualisrr. in Austria, 11 Westminster Review, 32:458, 
October, 1867. 
27. Ibid. , pp. Ll43-448. 
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Dualism through ooercion, illegality, and disregard of the 
lawful d.ecisions of the various Diets. About four and one-
half million Czec:hs from Bohemia and Moravia were not 
represented in tlte Vienna Reichsrat. The Poles and Ruthenes 
of Galicia, and the Slovene population of S~yria and Carinthia, 
also Ca.rniola, nwmering over six and one-half million had 
but fifty representa.tives, while the German-Austrians who 
numbered about six million had one hundred and twenty 
represent a tives. In regions with mixed populations the 
Germans were g iven preference in all matters. The Slavs 
bitterl y resented the Central Government's pressure upon 
them and the she. 'tby trea.tmen t accorded their Diets. It 
was st a ted that rr.ajorities in seven Crown land.s, including 
Croa tia and Dalmatia, had. voiced their objections to Dual ism 
28 
and to the Viennese program. The Pall Mall Gazette agreed 
with the views that appeared in tpe Westminster Review in 
1867: A Federative system wa.s most sui ted to the Austro-
Hlin garian stat e--a system of provincial diets combined for 
Imperial purposes into ?ne centra l asse mbly, each province 
and each nationality having self-government and privileged 
to control its own language, civic rights, and culture. 
In this way the loyalty of many diverse groups could have 
been secured and the Empire strengthened by i{llplanting a 
new spirit of tolera.nce a.mong the va.ried racial groups. 
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The paper regret1;ed that the Germans and the Magyars had 
chosen to remain the dominant people, and that they had 
used intrigue anCL fixed elections to ge. ther docile and 
29 
plia.ble representatives at Vienna.. 1-Iany articles in 
the Saturday Revj&! seemed critical of the Slevs and 
t :heir demands, but in 1868 it "t-.ras suggested in the weekly 
t ha t the several territories would be properly represented 
30 
in the Imperia_l legislature if Federa.lism were established. 
In 1870, Gladstone wrot.e that t h e best settlement for 
Austria would be a Federal monarchy, with a balance of 
power resembling that of the American Union; with s chan 
arrangement 11 she could fulfill vital functions in connec-
31 
tion with the EaEtern question." 
Lord Acton, whose views were respected in intellectual 
circles, believed that the parliamentary system of the 
Habsburg Empire failed to properly provide for the variety 
of na.t i onal groups and presupposed unity. The governmental 
structure emphasized vividly the differences which it did 
not rec ognize. He believed that the power of the Imperial 
Pe. rlia.men t ha_d to be limited like the power of the Crown, 
and many of its functions die charged by provincial cUets. 
29. Editorial in Pall 1~11 Gazette, October 29~ 
1867. 
30. "Austria and Bohemia, 11 Sa.turdey Review, 26 : 312, 
September 5, 1868. 
31. Outidanos, "Article IX," Edinburgh Review, 132: 
560, October, 1870. 
In Austria ••• the several nationalities are 
a.t very unequal degrees of advancement, and 
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there is no single nation which is so predominant 
as to overwhelm or absorb the others. These are 
the conditions necessary for the very highest 
degree of organization which government is capable 
of receiving. They supply the greatest variety 
of intellectual resource; the perpetual incentive 
to progress which is afforded not merely by 
competition, but by the spectacle of a more ad-
vanced people; the most a bun dan t elements of 
self-government, combined with the impossibility 
for the State to rule all by its own will; and 
the fullest security for the J:Teservation of 
local customs and ancient rights. In such a 
country a s this, liberty would achieve its most 
glorious results, while centralization and abso-
lutism would be destruction. 
32 
In the early seventies, an article in the Quarterly 
Review pointed out that a great part of the Empire favored 
Federalism, ~nd predicted that if the Emperor abolished t he 
group-method of voting unquestionably the Slavs woul d 
receive concessione from a truly representative Reicherat~ 
In addition to political objectives, the various nationalities 
wanted (1) the use of the Czech, Slovenian, Polish, and 
Rume.nian languages in an expanded educational system, and 
(2) the official language in every province determined by 
33 
the majority. The argument w-as presented that forcible 
unity could not 1:e effectively secured. "Unity of 
administration is only so far good a.s there exists a unity 
in the material administra.tion. 11 It was thought that the 
32. Lord Acton, Esse.ys .Q!2 Freedom and Power (Boston: 
The Beacon Press, 1948), pp. 191-192. 
33. 11 Austrit::. Since Sao owa, 11 Quarterly Review, 131:109, 
July, 1871. 
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diverse na.tionalities lacked a unity of political purpose, 
and t h erefore a central e.dministration was not justi fied. 
A movement for centralization ha.d to come from the 
extremities and not from the center. aGive the provJnces 
autonomy and it will not be long before they recognize 
34 
t he advantages of unity." 
In 1867, in an editorial, the Examiner spoke thus: 
Had Imoerial Federetion been possible, ae 
the Czechs, the Poles and the Tyrolese con-
tended, that would theoretically have been the 
most promising of all. Who shall say whether 
e ventually t :1at may not come? But as matters 
stood, e.no_ c )ntinue to stand, Federe.li sm is 
found to be l mpracticable. 
35 
Ho-vTever, in 1872, the weekly real ized that various groups 
in the Austro-Hun;se.rian Hone.rchy were discontented. Un-
quest i ontably a s ·~v e re Jolt would be rendered to the ruling 
st ock if the Slevs were given equal treatment, for they 
always had been treated ·a ·s political Helots and Parie.he; yet 
Sle.v satisfaction we.s deemed more important than the dis-
pleasure of the A1stro-Germans. Unless the Slave became 
loyally atta ched ·~o the Habsburgs, they would turn to 
Russia. . It v.Jas pi) in t ed out that the Hohenwart Ministry had 
won a greater elec~ toral victory for adoption of Fecleralism 
than Gladstone haci received for disestablishment of the 
34. Loc.cit. 
35. "Constit11tionalism in Austria," Examiner, p. 770, 
December 7, 1867. 
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Irish church, and yet this Government had been dismissed 
by the Emperor. After . Hohenwart 1 s fall, the Examiner 
maintained ,that tl~ centralists had used intrigue to make 
a parliamenta.ry mnjority from the support of a minority of 
the pooulation. ~ ~hey clutched tightly at the throe.ts of 
both Bohemia. and (~alicia. , and in order to avoid_ equality 
with other nationalities they were willing to become 
36 
vassals of German;,. By 1879 another change had occurred. 
The Examiner app~Jved Dualism as a necessity for 
preservation, for if Federalism were substituted for the 
Duel system Austrla-Hungary would be transformed from a 
constitutional st.a.te into a despotism which would benefit 
37 
only the Pan-Slavists and Russia. Perhaps the shift in 
feeling was caused by international relations. The Austro-
German Alliance had been cone luded and seemed a bar to 
Russian aggression. Austria-Hungary controlled by Slavs 
might imperil the alliance. 
Possibly the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham played an 
unconscio us part in British approval of Federalism. It 
ha s been claimed that utilitarianism set the drift and 
direction of EngJ.ish politics during the first two-thirds 
36. 11 Hungar;y and Croatia., 11 Examiner, p. 63, January 
20, 1872; also, 11 Poland and the Participating Powers, 11 
Examiner, pp. 19~;-197, February 20, 1872; also, 11 The 
Austrian ReichsrELth, 11 Examiner, pp. 665-666, July 6, 1872. 
37. 11 AustriEL, 11 Examiner, pp. 856-857, July 5, 1879. 
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of the century. B9nthe.m me.inte.ined the.t society was 
composed of ina.iv1.a.ual units separated from each other, 
each striving for its own happiness. As thew elfare of 
society was merely the total happiness of various persons 
who comprised it, every government should attempt to 
secure the greatest possible degree of individual freedom. 
Every person vm s best fitted to kno~l what was most con-
ducive to his own comfort. Federalism allowed the pursuance 
of separate existences within a general framework, ea ch 
area po s sessing its own customs and language productive of 
the most happiness. 
During t h e Balkan crisis when attention was drawn to 
eastern Europe, Federalism was suggested as a colut i on to 
the difficulties of the Habsburg Monarchy. One writer 
sympa.thetic with the Slavs noted that they were a majority 
in each half of the Empire, but they were without any real 
influence or authority which was humiliating to a people 
38 
with a.ny degree of dignity. In a. publication issued by 
The Ea.stern Question Association, Sir George Campbell 
asserted that Federalism was a practical settlement for 
Austria, and indepen dence on local matters was essential 
to the constituents of any federation, the same as equality 
of control was a requisite in the central government. 
Dualism had linked two distinct areas very imperfectly, and, 
in fact, had perpetuated separateness instead of furthering 
38. Ralph Earle, "The Eastern Situatio,n, 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 26:659, November, 1876. 
.39 
unity. 
The author of Two Years of the Eastern Question, 
published in 1877, believed that Austria would have to 
become Slav in order to insure her future and recover 
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her former p:reetness. The German or l-1agyar element B would 
not be deprived of Home Rule, but the Empire would be 
transformed into self-governing units held together by 
links of central administration and personal union. 
Dualism must be considered merely as a 
first step towards further division and sub-
. division •••• What Russia could only accomplish 
by conquest, Austria might easily achieve by 
assimilation. 
40 
This last statement implies that Austrian penetration of 
the Balkans was possible only if the Empire established 
Fecteralism. In the same year Lord Robert Montagu, M.P., 
declared: 
Let Austria pursue a wise and conciliating 
policy, shunning concentration, respecting local 
liberties ani ancient rights •.•. To Prussian 
uni te.rianism, Austria must oppose the pro.vincial 
and historical varities of a conciliating federalism. 
41 
39. George Ce.mpbell, 11 No. 4--The Races, Religions, and 
Institutions of Tllrkey and the Neighboring Countries, 11 Papers 
on the Eastern .9Jd:9stion (Lond.on: Cassell, Petter and Galpin, 
188'7'), p. 26. 
40. A Gallen~a, Two Years of the Eastern Question (London: 
Samuel Tinsley, 1977), I, pp • .336"-337. -· 
41. Lord Robert Montagu, Foreign Policy: England and 
the Eastern Question (London: Che.pman and Hall, 1877), p. 47. 
Lord Robert Montagu, second son of the sixth Duke of Man-
chester; from 1859 to 1874 he was a Conservative M.P. 
Moreover, he hoped that the European continent would 
federate. 11 We seek to bring about a unity..;.-to form a 
42 -
society of nations." 
After Austria had experienced difficulties in the 
occupa.tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Spectator 
asserted that the system of duality had been the cause 
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43 
of indecisiveness of action and prolongation of debate. 
In 1879, after tbe retirement of Andrassy, the Pall Mall 
Gazette maintained it wa.e inevitable that Austria would 
develop into a confederation. 
Not immediately·; perhaps, but soon, the very 
name of Austria-Hungary will be heard no more. 
Something like the 11 United States of Austria 11 
will take its place; and Hungary will be but as 
one voice amongst many. 
44 
Sir Charles Dilke, a prominent Liberal leader, commenting 
on European conditione in 1887, felt that Federalism was the 
ultimo.te solution for the Habsburg state. Dualism was 
considered dead, and it was most necessary for the country 
45 
to develop into a loose confederation. 
42. Ibid., p. 318. 
? 43. "Austria-Hungary in Bosnia," Spectator, 51"':1116, 
September 5, 1878. 
44. "The Development of the Plans of the Three Emperors," 
Pall Mall Gazette_, August 29 1879; also, 11 The Meaning of 
Count Andrassy's Retirement," Pall Mall Gazette, August 20, 
1879. 
45. Charles Dilke, The Present Position of European 
Politics (London: Chapman and Hall, Irtd., 1887~ p. 203. 
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Herbert Spencer who had a tremendous influence on 
his generation, advocated localism or some form of 
Federalism as the ideal governmental system. He believed 
thet civilized nations could be grouped either as militant 
types or ind.ustrial, and that only further evils would 
result in the continuance of militancy in civilized nations. 
Concerning local government we may conclude 
that as centralization is an essential trait of 
the militant type, decentralization is an essen-
tial trait of the industrial type •..• One result 
must be that the inhabitants of each locality 
will object to be controlled by the inhabitants 
of other loc:tlities, in matters of purely local 
concern ••. ) vf·micipal and kindred governments may 
be expected to exercise legislative and administra-
tive powers, subject to no greater control b,y the 
central gover•nment than ~s needful for the concord 
of the whole community. 
Again, Spencer sta ted: 
Emoires formed of alien peoples habitually 
fall to piec"e when the coercive power which 
holds them together fails; and even could they 
be held. toge1;her, would not form harmoniously-
working wholBs: peaceful federation is the only 
further consolidation to be looked for. 
46 
In 1886 John Morl~~y strongly maintained that the greatest 
strides had been nade by countries and area.s in which de-
centralization had been the rule. 
46. Herbert Bpencer, Principles of Sociology: Political 
Institutions, Per1~ V {London: Williams and Norgate, 1882), 
PP. 658-755. 
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The history of emigration in Canada, of 
transportation in New South Wales, and of the 
disastrous denationalization of the land in 
Victoria, are useful illustrations of the 
difference between the experiments of a. central-
ized compared with a decentralized system of 
government. Neither Australia nor Canada 
approached the United States in vigour, origin-
ality, p.._nd spirit, until, like the United States, 
they were left free to work out their problems 
in their own way. 
47 
The outburst of the new imperialism seemed to increase 
interest in Federalism as an ideal governmental system. 
Many Englishmen opposed to unrestricted imperialism 
embraced theoretical Federalism, for it could very well 
provide a system that would allow Britain to retain world-
wide holdings and. yet permit the necessary development of 
self-government. J. A. Hobson, a llberal writer, in 1902, 
came to the conclusion that the world was evolving into a 
series of federated states. The future tendency was toward 
a Pan-Teutonism, a Pan-Slavism, and an Anglo-Saxondom. 
Christer.dom thus laid out in a few great 
federal Em:r ires each with a retinue of un-
civilized dependencies, seems to many the most 
legitimate development of present tendencies, 
and one which would offer the be st hope of 
permanent peace and an assured_ basis of inter-
i mperialism. 
48 
47. John Mo rley, 11 The Expansion of England, 11 Critical 
Miscellanies (London: Macmillan and Co., 1886), III, pp. 
302-303. 
48. J. A. Hobson, Im)erialism: A Study (New York: 
James Pott & Com:r any, 1902 , p. 351. J. A. Hobson, a well-
known economist e.ssociated with Ramsay MacDonald in [cent. ] 
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A short time later L. B. Hobhouse scanned the futurE~ and 
p redicted tha t Federali sm could p erform a splendid 1vork 
by reconciling popular government with unity. 
Demo crac y may be reconcilable with Empire 
in the senfe of a gre a t aggregati on of terri-
tories enjo y ing independence while united by 
some common bond, but it is necessarily hostile 
to Empire in the sense of a system wherein one 
community i mposes its will on others no less 
entitled by race, education, and cap acity to 
govern themselves. 
49 
In fact, the a ttitude of the Briti sh public toward theoretical 
and concrete forrr .s of government was gre a tly affected by views 
of leading p e rsonag es, hence ideas concerning the governmental 
structure of Austria- Hungary were formed against such a 
background. 
In 1885 , Cbarle s Stewart Parnell, the Irish leader, 
in a sp eech at Wj cklo"J , called upon the Government of -
Britain to grant legislative autonomy to I reland, and he 
bolstered his are:umentation by pointing GUt tha.t Hun gary 
had been gr anted self-government and had become one of t h e 
50 
strongest f a ctorB in the Austrian Empire. And sp eaking 
[footnote 48 cont. ] publica t ion of The Progressive 1896-
1898 , later a s soc!iated with The Nation • . His circle in-
cluded H. vi. MasBingham, L. 'J.l. Hobhou s e, and L. B. Hammond. 
49. L. T. Hobhouse, Democracy and Reaction (London : 
T. Fi sher Unwin, 1904), pp. 156-157. Leonard Trelawny 
Hobhous e 1864-19~~9; philosopher and journalist, a Fellow 
at Oxf ord; in 1897 joined the staff of the Manchester 
Gua r d i an (lat e r H d.irector of the paper), and active in 
the Soc i ologica l Society. 
50. The London Times, October 6, 1885. 
at Newport a few days later Lord Salisbury replied: 
••• I observed in yesterday's papers a 
remarkable epeech from the Irish leader, in 
which he referred in so marked a way to the 
position of Austria-Hungary that I gathered 
that his words were intended to cover some 
kind of a new proposal~ and that some notion 
of I mperial federation wa s floating in his . 
mind... · 
The Conservative leader did not discourage the future 
possibility of federation as a means to keep the British 
Empire together. 
But with respect to Ireland I am bound to say 
t hat I have never seen any plan or suggestion 
which gives me at present the slightest ground for 
anticipatin~: that it is in the.t direction that we 
shall find ~ .ny substantial solution to the dif-
ficulties of the nroblem. 
. 51 
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This poli tice.l e:>:change indicated tha.t the governmental 
experiment instituted by Vienna in 1867 had significance 
for Britain. ThH Habsburg Emp ire was watched to determine 
whether the new 1cy s tern was a success or a failure, and 
Austrian affaire became interwoven with British domestic 
politics. I n efforts to obtain Irish Home Rule in both 
1886 and 1893, G:_adstone pointed to the Habsburg Empire 
as an area where a similar experiment had proven .successful: 
I take CHses of considerable interest. I 
think t hat ~ - t will be a.drni tted that Austria-
Hungary offHrs to us a case of considerable 
succe es. The relations may not be altogether 
easy in all cases, but they have saved Austria 
51. The Lond.on Times, October 8, 1885. 
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from a terrlble danger, and they have established 
her upon the ~ whole in a condition of honour, 
tranquility, and. strength. Long may that continue~ 
52 
In 18'89, the Earl of Pembroke, a Conservative, and like 
most Englishmen, s trenuotisly objected. to Irish Home Rule; 
he declared it fc ,l ly to imagine that such a policy would 
unite . na.tionalittes. He ad.mitted, however, that Home Ru~e 
was efficacious ln a country like Austrie.-Hungary. 
Divisions e.nd ante.gonisms were rr.ost marked and a certain 
amount of separaJ;ion was necessary in order to avoid total 
disintegration. But he insisted that a weak central 
administrHtion hHd. been a cause of ind.ecisiveness in Habsburg 
5:1 
foreign policy. In the same vein three years earlier, 
Ma.tthew Arnold Wl'ote tha.t Irish Home Rule was da.ngerous and 
should not be riBked unless absolutely necessary. 
In the cEtse of Austria- Hunf!:ary there was such 
a necessity. Hungary was the bigger of the two. 
But whe.t wael done there was a plunge into the 
unknown and a very grave one. Who will say · that 
the Austria of to-day is as strong and solid a 
Power as the Austria of the end of the last 
century. 
54 
52. Report tn Lond.on Times, April 7, 1893. 
53. G. R. Herbert, 11 The Septennie.l Act: Speech at 
Stapleford July t., 1889~" Political Letters and Speeches 
of George 13th Earl ~ Pembroke and Montgomery (London: 
Richard Bentley end Son, 1896), pp. 112-113. 
54. Letter to London Times, April, 1866. 
-220-
And even bet·ore Ireland had become a pressing issue 
in the ei £2;hties Elnd nineties, Englishmen seemed to h ave 
connected t h e arHa · a.nd its problems with Austria.-Hunga.ry. 
In 1868, John Stewart Mill tobk notice of the e.rgurr.ent that 
Ireland should ba granted a status similar 'to Hungary. He 
mainta ined that the governmental system in the Habsburg 
Empire was so ne~ tha t he could not definitively evaluate 
it. Mill stres ~ed the f act, however, that Anglo-Irish 
rela tions were unlike Austro-Hungarian. Transleithania 
and Cis lei thanie, were alma st equal in military resources 
and prol-ress; thE! assistance of both wa s required to safe-
guard the Empire 's external place in Eastern Europe, no 
bitternes s sepaPated the Austrian and Hungaria.n messes, 
and furthe r rnore the Hungarian people he.d shown a · notable 
cap Pcity ,for self-government. Consequently, he felt that 
the new experiment might be successful. In· contrast, 
Anglo-Irish relations had been marked by turbulence, distrust, 
.5.5 
and bitterness. In an opposite tone, in 1871, Isaac Butt 
declared: 
It wa s amid the trouble and perplexities which 
followed the campaign of Sa.dowe., that Austrian 
statesmen rose to the necessity of giving to Hungary 
the free c:onsti tuti on which has made tha.t country 
the strenf;th, instead of the -r;eekness of the Austrian 
Confederation. English statesmen would do well to 
profit by the lesson before a war overtakes them, with 
Ireland s till the weakness of the British ·states • 
.56 
.5.5. John Stuart Mill, England and Ireland (London: 
Longman s , Jreen, Re ader and Dyer, 18b8T, pp. 33-3.5. 
56. Isaac Butt, Irish Federalism~ Its 1eaning, Its 
ObJects, and Its Wake (Third Edition, Drtblin: Jo!m Falconer, 
1871), p. 28. 
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As a metter of fact, prominent people considered the 
Due.l Mona_rchy a Federal Empire. In discussing Home Rule 
for Ireland, Lord Thring, in 1887 referred to the Austro-
Bungarian Empire as a federal union which he defined as 
follows: 
A federal union differs from a confederate 
union in the material fact that the common 
superior au.t hori ty instead of acting on the 
individual subjects of the constituent States 
through the med.ium of their respective states, 
has a power, in respect of all metters within 
its jurisdiction, of enacting laws and issuing 
orders which are binding directly on the 
individual citizefi. 
57 
Arid. Henry Sidgwic·~, the most influential moralist of hie 
generation, surveyed European constitutions a.nd dec i ded 
tha.t a form of Fed.ere.lism alrea.dy existed in Austria-
Rungery. . His exposition, however, l"Jae ba.eed primar ly on 
58 
the ·constitution as it appears on paper. Sidgwick also 
believed that Federalism in general was transitional and 
59 
usually led to a more complete union. And Francis Palmer 
57. Lord Thring, 11 Ireland's Alternatives," Handbook 
of Home Rule: Bei[!_g Articles on the Irish Q,uestion (James 
· Bryce, editor, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1887), 
p. 155. 
58. Henry Siigwick, The Development of European Polity, 
(London: J1.1acmillan & Co., 1903), pp. 427-428. Henry Sidg-
'\'rick, a foremost H:ngli sh philosopher and professor of moral 
philosophy et Cambridge University; his thought was based 
upon English utilLtarianisrn. 
59. Henry Siigwick, The Elements of Politics (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1891), p. 519. 
held. that the Aue tria.n half of the Empire already had 
developed into a confederation, for the reason thatr each 
of the seventeen provincial Diets enjoyed as much Home 
- 60 
Rule as Gladstone' had proposed for Ireland. 
The ne\'T century brought serious :racial tensions and 
Federalism wss suggested as the means to bring sbout 
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in terna.l peace. In the Contemporary Review, it was main-
tained that Aust1:-ia should acknowledge its varied na.tional 
composition and tmdeavor ·to conciliate all groups and 
invest them with self-government and autonomy, in order to 
bring their many interests into agreement. Supremacy by 
one ethnic group, even though achieved by constitutional 
means, would leai to internal upheavals and result in 
61 
dissolution of the Empire. An article in the Ed i nburgh 
Review stated that conditione could not endure and that 
the constitutional framework had to be altered. In 1867 
rather mild concessions by the Germans would have allayed 
the turmoil, but after thirty years a. thorough reorganization 
lias requisite. It was thought that the seventeen Diets 
varying from lar·ge ones in Bohemia and Galicia to little 
organizations Uke GOrz, were too diversified to exercise 
control in a Fec.era.l system. But Austria could be divided 
into ·large, natural, geographical, and ethnological units 
60. FranciB Palmer, Austro-Rungaria.n Life in Town and 
Country (London: G. P. Putnams, 1903). -----.--------
61. Austrincue, "The Dead-Lock in Austria Hungary," 
Con tempora.ry Re,riew, 72: 60, July, 1897. 
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a.s follows: (1) Gnlicia and Bukovina, ( 2) Bohemia. together 
with Mora.via and l3ilesia, (3) German-Austria with the Its.lian 
62 
Tyrol and Trieste, and (4), the South Slav provinces. 
Likewise, the 'l'ablet in 1898 s ponsored a system of federa-
tion, and, in fant, agreed with the foregoing statements 
63 
expressed in the Edinburgh Review. Another writer 
admitted that a.n Imperial Federation was the logical solu-
tion even though many difficulties would a.ccompany l ts 
adoption; d.espi t e all obsta.cles, the German rule in 
Cisle i thania. and Ma.gyar dominance in Trs.nsle~ thania had to 
be repudiated. Federalism ha.d. settl~d disturbing conditions 
in other parts o : ~ the world and Habsburg problems were 
••• not greater than, possibly not as great, 
as those oV•3rcome by the balanced mind of 
James Madis•)n and the creative genius of 
Alexander H<3.mil ton in the most critical hours 
of America.n hi story when the Con s titution of 
the United States was being formed at Philadel-
phia in the summer of 1787. 
64 
In addition to Federalis m, a uniform scheme of local 
government simila.r to the one in Brita in was deemed essential, 
as well as a central council of a representative nature to 
advise the Crowr.. on matters which mutually affected the 
62. "The Internal Crisis of Austria," Edinburgb. Review, 
188:35, July, H l98. 
$3. "Dualinm in Austria-Hungary, 11 'Tablet, 60:1 61-162, 
July 30, 1898. 
64. Rowland Blennerhasset, "The Austrian Anxiety, 11 
Ne tione.l Review, 37:368, ~fay, 1901. 
65 
different regions. 
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In 1866 the London Times opposed Dualism but within 
a ye er accepted it, and by 1896, after it had been in force 
thirty years, thls paper strongly championed the 1-1agyar 
position, i.e., Penewal of the Constitution of 1867 without 
chana;e. Opponen·~s of the dominant group in Hunge_ry were 
referred to as clerice.l rea.ctionarie s. In the early 
twenteith centu~r, however, the paper had arrived at the 
conclusion t hat the Slavs in Hungary required a new and 
fairer representation in the government. In 1905 the 
Speaker called for reconstitution of the Empire on the 
basis of federation. 
Bohemia e.nd • not Hunp:ary, is the true pivot · 
of Austro-Eungarian unity. This had not been 
gre.sped by Austrian statesmen who were always 
an idee, a year, an army behind. 
66 
William T. Stead, in 1909, voiced the belief that the 
day of cast-iron empires had· ·passed, and the twentieth 
century Has an ~~ra of fecleration and Home · Rule. If Austria-
Hungary were to remain intact she had to evolve into a 
greater Switzerland, a free federation of semi-sovereign 
67 
states united and 9rotected. by the House of Habsburg. 
In 1909 a.n item in the Qua.rterly Review explained that 
66. 11 The J.ustro-Hungarian Crisis, 11 Speaker, 12:614, 
September 30, J.905. 
67. Vl illiHm T. Stead, 11 Austria-Hungary Without Francis 
Joseph," International, 4:92-95, January, 1909. 
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the establishment of a workable lt' ederalism in the Habsburg 
Empire 1-1a s complicated by the f 2.ct that the ethhic a nd 
geographical boundaries were not identical; but in spite 
of such difficulties, Federalism was regarded as the only 
68 
practical settle~~nt. Seton-Watson believed it imperative 
for the Habsbu r g Empire to adjust its South Slav Question. 
He was convinced that Tria.lism was the solution, and a 
reconstructed Mor..archy could conceivably arrange for a 
customs union anc. mill tary convention with Serbia a n d 
69 
Montenegro. Se·ton-Watson acknowledged that the 1-'Iagyars 
had prevented t!w adoption of Federalism, but me.ny British 
commen tators did . not sufficiently stress this fact. 
Just prior to the war, Henry W. Steed wa.s convinced 
that Dualism had become a danger to the continued existence 
of the Austro-Hungarian state, since it barred development 
of the -South Slavs and prevented an adjustment of their 
70 
place in the Emp:Lre. 
If Federali13m was not the answer, the outlook for 
continuation of ·~he Empire was very dim. A weekly observed 
that t h e success of a new constitution was dependent on the 
68. Archibald Colquhoun, 11 The Near $astern Question, 11 
Quarterly Review, 210:672, April, 1909. 
-
69. R. W. S,:lton-Watson, The South Slav Question and 
the Habsburg Mon ::~.rchy (London: Constable & Co., Ltd ., 1911), 
--·- ... 4 - --
D. 3'+ • . 
70. Henry W. Steed , The Hapsburg Monarchy (London: 
Constable & Co., Ltd., 1913), pp. 283-285. 
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71 
depth of the nati~nal differences. Sir John Seeley, 
profeseor of modern history at Cambridge University and 
one of the British imperial propagandists, expressed a 
widely held view~oint, namely--that rival nationalities 
within any empire can not be perfectly assimilated and 
therefore are a '\'reakness and danger. Seeley thought that 
Austria-Hungary lras an outstanding example of such an 
empire, but in contrast the British Empire, in the main, 
was based on an English culture and did not suffer from 
the obvious impe rfec tio ns of a mechanically forced union 
72 
of alien peoples. 
In retrospect, modern students of East.ern Europe do 
not believe that Federalism would have completely solved 
the Empire's problems; it has been called a blind to 
reality by A. J. P. Taylor. 
Men thottght to alter the European position of 
the Hebsburg Empire by che_nging its internal 
structure; in reality a change in its internal 
structure lrould _ come only after a change, or 
re.ther catEtstrophe, in its European position. 
73 
'I'aylor indicateB that the -establishment of such a system 
could have been accomplished only by a voluntary concession 
71. 11 The Immediate Future in Am tria, 11 SpectEttor, 85: 
327-328, Sept e rn ber 15, 1900. 
72. J. R. Seeley, The Exp1:1.nsion of England (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1914), pp.~6-47. 
73. A. J. P. Ta.ylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-..!.21§. 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1.9'48), p. 225 • . 
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from the dominant racial groups, Magyar and German. These 
two racial groups had secured their places through strength, 
and as the dynasty grew weaker it had to move with them. 
The grip of the "two master races" could have been broken 
only by mili ta.ry defeat loThich also would ha.ve destroyed 
74 
the Dynasty. Hritain looked to the Emperor to break the 
deadlock and. institute a new governmental system. Many 
did not fully renlize that Francis Joseph 1-ms not a free 
agent and vle.s limited by conditions over which he had no 
control. R. Kann believes that any attempt at major 
governmental tra:1sformation in the Empire 1866-1918 would 
have provoked internal revolution e. nd foreign intervention. 
What kind of far-reaching reforms leading to 
federalism or national autonomy would have secured 
her continued existence? Judging from twentieth 
century standpoint the answer is amazingly simple; 
none. One thing and one thing alone in all 
probability could have saved Austria ~or~ some time 
to come: oeace. 
~ 75 
In summary, Dualism received the greatest support in 
the mid-sixties. Some Englishmen seemed rea.dy to appla.ud 
any new constitutional experiment in the Habsburg realm. 
They reasoned the.t the Slavs either would receive liberal 
treBtment or woulCI_ be peacefully molded into German and 
Magyar culture. As the century lengthened, turbulence . in 
74. Ibid., up. 243-244. 
75. R. Kan::1, The Multinational Emoire: Natiol'lBlism 
and National Reform-In the Habsburg Monarch 1848-1918 
(New York: Columbia University P~ess, 1950),~ ~67. 
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internal Austria and Hungary made it clea_r to foreign 
observers that tbe Slavs had to be appeased, and. as a 
consequence, Dualism faded from British favor. In 1866-
1867 a Federa.l HE.bsburg state was recommended by a 
substantial number of English writers, and support for 
Federalism increE ~ sed a.s the Slavs exerted pressure upon 
the Governments Ett Vienna and Budapest. But actually the 
systems of DualiBm and Federalism were consid_ered tools; 
the desired product was domestic peace for the Habsburg 
realm. Moreover ;. in British feelings and attitudes toward 
the Imperial governmental system, a lar ger pattern can be 
observed. One o J ~ the interesting subjects of controversy 
during the centu:~ concerned the direction in which all 
poll tical organi13ms were drifting, i.e., toward 
centralization o::- federa.tion ·. Europe was experiencing a 
movement that ha<i wid_e ramifications. A deep cleavage in 
opinion existed, for such a person as Arthur Balfour 
maintained that the stream of tendency was against devolution. 
11 So if you go fr:>m unity to federalism you are on your way 
to separ~tion. If you go from separation to federalism you 
76 
are on your wa.y to unity." While people like Winston 
Churchill, Lord Rosebery, Hugh Childers, Herbert Asquith, 
and Earl Grey were well-d.ispoed toward varying forme of 
76. James Arthur Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule: 
Selected from The Speeches of the Rt. Hon.-xrfhur-James 
Be.lfour (London: -Kegan Paul-,-Trench, and Trubner &-Co., 
Ltd., 1913), p. 6. 
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77 
Imperial Federalism. Lord Rosebery, speaking at the 
University of Edinburgh in 1882, maintained that the world 
was developing into an "agglomeration of races with a 
powerful center, n but it had. to .be accompanied by a respect 
for the various c:omponent elements. And where a national 
type was of a self-sufficing character, there should be 
no blending. "AnCI. we, as . patriots, although we must wish 
all the races of the empire to possess certain qualities, 
we cannot desire uniformity ••• " 
There is; indeed, a stronger case--the case 
of Austria. It would be too long to work out in 
detail, and ind.eed, it might c·arry me beyond my 
point. But was Hungary ever a source of strength 
to Austria · ~ill ·she was recognized as Hunge_ry, 
and treated as Hungary, and not as an Austrian 
province? 'rake the case of Poland. Russia ha. s 
attempted t ::1e obli ter•ation of Poland . in that part 
of PolEmd w::1ich belongs to her; Austrie has 
recognized .:md respected the nationality of Poland 
in her part. What is the result? Polano., in spite 
of Russia, l.s as Polish as ever; rut in Austri~:t she 
is loyal, and in Russia she is not. 
78 
To Engiishrnen, Austria-Hungary appeo.red as an ideal test 
case inasmuch as the conflicting idees struggled for supremacy. 
77. The Case for Devolution and A Settlement of the 
Home Rule Question by Corteent: Ex"t'racts of Speeches--
Collected by ViEcount Hythe (London: P. ·s. King & Son, 1913). 
78. Earl of' Rosebery, "Address by the Right Honourable 
Archibald Phili~ Vth Earl of Rosebery Lord Rector, November 
4, 1882, 11 Rectoi'ial Addressee Delivered Before The University 
of Edinburgh 18;.9-1899 (Archibald Stodart-Welker, editor, 
London: Grant Ri.chards, 1900), pp. 211-213. 
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CHAPTER IX 
The .1\ustro-Hungarian ~.c.Q.nQ~ic. and 
• 
Financial Situation 
In the late nineteenth century the financial condi-
tion of continental states became the subject of more tha.n 
passing interest, for it increasingly determined a nation's 
rela tive rank in the unofficial list of Great Po wers. It 
was common to regard material progress as synonymous with 
human progress. The necessities of nineteenth century 
life d rew attentlon to material resources inasmuch as they 
were the substs.nc:e that produced the 11 Age of Materialism. 11 
A leading British statesman declared: 
I seek ::'or the most important and the most 
fundamental differences which separate the 
p resent from preceding ages. Rather is this 
to be found in the cumulative products of 
scientific resea.rch ••.• No single discovery, it 
may be, can be compared in results to that of 
Copernicus, No single discoverer can be com-
pared in genius to Newton. But in their total 
effects, the advances made by the nineteenth 
century arH not t o be matched. 
1 
1. A. J. B,;tlfour, The Nineteenth Century: Cambridge 
University Local Lectures Summer Meeting 1900, Inat~ural 
Address (Cambridl~ e, at the University Press, 1900), 
pp. 13-14. 
-231-
The maintenance of an effective fighting force and tech-
nological improvements in armaments depended upon a 
vigorous economy and a healthy financial system. In the 
opening years of the twentieth century, naval expansion 
progra.ms of the Great Powers necessitated substantial 
expenditures which could be afforded only by countrle.s that 
had internal strength. The states of continental E1~ope 
no long~r relied upon small professional armies, and as 
they requ ired a v·fl st number of trained personnel in reserve 
considerable func.s were absorbed by nonproductive outlay. 
In such a situatjon, industrial nations l"ike England or 
Germany had a trE!mendous advantage, while Austria, 
principally an a E:rarian country, was influenced by clima.tic 
cond.i tiona ana_ suffered from competition with more p reduc-
tive countr i es outside the European continent. Late in the 
nineteenth centm·y, industrialism enjoyed its ·heyday in 
Europe but agrar:.an economy underwent a severe depression. 
Moreover, Austro--Hungarian agriculture did not have a. high 
rate of production. 
Hungary with its excellent soil produces 
about half as much per acre as does Germany. 
In other words, Germany in many years produces 
on half the wheat land the same quantity of 
wheat as in Hunga.ry is grown on double the area. 
2 
2. Frederi ~~k Naumann, Central Europe (Christa bel M. 
Merideth, translator, Nelv York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917), 
p. 135. 
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Austria had exper:Lenced domestic political troubles also 
difficulties in f ,)reign affairs, and besides le.cked a sound 
financial structure. She was burdened with a sizablEl debt 
and currency troubles, which militated agains1; her value 
as an a.dvantageous ally and as a deciding quotient ln 
continental politics • 
. Just prior to the Austro-Prussian \Var, it was 
explained that if pee.ce continued the Empire he_d definite 
resources, which if properly cultivated could aid im-
mee.surably. The Saturday Review noted in 1866 that the 
governmental expenditure of both Austria and England was 
a hout t he same; cf course, the accumulated wealth of 
Britain was much greater, but in the Austro-German provinces 
the living standE.,rd wa.s higher than in the prosperous 
counties of Engl,tnd. However, the outlying provinces were 
judged comparablfl to Ireland both economically and socially. 
With the exception of Vienna, the entire urban population 
of the Empire ~vaB not larger than that of Liverpool or 
Gla.sgov.T. In re~ard to taxes, the Austrian was more heavily 
burdened in proportion to his means than the Englishman. 
Yet it wa s reco~lized t hat removal of tariff impediments 
and a period of peace and constructive legislation could 
alter t h e situation in Austria, for besides being rich in 
natural prod.ucti,)n of corn, wine, lumber, hemp, ancl flax, 
3 
she had consider~ble resources waiting for development. 
3. 11 Austrian Finance, 11 Se.turday Revi_2~, 21:3lJ.-35, 
Janue..ry 13, 1866; also, article in Morning Post, June, 1866. 
News organs stres~: : ed the Empire 1 s financial plights. In 
JanuAry, 1866, thEi Fortl'!.ightly Review declared: 
It is renarke.ble that the expenditure of the 
Austrian em!>ire should be only ~53,120,000 , and 
that its vaut resources and extent should only 
yield e. revenue of 1.49,000,000; a little less 
than one-he.~.f of which is requ1.red to pay the 
interest on the national debt. Are not these 
figures alone a censure on Austrian government? 
4 
A few mon the lateJ•, the London Times editorially stated 
that the armed stPength of Austria was a ]:B. rasi te on a 
debt-ridden state, 
The concLL tion of Austrian and Italian finance, 
if nothing ~~lse, should. deter those countries 
from these ~~ostly demonstrations. They have 
drained the :L r Exchequers and ruined their cred.i t 
in supporting vast armies_, which inflict upon 
them in pe~le many of the evils of war. 
5 
A year after the ·iVar, it was thought tha t economic problems 
had not been firmly handled and the Ernp~re was in the midst 
of a depression. The agricultural distress was complicated 
by the feet that capital for improvements was obtainable 
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only a.t prohibitive rates. Roads, railways, and. water 
communications -were entirely inadequa.te. It was pointed out 
that during a prior Hungarian famine the population in one 
area was in dire wa.nt and yet in another the swine consumed 
the surplus. In previous years, real property in Hungary 
4. 11 Public Affairs, 11 Fortnightly Review, 3:644, January 
15, 1866. 
5. EditoriHl in London Times, May 1, 1866. 
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had sold at one-third of 1 ts actual value, and a similar 
condition existed in other parts of the Empire;estates 
were auctioned without any substantial bids, and small 
farmers were forc 1:!d to sell their lands to pay taxes. The 
average value of ;an Austrian acre was nine pounds while a 
French acre was w~Jrth forty pounds; consequent 1y, surprise 
was shown that Austria should have taken twenty-six per 
cent ·of the net returns from produce, because the F1•ench 
6 
Government took only eight per cent. 
In 1867, Austrian exports, in proportion to the 
population, were not e.s large as those of Turkey ancl Portugal 
and imports were less than thocse of Turkey and Spain. It 
was stated that no substantial part of industry was pros-
perous; wages, prices, rents, and accumulations were on 
the downward path. Mining was at a standstill, and profits 
from the sugar industry were dissipated by an excise tax 
of twelve shillings on the hundredweight. The situation 
a.s outlined seemlngly described a people devoid of business 
intelligence and energy. The adoption of free trade inherent 
in Lord Bloomfield 1 s Commercial 'l'reaty was offered e.s a. 
partial solution .. The a boll tion of tariffs was believed 
necessary in order to wipe away enterprises built upon a 
false basis of p1•otection.7 
6. "Internal Concti tions in Austria, 11 Eclectic Magazin_~ , 
5:176-177, February, 1867. 
7. Ibid .. , p. 177. 
Gold will not flow freely into la.nds where 
revolution is a daily menace, where the tax 
gatherer ta. ~es away the prof~ts of stock, 
where speculation is hampered by usury laws 
and the other cobwebs of an absurd commercial 
cod.e. 
8 
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Suggestion of free trade as. a remedia.l measure for 
the Austrian economy we.s natural, because Britain ht:td 
embarked upon such a course in 1846 a.nd b,y 1866 the 
philosophy of Ada.m Smith had enveloped. the nation. It 
had proven a profitable course and so was Judged exportable 
to the economically less fortunate. John Bright, during 
the Ba lkan Crieie, was disturbed by sta.nding armies and 
the thrRats of 'h'lilr that hung over Europe. He believed 
free trade would eliminate antagonisms and rivalries. 
For the disbanding of great armies and the 
promotion cf peace I rely ·on the abolition of 
tariffs, ar.d on the brotherhood of nations 
resulting t~om free trade in the products of 
industry. 
9 
It is debats.ble whether Austria 1 s complete acceptance of 
the philosophy wc,uld. have made a great difference. 
The British public was informed that Austria's finances 
were in a seriou~ : state, for she owed to public creditors 
in 1866 about fourteen and one-ha.lf millions sterling. The 
fisca.l receipts of the Empire on the averpge came to about 
8. Ibid., p. 178. 
9. The Public Letters of the Right Honorable John 
Bright (H. J. Lee:ch, editor, Second edition, London: 
Sampson, Low, Mal'ston & Company, 1895), pp. 38-39. 
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forty millions sterling per annum, and. the deficit to 
a.11out eight millions sterling which had been met by 
foreign loa.ns. Financiers of the Empire had confesse~d 
their inability t::> suggest a remedy for easing the burden. 
Existing charges had to be reduced, but how? Direct 
te.xation then amounted to about twelve million five hund.red 
thousand pounds, nearly the amount oaid by a wealthy nation 
like France. Moreover, arrears in taxation amoun tecl to 
about twenty per cent in 1864 and Vienna, the richest area, 
was behind in taxes from ten to twelve per cent. In short, 
the foregoing facts painted e black picture. 11 New Ossas 
have been heaped on the old Pelions of 'l'axe.tion and debt. 11 
And it was pointed out that Austria might easily recover 
from Sadowa but s b.. e was troubled with poverty and bnnk-
10 
ruptcy, a most serious and lasting affliction. 
The Pall Mall Gazette, in the wake of Austrian defeat, 
reported that "the financial condition of the Government is 
whe.t weighs down all efforts of improvement; the syBtem is 
11 
rotten from beginning to end." The Chronicle observed 
that t h e Austrian debt devoured thirty to thirty-five per 
cent of the revenue. The weekly referred to the new 
consti tuti.onal experiment and the lowered cu etome barriers 
as signs of a new spirit. Interior customs, the protectionist 
10. Ibid., o. 176. 
11. 11 Austrie. in the Adriatic, 11 Pall Mall Ga.zelli, 
October 11, 1866. 
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system, and le. ck of political freedom were considerEld 
hindre.nces to the development of the Monarchy and it; was 
vital that certain goals be attained, (1) an equilibrium 
between receipts and expenditures and (2), the subs t itu-
12 
tion of gold for paper money. 
A diplomatic note of the British Foreign Minister, 
Lord Clarendon, during the Franco-Prussian crisis of 1870, 
confirmed the view tha.t the Empire was in a miserable 
plight. 
On paper·, and only on p~per, Austria has an 
army of 800 ,000, but she could not, even on the 
most pre s sing emergency, bring 200,000 men into 
the field. Her finances are dilapidated and her 
internal disorganization affords just cause for 
alarm . Danger to Prussia fr om Austria must, for 
many years to come , be a chimera. 
13 
It wes intimated that possibly economic weakness as well 
as Bismarckian dip lomacy determined Austrian neutra lity. 
The Pall . !!all Ga.zette again in 1875 reported on the 
depressed financial condition of the Emp ire. Austria_ had 
endeavored to curtail her expenses since 1867 but deficits 
continued until 1872. In that year a surplus had accumu-
lated, but speculation took over the country and in 1873 
the crash came. On the other hand, immediately after the 
adoption of the Ausgleich, Hungary began a wild spending 
12. "The Flnances of Austria," Chronicle, 1:269-270, 
June 15, 1867. 
1 3. Newton, Lord Lyo~~ A Record of British Diplomacy 
(New York : LongmB ns, Green & Co., 1913), I, p. 368. 
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~pree. Money was paid tonobles for liberation of peasants 
from feudal ctues, for public l!Torks, and for expensive 
ad.ministration. A halt was thought impera.tive, and an 
14 
increase in taxes was advised to a.void bankruptcy. In 
November of the same year attention was again turned to 
Imp erial finances as it was believed that Austria's 
condition had becJme extremely insecure; the government 
deficit probably ~r~ould amount to three million pouncls in 
1875. "It is not difficult to foresee what such a state 
15 
of things must lead to." 
Austria had experienced an economic revival in the 
la t e sixties before the crash of 1873, but it does not 
appear to have been commented upon in Britain to a great 
extent . Banking and industry issued large di videndEl, and. 
shares of new stock companies were greatly over-subs cribed. 
In 1869 new capite.l to the amount cif $4oo,ooo,ooo was 
authorized in Vienna alone, and a great many charters were 
16 
granted to companies. It was the spectacular crash so 
deep and. enduring tha_t left a marked impression on Britain. 
Austria-Hungary had not benefited a g reat dee.l from the 
14. 11 'I'he .b, inances of Austro-Hungary,u Pa.ll Mall 
Budget, 13:12-13, February 13, 1875. 
15. 11 Austri .:m Finance, " Pall Ma 11 Budget., 15: ::!1, 
Nove mber 6, 1875. 
16. Arthur :M. May, The Ha·psburg Monarchy 1867-·1914 
(Ca_mbridge: Harvar-d University ress, 1951), pp~-~ 
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prosperity because it was of s hort duration and not wide-
spread; burdens of defeat weighed he pvily and a lengthy 
prosperity would have been needed for a true reinvigoration 
of the state. However, in 1868 t he Chronicle had s t ated: 
Every one knows that the financial burden 
will not dissolve like mist before the dawn 
of liberty, but that the sun will for a time 
be darkened, and can only work itself through 
the fog by means of economy and industry. 
NotwithGtanding the a.bove statement, the weekly rejoiced 
that the Austrian economic situation had improved over 
cono i tions in 1867. Commerce, in<lustry, tre.ding, and 
mining flourished much IID re thHn in previous years. The 
country had no reason to despair and the threat of 
17 
be.nkruptcy retreated before the activity of the people. 
The financial fiasco of 187.3' was judg ed by the 
Economist to be a natural result when the situation in 
Austria. was clearly viewed. The country ha_d no great fund 
of exchange able wealth, and vlith added weight of a cleprecia.ted 
currency and nothing to mortgage but land it was inconceivable 
that she emerged a.s a leading buyer in markets of t h e \'ITorld. 
Loans at home and abroad increased the dangerous si tue.tion, 
and supnort to buttress credits wa.s not available. In 
addition, certnin conditions intensified the problem. The 
I mp eriel governmental structure allowed Hungs.ry to borrow 
17. "Austria. As It Is," Chronicle, 2:5-6, January 4, 
1868. 
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when the financial collapse should have ended it. Paper 
circulation and means of contracting temporary debts 
through usurers ha.d a detrimental result. Issuance of 
paper money had a damaging ~ffect on commercial stability, 
18 
and trading on credit was prolonged. 
A few years later, in the year 1877, when the Balkan 
situetion was most acute and Britain was casting about for 
an ally in case she had to oppose Russia, an evalue ·tion 
of the Emnire 1 s economic position by a leading British 
periodical showed. no real improvement over condi tiona ten 
ye8rs earlier. 1he Empire did not have the necessary 
strength to carry forward a bold progrs.m. 
( 
'l'illa.ge of the soil was poor, and. it was thought 
the chances for competition were not bright when the 
average yield of wheat per acre in Hun gary was about 
eight to nine bm1he1s, while in Britain it was t \'renty-
eight, and in thE~ United States twelve. Austrian imp0rts 
were lo1-rer than they ha.d .been in the peak yet?.rs of 1868 
and 1869. The s ~~verity of the depression of 1873 was 
indicated by the fact that from 1871 to 1875 the value of 
British good.s caPried in British ships, entering the port 
of Trieste, had dropped by over two million pounds, or 
19 
about one-half the entire value of British goods imported. 
18. "The lli1ngarian Section of the Austro-Hungarian 
State and the Ea ; tern Crisis," Economist, 34:1167, - 0ctober 
7, 1876. 
19. "Austria-Hungary and Ge rmany, 11 Fraser• s !1agazine 
15:87- 88, Janua~f , 1877. 
The situation in Hungary was shown to have had 
de.n~erous overtones, for the area. had become a heavy 
borrovJer during the previous eight or nine years an<l had 
incurred a debt of about fifty million pounds. Thi J3 was 
consid.ered not a large ·amount if she were a homogenE~ous 
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nation and a prosperous one , but such was not the ca.se. 
· Her State payments were in arrears, and t:he floating debt 
had been increased by the amount owed to Austria under 
agreements of 1867. Moreover, Hungary had mortgaged her 
buying capacity to a heavy extent and thereby crippled 
her selling power unless further sums of money were loaned 
her. But the situation was deceiving, for in times of 
agricultural proeperity the economy would seem to flourish 
and paper mortgaP.·es would appear to have been overtaken. 
Yet if a few bad harvests occurred as had been the case, a 
collapse was immEdiate, ~evenues fell, and both the cost 
20 
and size of the debt increased. 
Unwise plar.ning in the economic sphere was noticed, 
and it was belieYed tha.t since the settlement of 1867 
Hungary had spent money without due con s ideration of the 
value received. Fiume had been built up from an un:oreten-
tious port as a r·ival of Trieste. A great network of 
railways had beer. constructed without due care and without 
adhering to the r~irne consideration whether they would 
produce re ve nue. Moreover, railways had been constructed 
in the urovince c1f Gn.licia without sufficient regard for 
20. Ibid., p. 87. 
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strategic locatio:1. Pesth had been indiscriminately 
dotted with magnificent . huildings to publicize the nation's 
21 
autonomy. The H:conomist took note of the flagrant 
misman&gement of Hungarian finances; the debt had doubled 
between 1867 and 1876 and this meant an annual deficit of 
seven million pounds, with an income of only fifteen 
million pounds per annum. 'l'he ne'l.1 railwa.ys had not produced 
revenue, but instead h~d provided a drag of more than one 
22 
and one-quarter million pounds in 1874. 
Count Andrassy confirmed the weak financial condition 
of his country when he said to a British diplomat in 1878,--
"we have one million three hunclred thousand troops. We are 
23 
criopled in our finances." The fact that Austria had 
troops but no money \•las reiterated by other leading 
personages. Certainly, the reluctance of Vienna to embark 
upon a bellicose policy toward Russia was understand.a.ble, 
and the hesitancy of action, and willingness to compromise 
on all matters atout which Disraeli complained had a basis 
in economic reallty and in political weakness. 
In 1878, t:t.e Examiner scrutinized the Empire 1 s in sol vent 
state, and feared that the occupation of Bosnia. and Herzegovina 
21. J. D. E·ourchier, "The Heritage of the Hapsburgs, 11 
li.,ortnightly ReviflW, 51:283, March, 1889. - . 
22. "The H~ngarian Section of the Austro-Hungarian 
Stat e and t h e Ee. etern Crisi s ," QQ.cit., p. 1168. -
23. Henry I 'rummond Wolff, Rambling RecollEicti'~ 
(London: Macmillen & Co., Ltd., 1908), II, p. 176. 
would be detrimental because in the immediate future! the 
24 
provinces would bB a white elephant. This concern 
about finances in 1878 was a repetition of sentiments 
expressed ten yeB.rs earlier when it was stated that the 
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25 
yea rly deficits of Austria could not continue indefinitely. 
Al s o, at the time of the occupation of the provinceel , the , 
Statist reported. that Austria-Hungary, more than any other 
country of Europe, was unable to dischar~e heavy 
exp enditures in a long campaign to pacify Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Financial embarrassment was deemed the caus e 
for Austria's lack of opposition to the Russian army when 
it crossed. the Danube and, in fact, it even prevented 
26 
mobilization of her army. The very next year, thE~ Economist, 
in a prophetic manner declared that the finances of the 
27 
Empire were extremely weak and never coulo_ be made Btrong. 
Also, in 1879, the Pall Mall Gazette pointed out that the 
Imperial fina.nces were in a ~rave state and taxation could 
not be increased. "And it is quite certain that e. country 
24. "Austrian Finance , " Examiner ; p. 905, July 20, 
1678. 
25. 11 Austria and. Hungary, 11 ExamiJ:.llt~, p . 577, :3eptember 
14, 1867. 
26. "The Austria..n Occ'!lp ~ tionof Bosnia, 11 Publi<~ Ooinion, 
34:195-196, Au~ust 17, 1878. 
27. "The Strength and Weakness of Austria, 11 Eeonomist, 
37:1252, No vember 1, · 1879~ 
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28 
cannot prosper which in a time of peace goes on borrowing." 
Attention was called to the fact that monetary affairs 
were most vital to Austria, for lacking equality in numbers 
she hs.d to depend on wee.l th in any struggle with Russia. 
Even though she had been in deep financial distress, the 
uncertainty in Eastern Europe requ ired the maintenance of 
29 
large military forces. Monetary troubles had prevented 
the rapid reequ ip ment of her army and had hampered the 
construction of fortresses which competent military authorities 
30 
considered neceseities. But it was evident that some 
financial recover~ had been made. 
In 1885 the deficit was about one-half a million 
sterling, indicating a vast improvement over the period 
when it had been several millions annually, and yet it was 
pointed out that a.fter twenty years of pea.ce a balance had 
not been obtainecl, In a comparison of the fiscal resources 
of Austria and Russia an optimistic note was sounded, for 
Austria 1 s income wa.s equal to Russia.• s although her 
31 
population wa s only one-third to one-half as large. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable comparison, 
the Imperial debt of three hundred seventy-five millions was 
considered a hindrance to future development especially as 
28. "Austrinn Finance, 11 Pall Mall Gazette, July 29, 
1879. 
29. 11 The Auntro-Russian Fina.nce," Saturd~y Review, 
60:543, October ~~4, 1885. 
30. Loc.cit, 
31. Lo c .cit , 
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the state was primarily agrarian tending to be poor; mere 
va garies of lt'lea_ th~ :lr could do extensive damage to ite. 
prosperity. Only five cities had a population of more than 
one hundred tho us g_nd and inasmuch as accumulation of' wealth 
was not great, a ·"ar could impair the fUture of the country 
for decades. The inference was plain--the nation had to 
32 
keep peace even at extreme se.crifice s. In 1888, William 
T. Stead d.ec lared that A us tria was 11 wi thin an ace of bank-
ruptcy 11 and. her mill tary expenditures forced her to the brink 
33 
of ruin. 
A year later her precarious financial condition had 
not improved and Sir Fitzgerald Law feared that she could 
34 
not continue to mainta.in adequate military power. 
J. D. Bourchier, the Balkan traveler and TimeB 
correspondent in this area, reported: 
Austria-Hungary is compelled to maintain 
military armament altogether disporportionate 
to her economical resources. Her financial 
condition is alarming; she supports a load of 
taxa.tion so overwhelming that it paralyzes he r 
recuperative power .••. Her deficits are increasing 
year by year; in fact she can no longer affo~l to 
hold the position of a Great Power. 
35 
32. Loc.cit. 
33. William T. Stead, Truth About Russia (London: 
Cassell and Company, Limited, 1888~~ 69. 
34. Kurios, "Current Influences on Foreign Policy," 
Blackwood. 1 s Edin1:urgh Me.gazine, 146:7 56, December, 1889. 
35. Bourchier, QQ.cit., pp. 282-283. 
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Therefore, me.ny in Britain recognized that some of Austria-
Hungary's heavy eJCpenditures had. been caused by events 
beyond her control. A vicious ci~cle had been established; 
money was required for a sizable army, new equi pment, a 
navy, et cetera, in order to me.inte.in her Great Power 
standing and her position .in eastern E1wope, but the outlay 
forced her to the point of financial ruin and. ultimate loss 
of prestige. 
The Times correspondent in Vienna, in 1888, presented 
a dismal picture. "Everywhere in Austria you mark t he 
outward. signa of WP-al th in grand a.rchi tecture, with inner 
poverty, decline and absence of recupera.ti ve power. 11 He 
noted that Vienna could h a ve been the center of thriving 
Danubian trade, s base for companies trading with Turkey 
or Ru8sia, but the Government did not encourage it. The 
British trading colony was . small and labored 11 under circum-
sta.nces which would discourage Mark Tapley. •t. Further, 
American speculators came to Vienna e.nd after uttering a 
low whistle rAtUI~ed to Paris, an d schemes for using foreign 
capital in :T.)Ublic works simply collapsed after a short time. 
Trieste, the single port of Austria, had the commerce of 
but a third-rate English maritime town. 
Apathy and discouragement in the economic picture was 
blamed upon the Government. A representative of the 'l'imes 
sta.ted that the appearance of consti tutiona.lism had blinded 
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me.ny to the feet that the country we.s governed by a bur~au-
cracy unchanged since the de.ys of Metternich. Business men 
negotiating for C·)ntracts or commercial agreements ·with the 
Government became bogged down in a mass of red tape and 
- - 36 
delays which continued ad infinitum. 'l1his same source 
gave vivid proof Jf financial troubles by a notation 
concerning fluctu9ting currency: "Three months ago EL sovereign 
was quoted at 12 fl. 70 kr: it is now worth 12 fl. ~!0 kr., 
which makes a differenc, of 50 fl. (or, rough l y J:.4) on the 
;,.10 0 . 11 Such a f'luctue.tion had a most damaging effeet on 
37 
trade, travel plals, and the tourist. In 1893 Sidney 
'VJhi trnan asserted: 
For in tr'uth the Austrians, although they are 
such poor w·~alth-producers that their volume of 
trade hardl;y exceeds that of thirf'ty little 
Belgium ••. e.lthough nobody dies of starvation, 
yet there are so few methods of making money, 
thB.t in Vienna the bakers, butchers, and brewe~ rs 
appeer to b~ the only prosperous tre.ders. 
38 
Eight years later the Soeaker complained of the ever-present 
39 
bur~aucrfltic trad•~ restrictions and miserable fisca.l system. 
36. Article in Lona.on Times, September 26, 1888. 
3.7. Loc.cit ., 
38. Sidney vihi tma.n, 'l'he Realm of the Habsburgs, (London: 
Willia.rn H einemma.n 1, 1893) 1 pp ~ 227-228. 
39. "The At~trian Elections 11 Speaker, 23: 395-396, 
Ja.nuary 12, 1901; also 1 Heinrich Kanner, 11 The Commercial 
Policy of Austria--Hunga.ry, 11 25:249-250, November 30 1 1901. 
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When responsible quarters in Britain suggestecl that 
the weighty ha.nd of government bureaucratic control be 
lifted from Austrian commercial and industrial ventures, 
they reflected a . situation in the English homeland. Even 
in the la.te yea.rs of the century laissez-faire had a great 
many s.dherents in Britain. If commercial and industrial 
investors were allowed a. free hand, would not Austr:la have 
experienced an economic revi va.l? A. J. P. Taylor su~gests 
a plausible reason why la.issez-faire did not regulate the 
Austrian economic system throughout the century. At the 
este.blishment of Dua.lism, laissez-fB,ire had been instituted 
under the German Liberal Party and continued until 1873. 
In that year, when the crash occurred, confidence i this 
economic theory f .i s appeared; the other nationalities · 
bla.med t h e Germar:.s and there was a readiness to return to 
governmental d.ire·ction. The German unper middle class also 
laid aside its llberalism and defended its capit a list 
interests. In a defense of these interests an e.ppeal was 
made to the sta.te, therefore distrust of state power, the 
40 
strong element in liberalism, was · abando ned. 
In the mid-·eighties, Vanity Fair reported that Austria. 
was "steeped to ·:ne eyes in debt. 11 Her tax limit appeared 
to have been met 1 and unless new fields of taxation could be 
onened and a widHr market for manufactures secured, bankruptcy 
4o. "A.J .P .. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 180,2-1918 
(Lonclon: Hamish Hemil ton, '19"'48), p. 151. · 
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s.nd renucliation · Nere inevi ta.ble. 
Durin~ the nineties and in the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the Economist which frequently imposed 
a close scrutiny 1m the Habsburg Empire 1 s economic situation, 
presented a picture of a Government ba.rely solvent or in 
some years actually insolvent, and an economy not really 
thriving either i :1 agriculture or in new industrial 
enterprises. In ;3.ddi tion, the fin a ncial structure of the 
nation was shaky, to say the least. :B,or example, in 1911 
the above-mention ,~d paper reported. that since 1908 s. debt 
of sixty-two mill.lon pounds had been built up making the 
total debt ove r f .Lve hundred million pounds sterling. It 
significantly ad d ed that this occurred. in a. time of peace, 
and. furthermore t :~ere was little likelihood that the state 
would energetically confront its problems or that a real 
financial r eform 'N"ould. be instituted; instead, issuance of 
new loans and app Lication to the money me.rket would continue. 
The Na.tional Observer reoorted that both industrial and rural ~~~~~ -------- ' 
laborers were in e state of indigency. Wages were extremely 
low in all f o rms Jf industry, hours of labor were excessive, 
43 
anc' sanitary and : ~ e alth conditions were miserable. Both 
41. 11 Notes, 11 Vanity Fair, 36:127, September 4, 1886. 
42. 11 Austri.:t-Hungary, 11 Economist, 73:137-138 .l. July 15, 
1911; a lso, 11 Fina:1ce, 11 Speaker, 17:724, June 11, 1~98. 
43. 11 Why Au s trian Farmers Are Socialist," National 
Observer, 13:-584, _April 13, 1895; also, "How the Working 
Cless Live in Austria," 12:300-301, August 4, 1894. 
42 
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Francis H. E. Palmer in 1903, and Geoffrey Drage a few years 
le. ter ( 1909), declared the.t working conditions in the 
factories were very poor and a much worse condition prevailed 
among small and home industries. Wages of the Austrian 
laboring class were much lm>~er than in other European coun-
trie s with the exception of Ruseia., and it was reported 
that the poverty of the urban · i<JOrkers had become a political 
ana social danger. The purchasing power of the laborers 
ha.Cl been red.uced, and manufecturers were compelled to rely 
on export tra.de which had been made difficult by the 
inability of the home population to buy foreign goods. Drage 
asserted tha_t the working cla.ss eked out a meager. llving, 
and long hours, inadequate housin~4 inspf~icient_clothing 
and food me.de the outlook dismal. The small tenant farmers 
and peasant proprietors were he Fvily burdened with ta~es. 
The science of agriculture had advanced as well as the 
technological knowledge necessary for prosperity, but 
unfortuna. te ly they lacked the adequate capital for lmpr9vemei} ts. 
Probably the ideas of John Stuart Mill had directed the 
attention of Englishmen to the condition of Austria ' s 
industrial and agricultural classes; that is--recognition 
that a more even :'listribution of wealth was necessar•y, 
44. Geoffre:y- Dre.ge Austria-Hun~ary (New York : E. P. 
Dutton and Compan:y, 1909~ 1 pp. 114=12 and 136-142; also, 
·l?rancis H. E. Pa.l :ner, Aus"I;ro-Hungaria.n Life In •rown end 
Country (London: G·. P. PUtnam's Sons, l903),pp~0-263. 
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together with a satisfa_ction of the ma_sses by eliminating 
obvious evils. 
In the Bosnie_n crisis of 1908 when Austria waB exerting 
herself to a resolute political action, her financial 
situation ws.s seen a e a deterrent to the sustenance of such 
a program. 
- -
Financial difficulties, - again may cost Aus t ris.-
Hungary very dear. The tensiop which has required. 
the mobilization of the Army shows no s i gn of 
ending, and it is said that the mobilization had 
already involved an ultimate expenditure of nearly 
six millions sterling. 
45 
In 1909 Geoffrey Drage made a rather comprehensive 
statement concerning the economic situation. He used as 
sources Foreign Cffice Reports, native writers, and material 
supplied by the 1imes correspondent in Vienna. Drage 
believed that by 1906-1907, · both Austria. and Hungary ha.d 
shaken off many ~ast limitations and the financial and 
commercial situation had vastly improved. He admitted that 
critics pointed to the late date at which the Budget deficit 
wa.s wiped away ar!d currency reformed, but he insisted that 
c onditions finall3 had become stabilized as the steadiness 
of Government bond s showed that cred.it was finally on a 
sound footing. Noreover, a gre at deal of the outlay had 
been used to increase ma.t erial assets such as railways, roads, 
and other transpCirtation facilities. Immediately following 
45. "The Policy of Austria-Hungary, 11 Spectator, 101: 
982, December 12_, 1908. 
t be Austro-Prussian War, yearly deficits bad amountf~d to 
6,ooo,ooo to 7,oco,ooo pounds, but in 1906 the Austrian 
budget had. a surplus of 200,000 pounds. Also, in t h e field 
of trade sip;nificant improvements bad been rmde; the total 
foreign trade had risen from 144,600,000 pounds in 1899, 
to 194,900,000 pounds in 1907. 
This prosperity is likely to continue, and 
even to increase, given confidence in good and 
permanent rela tion with Austria; otherwise 
Hungary mi¢~t be left with its social difficul-
ties, its diminished credit, its unsolved problems 
of taxation r eform, and i t s incomplete Colbertian 
programme, to face age.in the dreary era of def'ici t s, 
now,happily, a thing of the past. 
46 
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Prior to thH outbreak of t h e war, the Austria.n financial 
condition was reported a s very serious by the Times corree-
pendent; military activity in 1912 and 1913 had cost the 
Empire about one hundred fifty thousand pounds a day, and the 
naval building program of Admiral Montecuccoli if undertaken 
would have to be BUpported by loans. 11 1-'loney is very dear." 
The commentator gave the impression that the country ha_d 
exerted itself at an enormous co s t which threatened financial 
47 
solvency. 
In 1913, the whole Austro-Hungaria.n Empire had an 
adverse balance ol' visible trade which amounted to 
560,000,000 kronen. Of course, this was somewhat offset by 
46. Drage, .£~.cit., p. 452. 
47. News die:patch in Lonclon Times, January 4, 1913. 
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invisible assets from tourists and from Vienna 1 s position 
. 48 
as a financial center. The Economist remarked that much 
costly goods was displayed in Viennese shops and one would 
suppose that indt.stry and commerce were thriving, instead 
49 
they were in a state of chronic depression. On July 22, 
1914, a few days before the outbreak of war, in an article 
"Danger to Europe: 11 appearing in the London Times, the 
deplorable state of Austria 1 s finance and credit was mentioned 
50 
as a. preventive to her adoption of a bel l i cose program. 
It is very noticeable that in times of crises attention 
turned to the finances of the Danubian Monarchy, which seemed 
to sho"\'J that Bri ·;a in was aware of the fact that wealth l-Jas 
a vital determinant in "\var, and a healthy economic system 
was the substance which SUP,ported and nourished it. A 
sizable portion of the Empire 1 s debt in the early twentieth 
century wa.s due ·t;o heavy mill ta.ry expenditures, a.nd. a 
tremendous outla.;r was req_uired for the dreadnought building 
program actively supported by the heir, Francis Ferdinand. 
Actually, from the Austro-Prussian War to World War I, 
British journalists often commented upon the Empire 1 s weak 
financial conditton, and it is quite surprising that the 
Austrian economy and finances did not sha.pe opinion to a 
48. Sir William Goode, "The Problem of Austria: The 
General Financial Position of Austria, 11 Manchester Guardian 
pp. 143-146, June 15, 1922. 
49. 11 Austria-Hunge.ry, 11 Economist, 77:1189-1190 
November 29, 1913. 
50. Article in London Times, January 4, 1913. 
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greater degree. Many in Britain clung tenaciously to the 
be lief that tbe Danubian Mone.rchy was a Grept Po1~rer. 
In glanc in@: over these estimations of internal 
conditions in Austria, it is fair to Hssume that they did 
not enhance her prestige or instil confidence in her future. 
To some persons at least, her trade and econo mic influence 
could have been a deciding fBctor in the Balkans. After 
the esta.b l ishment of peace in 1878, the state's natural 
advantages were visible. It was possible that Austrian 
commerce could. have displaced British trade in southeastern 
Europe. 
Possessed of the magnificent trade highway 
of the ranube for a considerable nortion of its 
length, Austria-Hungary can comma~d against the 
world the trade of its :banks, and should it be 
possible to agree with Russia, trade beyond its 
banks into all the ports of the Black Sea. If 
the Sle.v element gets the upper hand in the 
empire, and Francis Joseph, as he should, goes 
eastward and so-uthward in his political sympathies 
and ende avors, we may expect England to be, at 
least for a time practically shut out of Central 
and Eastern Europe, almost as much as if the whole 
territory fell into the hands of Russia. 
51 
In the se.me period., trade between Britain and Austria-
Hunga ry was deemed negligible even though twelve years earlier, 
in 1866, a new commercial treaty lowering customs had been 
negotiated bet·;.reen the two na tiona, but in spite of the 
reduction the t ariff was considered high. Future trade prospects 
were believed not at all encouraging, for Austria probably 
51. 11 Aus tria-Hungary and Germany, 11 .212..· cit., p . 90. 
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would be unable to purchase additional British goods as her 
paper credits could not be expanded in an unlimited manner. 
Conversely, Britain appeared to have need of only a small 
i 
share of Austria's goods, principally corn, wine, and oil-
seed. Ho wever, her fluctuating harvests proved deterimental 
52 
even to this trade, and competitors were always on hand. 
Investme:1ts were an important part of Britain's 
foreign economi.c policy and provided her with most lu~rative 
returns, but the Habsburg Mone.rchy was not a major area. of 
investment. A study has disclosed that in 19t0 dividends 
from this coun·:;ry amounted to 74,171 pounds in com]:e.rison 
with 8,768,237 pounds from India, 1,4B7,744 from Canada, 
429,908 from · l~ussia, 1,617,361 from Japari, 869~004 from. 
China, and 353 J 125 from Turkey. Capital was inve steo. chiefly 
in colonial anCL non-European countries. In 1go8 Britain 
invested in th€! following countries: Cana.da, Argentina, 
Brazil, India, United States, South Afric·a, Mexico, 
Australasia, Russia, Ja.pan, Chile and China, the foregoing 
arrangement of the countries being relative to the amounts 
53 
invested. Tts amount of capital invested in the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, during the years 1908-1910, was .as follows: 
52. Ibid., p. 92. 
53. George Paish, "Great Britain's Capital Investments 
in IndividuP.l, Colonial and Foreign Countries," Journal of 
the Roye.l Statistical Society, 74:167-187, Part 2, Janua.ry, 
1911. 
1908 1909 1910 
Austria 130,000 2 J 6:~8 J 000 
Hungary 1,950,000 
Therefore, a sizable amount hacl ,been invested in the 
Habsburg Empire in one year alone, and in the over-all 
list of those foreign countries in which accountB had 
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been invested, that is, aside from colonial investments, 
Austria and Hungary were not included in the first twenty 
54 
nations. It is safe to say that Britain was not interested 
in the Austro-Hungari~.n Empire for reasons of in,estments, 
either t hose existing or any that might develop in the future. 
In summ~ry, Great Britain recognized and expressed 
concern over the financial plight of the Austro-Hungarian 
Ernoire. Throu~hout the fifty years prior to World War I, 
it 1as thought that the sta t e was in difficult straits and 
teetered on the brink of catastrophe as its internal 
structure was seld.om free from debts and financial 
embarassment. Seemingly, the Empire did not share~ in new 
opportunities for enrichment that h ad been enjoyed by other 
European nations of the nineteenth century. Britlsh critics 
maintained that a gree.t d.eal of the distress was the nation's 
own making such as an antiquated commercial code 1 lack of 
54. Geor~e Paish, 11 Great Britain's Capital Investments 
in Other La.nd.s, 11 Journa.l of the Royal StatisticaJ=- Society, 
72:155, Part 3, September, 1909. 
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governmental sympathy and understanding of economtc rela.tion-
ships in the moaern age, and failure to utilize resources 
and geographic location. As Britain 1 s l:usiness acumen and 
inclustrial know-how had reached an envi a ble keenness, 
unders t andably !IlB.ny Englishmen were impatient with the 
tardigra de Dual Monarchy. It w e.s felt that a complete 
s everance with the past was needed plus a governmental 
interes t in eco:1omic questions, as well as a cleHrer 
realization that finances were the handmaid of politics; 
ambitious polic 1.es could not be supported by a debtor sta.te. 
As in other dep1 :1. rtment s of Am tria.n life, the economy and 
finances \\rere s '3 en as 11 muddling along. 11 Direction and firm 
handling were d1~cicledly in absentia. A p a r amount question 
was whether such a weak internal structure would be able to 
suppor t a f ull-f ledged nineteenth century conflict and this 
to Britain wes nn all i mportant factor. To well-informed 
British circles the Austrian scene was marked by complacence 
and an ennui. 
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CHAPTER X 
Austrian Armed Strength 
In the P'3riod. under consideration Europe experienced 
rapid industrialization which resulted in the improvement 
of military weapons and armaments. In 1859 Darwin had en-
nunciated his doctrine for biology, but much earlier 
Clausewitz had made a similar contribution to the life 
history of ne.t :Lons ano_ naturally Englishmen became interested 
in the mill tar~r strength of European states. Survival came 
only to the fi·~test, and Sadowa and. Sedan tended to ve.lidate 
the views of this military theorist. Anything that disrupted 
the balance of po-v,rer and encouraged the emergence of e. single 
state or alliance that would control the European continent 
roused apprehension. The fear increased inasmuch as Great 
Britain was not merely an island or two off the coast of 
Europe, but a \lrorld-wide Empire held together by tenuous 
lines of communication and insecure military outposts. Her 
geographical position dictated her foreign policy. In a 
similar manner, Austria's foreign policy was imposed upon 
the Habsburgs r. .ot by geography, but by ethnogre.phy. British 
attention cente·red on areas of strategic i mportance. The 
Mediterranean Eiea we.s of prime concern as were its outlets, 
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Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and the Dardanelles. The Russia n 
Empire, a epra,vling mass, hs.d one of .).ts es.lients pointed 
in the direction of the Mediterranean llfe line and another 
aimed at the pa sses which led to India. Until the Anglo-
Russian unders t anding of 1907, Britain's foreign policy was 
de c i gned to prBvent Russia, perhaps in conjunction with 
France, from oncupying Constantinople and closing the 
Medi terranea.n to the British fleet, because these movements 
would allow Runsia to control the entire Near East and turn 
military forceB against India. Like Britain, Austria-Hungary 
was a nation beset by danger from Russia; the Habsburg state 
was Britain's potential ally in 1878, and a partial one in 
1887. Austria--Hungary depended on her land forces and the 
German alliancE!, while Britain relied principally upon he r 
navy for proteetion of outlying dependencies until a military 
force could be assembled • 
.•• either England must create a navy superior 
to those of the rest of the world combined, and 
must so t .se it in the service of the world as to 
satisfy the intelligence and t he conscience of 
mankind; or, she must enter into partnership with 
that hs_lf of Europe whose aims mo s t nearly agree 
with her own against the other half which rejects 
those aims. 
1 
Lack of military effectiveness was one of the causes 
of Aus tria's lG~ered political station. Her days of military 
1. Spenser Wilkinson, The Great Alternative : A Plea 
For National Policy {London: s. Sonnenchein & Co., 1894), 
pp. 19-20. 
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glory were in a bygone era and the immediate past provided 
only bitter memories. Staggering defeats meted out by 
Napoleon in such battles as Austerlitz and Wagram could be 
forgotten, for Prussia and Russia also suffered at his hands. 
The years that had sped by since the Napoleonic era had been 
a period of re:mvigoration for Prussia. A military 
revitalization also had been undertaken by Austria and 
Englishmen felt that it was successful. The rigidity of 
discipline, the~ care, and the training of the Austrian a.rmy 
were emphe.sized.; in short, l:efore the summer of 1:366, the 
Habsburg state possessed a military organization of European 
renown • . Therefore, confidence was badly shaken by a second 
sweeping defeat within half a century. It was clE~ar that 
the military do·iV'nfall at Sa.d.o't'ITa had been caused not by one, 
but several def1.ciencies. Drawing of parallels is most 
dangerous, yet ln many respects the events of the French 
collapse in World War II 1-rere quite similar to the Austria.n 
defeat in 1866. The defeated powers had a substantial military 
reputation priol' to the ·war; both had been crushed by new 
superior ¥Teapone1, and the fall of both nations was the result 
of one lightnin@:-like ca.mpaign in wh ich the mill tary 
authorities o:f the conquered nations had pursued vr3ry unwise 
strategy. 
Five years after the Austro-Prussian War, a high British 
army officer wrote in his journal: 
We •.• :Lamented the state into which, thanks 
to injudtcious reforms, the noble old Austrian 
army had fa.llen, and ag reed how necessary for 
Europe i·.; was that Austria should not become 
too weak,, 
2 
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Attention was turned to Austrian military preparedness as 
naturally woulcl. be expected at times of crises when military 
action was pos1:1i ble. With Austrian defeats of recent 
reference, it lfas surprising that some quarters highly 
evaluated the lmperial armed forces. Perhaps this was 
explainable by the fact that Austria 1 s. chief enemy in all 
fore se eable struggles was Russia, and on the field of battle 
Russia had not proven an effective force in supply, in 
organization, or in equipment, .and the achievements that she won 
ca.me largely through sheer force of numbers. Possibly there 
was an unconscious inclination to overestimate the Austrian 
army which was considered an indispensable oorrier to 
Russian e.xpansi:Jn. 
In 1869, the British Consul at Trieste reported to 
the publishers Blackwood and Sons, that the Austris.n army 
was only half-dr-illed and the new l'leapon was a 11 puzzle to 
the raw recruit s. 11 Moreover, he telieved the Empire lacked 
2. C. P. Beauchamp Walker, D~ys of a Soldier's Life : 
Being Letters W::-i tten W. ~he_ late eneral-Sir G. P. Beauchamp 
Walker During Aetive Service in the Crimean, Chinese, 
Austro-Prussian (66) and Franco-German (11) Wars (London: 
Chapma.n and HaL_, Ltd,., 1894), p. 379. 
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3 
a competent general. 
In 1872, an evaluation of the Austro-Hungarian army 
appeared in Colburn 1 s United Service ll...agazine; it was a most 
fe.vorable Judgment in view of the fact that barely six 
yeBrs earlier the army had suffered a military debacle. It 
wes pointed out that the Empire possessed an army of eight 
hundred t housard men including well-equipped reserves 
provided with guns of the newest type. The war had taught 
the country a lesson; the soldiers had. become better cared 
for and the officers had military bearing and spirit. 
Furthermore, the officer corps we.s considered fully re-
invigorated by the elimination of favoritism and by adoption 
of a system w ereby all officers matriculated a.t a military 
college and rose through the ranks. The entirely new plan 
of tactics este.blished e.fter the disastrous defeat, as well 
as the foundatiJn of several first-class military schools, 
seemed to incre ~se confidence. The Empire 1 8 mul ti.ne.tional 
structure which interested all mili ta.ry observers was judged 
a source of st~~ngth. Homogeneity ve rsus heterogeneity 
became th:e cont :roversial issue in England whenever the 
Habsburg army was evaluated. Captain Spencer, the author o:f 
the e.rticle, :fe1 t that the Empire' 8 mili ta.ry power had been 
greatly augmented by the guarantee of Ha.gyar loyalty, and 
3. Edmund Downey, Charles Lever: His Life in His 
Letters (Lonclon: vlillia m Ble.ckwood and Sons, 190bT, II, 
p. 2'46. 
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thus he voiced the widely held. view that the Hungarians 
were t h oroughl;y fa.miliar with the a.rt of military 
4 
org e.nization and possessed heroic qualities. In a survey 
of continental armed forces, in 1871, Professor Cairnes 
sta.ted that the military resources of Prussia and Austria 
were enormous Hnd that both were continental powers of the 
5 
first class. 
In 1878 when an engegement between Russia. and the 
Habsburg EmpirE was a much discussed possibility, a British 
a.rmy officer, G·eneral Hamley, wrote in the Nineteenth 
Century the.t the geographical features of Eastern Europe 
ga~e Austria the advantage in a struggle with Russia. 
This view was indicative of an important trend in British 
military thinking: Austria's strategic position was considered 
by well-informei persons as one of her assets. Such persons 
as Lord Robert .Montagu, Captain Hazier, and Baron de Worms 
were of the opi:1ion that Au stria aided by Turkey and 
Rumania could p:revent Russia from invading Eastern Europe. 
With the assist :mce of the Bri tieh fleet operating in the 
Black Sea, Russ:La 1 s communication lines could be out and 
4. Captain Spencer, "The Future of Austria and Her 
Military Forces," Colburn's United Service :tvia€.§-zin~, pp. 
335-338, March, 1872; also, Captain Spencer, 11 Frs.nce and 
He r Nel'r Ally: With a Few HeD!I!ark e on Poland and the Military 
Orf!:anization of the Hungarian Honved," Colburn's United 
Service :!VIagazine., p. 576, April, 1872. 
5. J. E. Cairnes, 11 A National or a Standing Army, 11 
Fortnightly Revi~, 15:169, February, 1871. John IUliot 
Cairnes, author and Professor of political economy 
University College, London, 1866-1872. 
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her army throwr·. back upon the Rumanie.n route; in that area 
the roads were wretched a.nd the single railway was of 
di f ferent gauge than the Russian system. Defee.t in such a 
6 
limited area would not mean merely disaster, but ruin. 
Writers gave special prominence to Aust~ia 1 s 
nume rical strensth which me.de an impression on Englishmen, 
maybe for the reason that the British a.rrny was comparatively 
small. For ins t .9.nce, one author stated that ViennEt without 
extreme effort oould. raise a fi ghting force of five hund.red 
and twelve t h oUt3e.nd infe.ntry and fifty thousan · ca·valry ,. 
with sixteen hundred field-pieces. Besides t h e completely 
treined force, f:he he.d the Ersatz Reserves of about ninety-
seven thousand '\'rh ich required add.i tional tre.ining before 
they could be UEed. The Landwehr consisted of old soldiers 
ma cle up of apnrcximately one hundred and eighty-on1e thousand 
infe.n try and ten thousand cavalry J but this contingent could 
7 
be employed for home defense only. 
Reequipmen t of the Austrian army drew commen1;; perhap s 
the effectiveness of t ~e needle-gun in the Austro-Prussian 
6. Lord Ro '::>ert Montagu, Foreign Policy: E7~land and the 
Eastern Question (London: Chapme.n and Hall, 187 , pp. 95-96; 
also, The Russo-~~urkish War: Including An Account .Qf the 
Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Power, and The History of 
the Eastern Que)tion-rGaptain Hazier, editor, London: William 
MacKenzie, 1877 , II, p. 329; also, Baron Henry de Worms, 
England 1 s Policy in the East (Second editiont London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1877), p . EO:----
7. E . B. Hemley, "The Armies of Russia and Austria," 
Nineteenth Centur~, . 3:856-860, May, 1878. 
-265-
V.!ar made E q;z:l i~ :hmen take a lively interest in equipment 
a.nd arms. The Austrian army was said to have been provided 
with an excellent weapon, the \IJ erndl rifle which was 
sighted up to twelve hundred paces. Each soldier carried 
seventy-two rotnds of ammunition with additional supply in 
the fighting train. Field-artillery had been rem:)wed, and 
in comp etition with the Krupp _ gun Austria had developed her 
own armament cons t ructed of the so-called steel-bronze. 
Her field-pieces were superior to the Russian field-
artillery, but Russia had ordered the newest type of Krupp 
8 
gun and a future Austria.n superiority was doubtful. 
Baron Hen~y de Worm~, in 1877, examined the ever-
popu l a r nationality question and discounted rumore; that the 
Slavs of t h e £ m:)ire would. prove disloyal in military 
operations ag ainst Russia; Pan-Slavism had_ n o t spread to the 
army or to the ·:.lulk of the pop ula tion. 11We may assume, there-
fore, the.t Pan-:3lavist sympathies would not weaken the milit a ry 
9 
resources of Au ntria in a war aga.inst Russia." 
In the Pa:.l Mall Gazette in 1 878 app e ared a criticism 
of the Aus trian army. Judgment "'' as based on ideas of Major 
C. Adam s who haCl se rved in the Austrian a.rmy and later became 
Professor of' Military History at the British Staff Colleg e. 
Austrian infenti~ was thought inf'erior to that of' other 
na t i on s , f or the f'ollowing rea.sons: ( 1) The heterogeneous 
8 . Loc.cit.; also, 'l'he Russo-'r urkish v·ar, .QQ.cit., p. 328. 
9. de \>forms, loc.cit. 
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character of tt~ soldiery, (2) an absence of national spirit 
and the average soldier 1 s indifference to the cause for which 
he fought, (3) lack of individual - independence wh:lch came 
from free institutions, and (4) difficulties of language. 
After admitting these deficiencies, however, it was stated 
that the Austri!in army WEts still a formidable fighting 
mach ine as it ab:aye arose from defeat with discipline and 
10 
organization in·tact. 
During tht! Balkan Crisis, British Conservative leaders 
endeavored to form e.n alliance with Austria. but it appears 
t~ey were not gPeatly impressed by her military strength. 
The British GoVE!rnment felt uncertain about her army; during 
the previous dec:ade it had been defeated and a.s a result it 
was reorga.nized and reequipped, but remained untes·ted. Lord 
Salisbury stated that her power in arms was not grt3e.t 
11 
although she had shown marked ability for intrigue. Again, 
examining Salisbury 1 s private correspondence, the Foreign 
Secretary in his first talks with Bismarck, said: 11 It seems 
rather incongruo ·~s that this power then should be viewed 
12 
as a new bub·.rark of pm-rer and. a substantial block to Russia. 11 
10. 11-The F:Lf;hting Value of the Austrian Army, 11 Pall 
Mall Gazette, 27:11, February 27, 1878. 
11. Gwendolen Cecil, The Life of Robert Marquis of 
Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921}, II, 
'P. 86. 
12. R. 1'1. t•eton-Watson, Disra.eli, Gladstone and the 
Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party POiitiCS 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 533. 
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Bismarck attempted to modify this opinion. 
The Earl of Derby had. been Conservative Secretary 
of Foreign Afft: ~ irs until late March., 1878, at which time 
he resigned frc 'm the Ministry. He was opposed to the 
Government's Balkan policy and he especially objected to 
any overt atterrpt by Britain to n·egotiate for an Austro-
Hungarian alliance. In early April, in Parliament, he 
stated in plain terms his opinion of Austrian armed strength. 
Derby freely acknowledged that if England had to seek an 
ally in Europe, it was to Vienna alone that she could. turn 
but he doubted Austria-Hungary's worth as an ally .. He 
believed a single unsuccessful campaign could result in her 
disruption. Her population was divided in sympathies, the 
Magyars were frlendly to Turkey, the Slavs had a directly 
opposite sentimt:lnt, and the Austro-Ge rmans just wan ted peace. 
Her two parliem~mts pulled in d.ifferent directions, and as 
her army we.s pa::-t Slav, how could it be used against Sle.vs? 
Derby also noted that it had been difficult for the Empire 
to ra.i se five or six million pounds necessary for the first 
mobilization; furthermore, Hungary was not a co1.mtry that 
could be relied upon for efficient aid. 
You cali.not be sure the. t A us tria will come in to 
the field with us as an Ally-- we cannot be sure 
that if she does so she will not go out of the 
field without us--we may not he.ve to go out of 
the field without her • . 
13 
13. The Hansard, 239:797-798. 
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Lord Od.o Russell, British Ambassador to Berlin, in March, 
1878, reported to Lord. Derby, 11 Austria is poor, weak, and 
14 
dependent uuon her neighbors •.• 11 
The Morni~ Post did not agree with the statements 
of Derby and insisted that if the Empire had been purely 
German it would. not have ht=td a firm hold on the Slavs, but 
in trut:h there ,t~as not the slighte s t danger of Slt:tV 
disloyalty. The army was r eferred to as a magnificent military 
force. The Time:~ remarked that iri a war with Russia Austrian 
Slav officers would be as loyal as their Magyar brethren. 
If it :.s any sa.tisfaction to them to learn 
that the sE! fa.cts are perfectly well known in 
England, they will be pleased by the assurance 
that Lord Derby spoke merely for himself. 
'11he Daily News 8.vowed that the Derby speech did not contain 
anything that had not been repeatedly discussed by 
15 
Englishmen. 
The Tablet had frequently expressed sympathy for the 
Habsbur~ state which, of course, wa.s quite natural because 
the Empire v-.ra.s vigorously Catholic. During the Ba _kan crisis 
the weekly exami:1ed the strength of the Empire and passed. a 
14. Winifr,~d Taffs, Ambassador to Bismarck, £•ord Odo 
Russell, First Baron Ampthill (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 
1938), p. 224; F~ H. A. Munro-Butler-Johnstone 11 The 
Eastern Question ., 11 treprinted from Pall Mall Gaze!te for 
private circulat!Lon, lB75), p. 33. - ---
15. Pall Ivinll Gazette, 27: 3, April 17, 1878. 
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low judgment on it. 11 Austria ••. might master half a million 
of half-hearted Germans and Sla.vs against the great centers 
16 -
of German and Slav aspirations." 
After the difficulty experienced by Austria in the 
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina her deficiencies were 
noted. She appeared poorly organized even though the entire 
nation was thou ght subordinated to military necese1i ty. The 
training and courage of her soldiers and skill of officers 
had be en made i ::leffectual by ind.ecisi vene ss in higher 
echelons , by sll)wness of movement, and by great inadequacies 
17 
in matters of supply. An attempt had been made to remedy 
the slowness of movement and inefficiency, and a few years 
after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina there appeared 
in the Army ~ Navy Magazine, a proposed plan for reorgani-
zation of the Austro- Hungarian army by adoption of the 
territorial sys1;em. The object was to provide speedy mobiliza-
tion which had proved most successful to the Germans in 1886 
18 
and 1870. In 1879 the Economist recognized that the Austrian 
army was numeri eally strong, brave, and fairly well organized. 
Nonetheless, pel•fection was thought impossible in an organiza-
tion composed of many cultures, nationalities, and languages 
16. 11 The Danger of England from the Situation of 
Europe, 11 Tablet, 45:133, January 30, 1875. 
17. 11 Austro-Hungary in Bosnia, 11 Spectator, 512:1116, 
September, 1878. · 
18. 11 The Reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian Army, 11 
Army and Navy Magazine, 5:343-348, .tt 'ebruary, 1883. 
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a.nd such multiplicity made it a Sepoy Army, easily dis-
heartened, with efficiency dependent upon victory; but 
unfortunately complete victories had been very infrequent. 
Furthermore, the aristocrats who held command were 
considered poor lee.ders; very rarely men of abili~;y like 
Archduke Charles, Windischgratz, or Marshal Radet2:ky 
19 
appeared on the scene,. 
In the mid-eighties, when Russia seemed read.y to 
expand into the eastern regions 1 at the time that Britain, 
Austria, a.nd Italy negotiated the Mediterranean Agreements, 
examination was mad.e of Austria 1 s mill tary strength. Sir 
' 
' 
Che.rles Dilke rxpressed a rather low estime.tion of her power 
as compared with Russia 1 s emphasizing the fact that the 
outlay by the H!Lbsburg 1•lonarchy on mill tar y preparedness 
was slightly more than tha.t of Italy and less than two-
thirds of the Ge·rman mili ta.ry appropriation. 'rhe combined 
Austrian and Ger·rnan forces would not quite equal those of 
Russia and therefore Austria was two or three times 
numerically weaker than her Eastern neighbor. Following the 
path of military critics, he looked into the positi on of 
Austria on the Ea s tern front a.nd argued that the fortresses 
or Cracow and Przemyel were not strong enough to resist en 
at t a ck by a supe r:-ior force. Her armies could retire 
19. "The Strength and Weakness of Austria," ~conomist, 
37:1251-1252, November 1, 1879. 
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into the Carpa thians of course, but Vienna ~auld be un-
guarded. Dilke was astonished that she had not fortified 
herself in Galicia which had seven hundred and twenty miles 
of winding frontier, unless she was prepared to lose Eastern 
Galicia. He be.Lieved aid from Germany would not be a 
deciding factor because France would join in the st!ugg le if 
Germany e.ctivated her armed forces. The multina.tional 
structure of Au:3tria was considered detrimental to military 
vigor, for certain groups might not enthusiastically join 
in action againE;t Russia, that is,--the Red Russians and 
Little Russians of Northern Bukovina, a.nd complete loyalty 
of' the Croats WGS uncertain. Besides, her general and officers 
were not highly ~ted and did not arouse confidence. The 
Libera.l leader admitted tha t the Austrians had. beg1m to re-
orge.nize their cavalry but '\'Tere at a disadvantage 1nasmuch 
as the Ru esians had a significe_nt headstart. They also he.d 
a sizable force :>f dre.goons which combined the best features 
of cavalry and mounted infantry, plus another force of Cossack 
reserves in little Russia and the Don Cossack Steepes; and 
before Austria could move a sufficient army to meet this horde 
they would overf:.ow the frontier, sever railway line s and 
tele graph communlcatio~B and thus destroy Habsburg mobilization 
before it h2d started. 
Sir Charles Dilke, like most English critics, r eflected 
upon two controversial issues,--Austria 1 s strategic position 
20. Sir Charles Di1ke, The Present Position of European 
Politics or Europe in 1887 (Lond.on: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 
1887), pp. 187-190. 
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and defence, a:1d her heterogeneous army. 
The Duke of Cambrid~e, who was Commander-in-Chief 
of the British army and much interested in continental 
military affai :rs, placed a high valuation on the Imperial 
army. He atte i1ded the Austrian maneuvers in 1887' and 
reported: 
I am , :~e.tisfied that the Austrian Army is in a 
very fine condition, the Cavalry perfect in horse 
and man; the Infantry well instructed and good 
marchers ;: the Artillery perhaps rather slow, but 
g ood in the positions taken up. 
21 
As oppone1nts of Sir Charles Dilke, there appeared stout 
d.efenders of t h e mill ta.ry forces of the Habsburg ste.t~. 
H . o. Arnold.,...Fc,rster maintained that the Empire was in a 
strong stra teglcal po s ition, for Bukovina and Rumanie. \\rere 
so si tuated as to threaten a Russie.n edve.nce in to the 
Peninsul a. The! flank of an invading army would be open during 
severBl days' march. The railway between Viema a.nd 
Constantinople then under construction was considered a future 
asset for b o th at t a ck and <'lefense; 1 t was be in~ built along 
the we s tern rot.te through Belgrade, Nisch, Sophia. and 
Adrianople and joined the Austrian system and consequently it 
21. George Duke of Cambridge, A Memoir of His Private 
Life Be sed on .:Hfe ~rnBls and. Correspondence of His Royal 
Highness (Edgar Sheppard, editor, Longme.ns, Green and 
Comp any, 1906), II, p. 157. 
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22 
was safe from attack. An appraisal of Austrian military 
strength also appeared in the Snectator in 1887. It was 
reported that if the whole Austrian army was as good as the 
section which had held maneuvers on the fields of Transylvania, 
then it was tough, supple, and would not be pushed aside 
easily. The Empire consisted of hardy people who had with-
stood trials that would have bested weaker ethnie groups; 
German Tyrolese, Hungarian, Croat, and Pole soldiers 
furnished a st u.r<ly infantry and a first-class cava.lry. In 
add ition to ca.oable fighting people, the weekly declared 
that Austria h ad developed a system of training and a regular 
warlike machin ·3 which •·:as not equal to the German standa rd, 
23 
but was consid·3red on a par with Fra.nce and Russia. A 
military cri ti(~ believed the activity and mobility of field-
batteries dese ::-ved high pre.ise, and further, that the 
cava lry in rnant~uvers had made a fine impression on all foreign 
observers . Bu· ~ doubt vJa s expressed as to whether Austrian 
1•mrking arra.ng~!ments were careful and precise enough to meet 
re quire ments of 1-rar, and whether plans for mobilization 1'1T ere 
suitable and complete in actual operation. Lack of confidence 
22. H. 0, Arnold-Forster, "The Balkan Provinces," 
Contemp orary Re·view, 45:415, March, 1884. 
2 23. "The Strength of A us tria and Italy, 
11 ~ectator, 
60 :1337-1338, October ~~ 1887; also, "The Weakness of 
Austria," Spectator, 60 :455, April 2, 1887. 
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in Austrian efficiency was evident throughout the entire 
period 1866-1918, but was incree.singly stressed as military 
orge.nization ·::>ecame more intricate and advanced. The 
Soectator credited the Austria.n armies with a remarkable 
staying pmrer and ability to recover from defeat, but 
thoup:ht small defects had prevented full victories. Russian 
numerical sup1~riori ty was not considered a. gua.ra.ntee of 
Austrian de fe a t as p:reat masses could be brought into 
effective use only after long campaigns. "In any case, · 
depend upon it, the Army of Austria.-Hungary is e. big iveight 
24 
to throw into any scale." 
After the maneuvers of 1887, Vanity !~'air pra.ised the 
armed f orces l)f the Habsburg state, especially the cavalry; 
all military 'branches were ready for action with the 
exception perhaps of the commissariat and transport. And 
the experienc~~ ano_ capabilities of the Archdukee: Albrecht 
25 
and John added. luster to the military outlook. 
As might remained the arbiter in international relatione, 
Bri ta.in main t a ined interest in continental military affaire. 
It was generally felt that limited military preparedness was 
necessary for self-preservation, but it was not liked and 
its worship was severely criticized by the intelligentsia. 
In many cases it was viewed as characteristic of the past; 
oeace and con:federa.tion should have replaced it. Herbert 
25. "Notes, 11 Vanity Fair, 38:209, October l, 1887. 
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Spencer indicated that "from war has been gained all that 
it ··had to give." He believed war had b een useful , for it 
had aid.ed ' the most powerful and the most intelligent races 
~ b 1 h to people the earth, ut n the nineteent century the quiet 
pressure of iniustrial civilization on remnants of barbarism 
would be adequ;Stte. 11 Thus, that social evolution ~rhich had 
to be achieved through the conflict of societies with one 
another, has already been achieved; and no further benefits 
26 
are to be lookE~d for, 11 T. H. Green cri tiel zed mill tarism 
from another s ~~andpaint: 
This le no dOubt a very incomplete account of 
the influences which have combined to •turn 
Europe ir.to a great camp 1 (a very exaggerated 
expressicn); but it may serve to show more clearly, 
that the military system of Europe is no necessary 
incident of the relatione between independent 
states, but arises from the fact that the Ol:>ganiza-
tion of state-life, even with those peoples that 
have been brought under 1 ts influence at all, is 
still so incomplete. 
27 
Sir Henry Maine, when asked for measures to eliminate war, 
emphasized the fact that forces arrayed against 1 ts 
obliteration weJ:>e enormous. European armies had become 
larger in peace than during the height of the Napoleonic Wars 
26. Herbert Spence , The Principles of Socio~, Part 
V (New York: D. Appleton (fl;ompany, 1904}, pp. 664-665-.--
27. ThomaE Hill 
Political Obligation (Lo 
p. 177. 
n, Lectures On the Principles of 
on: Longma.ns, Green & Co., 1917>, 
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and, of course, a great J amount of intellect had become 
I 
concentra.ted upon perfepting equipment for war. Hovrever, 
I Maine displa.yea. Victori;m optimism, observing thHt war 
ori p..; inally ha d been the 1
1 
r ule, and peace had been the 
28 
excep tion. But there I were d.efin1 te advocates of justifiable 
I 
"'ar. Henry Si ·~-f2:wick in 11890 wrote: 
I 
I . \•la r 19 an evil• but 1 t is not, from an ethical 
point of viRW an ~.mmixed evil •••• 'ivhat I rather wish 
now t o no in t out ls, that the mora 1 benefits of 
war s uch as they a.re depend on the fact that war 1 s 
not u sua:.ly--as c:ylnics imply--a mere collision of 
passions .and cupi~ities; it is a conflict in which 
e a ch sidE! concei ve
1
s itself to be oon te'nding on 
behalf of legitim~te interests. 
I 
Moreover, he believed thla t beyond a cla sh of interests, war 
I 
was u s ually a etruggle qetween different concepts of justice 
29 1 
and right. F~gardles~ of divergent views among the British 
intelligent s ia, the ma.jo:rity of the general public desired 
30 
abolishment of war and s lta.nding armies. Without doubt, 
I 
John Morley's opinion a.c burately reflected the te lnper of the 
I 
British public. 1 
I 
28. Robert H. furr JiY, Studies in the Englisl!, Social 
e.nd Poll tical T:hinkere ot the NineteentbCentury ( Ca r~bria.ge: 
W. Heffer & Son s , Ltd., J. 929T, II, pp . 56-57. 
I 
29. Henr:r Sidgwick, 11 The Morality of Strife, 11 
National and International }ight and Wrong (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1919 , pp. --zrB-77. 
30. Cobden Club, The Burden of Armaments: A Plea For 
Retrenchmmt (London: T:-F'isher Un-rin, 1905). 
All this glorification of war, although 
shining poets of our own lent to it the genius 
of their music not so many years ago, is surely 
as disastrous an outcome for the school that 
presents it, as wa.s YlB.chiavelli'e choice of 
Caesar B.)rgia to be the grand example of hi.s 
Prince. 
31 
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The Aust:ria.n cavalry seemed to ha.ve been an impressive 
factor, for throughout the entire period (1866-1918) British 
reports acknowledged its effectiveness. In Colburn's United 
Service i<fagazine it was stated that the Austrian cavalry in 
I 
all engagementn had proven its splendid and reliable fighting 
32 
quali ti~s. J,na. a British a.uthori ty decla.red that its 
ability and pepformance had saved the Austrian army from 
33 
complete destruction at SadOli.'a. The Pall Hall Gazette 
ma.in tained. that the Austrian cavalry was the finest in the 
world and_ was composed of the very best elements :in the 
Empire, but lack of able leaders ha.d prevented th1e realiza-
34 
tion of its full potentialities. The London Ti1~ 
correspondent at Berlin asserted that, 11 the way the cavalry 
31. John Morley, Note:s on Politics and Histc?.n:.: A 
University Address .:Qz. Viscount Morley (London: l.fa.mnillan 
and Co., Limite<'i, 1914), p. 103. 
32. "The Prussia.n Army German Unity, and British 
Military Policy," Colburn's ~lilitary Service Maga2~ine, p. 276 
October, 1868. 
33. Edward Sincla.ir May, Guns and Cavalry: 1'heir 
Performa.nces in the Past and Their Prospects in th& Future 
(London: Sa.mpson, Lo w, :Marston and Company, 1896), pp. 163-164. 
34. 11 The l~ighting Value of the Austrian Army, 11 lac. cit. 
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moved, their pliability and hard.iness, and the combined vigor 
ancl regularity of their charges must have struck all the 
35 
foreign officers with admiration." Others avowed that the 
a.forementioned military branch was without doubt second to 
36 
none in Europe., In evaluations of European armed strength 
the attention given the ca.valry emphasized its importance to 
military observers and to the public at large. 
In 1889 ~)ir Fitzgerald Law appea.red as a protagonist 
of Austrian armed strength and tilted lances with Sir 
Charles Dilke. Law's opinion of Austrian strength, in 
comparison witt. Russian military might, c arried weight, 
because he h ad been a commercial agent for British companies 
in Russia and haC!_ visited every part of the ccnntry and thus 
acquired an intimate knowledge of . conditions; also, about 
the time this article was written he was employed by the 
Army Intelligence Department for advice on Russia.. He 
commended the organization and material of the Habsburg state 
and was certa in tfiat in the event of war the whole Empire 
would present a solid front of Hungarians, Germans, Italians, 
and Roman Catholic Slave aga inst the common enemy, Russia. 
Vienna could call together a force of one million six hundred 
35. News dispatch in London Times, September 27, 1887. 
36. "The Bnlance of Military Power in Europe, Part III, 
Germany, Russia and Austria, 11 Blackwooo_• s Edinburgh Magazine, 
142:597, November, 1887; also.~. 11 The Settlement in Austria-
Hungary," Spectc·tor, 98:755, 1\lovember 7, 1903; also, Cecil 
Battine, "The Pc1wer of Austria, 11 Contemporary Review 92: 
972, Dece mbe r, 1909. 
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thousand men, with a contingent of ninety thousand sabers, 
forming one of the finest cavalry groups in the world. 
Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, was a military 
leader of the first rank and was ready to assume command. 
:furthermore, Law aseerted that Austria 1 s position was strong 
on her eastern frontier.The Carpathians formed a natural 
barrier, and her cavalry from that base and from the 
fortresEes of '}alicia could raid and. operate along the 
Russian line o.f communice.tion, through Poland into Moravia, 
the only way b;r which the Russians could make an attack. He 
reported that he had visited the Galician frontier and his 
vi ewe were supported by Colonel Maurice, the military expert. 
A. year earlier Sir Charles Dilke had based his conclusion 
on the supposed weakness of the Galician fortresses and the 
strength of the! Russian cavalry; but Law maintained the.t the 
fortresses l<Tere in first-rate condition and the Austrian 
frontier organization was much improved. In addition, he 
thought that tbe Austrians were sufficiently strong in 
armament, and although the artillery was not of the best, the 
infantry was supplied with magazine rifles; the Russians had 
only t h e single shooting Berdan. The Irnperia.l of f icer corps 
37 
wa s well-trained, intelligent, and brave. 
An other article in Blackwood 1 s Edinburgh Magazine took 
exc ep tion to DilkeJ s appraisal of the Austrian ar rny and claimed 
37. Kurio 13 (Sir Fitzgerald Law), "Current Influences 
on Foreign Polioy, 11 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine., 146: 320, 
December, 1889. 
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that he had erroneously interpreted the statement by Narga, 
the military authority,--that Austria after several defeats 
could retire to the wooded Carpathians but the road to 
Vienna '\<Tould t e left open. Marga made the statement not to 
show that Austria's armed forces very probably would be 
defeated, but to point out that she had a better alternative 
than to retire to the Carpt:Jthians. Instead, he Emggested 
tha t she waE able to fall ba ck on the SRn, the Wysloka, and 
the Donajec, ru1d could protect Vienna and Prague by guarding 
wit l-) field-fortifications the carriage roads across the 
mountains. Fu::-ther, an aseaul t on the left of the Vi s tule. 
a.nd on Cracow lfould endan ger the attacking force for it 
could be cut off by an Austrian army on the right bank. The 
article pointed out that the discussion by Marga tended to 
show t _at the Pinsk Marshes placed Austria in a beneficial 
position. More· over, the Carp a thians were a great line of 
d.efense and she could use them as a base to strike into 
Poland . In the southern pa.rt of her Empire she was in such 
a strong strategic position against any Russian att ack that 
the Rome.nov eta te had never dared to e tteck Turkey without 
an understanding with Vienna~ Alli ed to Germany, the Dual 
Mo narchy c ould face any threat from the East, for lf Russia_ 
atte mpt ed to att .s.ck by the western frontier of Poland., she 
had to select o.ne of the Powerf? and move either north or 
south and t hen :face the a tta.ck ot: the other, which had not 
received the full Russian onslaught. The Li beral leader 
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Dilke haC. stat eo_ that Germany could not aid. Vienne_ because, 
when Russia. ceased to oo neutral, lt.,rance in turn would 
enf!:ap:e her forces, with the result that all Germetn troops 
would be reouired on the Rhine. However, it was asserted 
the t the a.fore mentioned view of Dilke wae not tenable as 
a. comparativel:r small force could. crumble a lonf!: line 
38 
open to attack ,, 
The Times correspondent in the nineties felt that the 
Auetrian army 'loras in excellent condition but its financial 
backing \'laS weEtk, and even though the country was overtaxed 
it did not posf.ess a reeerve war fund in gold like Prussia; 
in case of a ccnflict, Vienna would have to ap ply to the 
money ma.rket. Therefore, Austria might profitably reduce 
armaments in order to i mprove her financial cond ition and 
39 
such a move would not impair her excellent army. After 
military maneuvers in 1891, the Times correspondent in Vienna 
reported the t t h e Austrian army was numerically we:a.ker than 
the German, but equal in organization and ability and made 
B. homogeneous gr•oup. 
Whoever it is tha.t one day face a.s enemy these 
two e.rmies l-Till find it impossible to und.ervalue 
the on~ at the expense of the other, and will have 
38. 11 The Bala.nce of lvlili tary Power in Europe, Germany, 
Russia and. Austria, 11 on.cit., pp. 595-598. 
39. News d ispatch in London Times, June 13, 1B90. 
to reckon with the two perfectly equal and 
most read;r armies of the world. 
. 40 
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The Economist, :Ln the sa.me year, declarea. that the Austris.n 
Monarchy, although cumbrous and slow in organization, was a 
s olid first-cla. Gs state with man-power resources exceeded 
ltl 
only by Russia. The South German was one of the best 
fighters of Europe, the Croat had a high reputation, and the 
Wallach ian 1 s ab:_li ty to fight was shown in 1877. It was 
believed that all the na.tions.lities fou ght well when commanded 
by a cap a ble leHder, someone like Archduke Cha r les; but, on 
the whole, Austria 1 s officers were not as well ' trB.ined a.s 
those of German~ · because her nobility, the chief ingredient 
of the officer c:orps, wa.e not economically dependent and did 
n o t regard military life as its only profession. Excessive 
fa.vori tism had considerably declined, and ethnic diversity 
42 
was not sP-rious inasmuch as a brotherhood ha.d been develop ed. 
Si<'lney 1:lhi tman rra.in tained there was no comparison between 
the Austrian and German armies; the Habsburg Empire had 
spent on military m~tters about one-third as much ae Berlin. 
The intermingling of peoples was looked upon as a serioue 
disadvantage. 11 Troope of this kind lack vita.l touch at the 
supreme moment." In the Officer Corps, theoretical training 
40. Ibid., September 21, 1891. 
41. "The Strength of Austria, 11 Economist, 49:819-820, 
June 27, 1891. 
42. "The S3tt1ement in Austria-Hunp:a. ry," . loc.cit. 
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ha d been over-emphesized and practical training mini mized. 
The officers were criticized for love of ease and plea6ure 
and e. d i etas te for hprd_ loTork. In short, the content ion we.e 
made t ha t Austria lackRd the qualitiRs of a cepeb. e mili-
tery nower in a ::1 era. t h P-.t reoui red intricate or~e.ni zation 
43 
on a colossal s ~Jale. At t he turn of the century, the 
Morning Post re :11arked that the Austrian a.rmy was not large 44 . 
but was honest~r ~overned and consequently efficient. 
In 1903, :l''rancis Palmer observed that · reinvi.gora.tion 
of the Austrian army had been quiet and unobtrusive, but 
most effective. '11he Emnire could la1.mch two milli.on \olrell-
equipped. trained men a gainst any enemy. The u pp er cla.ases 
of all ra ci.al gJ•oups looked upon the army as a bond of 
common interest and mutual good-will. Among the non-Germanic 
lower classes, ·~he ani mosity' toward this insti. tuti.on whi.ch 
hac existed i.n the early part of the century hacl enti.rely 
45 
di sappet'lred. , 
Hun g eri.an de mand for employment of the native tongue 
in the army awa.kened i.nterest. The Spectator ana_ Speaker 
claimed that t he demand was the hei~ht of folly. A 
43. Sidney Wh i trnan, 'rhe Realm of the Ha.bsburge (London: 
William Hei.nemann, 1893), pp. 165-16~ ---
4LJ-. "'rhe Austria-Hun gary Problems," Public Opini.on, 
77:6 8-69, January 19, 1900. 
45. Fr8nci. s H . E. Palmer, A us tro-Hunge..rian Li fe 
in 'rown e.nd Country (Londo n: G. P . Putna.m1 s Sons,--:1903), 
pp. 225-228. 
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correspondent for the Standard reported the Emperor's feelings 
and the Soecta·tor agreed with Francis Joseph: 
I c annot give way on the military langua.ge 
question :, and that in the interest of Hungary · 
itself. Think of the conseauences! The Croatian 
regiment~ ; of the 11 ne would. -have to be granted 
the use Clf the Croatian language, the Southern 
Slavs the:ir language, and what wcu ld be the end. 
46 
Various ~ourcee described the common army as one of the 
strongest bonds for preservation of the Empire; if military 
unity were dissolved nothing but suspicious and jealous 
fragments would remain. It was alleged that the Budapest 
Government wa s ietermined to . control and regulate Hungarian 
military affairs and the army language question was the 
' 47 
first step in t h e program. ~he Magyars atte mpted to protect 
the mselves against any absolutism that might be displayed 
by the Crown af1;er the demise of Francis Joseph. Comments 
on the army situation which appeared in the Westminster Review 
advised compromlse, and suggested that the Hungarian command-
language be trie:d as an experiment in one army corps to test 
its effect on t:t.e efficiency of the fighting force. It was 
hoped that the Emperor would disregard his advisors who were 
46. "The Austrian Emperor's Case," Snectator , 91:377, 
September 12, 1903; also, "The Dual Mon2rchy," SpeHker, 
9 :290-291, December 19, 1903; also, "The Austro-Hungarian 
Crisis, II Tablet, 102:682-683, October 31, 1903; ale;o, l''rencis 
Hirst, 11 A Dissolving Emp ire, 11 Fortnightly Review·, 70:71, July 
1898 . 
47. "The s ,~ttlement in Austria-Hungary," loc.cit. 
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opposed to appeasement and would agree to a compromise in 
order to stren@:then the tie between AustriR and Hungary. 
11 If Francis Joe:eph does not compromise, he i>Till nave rung 
48 
v!i th his O"Vln h~; .nds the tocsin Of revolution o. • • 11 
J 
The :t-1orn:1:.ng Post observed tha.t in the difficulty 
with Hungary tt.e Emperor wa.s right in principle but should 
have made concessions because Hungary had spoken clearly, 
11 and when she rr.akes up her mind those who oppose her do so 
49 
at t he ir peril." The Tablet reprinted views expressed 
in the Quarterlx_ Review which criticized the use of the 
Magyar language in the army. The weekly remarked that every 
army h ad to have one official language, 11 else the unt01.-vard 
experience of the Tower of Babel would be repeate d in its 
50 
ranks. 11 Apparently, British attention .was drawn to the 
dispute tecause it was indiceti ve of the independent spirit 
of Hungary and therefore was a disruptive force; also, the 
issue reflected on the competence of the Austrian armed 
strength. 
Two years prior to the outbreak of World War I, a 
favorable vi ew of Austrian armed strength wa.s pre ~> ented in 
48. H. J. D~ F. 11 The Hungarian Crisis 11 Westminster 
Review, 164:633-634, December, 1905; also, ''The Future of 
Hungary, 11 Outlo~k, 16:930-931, July 1, 1905· also, 11 Europe 
and the Hunga.ri 9.n Crisis, 11 Outlook, 17: 423-435, September 30, 
1905. . 
49. "Home Rule Crisis Abroad, 11 Public Opinion, 87:665, 
June 2, 1905. 
· 50. 11 'l'he a::rnperor Francis Joseph and His Sub~iects, 11 
'l1a.blet, 63:86-87, January 20, 1900; also, "Pa.rtiee; in 
Austria-Hungary," 'rablet, 66:721-722, November 9, 1901. 
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the Army Revie'Tf;~ published under the <'lirection of the Imperial 
General Staff cf Great Britain. The army was considered 
modern, well-ecuipped, and fervently devoted to the Emperor. 
A close examination of particular sections of the military 
forces s how·ed that the officer corps was intelligent, 
educa.ted and zealous, while the . common soldier was obedient 
and loyal; also, socialistic and anti-militaristic 
propaganda had mac1.e no inroads. The General Staff was well-
trained and efficient, and the Austrian cavalry had always 
possessed a fins reputation, and deserved it. The amount 
of machine-gun strength and excellence of musketry training 
WP.S most advant ,9.geous but the proportion of artillery to 
other e.rms was a source of some weakness, as was the lack 
of en independent line of sight for field-guns. In peace 
the army ..,.,ras re,~ognized as the highest expression of Imperial 
51 
unity of the many peoples of Austria-Hungary. 
A year later, in a more popule.r periodical, the Austrian 
army was considElred an organization le.cking uniformity. Some 
of the units in the central and southern army corps were 
referred to as ~~ficient in discipline, training, and morale, 
vThile others were recognized E. s equal or superior to the 
best in Europe. Attention was called to the spirit of brother-
hoo d end comradeship be tween officers and men; it was unlike 
51. 11 The .Armed Forces of Austria-Hungary, 11 Army Review, 
2:345, April, 1912. 
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the situa tion in Germany where a rig id separation was 
maintained between the ranks and the officer corps. And 
the average Austrian recruit was claimed to be more alert 
and inte l ligent than his German counterpart. As ~m 
Austrian officer knew his men individ.ually and came into 
associa tion with the noncoms, he was a ble to get the best 
re sults. from e a ch man; on the other hand, the Gero.an 
officer corps he.d no regard for the soldier as a person. 
In the tw,:m tieth ·centu ry Britain recognizecl the 
excel l ence of t h e German military forces, but the so-called 
Russian rig id.it;y- was highl y criticized. Obvi ously political 
antagonisms app,3ared in military judgments. 
In mili ta:ry thinking, the Austrian a rmy was regarded 
as a blend of t :1e old and the new; younger officers desired 
a moderniza tion of the fighting force and a wide d issemination 
of new developm,3nts but, except for one :).nstance a ll high 
positions were lleld by men of the old school. Advancement 
did n o t come to officers who ad.vocated new ide a s. 11 It is by 
no means the fi ::""st time in lt e hi s tory that the Austria.n 
army h as been lamed by senile imbecility in high quarters. 11 
This 1·as judged as a vi tal ree son why the army lacked a 
unifor mity of' eff'ectiveness. The Kaiser-Jager Re giments 
were designated a.s the elite of the infe.ntry, and in mountain 
"t-rarfare, skirmi Bhes, and the like t h ey had no e que l . Comments 
were mad.e conceJ•ning various f-eatures of the Aust rie.n military 
set- up. On the cred it side, mounte.in-artillery was t hought 
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effective when it v.ras once placed, but the field-artillery 
h ad_ some drawbacks as guns were not equal to the British 
eighteen-pounder and certa.inly not comparable v.ri th . the 
FrP.nch weapon. Military engineers appeared very efficient 
especially in field-entrenchments, and the Austrian cavalry 
W8S reported better than the German but its methods were 
obsolete as old shock tactics were used. On the debit side, 
the Austrian army was thought deficient in its commissariat 
and transport d1~partments; secondary equipment and wagons 
were very poor; of course, some i mprovements w~re visible 
but generally conditions were woeful and not equal to German 
etandard.s. The situation was emphasized because the Turkish 
mill tary collapBe had been a.djudged the outgrowth of a 
S2 
simila r defect. Clause\'Ti tz he.d sounded an ominous warning 
on this sort of deficiency: "The subsistence of troops 
being a conditicn which is indispensable in the conduct of 
war, it has a. gr·eat influence on the oper~tion of r.var •••• 11 
53 
Britain seemed to hold the widespread idea that Aus tria was 
very deficient in lo gi e tics. Without doubt, prevalent 
beliefs regerd.ing Austrian :t;J.at ional tra its had been 
contributory. Easygoingness and ca.reless indifference became 
associflted with A us tria, and in modern warfe.re such 
c haracteristics .:~ou1d mean disaster. British cr1 ticiems 
52. 0. T. C. 11 The Austrian Army, 11 Westminster £teview, 
179:122-124, 'eb::-ouary, 1913. 
53. German,r 's War lvJS.nia (New York: Dodd, Mead. and 
Comp any, 1915), p. 213. 
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seem valid, for· during World ivar I the organizing capacity 
and efficiency of Germany were required in order to prevent 
the Austrian army from collapsing. 
Henry W . Steed believed it 't'rae needless to 'Speak of 
the Austrian Army 1 s excellent fighting qualities; they h ac_ 
been displayed upon many battlefields, but dogmatic state-
ments concerning the value of a fighting machine untested 
for fifty years were most dangerous. This well-known 
commentator believed that as far as i mpartial opinion was 
concerned, the Austrian officer had real ability and in fact 
was superior to the German officer. Moreover, victory 
depended upon the officer corps, and it was maintained that 
the Austrian General Staff had displayed both intelligence 
a.nd. unity of direction in partial m:::>bilizations in 1808-1809 
and 1912-1913. Hmvever, maneuvers had presented palpable 
defects in commissariat arrangements and handling large 
ma.sses of troops. Steed felt that a aue s tion which could. 
not be lightly answered was whether Austria's army wa~ 
54 
ready for a military engagement. 
In 1914 Austria-Hungary spent less oh armaments than 
any of the Great Powers, about a quartar of the amount 
expended by France and Russia, about a third of the sum 
spent by Britain or Germany, ana_ even less than Italy. 
"The military ID•)narchy 11 of the Habsburgs \'las, in fact, the 
54. H. W. Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (London: Constable 
and Cornnany, Ltd., 1913/,'pp. 60-73. 
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least militariz~d state in Europe •••• It lacked the nat i onal 
55 
unity and en~husiasm for a greet . patriotic effort." 
However, this f .9Ct did not seem completely impresged upon 
British minds. 
In summar;r, severn. 1 conditions were believed responsible 
for the obvious defects in the Austro-Hungarian military 
eyste m; for instance, the financial situa.tion prevented full 
use of existent man-power resources and, of course, wealth 
Wt;~s n e eded for llrmaments. The old p;uard seemingly not in 
etep with the tlmes held tenaciously to the posts of command, 
and the danp;er CJf court favoritism was a shadow in the 
56 
be.ckground,. Hri tish writers noted the fact tha.t the various 
ethnic groups had been trep.ted in a more consid.erate manner 
than ever before·, yAt the que ·stion still persisted whether 
in a strup;gle with Russia they would be as dependable as a 
homogeneous peot=le. And during World l'lar I, in partial 
fulfillment of predictions, the national multiplicity proved 
a burden; certain sections of the army lacked a patriotic 
zeal and, in fact, some troops were ready to surrender or 
desert. The ability of the individual soldier was not t hs 
only f actor to be considered, for modern warfare meant more 
than bravery and determination; it required unity of purpose 
and a full utilization of national economic, political, and 
55. A. J. P. Ta:ylor, The Habsburg Monarchy (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1948}, pp. 229-230. 
56. ArticlH in London Times, September 13, 1909. 
eocial reso n rces. Ae early as 1871, a journalist had 
observed: "Moreover, war is becoming every year le s s 
matter of perscnal valour than a ma tter of organization, 
57 
science, a.nd mcney. 11 
57. Augustus Mongredien, England' e Foreign Policy 
(London: Edward Stanford, 1871), p. 52. 
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CHAPTER XI 
Austrian Tendencies Towa.rd Liberalism 
Gree.t Britain achieved complete poll tic s 1 democracy 
and a ccepted basic principles of the social welfare state 
during the fifty years prior to World War I. Liberals and 
Conservatives had reform as a stated objective. Both 
politicRl nerties vied with each other to introduce the 
actual reform le~islntion. The absence of powerful 
re a ctionary ~roups resulted in a. widesprea_cl tendency to 
aporove any gl immer of liberplism on the coritinent, and to 
vi ew with disdain remnants of ree ction end. a.utocracy tha t 
thwarted progre s s. Constitutionalism, freedom of the press , 
freedom of spee~h and, of course, a liberal franc hise were 
the guides whi~~ indicated whether a European nation 
conformed to Br1 tish democretic standard_s. 
Before th13 Seven Weeks' War the Austrian Empi re lacked 
a sustained. lib<3ral sp irit, for the most part autocracy had 
been the guiding_ poll tica.l philosophy. In the afterma.th of 
military defeat a constitution was forced from the Emperor. 
Even Francis Jo 13eph rea.lized that a new era. he d opened for 
t he Empire . 11 \'le are about to e s t a blish a work of peace and 
concord. LAt UG thro"t>J a veil of .·forg;e tfulness over the 
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immediate pa.st, which h os inflicted deep wo tmd s upon the 
l 
Empire. 11 
Bri t ain ~·ras in c1isetg reement concerning the I mpe rial 
con st itutional settlement--Dualism, but she was pleased 
thet the ne~ Aust r o-Hunga ri 2n Empire had severed past 
connectione. and the.t a nevi era could be expectecL Count 
Beust d.irected t :t.e Imperial Government in the post bellum 
period, and wh ile personal e!O!timatioris of him v a ried. the 
li b P. re l legi sle t 1on en F.lcted durinp; h is Ministry wa.s prei sed. 
I n 1871, the Saturo.ay Review d.eclared that during t h e previous 
five years Count Beus t h a d. originated the liberal measures 
sponsored by the Government and ha.d formulated policies 
which s t rengt h enE!d A us tria 1 s ext e rnal posit ion. He had 
2 
been opnosed to the ruinous program of Count Hohemvart. 
The Y.T eekly stated that his liberal spirit we.s visible in 
approval of free t r e.d.e and_ in lal-.rs which recognized civil 
3 
marria ge , religious and educ a tional freedom. Blackwood 1 s 
Edinburgh 11Isgazine held a similar view and charecterized 
Ba.ron Beust as e. leader who had li'rork ed with determination 
ancl hed established a parliamentary form of government, 
ministerial responsibility, freedom of discussion, triel by 
1. 11 Austri:9. and Home Rule, 11 Se.turday Revie1-r, 91:166, 
Februa.ry 9, 1901. 
2. The Hohenwart Ministry sponsored Federelism. 
). 11 Count Beust, 11 Saturday Reviel-T, 32:607-608, 
November ll, 1871. 
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jury, s.na_ municipal reform. He was · .praised for granting 
autonomy to Hunga ~ ::-y and educational concessions to the 
4 
Italian speaking l)rovinces. A current authority on Austria-
Hun@:ary probably <~omes close to an analysis of Beust: The 
Minister h ad no real political philosophy; his stock-in-
trade was the clever maneuver and quick result. Hie 
objective was to settle the internal condition of the Empire, 
5 
build up. it s prestige and crea.te an anti-Prussian coalition. 
i'l i thin a few years of 1867, British news organs 
a lluded to the pr ·ogressi ve and liberal spirit in Austria. 
An . article in BJa ckwood's Edinburgh Magazine maintained 
tha.t since SadoWlit, Austria had become a changed nation; 
p ress freedom, tJ~ial by jury, and abroga.tion of the Concordat 
6 
wi th Rome had made her one of the freest lands in Europe. · 
The North Britisl1 Review contained the following statement. 
But Austri8, though yet far from ideal, has 
since Sado·~ , accomplished wonders. The 
regenerati~n of the Empire upon the bold scheme 
of Beust is progressing with ample strides •• • • 
No other po litical body of the Continent keeps 
pace with Austria in the development of its 
public life. 
7 
4. C.O'Dowd, 11 New Measures and Old Men, 11 Blaekwood 1 s 
Edinburgh Magazine, 107:243, February, 1870. 
5. A. J. P. 'l'aylor, The Ha bsbur:g Monarchy 18(~-1918 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, T948T-,· ·p. I3~. 
6. C. O'Dcwd, "Austria and Company," Blackwood's 
Edinburgh Magazlne, 106:362, September, 1869. 
7. 11 The Ccmetitutional Development of Austria, 11 
North British Review, 51:.172, October, 1869. 
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The old out-dated Austrian bureaucracy, however, wa13 
considered an im~€diment to progressive action, for this 
dry, formal, mim.;~ te, and methodical a gency had not 
·progressed from the days of Metternich and Schwarzenberg 
when delays and lnsignificant duties nullified action, and 
yet it ha.d retair.ed an inordinate i nfluence in the Empire. 
Employes of the f;tate had not adapted themsel vee to new 
ideas and philosc,phies and had been unable or unwilling to 
abe.ndon antiqua t E~d habits. 
The old musket drill will not d.o with the new 
breech-loader, nor will old Austrian bureaucracy 
consist with modern liberty, nor with the demands 
of men, who, to be rl .led must be reasoned with. 
. 8 
Political figuren also referred to domestic conditions in 
the Habsburg Emp:.re. In 1 870 Gladstone declared that free 
go vernment had been established in the whole Austrian state. 
Then the superstructure was undisturbed, but 
the founda·~ions were grad.ually and surely eaten 
away. Now the superstructure has been disturbed, 
but t h e foundations are in ·course, at le a st, of 
progressive renewal. 
9 
In 187.3, in the J3aturday Review it was asserted that the 
Parliaments of P:russia and Germany had not competed. with the 
Crown for suprem~~ power; 
8. 0 'Dowd, "New Me asures and Old Men, 11 Q:Q..ci t~ ., 
p . 244. 
9. Outidan )8 (Gladstone), "Article IX, 11 Edinburgh 
Review, 132:558-559, October, 1870. 
but in Austria, although there may be some 
irregularities or practice, the fundamental 
principle of the responsibility of Ministers 
to the Council of the Empire is formally 
acknowlea.ged. 
10 
And it was held that the Government had acted wisely in 
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11 
disregarding 11 the ruinous device of universal suffrage. 11 
Sir Thomas Erskir.e May, a legal expert wrote in 1877 that 
the institutions of the Austrian Empire had been remodeled 
upon a constitutlonal base. 
'rhe conflicting claims of rival races and 
nationalitles, in this composite ell}pire, have 
since prove!d a grave embarrassment;. but Austrian 
statesmen :have learned to trea.t them with 
moderation ana liberality, and in harmony with 
the principles of a free state. 
12 
David Kay contriimted an article on Austria to the r;1inth 
edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. In 1880 he wrote 
a volume on the Da.nubian Mona.rchy and called attention to 
the altered situation. 
New Austria ••• appears in spite of the shortness 
of time since elapsed as a new world •••• Austria 
has freed her pes.sant population from the traditional 
burdens of feudalism and her working industry from 
its trammeJ.s; while a system of . education, worthy 
10. "Canst~. tutional Changes in Austria.," Saturday 
Review, 35:2-3, ~ranuary 4, 1873. 
11. Loc.ci1~. 
12. Thomas Erskine May, Democrac) In Europe: A History 
(London: LongmanB, Green and Co., 1877 ,II, pp. 275-276. . 
Thomas Erskine May (1815-1886), an eminent Constitutional 
jurist, clerk of the House of Commons 1871-1886, and author 
of The Consti tut:Lona.l History of England Since the Accession 
of George III 1760-1860. 
of a constitutional state, is bringing light 
to the lowest strata of society. 
13 
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In 1880, the Examiner judged Au-stria-Hungary to be an 
enlightened constitutional state that had made wond.erful 
progress during the previous twenty-five years in every 
. 14 
area of human endeavor. 
Another writer ma.de the cogent observa.tion that the 
Austrian administrative system was similar to the Turkish; 
it was loose and therefore reflected the caliber and 
pirsohality of tbe provisional chief. In Dalmatia the 
rule of Radich was·liberal and humane while the regime in 
Trieste, closely supervised by Vienna, had been marked by 
administrative severity, seizure of newspapers, and dismissal 
of civil functionaries. "Every form of government · is 
possible in such an empire, and unfortunately, Austria is 
15 
no exception to the rule." 
In a speect in the mid-seventies John Bright asserted: 
Austria has great difficulties of her own. I 
have a greet sympathy with Austria, because for 
some years past she has made rapid and remarkable 
strides in improved and constitutional government. 
16 
lJ. David Kay, Austria-Hun~ar1 (London: Sampson, Low, 
Marston, Searle and Rivington, 180, pp. 207-208. 
14. 11 Mr.Gladstone ana AtEtria, 11 Examiner, pp. :394-395, 
:M.arch 27, 1880. 
15. ~f. Stillman, "Austro -Hungary, 11 Fortnightly }.i.eview, 
33:790, June, 1880. 
16. John Bright, Public Addresses (James E. 'l'horold 
Rogers, editor •, London: Macmillan and. Co., 1879), p. 313. 
In Parliament, in 1879, Salisbury stated: 
Austria is now and has been since 1867, a 
free Constitutional State, and instead of being 
the ene my of Slavonic freedom has been the friend 
of that freedom. She has given what Russia will 
never give, Parliamentary small institutions to 
10,000,000 Slavs. The institutions of Austria 
are so liberal that they go even beyond what the 
Liberal Party here will grant. Austria has given 
Home Rule t o her subjects. 
17 
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In the same year, after defea.t of the German L,i beral Party 
in Austria, the l:,onclon Times declared that progress might 
be ret a rded but it could not be stopped, for even the 
Con servative s had. abandoned all thoughts 6f ree.ctio:n. 
Europe has witnessed in Austria the substantial 
success of one of the most re markable experiments 
in moclern poll tics .••• 'l'he choice wa.s boldly and 
happily mao.e, and thenceforth the China of Europe 
has become liberal, constitutional, and progressive. 
. 18 
Severa l yea.rs later H. o. Arnold-Forster declared, 11 parlia-
mentary government in Austria-Hun gary is by no means a sham, 
as witness the strong representation of Austrian Poland in 
19 
the Imperial Chamber." By 1899 William T. Stead had 
modified his hare:h opinion of Austria-Hungary. He stili 
insisted tha t her' policy in Eastern Europe had been unwise 
and probably no 1~tter than England's, but she had maintained 
neace and had tamed and kept semi-savage people orderly. She 
17. The Hansard, 2.52:173-177. 
18. Edi tortal in London Times, July 12, 187 9. 
19. H. L. J,rnold-Forster, 11 The Balkan Provinces, 11 
Conte mnorary Revlew, 4.5:416, March, 1884. 
had acted as a schoolmaster motivated by constitutional 
rather than d.espotic principles. 
Fifty years ago Austria was a byword to 
every Liberal. Today there is hardly any 
State in Central Europe which has worked out 
so many problems of decentralization on con-
stitutional lines as the Empire of the Habsburgs. 
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20 
The view of Stead was representative of a certain group that 
differentiated between internal programs and f.oreig_n policy: 
In domestic relationships the Empire was commended for a 
fairly judicious and liberal rule, but in foreign affairs 
the governing authorities were accused of malevolent in-
terference and expansionism • . Yet in the same period Sid.ney 
Whitman arrived at a different conclusion--liberalism in 
Austria had not proved to be an elevating force. HE~ ex-
plained that the Liberal era resulted. in the ennoblement of 
the financial Croesus and, in fact, pol itical differences 
had become accentuated. 
Instead :)f strong character, a manipulating 
Liberalism nas taken the place of autocratic 
rule. It created the 11 me.nipulator 11 under the 
direction or the late Count Beust as master-mason. 
'l'hus,. besid_,~s Liberty, the huckster, the self-
seeker, vanlty, egotismi conceit, incompetence, 
lifted thei :r heads simu taneously. 
21 
20. William T. Stead, The United States of Europe On 
t he Eve of the Pa :~liament of Peace (New York : Doubleday 
& McClureco:-;- 1899), pp. 72-73. 
21 . . Sid11ey Whitman, The Realm of the Habsburgs 
(Londo n: William Heinemman, 1'8"93), pp-.-219-220. 
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Foreign o be1ervers recognized that a substant.l i!il amount 
of libera l and ccnstitutional legislation had been enacted 
from 1866-1879, the era when the German Liberal Party held 
power. The Taaffe Ministry (1879-189.3) which vms supported 
by Czechs a.nd Poles failed to enact new legislation, except 
laws for the protection of the laborer. And so many British 
qu arters interpreted the course of Austrian politicB as 
proof that in general the Czechs and Slavs were re a.ctionary 
and clerical and, conversely, that the Austro-Gerrnans were 
p rogressive and liberal. Moreover, from: l866-1879 British 
news organs comme nted upon liberalism in Austria to a 
greater extent than during the Taaffe Ministry. 
With the passage of years it wa s noticed t hat the 
electorate of the Habsburg Empire had not been gr eatly 
increased; in contrast, Great Britain had passed enfranchise-
ment legislation .ln the sixties and again in the eighties. 
In 1892, the Royal Commission on Labour submitted a report 
on conditions in Austria-Hun gary; it was asserted t hat in 
re gard to poll ticnl rights the Austrian 18 boring class was 
in a very inferiol' position, actually much behind the 
22 
1-rorkingmen of other European countries .. In 1898, Francis 
Hirst hopted that reform of t he franchise would "awake in 
a <'lorman t <1emocrac:y something like the Liberalism which 
2.3 . 
saved England in the thirties and forties." The franchise 
22. The RoyE.l Commission on Labour, Foreiffn Renorts: 
Au s tria-Hungary ~.d the Balkan States, Vol. X,London: Her 
Maje s ty's Stationery Office, 1894), p. 19. 
2.3. li'rancis Hirst," A Dissolving Empire, 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 70:71, July, 1898 . 
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in Austria. and in Hungary remained restricted throughout 
the century; it was not until 1907 that the vote was granted 
in Au stria on the principle of universal manhood suffrage. 
Hungary very rel uc ts.ntly agreed to an electoral reform, and 
the Hungarian Gov3rnment sponsored the Andrassy Bill which 
hedged the franchl.se with obvious restrictions, sucb as a 
gractus.ted educati ,)nal clause and public voting. It was a 
clear attempt to perpetuate the povrer of the Magyar 
aristocracy. Vari1:JUS prominent British politicans, editors, 
ana_ others, ps.ss e1i judgment on the Andrassy Bill of 1907. 
Their views appli ,3d primarily to this pa rticular ;piece of 
of legislation, but they were also indicative of the temper 
of the times . H. N. Brailsford, editor of the Daily, News 
and Nation, maint ,3ined that equal and secret euffrag·e was 
the method by whieh a democracy could announce itself, 
and every citizen hurt by evil government or assisted by 
good government ~td an equal right to vote; also a laborer 
had as much at stake e. s a capitalist, i.e., happiness. He 
believed Count Andrassy's Bill aimed to create class and 
nationality antagonisms. Brailsford wondered how an 
illiterate laborel' would react upon discovering that he was 
counted as one wW.le his master was counted as thirty. The 
non-Magyars would feel deeply r esentful because they had 
not enjoyed a fair opportunity for a vernacular educatton .. 
Public voting meant merely perpetuation of 11 class do:mination 
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and racial ascendency." 
C. P. Scott, Manager of the l~nchester Guardian, stated 
the.t the very object of the franchise was to impart civic 
eauality, happiness, and loyalty. Weighting the vote in favor 
of the rich or educated man tantalized. the poor and ignorant 
and denied the substance. He preferred England's method 
whereby full rights of eque.l citizenship were extended slowly; 
this seemed more equitable than to grant fragments of 
25 . 
electoral power to people who were not trusted. 
A. E. Gardiner, Manager of the Daily News, rem~rked 
that all parties in Britain believed in the secret ballot 
26 
and few would advJcate any intellectual qualification. 
Ramsay MacDJnald gave his opinion as follows: 
I do not be lieve either in plural or in public 
voting. Th~ basis of a Democratic Franchise is 
not p ropert;r, because that means that a state will 
be controll1~d by interests whose aim is other than 
that of the common well-being. 
27 
Britain disapproved of the restricted electors.te in 
Transleithania, b1t enfranchisement of the Austrian masses 
aroueed high hope. The Nation called. it a new triumph for 
24. Sz&zad Huszadik, La Hongre Contemporaine et Le 
Suffr~ UniversaJ. (Paris: V. Gie.rd. et E. Brie~. 1909)-,-
pp . 246-271. -
25. Ibid., p. 272. 
26. Ibid., p. 273. 
27. ~., p . 274. 
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democra.cy and another step in the creation of a new Europe; 
. 28 
community of interests would outweigh ethnic diversity. 
Seton-Watson rejoiced that finally the old curial sy s tem 
h a d been removed and its compromises and anomalies wiped 
away, 11 theAus trian nat ion thus becoming one of the most 
29 
DemocrP.tic on the continent." After the Electoral Law 
of 1907, the Econ~mist also noted that Austria had become 
truly liberal and this liberal ity h a d been shown e a rlier 
in educ a tional reforms, limitation of clerical influence, 
a.nd enlBrge Dent o:r the role of the midd l e class in the . 
Government, Church, and Army. 11 Austria. is teaching political 
lessons in democracy, freedom, and toleration, not only to 
her great ally, but still more t o that tmwieldy Russia.n 
30 
"k i II 
.L:.Jmp re ••• 
The Universnl Suffrage Bill of 1q07 caused. some fear. 
The London Times vas RlrJare that certain f a ctors deterred 
adoption of univePsal suffra ge, n ame l y, multinational 
co mposition a n d bEtCk mrd poll tical education.; the pa.per 
could h a rdly be l i E·ve t hat the Emperor would open the flood.-
gates and allow t:t.e Austro-Fun garian fabric to be submerged. 
The Times hoped tt.at Francis Joseph ha.d chosen the wise course. 
28. 11 The I·1aking of Austria, 11 Ne tion, 1:443-444, May 18, 
l G07. 
29. Scotus ViAtor, The Future of Austria-Hunga~ and 
t h e At titude of the Great--powers (London: Archibald Con s table 
& Co., Ltd., 19107T, u. 10. 
30. "Au s tria a nd Its Policy," Economist, 71:594-595, 
Septe ~be r 24, 1910. 
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The Manchester Gu a rdian noted that the suffrage bill was 
a blow to a. centra lized homogeneous state which had been 
the European ideal during the ·nineteenth century. It 
stated t ha t the legisla tion inaugurated a revolution in 
political organi2ations; a similar problem existed in 
31 
Russia, Ireland , and India.. 'l'he reluctance of the Times 
and Manchester Gt~rdian to heartily endorse universa l 
suffrage e_pp ears strange. Naturally it would be texp ected 
the.t such democrs.tic legislation would receive unqua lified 
appr oval. .Appare·n tly, it was feared full suffre.ge might 
result in dissolt::tion. Seemingly, full democre.cy wa s not as 
imp ortant a s preE:ervation of the Dual Monarchy. 
However, it is possible that the effective abstract 
and concrete argt~entati on used by the proponents of a 
limited and restricted democracy to buttress their philosophy 
had mace a deep lmpression in certain intellectual .circles. 
In 1896, Willia.m Lecky fully endorsed the ideas of the 
German h istorian Sybel who had re marked tb.a.t the realization 
of universal suffrage had always signalled the end of all 
parliamentarism. Lecky a dded: 
- Parliamentary government which is mainly 
directed by the educated and propertied classes 
is an essentially different thing from parliamentary 
government re sting on a purely dernocra.tic base. In 
all t he instances in which this form of government 
has been conspicuously successful, the representa-
tive body WELS r e turned on a restricted suffra.ge. 
31. 11 Univ er oal Suffra.ge Begins in Aus tria, 11 Public 
Opinion, 9li615, May 17, 1907. 
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He insisted that a selective representative body hacl. given 
Austria wise and :noderate legislation and had transformed 
her "from a reactlonary despotism into one of the best-
32 
governed countries in Europe. 11 The English historia.n 
had observed the Austrian political scene during compara.-
tive political calm, that is, under the German Liberal 
leadership (1867-1878), and under the coalition Government 
of Count Taaffe (1879-1893). But three years later Lecky 
noted that poll ti~a.l turmoil had b roken out in the Habsburg 
Empire, causing p .a.rliamentary anarchy. He therefore judged 
that parliamentar;r government could not last and, to a 
considerable exte.nt, he blamed too much pure democracy for 
the evils that h~i befallen the Austrian state and other 
.33 
European nations. An intellectual and aristocretlc 
democracy was not a new idea; it had been freely advocated 
by illustrious per-sonages. Macaulay, the historian, in the 
late 50s wrote: 
The day w:lll come when in the State of New 
York a mul titucte of people, none of whom has he.d 
more than half a breakfa.st, or expects to have 
more than half a dinner, will choose a legisla-· 
ture. Is it possible to doubt what sort of 
legislature 1vill be chosen? 
34 
32. ~·lilliam E. H. Lecky, Democracy e.nct Liberty (New 
edition, New York : Longmans, Green and Co., 1899), l, pp. 
33-34. 
33. Lecky, QJ~.cit., Introduction. 
34. John Morley,Critical Miscellanies (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1886), IV, p. 325. 
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Carlyle had. been fully convinced that the fre..nchise exten-
sion of 1867 would mean disaster to England. He vigorously 
asserted in Shooting Niar~ra that s u icid.e of the ne, tion 
had been encourfq~ed by traitorous poll ticians who g rasped 
35 
at th e votes of ·~he rabble. And a bou t ten years later, 
Willle.m Re. t h bone Greg, the essayist, in Enigma s of Life 
i4Thich went through eighteen printings, sp oke forcefully 
against f u ll ctemc,cracy and f or rule by an enlightened 
oligarch y. "The few- - intellectually at least ••• muet always, 
and as it would eeem unavoidably, be fitter t o bear rule, 
36 
abler to govern ri ghteously and sage..ciously, than the many." 
John Ru skin, t h e follov1er of CB.rly le, also had p le.ced his 
hope vpon the awakening of the aristocracy and upon 
authoriterie.n leaiership. "I am just as far from universal 
suffrag e e. s you a~e--and by my measure, one man of parts and 
37 
r e..nk would outwei r;h in voting a whole shoal of the mob. 11 
35. Thom 1;1 s Carlyle, Shooting Niagara: and. After? 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1877). Robert Lowe was a 
bitter opp on e nt of an enlarged electora te. A. Patchett 
Iviartin, Life e.nd l"ett ers of the Right Honourable Robert 
Lo1-1e Visco unt Sherbrooke 1London: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1893), II. 
3 ~ . Vlilliam F ~a thbone _Greg, Enggrnas of Life (New York: 
Henry Eolt and Corr 'p any, 1 8.80) , p. 5; also, Sir James F . 
Stephen, Libertx_, Equality_, Fraternit.l:_ (London: Smith , 
Elder & Co., 1873), p. 295. 
37. Edwaro_ T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin (London: 
G. Allen & Company, Ltd., l9l~I, p. 276. 
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However, Ruskin rea.lized that universal suffrage was coming 
and hoped to soften its impact by granting votes on the 
38 
bssis of a.ge, we.9.lth, and education. Sir John Seeley did 
not explicitly ad.voca.te a narrow franchise yet he '\'Jas most 
apprehensive abo ·llt universal suffrage. He felt the.t a 
broad franchise was dangerous because public action might 
be taken without sufficient knowledge or consideration. 
The suffr•a.ge, I maintain, is no education at 
all; it h a s no tendency whatever to make people 
wiser. Conferred on those who are entirely 
untu t "Ored, lt can do nothing but develop and give 
substance tc• error and. misconception. Ex stul tis 
insanos faclt. 
--39 
Sir Henry Ms.ine, in 188.5, wrote: 11 But. one of the strongest 
vulgB.r idea.s is tha.t a wi<le suffrage could or would promote 
p rogress, new ideas, new discoveries and inventions, new 
. 4o 
arts of life. 11 
Perhaps universal suffrage failed to cement the Empire 
because conditior..s hs.d changed. Pee.sa.nts might have been 
free from nationalismin the era of ma s s illiteracy , but 
Austria had univer_E=a.l elementary educ a tion and all who could 
read or write were required to define their national 
41 
allegiance. 
38. John RusJcin, Lectures on Architecture and Painting 
(London: Smith, El der and Co., 18_54), Introduction. 
39. John See ley, 11 Poli tica.l Somnambulism, 11 Macmillan 1 s 
Magazine, 43:29, .January, 1880. · 
40. Sir Henr:r Maine, Popular Government: Four l!;ssays 
(London: John Murray, 188_5), pp. 34=3.5. 
41. Ta.ylor, ;2£.. cit., p. 213. 
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Considere.bie comment had been made on Magyar racial 
discrimination, forcible cultural assimilation, and 
disregard for constitutional rights within the Hungarian 
Kingdom (See Chapter 5). Some British writers and politicians, 
hov!~Ver, did not sufficiently differentiate between the two 
component parts ')f the Empire, i.e., Austria and Hungary. 
Various writers 1~Tho referred to the Habsburg Empire as 
constitutional, l iberal, and enlightened, did not stress 
that different pc,licies had been practised within the 
confines of its borders and that Hungary had ignored 
constitutional guarantees. Moreover, writers who condemned 
the Empire as reactionary too often did not outline 
conditions in Austria as different from the Hungarian 
situation, but cr,9ated an impression of uniformity. Certainly 
.fr::nn 1867 to 1907 the Slavs of Cislei thania may not :ta ve 
enjoyed p roper representation in the . legislative halls at 
Vienna, but they underwent no subs tantial cultural dis-
crimination and \>1E·re not deprived of basic civil liberties; 
this wa s not the case in Hungary. A much clearer picture 
would have been presented to Britain if a sharp and defined 
line bad been drawn between Austria and Hungary, for 
commentators tended to treat Austria-Hungary as a unit and 
referred to the whole Empire either as liberal or as 
reactionary. 
In 1909, Geoffrey Drage reported that "Francis Joseph 
••• will leave an Empire broad based not only on the loyalty 
42 
but also on the liberties of his people." H. W. Steed 
made a penetrating judgment just prior to World War I: 
Freedom is, in Austria, conditioned by the 
prerogatives of the all-encompassing State, and 
resembles in · more than one respect, the freedom 
recognized by Scholastic do'ctrine to be the 
prerogative of Christians. 
43 
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Viscount Bryce who had been familiar with the European 
scene, in 1921, reflected upon the defunct Habsburg state. 
He remarked that the Emperor and his re Epective. advisors 
had pursued their ends with steadfastness. "No popular 
sentiment, no . 44rliamentary opposition, made much differ-
ence to them." Again he stated: 
There are communities in which, though universal 
suffrage prevails, the power of the voters is fet-
tered in its action by the rights reserved to s. 
king or to a non-elective Upper House ••• such was 
the Austrian Monarchy. 
45 
In 1948, A. J. P. 'l'aylor expre seed the opinion that the 
Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy possessed a system of 
individual freedom from 1867 to the dissolution of the Empire. 
42. Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (New York: E. P. 
Dutton and Company, 1909), p. 53. 
43. Henry W. Steed, The Hapsburg Mo.narchy (London: 
Constable & Co., Ltd., 1913), p. 136. 
44. James Bryce, Modern Democracies (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1921), II, p. 380. 
45. Ibid., I, p. 21. 
The Austrian citizen. after 1867 had more civic 
security than the German and was in the hands of 
more honest and more capable officials than in 
Fre.nce or Italy; in fact he m d an envi&bJ.e 
existence. 
46 
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Even with the advantage of historical perspective, it appears 
the.t a definitive answer has not been given to the query--
had the Habsburg state developed a liberal atmosphere? The 
personal definition of the . terms liberal and progressive 
determines judgment. 
Great Britain prized freedom from press and postal 
censorship as a guarantee: of .lawful expression in a democracy. 
The following few lines indicate a fervent devotion to 
freedom of expression: 
The night of minds is gone! 
"The Press!" all land~ shall sing; 
The Press, the Press we bring, 
All lands to bless; 
0 pallid Want! 0 le.bor stark~ 
Behold, we bring the second ark! 
The Press! the Press! the Press! 
4'7 
Arthur Evans, a major critic of the Ha.bsburg state,· disclosed 
tha t postal and press freedom had be~n curtailed in Austria-
Hungary. He declared that before publication all Austrian 
journals were required to submit their material to a police 
censor and if found objectionable the whole issue was 
J 
con.fisc.ated. Censorship was considered extremely capricious; 
46. Taylor, ~.£11., P. 139. 
47. Ebenezer Elliott., "The Press, 11 Woods, Watt and 
Anderson, The Litereture of England (Revised edition, 
Chicap:o: Scott, Foresme.n and Company, 1941), II, p. 317. 
one rule was in force at Vienna, another at Prague, and 
still another at Ragusa; in other words, political news 
48 
became dependent on the ideas of petty officials. 
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Furthermore, Evans said the Austrians believed that a post-
office was a bureau of espionage. In ~oat cases a suspected 
letter was opened, read49and reclosed, but sometimes it 
disappeared alto gether. Occasionally throughout the 
century the London Times noted that the Austrian Government 
had disregarded freedom of the press which was guaranteed 
in the Constitution. In 1892, the Times considered Austrian 
press censorship an anomaly inasmuch as the state wa s 
politice.lly ad.va.nced. Austrian newspapers could not be sold 
in public "iiays and newspaper kiosks were prohibited; papers 
had to be purchased at the journal office, tobacco shops, 
or at rsihTay book-sts.lls. In addition, the sale of foreign 
. so 
newspapers was forbidden except. at one licensed · book-· stall. 
And two years ls,ter, a report of the Roysl Commission on 
Labour referred to press censorship as preventing "the 
51 
unrestricted expression of public opinion." 
Socialism represents a form of s ystematized liberalism. 
Cert s in features of Austrian Socialism resembled t h ose :found 
48. Arthur J. Evans, "The Austrian War Against Publicity, 11 
Conte mporary Review, 42:384-385, September, 1882. 
49. Ibid., p . 386. 
so. News dispatch in London Times, February 15, 1892. 
51. Royal Commission ori Labour, .. Foreign :r:-~_port!=l: Austria-
Hungary and the Balkan States, Vol. X. Loc. CJ.t . .· 
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in British coll~ctivism. The influential sections of both 
movements were not revolutionary but aimed to reach goals 
by evolutionary processes; also, their legislative programs 
were similar. Neither movement exercised any important 
political weight until the first decade of the t wentieth 
century. The association of Socialism with ' the labor 
movement was characteristic of both countries; and political 
socialism tended to usurp the place of the old Liberal 
Parties. The Social Democratic Party was the largest a.nd 
most powe~ful political branch of Austrian Socialism. It 
was ably led by a man of continental renown, Dr. Adler, 
who was the key figure in forming and unifying the party. 
Up to 1907 the Socialist movement in t b e Austro-Hungarian 
Empire attracted only minor British interest for racial 
struggles, nationalism, snd expansionism were more startling 
parts of the Austrian scene. Of course, a few British 
Socialists had done some wishful thinking. William Morris, 
in 1884, reported: "Austria is ready any moment to shake 
52 
off her Gov ernment of Jew bankers and police spies." 
Prior to the new century the movement might have been called 
in its incubation stage. It possessed leaders who were 
internationally known in the Socialist movement but its 
influence was limited by a restricted suffrage. 
52. The Letters of \'lilliam Morrie to. His Family 
Friends (Philip Henderson, editor, London. Longmans, 
& Co., 1950), p. 217. 
and 
Green 
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Britain realized that universal manhood suffrage . 
inaugurated a new era for Socialism. An article in the 
Fortnightly Review pointed out that the Socialist movement 
had played a very insignificant role in comparison with 
similar organizations in France and Germany. Vienna had 
been the stronghold of Adler's party and yet the Municipal 
Council contained not a single Socialist; the same condition 
existed in the capitals of Moravia and Bohemia. Many 
believed that the Social Democratic Party would receive 
heavy support from the seventy per cent of the population 
53 
formerly disenfranchised. 
Britain had a definite interest in the strength and 
activity of the Socialist group in future Austrian parliaments. 
Organized Socialism had disavowed violence and the Saturday 
Review, an organ with conservative leanings, seemed 
undisturbed by its re.pid growth, especially since Dr .. Adler 
in hie political speeches had not referred to an imminent 
Socialist Austria-Hunga.ry. The weekly thought Adler's program 
was not overly extreme, for he aimed to reduce indirect 
taxation on beer, brandy, and tobacco, and recover fund.e 
thereby lost through graduated income and inheritance taxes; 
any residue from the l a tter source would be applied to 
sickness, accident, and old age insurance. Other objectives 
were the separation of education and religion, reduction of 
53. Hirst, Qg.cit., p. 63. 
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military service to two years, ana_ curtailment of working 
54 
hours. It is not surprising that such a pro gram caused 
no g reat fear, for the goals were quite like the English 
LiberP.l Pa.rty 1 s political platform of 1 05. 
After a study of the Austrian Socialist Party, William 
T. Stead, in 1909, concluded that it was beneficial to the 
nation and in f act was the most peaceable, law-abiding, 
55 
and fair-minded party in the Habsburg Empire. Four years 
later, Henry w. Steed declared that the Austrian Socialist 
movement had raised the intellectual 1evel of the masses, 
a.roused the working class to a keener interest in public 
affairs, soJ¥ewhat mitigated r acial rivalries, and had 
forced the Government to consider the welfare of wage 
56 
earners. 
In 1907, the Saturd.ay Revi~w preferred the triumph 
of Christian Socia_l i s rn to the victory of the Social 
De mocratic Party. 11 0ne thing is certain, that in the 
interests of Europe and. of humanity the success of the 
Christian SociRlReformer is immeasurably preferable to 
57 
the.t of the Social Democrat." Yet after the success of 
54. "Politics in Upper ana_ Lower· Austria_, II pB.turd.ay 
Revie\<T, 103:579, May 11, 1907. · 
55. \Hlliar:~ T. Stead, "Aus tria-Hungary Without Francis 
Joseph," International, 4:92, January, 1909. 
56. Steed, ..QQ.cit., , p. 137. 
57. "Christian Socialism in Austria., 11 Saturday Review 1 103:483, April 20, 1907. 
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the Social Democrats, the weekly adwitted _ that the party 
had risen above national distinctions and had appealed to 
· its follo~ofers as a unified body. Furthermore, to other 
Austrian parties it had set an example of unity which had 
been sa.dly lacking in Imperial politics, and the Saturday 
Review pointed out that the new deputies might accomplish 58 -
much in Parliament. The Nation that leaned to the left 
of center, hopefully forecast that a union of all working 
classes in a single party would also unify the whole Empire 
59 
and aid in elimination of national separa.tiem. Geoffrey 
Drage called attention to an evaluation or the Austrian 
Social Democrats by the London Times. They had been 
nicknamed the "Imperial and Royal Socialists, 11 beca.use 
of loyalty to the monarchiac form or government and to 
60 
the Emperor. 
In the decade prior to the war the Social Democratic 
Party competed with Social Christian forces but its fondest 
hopes were not fulfilled as political influence, except in 
61 
socia.l legis~a.tion, did not increase proportionately. 
58. "The Austrian Genera.l Election, 11 Saturday Review, 
103:641-642, }~y 25, 1907. 
59. "The Making of Austria, 11 Nation, 1:443-444, May 18, 
1907. 
60. Drage, QQ.cit., p. 50. 
61. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism 
and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), I, p. 105. 
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A different situation existed in Germany, for in 1914 the 
Social Democratic Party had emerged as the determining party 
in the German Reichstag. And so ae the Empire entered upon 
the fateful year of 1914, neither Christian Socialism nor 
pure Socialism had provided a panacea for discontent and 
62 
vigorous nationalism. 
62. Ibid., II, p. 225. 
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CHAPTER XII 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The Islamic horde broke forth from Asia Hinor in the 
fifteenth century a.nd conquered Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In the nineteenth century the influence of the Sublime 
Porte receded from Europe, and the provinces veilea. for 
hundrecls of ye ars from Christian countries emerged from 
obscurity . Like other Balkan principalities etill under 
Turki sh control, they became restive and eruptea into revolt 
in 1875. During the prolonged Near Eas t ern Crisis (1875-
1878 ), a problem arose concerning their future status and 
four alterna tives were offered--(1) return to Turkish 
control, ( 2) independence, ( 3) occnpa t ion by or annexation to 
Au r. t ria-Hungary, and (4) occupation by or annexation to 
Se rbia ana. Montenegro. At the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were assigned to an Austrian trus teeship 
and thereafter they interested Europe as a recently liberated 
area with many Eastern features, ethnic, religious, economic, 
and social. They were examined to determine whether or not 
Austria 1 s occupation was beneficial, and whether she prompted 
Western liberalism and provided an enlightened administration 
with materia.l i mprovements. The provinces were considered 
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more than isola_ted acquisitions, beca.use with the Sanjak of 
Novi Bazar an Austrian edge had been formed with its point 
aimed at Salonika. They were reminders of Habsburg interest 
in t ... e di sposition of any and all Balkan territories. They 
also could be regarded as experimental laboratories which 
revealed whether or not Austria-Hunga.ry could permanently 
implent Western we.ys and civilization upon Eastern peoples. 
Europe was notified that the Dual Monarchy had oriented 
it self to Sla.vic ethnic lands. Additional Balkan terri tory 
would transform the sta.te into a Slavic Empire and thereby 
intensify the competition with Russia, for prote·ctorship and 
perhaps the allegiance of B~lkan peoples. 
In the mid-seventies the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had not been settled, but on the horizon loomed various 
possibilities about which Englishmen had formed definite ideas. 
Influential British circles d.id not favor independence 
for it was understood that the provinces conta.ined diverse 
nationalities but, of course, religious differences had more 
import. The population was composed of Mohammedans, Orthodox 
Christians, and a smaller group of Roman Catholics . The 
Christians had been oppressed for centuries and were eager 
to right past wrongs and share in land that had belonged 
almost exclusively to the Mohammedans. It we_s t hought 
that in all likelihood independence might cause fratricidal 
civil war. The following few lines of the Austrian poet 
Grillnarzer expressed the sentiments of many in Britain: 
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Der Weg der neuern Bildung geht 
Von Humanitat 
Durch Nationalitat 
Zur Be stialitat . 
In 187.5, Disraeli allowed the impossibility of independence. 
Fancy autonomy for Bosnia with a mixed popul a-
tion; autonomy for Ireland would be lese absurd; 
for there are more Turks in proportion to Christians 
in Bosnia, than Ulster V. the three other Provinces. 
2 
In 1877, both Sir Henry Elliot ·e.nd Sir Andrew Bucharam 
1 
ackno-vdedged the unsuitableness of autonomy; Buchanan stated 
the_t 11 i t never has been advocfl_ted by any person, acqueinted 
with conditions in Bosnia, who wishes a durable state of 
things to be established t h ere •.• " In October of the same 
year Lord Derby told the Mansion House deputation: 11 I look 
upon the plan of complete autonomy--a plan a.s it is, of the 
creat ion of a fresh group of tributary States--as outside 
the range of p ractical politics. 11 Yet Derby, the Foreign 
Minister, differentiated between political autonomy and loca.l 
or a dministra tive autonomy and advoc&ted loca_l self-govern ment 
. 3 
for the provinces under Turkish suzerainty. 
1. The Letters of Disraeli ·to Lady Ches terfield and 
Lady Bra'df'Ord (Marquis of Zetland, editor, New York: ~ 
Appleton & Co., 1929), I, p. 376. 
2. Sir Henry Elliot, British Ambasss.dor to Constantinople. 
Sir Andrew Buchanan, British Ambassador to Vienna. 
3. Lord Robert l<lontagu, Foreign Policy: England and the 
Eas tern Question (Londo n: Chapman and Hall, 1877), pp. 203-20.5. 
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The widesprea.d reluctance of well-informed people to 
end.orse complete indepenctence emphasizes that anthropology 
and DarwiniEm theories which gree.tly interested the well-
educated Englishman in the nineteenth century may have found 
concrete applica.tion, · (e.g., the popuiari ty of The Gold.en 
Bough (1890), by Sir James Frazer, and t he contributions of 
Sir John Lubbock, Henry A. Keane, and Sir Edwa~; B. Tylor). 
Possibly Balkan people were thought to be at a backws.rd stage 
of development. 
English _news organs were much concerned with the 
provinces. The London Times in 1875 believed that nothing 
but a strong foreign army could prevent conditions from 
la.psing into anarchy. As the Turks were unable to obtain a 
cessation of hostilities, Austria would perform a splendid 
4 
act if she would. occupy the area as she had in 1854. The 
following year the Times took a further step and eponsored 
outright connection with the Habsburg Empire. "The sugges-
tion that Bosnia and Herzegovina might be administered by 
an Austrian Prince has been received with a degree of 
5 
unanimity which at least attests its practical character. 11 
After the Congrese of Berlin, two of the most severe 
critics of t h e Empire, E. A. Freeman the English historian, 
and his son-i n-ls.w the journalist Arthur J. Evans, were 
convinced the.t Habsburg control although not ideal \Arould be 
4. Editorial in London Times, November 19, 1875. 
5. Ibid., August 29, 1876. 
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satisfactory. Freeman explained that the situation in Bosnia 
o.ffered a problem because it v-rae not advisable to join the 
area to either Serbia or Montenegro as the two countries were 
s.lmost entirel_y Orthodox Christian. If the large Mohammedan 
and Catholic groups in Bosnia we~e joined to an Orthodox 
state, in all probability the Orthodox major~ty within th~ 
provinces would e sta.blish sn arbitrary rule and would. take 
vengeance on the Mohammedans as retribution for centuries of 
persecution. Freeman stated that Austria had made substantial 
strides in the years 1865-1875 and_ therefore she would 
a<'iminister Balkan lan cls in a more equitable manner than Turkey. 
J 
Bosnia an d Herzegovina. would. experience real improvement if 
rcli sed to the leve 1 of Dalma tie. . However, by 1882 the 
6 
historian had entirely reversed his position. 
And I am inclined to think that an annexation 
in 1875 by Austria, as Austria looked in 1875, 
would have been accepted by the Christians of 
those lands as deliverance. But the next year 
everything changed. The fact was that the King 
of Hungary could not dare to do wha.t the King of 
Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia might have been 
tempted to do. The Magyars grudged the slightest 
favor to the European races which they so largely 
held i ·n bonda.ge. 
7 
In 1876, . Albert Rutson, in the Fortnightly Review, observed 
but two choices, either occupation by a European force until 
difficulties had been eliminated, or annexation partly to 
6. E. A. Freeman4 
11 The True Eastern Question," 
Fortnightly Review, 2 :768, December, 1875. 
7. E. A. Freeman, 11 The Positi on of the Austrian Power 
in South-Ea s tern Europe, 11 Contemporary_ Review, 41:740-741, 
May, 1882. 
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8 
Montenegro but principally to Austria. M. Grant Duff 
maintained that he personally had no objection to Austria's 
control of Bo snia and He rzegovina or anything else she could 
comfd'rtably t ake in the Balkans, but he believed expansion 
would ruin her delicately balanced governmental system and 
might precipitate dissolution. In the opinion of Arthur J. 
May, Grant Duff was one of the best informed members of the 
9 
British House of Common s on continental affairs. In May, 
1878, both the Dail~ Telegraph and the Daily News were con-
cerned abo ut rumors that Austria would receive Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, because such an acquisit-ion would increase Pan-
Slavic agitation within her borders and result in further 
expansion. 
In April of the same year, the Standard believed that 
if Vienna had consented to the occupation of Turkish 
territory it was because of an urgent motive of self-protection. 
It is a measure to be regarded as not an 
equivalent to the Russian occupation of Bulgaria 
so much as a parallel to the B~itish occupation 
of the Sea of Marmora. 
10 
The Pall Mall.. Ga zette, about the time of the Congress of 
Berlin, somewhat reluctantly consented to the "cession" of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 11 To the Austrian proposal ~re ourselves 
at any r a te ma.ke no objection. Only--can it not be presented 
B. Albert Rutson, 11 Turkey in Europe, 11 Fortnightly Review, 
20:274, September, 1876. 
9. Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1951), p . 46. 
10. Pall ~~ll Gazette, 27:2, April 30, 1878. 
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11 
in a straightforward way?" · Yet afterthe Congress , the 
paper was fearful that the Habsburg s might lookupon the 
new territory as a mere stepping-stone by which they could 
12 
rea.ch the shores of the Aegean. The Morning Post ma.in-
ta.ined tha.t the progra.m of the Great Powers had been most 
unjust and Austria should not have received land belonging 
13 
to Constantinople. 
Prior to the meeting at the German capital, the 
14 
Spectator endorsed the proposed occupation; subsequent 
thereto the weekly concluded that trusteeship was 
15 
permanent. The Times declared no other settlement was 
practical and that the provinces under Austrian administration 
would have a chance for development. Furthermore, England 
could feel secure at the expansion of Austria as she was not 
aggressive. Since the area could not have remained 
indefinitely under Turkish control, the paper was satisfied 
with an Austrian administration rather than independence or 
attachment to Serbia, for the latter settlement would have 
increasea_ Serbian materials of aggression. The }.{orning 
Advertiser decried opposition to the occupation and insisted 
11. "Occasional Observations on the Question of the Day, 11 
Pall Mall Gazette, 27:2, April 30, 1878. 
12. 11 Lord Salisbury 1 s Apology," Pall Mall Gazette, 28:3, 
July 17, 1878. · 
13. Pall Mall Gazette, 27:3, July 2, 1878. 
14. "The Bribe to Austria,u Spectator, 511 :400, March 
30, 1878. 
15. "The Austrians in Bosnia, 11 Spectator, 512:849, July 
6, 1878. 
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that an Imperial army could preserve order and prevent a 
16 
flare-up of hostilities. But the Fortnightly Review 
discounted Lord Beaconsfield's statements that Austria 
could provide law and order in Southeastern Europe) for 
she might become a 11 broken reed." any time, in fa.ct, her 
17 
presence would insure a future conflict. The Globe 
viewed the settlement with scepticism as it amounted to 
spoliation and Austria had not been straightforward in the 
Balkan troubles, therefore the move was intolerable unless 
nothing else was practicable. The Daily News decided that 
Austria-Hunga.ry' s internal structure was threatened because 
she had. been unable to reconcile even her own multi-
nationalities. Vanity Fair predicted that Ea.stern Europe 
would become a great battleground considering the fact that 
Imperial control of the provinces would eventually result 
18 
in partition of the Habsburg state. The Examiner in 1878 
gave guarded apuroval to the arrangement . for it wa.s believed 
that the provinces actually had been annexed. The weekly 
admitted. that even though the population preferred Serbian 
or Montenegrin rule, the new a dminietra.tion would benefit 
the area and would bring it into affinity with the West. 
16. Pall Mall Gazette, June 29, 1878. 
17. 11 Home and Foreign Affairs, 11 Fortnightly Review, 
31 : 308, August, 1878. 
18. 11 Congress and the Austrian Occupation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina," Public Oninion, 34:1-2, July 6, 1878. 
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Unquestionably Europe should feel eatisfied that Austria 
had been rewarded at the expense of Russia, but the 
periodical reminded its reeders that Austria-Hungary had 
not merited the friendship of liberal forces on the 
19 
continent. Ho·wever, two yes.rs later the Examiner stated: 
"In Bosnia and Herzegovina ••• there has been, since the first 
explosion of fanatic opposition, a wonderful progrese toward 
20 
peace and prosperity." 
British opinion of any Bosnian settlement ~ras influenced 
by her primary objective, i.e., Balks.n peace and_ containment 
of Russia. The British press had prepared the public for the 
Austrian occupation. Di sraeli went to Berlin kno\\ring that 
his nation hPd been informed of the different problems 
connected with Bosnia and Herzegovina; hence public opinion 
was somewhat ahead of policy. 
At the Congrese of Berlin, the proposal for Austrian 
occupation of Bosnis. and Herzegovina received officisl 
British sanction. Lord Salisbury disclosed that Great Britain 
had offered to support Austria on any proposa.l she might ma.ke 
c'oncerning· Bosnia, if she in turn would support Britain 1 a 
21 
propo sa.l for Bulge. ria. Salisbury showed e. predilection 
19. 11 Austria' e N e"T Province, Examiner, pp. 836-837, 
July 6, 1878.., 
20. 11 Mr. GlaC!_stone and Austria, 11 Examiner, pp. 394-395, 
March 27, 1880. · 
21. Lord Newton, Lor~ Lyons, A Record of British 
Diplomacy ( London: Edwe.rd. Arnold,-1913), p-.-1~3. 
for what he called an annexation of the provinces. 
I suppose the annexation of Bosnia must be 
looke·d upon as a. profound secret •••• I am gls_d 
that Austria has resolved upori this step, for 
in itself it cannot hurt us and it will bring 
to light what is the real power of the Hungarie.n 
element in the monarchy. 
22 
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Upon Disraeli 1 e return from Berlin, he justified assignment 
of the a.rea to the Habsburg realm. He stated that anarchy 
prevailed in much of the Baikans, and especially in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Turkish e.uthori ty which had 'teen 't'rea.k 
and ineffectual for some time had become non-existent. Under 
the circumste.nces, a powerful stat e of pee.ce and order ha_d 
to assume control of the provinces and restore tranquility. 
Disraeli felt that the Habsburg realm could perform this 
task, for on two or three previous occasions it had been able 
. to execute similar functions. However, his remarks contained 
a tone of defense; seemingly, he tried to justify and make 
pale.ts.ble the Berlin settlement which was not ideal but was 
23 
the best atte.inable. A Tory, in citing the Prime Minister 1 s 
accomplishments, declared that 11 he has pointed another empire--
that . of Austria--to~ new career which•*ill benefit the world 
24 
as well as strengthen and ennoble herself." 
22. Gwendolen Cecil, _The Life of Robert Marauis of 
Salisbury , (Lond.on: Hodder B.hd Stoughton, .Ltd., 192ll, II, 
p. 248; also, for annexation viewpoint: "The Austria.n 
Advance oh Novi Bazar," Tilblet, 54:327-328, September 13, 
1879. 
23. The Hansard, 230:1760. 
24. A Tory, 11 Lord Beaconsfield: Why We Follow Him, 11 
Contemporary Review, 36: 676, December, 1879. 
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The Earl of Kimberley, a Libere.l who became Minister 
of Colonial Affairs 1880-1885, viewed with satisfaction the 
movement of Austria into former 'I'urki sh terri tory, but 
' 
disapproved of the over-all result at the Congress of Berlin 
because large area.s had been severed from the Turkish 
25 
Empire. Gladstone gave a most qualified accepte.nce to 
Austrian occupation and pointed sarcastic jabs at the 
Habsburg state. He believed it meant virtual annexation 
and that Austria had received the provinces as a re'tlard for 
not impeding Russia. As to principle it was no different 
than if Russia he.d taken control of Bulgarie_, the only 
distinction being Austria neither bled nor paid~ for the 
provinces. "Abstaining from vice may prove more cheap and 
profitable than practicing virtue." Reluctant acceptance 
was given. 
It cannot however be doubted, that, as far as 
regard.s the actual condition of life, the ge.in of 
transfer from Turkey to Austria, and an Austria 
not now despotic, ~ill be immense. And there is a 
further reason, which does something to mend the 
ee.se. Austrian rule will eerte.inly be backe.d by 
ample power to obviate the relations between the 
Mohammedan · and Christian ponulations. 
. . 26 
A British diplomat who was the nation's representative 
at Constantinople during the years of the Balkan Crisis, 
asserted that on account of nationality di~isione anyone 
25. The Hansard, 246:553. 
26. W. E. Gladstone, "The Peace to Come," Nineteenth 
Century, 3:224, Februery, 1878. 
with knowledge of conditions realized the only possible 
arrangement WP S to attach Bosnia and Herzegovin~ to the 
27 
Habsburg state or reestablish Turkish suzere.inty. The 
-328-
Duke of Argyll, a Liberal who had been Minister for Indian 
Affai r s in the first Gladstone Ministry, wrote in 1879 
that it was impossible for the two provinces to receive 
self-government which, of course, would have been ideal. 
Bitter national, religious, and economic antagonisms tore 
the region. In the light of such conditions e. strong 
Executive Government was needed; Au.stria-Bungary was well 
suited and trained to rule her new acqusition. He indicated 
that thirty years earlier the Habsburg Empire had been the 
incarnation of despotism but had certain noteworthy 
features. ''What was bad then has been changed now; whilst 
28 
all that was good has been r~tained." , 
In ·a speech in ·1880, Joseph Cowen, a well known Li bera.l 
· acknowledged that the occupation, <;>r, as he called it, the 
annexation we.s a block to Russian expansion, but inasmuch 
as he favored the growth of independent B~tlka.n ,states he 
refused to fully endorse ~he Austrian move because it stifled 
27. Henry G. Elliot, Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic 
Experiences {edited by his daughter, London: John Murray, 1922), 
p •' 214. 
28. Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question {From the 1'reaty 
of Pe.rie 1816 to the Treat'Y"of Berlin 1878 and to the Second 
Afghan War London: Strahan & Co., 1879), II, p. 152. 
29 
natione.l 1 sm .. 
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And. so G-reat Britain in general did not enthusiastically 
greet the Austrian occupation but accepted it ae the only 
p ractical alternative to Turkish rule. I t wa.s believed 
Austria would pre vent the region from lapsing into complete 
ana rchy and would check bloodshed among Moslems, Catholic 
Christians, and Orthodox Christians. Gladstone, a staunch 
friend of Balkan nationalisw, accepted the settlement. 
Significantly, many writers as well as Lord Salisbury 
displayed realism for they clearly saw that the occupation 
'\'lOUld be -permanent. 
From 1878-1908 Bri ta.in showed a lively intere s t in the 
progress and. development of the former Turkish principalities. 
Attention centered on the task to civilize and modernize them. 
Educated English people traveled in the occupied region and 
observed conditions fir~t-hand; they were few in number, 
however, for it was not a tourist resort and did rot have 
many attractions for a person seeking a pleasant holiday. 
Those who had tra.versed the Austro-Hungarian Empire reported 
that few Englishmen had frequented the more remote districts, 
namely, regions not urban or famed as resorts. 
Amusing guesses were made at our nationality 
in e. country where so few Englishmen are seen •.• 
29. Joseph Cowen's Speeches (On The Near ~ast Question: 
Foreign and Imperial Affairs: And On the British Empire) 
( London: Longmans, Green & Co.~909)~p. 56-57. 
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PITT a poor policeman ! Told off to a new beat, . 
Considered quite an easy one, and rich in tips and perke, 
The Austrian Bobby finds his task by no means such a treat, 
The boys in the new neighbourhood seem most tremendous Turk!!. 
'Twas thought his tramp and truncheon would hne quelled them double quick 
. But that awful r,ickle IIERZY is as slippery as an eel 
And youn"' Bozzr s far too handy with the unoxpect;l brick, · 
.For a Bobby 10 bewildered every kindly soul must feel. 
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and the two English cyclists were as great a 
wonder as Patagonians. 
30 
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To a large extent public opinion was governed by the 
published reports of travelers, and. for ths.t rea.son their 
views are of primary importance. In 1879, R. Hamilton Lang 
who had toured Bosnia, wrote 1n the Fortnightly Review: 
All the philanthropists should rejoice that 
Boenis., w1 th its antagonistic sects, has passed 
into the hands of a Power from which may be hoped 
as strict impartiality as the rule of England 
secures to India. 
He ste.ted that one country in Eastern Europe {Austria) to-ok 
no cognizance of differences in religion and etbnic origin 
31 
"and under whose laws all enjoy eque,l privileges." Hardly 
two years after Austria moved into the new territory, the 
London Times very enthueiastics.lly r ecorded her achievements; 
her rule had been based on principles of honesty, common 
32 
sense, and straightforwardness. In 1882 the Tablet no.ted 
the excellent manner in which the occupa tion·al duties had 
been d.ischarged. 11 It has been well for .i!.:urope, and for 
30. Grenville A. J. Cole, The Gypsy Road: A Journe! from 
Krakow~ Coblentz (London: Macmillan and--nompany, 1894,--p:-
96. Grenville A. J. Cole, Professor of Geology at Royal 
College of Science for Ireland; Director of the Geological 
Survey of Ireland from 1905. 
31. R. Hamilton Lang, "The Austrians in Bosnis., 11 
Fort.nightly Review, 32:671, November, 1879. 
32. Editorial in: London Times., January 22, 1880. 
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33 
ourselves that the task has been in such safe hands. 11 
Pauline Irby was well known in England. for her expose in 
1877 of conditions in Bosnia end Herzegovina and for her 
humanita r i an activit i e s in behalf of Balkan Christians. 
In 1889 she asserted that Bosnia was in a transitional 
state and consequently anomalies would exist in spite of 
everything. However, the governing a.uthori tes had shown · 
34 
an admirable sense of humanity and justice. In the early 
nineties the Saturd.ay Review praised the Austrian trustee- · 
ship, and added that the achievements should have been 
apparent even to LibP. rala who had been Austrophobes a few 
ye e_rs earlier; anti-Aust ria.n feeling s were retained by only 
a few crotcheteers and monomaniacs who were uriable or did 
35 
not wish to see t h e true state of affairs. A few yea rs 
later, articles in the Quarterly Review and the Speaker 
36 
passed similar judgments on Haqsburg administration. 
After a journey through the provinces, T. \'/. Leigh, a member 
of Parliament reported most favorably on condi tiona: Life .-and 
33. "Austria in t h e Balkan Peninsula," Tablet, 59: 441-
442, March 25, 1882. 
34. Pauline Irby, "Bosnia and the Land 11 enure, 11 
Contemporary Review, 56:33, July, 1889. 
35. "Austria and England, 11 Saturday Review, 71:763, June 
27, 1891. 
36. "The Eastern Crisi.s, 11 Quarterly Review, 186:283, 
July, 1897; also, W. M., 11 An Austrian Crete, 11 Speaker, 
15:424-425, April 17, 1897. 
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property were just as safe as in the more civilized states 
of Euro pe; the dependencies had been made to pay expenses 
and indeed had produced a surplus; communications had been 
greatly improved and the natives seemed satisfied with the 
status ~. He believed that ine smuch as Austria had no 
trained colonial officers prior to 1878, her accompl~shments 
merited high praise. On the adverse side, the natives were 
still in a backward condition, and perhaps more could have 
been done to develop mineral resources, improve public 
works, and aid agriculture. But the political admini s tration 
had be en carried on well; Western civilization had· been 
adapted to Eastern customs instes d of overturning the existent 
system too rapidly, and an admirable attempt had been made 
. 37 
to reconcile the Mohammedans to Christian rule. 
The Marquis of Huntly on his return from Ea.stern Europe 
. wrote: 
Europe's mandate to Austria in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has proved fairly successful; and 
the incorporation at no distant date of these 
two territories within the Empire that now 
manages them may be expected. 
38 
In 1899 the Economist noted the worthwhile contributions of 
Western civilization to unstable Eastern lands (Bosnia and 
37. T. W. Leigh, "A Ramble in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 
New Review, 5:479, November, 1891. · · 
38. Marquis of HuntlyJ.. "Eastern Notes," Fortnightly 
Review, 36:809, December - 1~84. 
-333-
39 
Herze~ovina). A@:ain in 1907 a.nd 1908, the weekly praised. 
40 
the program follo"tved by the Empire. Likewise, another 
Balkan traveler, William Eleroy Curtis lauded the excellent 
administration ~Thich had wisely p;overned foreign people by . 
justice, benevolence, and liberal treatment. He pointed 
out tha.t three decades earlier the position of Bosnis was 
like t h a.t of MB.cedonia in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Neither region was suited to liberty, consequently 
he bell ved w·hat h Dd be en done in Bosnia could have been 
accomplished in Macedonia except for the antagonism of the 
Great Powers. Bosnia had a pe~ceful and prosperous . 
population; new buildin~s of diversified types, factories, 
homes, and schools were being erected. The court system 
was impartial, and the multinationalities were tre a ted in 
an enlightened manner; hope for the future was in free 
41 
education tha t would raise the level of the popula tion. 
Luigi Villari, t h e historian, · s not an Engli shme.n but he 
hacl become well known in Britain; his - ideas and. vielH! were 
rep;arded as wei@:hty and m old.ed public opinion. In a leading 
39. ~Austria-Hungary " Economis t, 57:1836-1837, 
December 30, 1899; also, AAuetria Reaux," National Observer, 
15:36-37, November 23, 1895. 
40. ~The Dual Monarchy and Europe," Economi st, 65:1391-
1392, August 17, 1907. 
41. William Eleroy Curtis, The Turk and his Lost 
Provinces: Greece 1 BuJg aria, SerVIa a.nd B'()"'Sriia"TLondon: 
F'. H. Reve 11 Company, 1903) 1 p. 274. 
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British periodical he wrote that Austria had performed 
wise and. splendid work in the occupied provinces and had 
not committed euch serious mistakes as nations which had 
been accustomed ·to directorship of colonial lands. Her 
religious policy had been skilful and prudent; the population 
was · allowed its own form of worship, and the priests had 
become better educated which in turn benefited the people. 
If such a program· had. been instituted in Ireland the result 
. . 42 . 
might have been very propitious. A British officer 
familiar with the Balkans compared Austrian administration 
of Bosnia to Britain's rule in India. Equal rights existed 
before the law, and person and property were protected. 
Also in· civil affairs affecting property, · inheritance, or 
marriage, cases were tried before and decided by Mohammedan 
judges. In addition, the officer pointed out that the. 
Government supported a law. college for the training of Imams 
and Hodjas of the Mohammedan ·p riesthood. Separate elementary 
schools had been established for Mohammedan children although 
the officials had urged that they be sent to the state schools 
42. Luigi Villari, "Austria-Hungary's Colonial 
Experiment," Monthly Review, 8:75-86~ September, 1902; 
also, Sir Rowland Blennerhasset, "Great Bri te.in and the 
Dual Monarchy, 11 National Review, )5:555, June, 1900; 
also, H. C. Thomson, The Outgoing Turk (London: William 
Heinemann, 1897), Preface; also, Allen Upward, The East 
End of Europe {New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1909), p. 53. 
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43 
where advantages were equal. Valentine Chirol, one of 
the leading journalists of Britain, had been London Times 
represent a tive in .Berlin .and in 1899 became Chief of the 
Foreign Dep artment of that paper. He declared that the 
successful administration of von Kallay and his subordinates 
had justified Austria's claim to the dependencies assigned 
44 
to her in 1878. Emile Lavalye, a Belgia.n publicist who 
almost held the position of European correspondent for the 
. 4_5 
Fortnightly .Review, stated that the Bosniroexperiment 
merited approval if political questions were disregarded 
and progress of civilization was the desired goal. Under 
Turkish dominion, di sorder and cruelties had increased4 
. 6 
under the new rule, improvement was rapid and general. 
In 1902, G. P. Gooch of Cambridge University, commended 
47 
Austria for her excellent work in Bosnia and_ Herzegovins . • 
43. Major Percy Henderson, A British Officer in the 
Balkans (London: Seeley & Co., Ltd., 1909), p. 106-.----
44. The Balkan Question: The Present Condition of the 
Bs.lkans and of Euro~n Respon"S''bilities m_ Various Wri~s 
(Luigi Villeri, editor, New York: E. P. Dutton and Co mpany, 
1905), p. 2_58. 
4_5. Edwin Mallard Everett, 'rhe Partz of Huma.nit;l,, 
Fortnightly Review and Its Coptributors (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North-cBrolina Press, 1939), p. 328. 
46. Emile Lavelye, The Balkan Peninsula (Mrs. Thorpe, 
trHn sls tor, Lono.on: T. F. Unwin, Ltd., 1887), p. 1_56. 
47. G. P. Gooch, "The Problem of the Near East," 
Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century, (edited 
by F. A. Kirkpatrick, Carr1bric'lge, at the University Press, 
1902) ' p . 294. 
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Ancl three years later James Bryce d.eclared, 11 as Egypt has 
thriven under English administration, so has Bosnia. under 
48 
Austrie.n. 11 
Lady 'rhompson, a visitor to the region in the early 
years of the twentieth century, in answer to the criticisms 
leveled at Austrian administration, issued the rejoinder 
tha t evils resul ting from the occupation such as destruction 
of native industries and weakening of the moral fiber were 
not peculiar to Habsburg . rule, but usually accompanied 
penetration of back"rard land.s by Western civilization. In 
reports of murders and massacres in Balkan land.s especially 
in Macedonia, equality b efore the la.w and complete security 
of life and property were recognized as real benefits; 11 it 
must be e.dmitted. that she hss succeeded in bringing what 
was the most be.ckward part of the Sultan* s dominions nnre 
49 
or less into line with the rest of Europe. II Harry 
DeWindt who toured the occupied provinces as a special 
correspondent of the Westminster Gazette just prior to the 
annexation, commended Austrian rule. The tra.nsforrnations 
brought about since 1878 seemed. incredible to him. In short, 
48. James Bryce, "Introduction," The Balkan Question 
(Luigi Villa.ri, editor, New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 
1905), p. 10; also, "The Death of M. K'llay," Outlook, 11: 
656, July 18, 1903. 
49. Lady Thompson, 11 A Ride Through Bosnia and Herzegovina," 
Nineteenth Century And After, 61:699, Ap ril, 1907. 
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commerce e.nd civilization flourished. The Austrians were 
praised as colonizers inasmuch as they had administered 
state affairs under stressing conditions and also had given 
attention to small details such as comfort of travelers. 
The prospp,rity of Bosnia had been due to the effective 
ao_ministra.tion of Baron von Kallay who had. reorganized1 the 
state politically, socia.lly, and strategically. , The 
corresponc1ent believed_ that if Mr. Gladstone had been living 
he would have rectified his opinion of the Austro-Hunga.ria.n 
50 
Emnire. 
William Miller presented a rather detailed stua_y of 
Austrian policies. The various religions fa.red well under 
Habsburg rule. The Mohammedans enjoyed full reli g ious 
liberty; the church and mosque stood side by side, and a 
Scheriatschule for the education of Moslem jurists had 
been erected in the capital. The education of the Orthodox 
clergy a.lso had vastly improved. Protestants who formed 
only .23 per cent of the whole population were encourq,;ed by 
the Government which granted a site and made a contribution 
for the erection of a Protestant church at Sarajevo. In 
regard t o education it was explained that the provinces were 
in an advantageous position because practical tra ining had 
been stressed rather then theoretical and literary and 
the 
and. 
and 
50. Harry De Windt, Through Savage Eurone: Being 
Narrative of ~ Journey Throughout the Balkan States 
Eu ronean Russia_ (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), . pp. 
104. 
81 
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of course, the former was needed in an agricultural area. 
Farmers were wanted, not doctors and lawyers, and progress 
would have been retarded by creation of a Gelehrten-
proletariat which eyed politics as a livelihood. Model 
farms existed throughout the provinces for the improvement 
of agriculture, and native industries were encouraged. It 
was felt that the Austrians had made a worthy contribution 
in the field of transportation. The Turkish railway had 
been merely a fragment choked with grass and to correct the 
condition five hundred miles of track had been built from 
Banjaluka to Dobrlin. For the convenience of travelers and 
busine s s men the Government had established a series of 
well-appointed hotels. 
From a. considerable experience of the 
Austro-Hungarian authorities •.. I have come to 
the conclusion t h at they resemble our ov.m civil 
servants in their integrity, their absolute 
devotion to their duty and their unflag ging 
energy, while, I think, they surpass the average 
Anglo-Indian official in their keen interest in 
the welfare of the people committed to their charge • . 
51 
Edith Durham recounted her impression of conditions in 1906 
and during the years prior to the war; she presented a 
picture o f Austrian rule that wa s not at all malevolent. An 
a ttempt had been made to impose nineteenth century political, 
economic, a.nd social idees, on a population ·which lived in 
51. lilliam Miller, Travel and Politics in the Near 
East (London: T. F. Unwin, 1898), pp . 94 and 108-110-.---
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a manner f i ve hunired years behind Europe and was accus-
tomed to Eastern ways; as a result the people searched for 
52 
reasons to be discontented. 
The London Times editorially scored the formal 
annexation, but ad.mi tted that the Austrian administration 
53 
had been wise even though disliked by the inhabitants. 
The Daily •relegraph and the Outlook sharply rebuked Austria 
for the annexation and yet th54 ackpowledged that she had 
rul ed with brilliant success. In the autumn of 1908, a 
number of prominent Englishmen who had recently traveled 
in the annexed area wrote to the Times and highly commended 
Austrian rule. W. L. Duckworth, Fellow at Jesus College, 
Cambridge, stated that it was obvious to anyone Who visited 
the region that tact and consideration had been used in 
governing the Bosnians and in his opinion the occupation 
55 
had been mo st advantageous. Others writing in a similar 
vein were the Duke of Sutherland, H. Y. Stuart MacKay, and 
56 
Geoffrey Drage, M. P., from Sheffield. 
52. M. Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle 
( London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920). 
53. Editorial in London Times, October 7, 1908. 
54. 11 An Aged :tvlonarch 1 s Perfidy, 11 Public Opinion, 94: 
441, October 8, 1908; a.lso, 11 The Crisis, 11 Outlook, 22: 
453-454, October 10, 1908. 
55. Letter in London Times, October 9, 1908. 
56. Ibid., October 13 and 14, 1908. 
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Critics of Austrie.n occupation were ra.ther few; in 
the forefront was Arthur Evans who passed. severe judgments 
on conditions in the provinces. Engaged in archaeological 
and ethnographical studies~ he traveled extensively in the 
Balkans in the years. 1875-1878. He contended. that the 
occupation . would. be productive of good if it contributed 
to the break-up of Austria-Hungary and, in hie opinion, 
En~lishmen who endorsed Imperial desig~s in the Balkans 
were renegades who . linked the destiny of their co 11ntry 
with t h e most petty tyrannica.l power in Ruope. In 1880 i. 
he reprimanded Vienna for retention of the tretina payment 
which the Bosnian peasants always had considered a yoke of 
servi tuo.e; it appea.red to him that Bosnia. had beem occupied 
to oerpetuate arbitrary control of Mohammedan landlords. 
:t-1oreover, in disputes the lv1oha.mmedans seemingly had been 
given the priority over the persecuted Christians. He 
insisted that the actU:a.l a.dministra.tion of the occupied 
provinces was a.n engine of political c.onrupt· ;on in the ha.nds 
of an alien bureaucracy and 'soldiery. Evans stated tha.t 
the tHx-fa.rming system had been ended but more taxes had 
been wrung from the provinces. Although religious 
disabilities had been removed from the rajah, an anti-
national persecution had been instigated against the Serbs. 
Mos t of the Austrian officials held the people in absolute 
contempt and treated them like cattle. 11 ot a. day paeses but 
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some fresh wound is inflicted on the susceptib~lities of 
57 
the population." However, Evans was quickly challenged. 
An article in the Saturday Review explained that he had 
been a frequent traveler in Bosnia and Herzegovina but he 
wrote with furious prepossessions. It was stoutly main-
t a.ined that the Austrian occupation was the most p ractice.l 
settlement and the Empire could not be censured for evils 
58 
which p ossibly accompanied its rule. The Examiner also 
took Mr. Evans to task for his prejudicial position: 
It is not so much that he wilfully colors his 
representations as that he is, so to speak color-
blind in politics. The Austrian is black; the 
races which the Austrians and Hungarians have striven 
so hard to benefit are white as the driven snow. 
59 
The opinions of James Minchin~ an Englishman who . served as 
Serbian Consul to London 1883-1885, were published in the 
mid-eighties. He presented a surprisingly moderate and sober 
estimation of conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but as 
the Serbs were the largest racial group in the region he did 
not sanction Austrian suzerainty. He indicated that Bosnia 
in her present position was "neither fish, flesh, fowl 
nor good red heering." Before progress could be made she had 
to become a part of the Habsburg Empire for her commercial 
57. A. J. Evans, "The Austrian Counter-Revolution in 
the Balkans, 11 Fortnightly Revie't~r, 33:520, April, 1880. 
58. 11 '1'he Austrian Occupation, 11 Saturday Review, 49: 
431-432, April 3, 1880. 
59. 11 The Heart of Europe, 11 Examiner, pp. 712-713, June 
13, 1880. 
relations with Novi Bazar and Albania had been cut off 
a.nd she was forced to a.tra.de with A us tria; but inasmuch 
as she was regarded as a foreign country she faced the high 
Imperial tariffs. The highest type of official \'Vas not sent 
to the re gion e.nd one · found 11 either young men without 
experience or old men without character." He pointed out 
that Serbia had a just claim to the provinces as far as 
ethnography and hietory were concerned, but as force was the 
arbiter of justice in international a f fairs her cla.im was not 
worth a great deal. Both Austria and Russia would have 
objected to Serbian · annexation of the provinces. Minchin 
realized that an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina was not 
prsctical but rie hoped the future would bring forth a semi-
independent state with an Austrian Archduke for its Prin ce. 
11 The uresent condition of these provinces is a bridge leading 
- 60 
none knows where." In the early eighties the Suectator 
believed that conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had no t 
i mproved substantially . The administration wa s judged not 
as harsh as the Turkish, yet it was 11 conservative and wooden 
61 . 
to stupidity." However, ten years late~ · the we ekly 
presented an entirely different evaluation. 11 It i s literally 
60. James Minchin, The Growth of Freedom in the 
Balkan Peninsula. Notes of a Traveler in Montenegro 
Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria. and-Greece (London: John . Mu~ray, 
1886), pp . 400-412. 
61. 11 The A us tro-German Alliance, 11 Spectator, 582 : 1126, 
Augu s t 29, 1885. 
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true that the wilderness and solitary place has become glad 
and. tha.t l-Jhere anarchy, plunder, and murder flourished, peace 
now reigns." Further, the region had been in miserable 
circumstances but in a ehort time it had been converted into 
as peaceful a spot as Scotland; the roads were almost 
comparable to those in Switzerland. In short, tolerance and 
62 
consideration had been the guiding principles. The Austrian 
63 
mandate received criticism from Herbert Vivian, a newspaper 
reporter and a partisan of Serbia. The people were considered 
poorer and more downtrodden than before occupation and only 
outside speculators had profited greatly; also taxation had 
increased and the cost of living had risen. He regretted 
that English journalistic ideas of the Near East and the 
64 
Balkans had been remotely controlled from Austria. 
Therefore, in reviewing British opinions of Austrian 
occupation, a majority stated that a beneficial rule had 
been provided, not perfect because of the character of the 
provinces yet law and order, stability, and an improved 
economic atmosphere had been secured. 
62. 11 The Austria.n Paradox, " Snec ta.tor, 82: 743-744, May 
27, 1899. 
63. Herbert Vivian acted as special correspondent of 
the Morning Post 1898-1899, end the Daily Exnress 1899-1901, 
and wa.s decorated by the Serbian Government in 1892. 
64. Herbert Vivian, Servia: A Poor r'Ian 1 s Paradise 
( London: Longma.ns, Green & Co., 189~p. 36. 
During the last centur~ many circles in Europe gave 
wide spr ead lip-service to democratic principles and 
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liberali sm. However, in colonial areas they strongly 
emphasi zed introduction of modern improvements, implantation 
of Western education, and creation of a veneer of We stern 
cus toms and mores. A corresponding feeling developed tha t 
democracy and full civil rights had. to be d eferred until 
t he colonial p Aople s h~d reached a more a dvanced stage. 
The se i d ea s influenced views about Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for the provinces were in reality the Austro-Hungarian 
venture into coloniali sm. In judging Austria n trusteeship, 
Britain u s ed as a yards tick for measurement her own experiences 
and accomplishmen~, or lack of them, in India and Egypt. 
Cont emporary historians admit t hat Austria introduced 
improvements such as railways, new indu s tries, and the like, 
but that ine qualities of the land tenure system had not been 
fully corrected, only the surface had been s cra tch ed. Also, 
after fift y years of occupation, illiteracy amounted to 
ei~hty-eight per cent in 1918. More sober estimations of the 
situation have been adva nced since the Empire's dissolution. 
Nineteenth century attraction to exte rnal fea.tures .of modern 
life h a s declined and attention has been centered on basic 
transmutation s in society, economic leve l of the population, 
land holding sy s t e m, popula r participation in government, and 
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65 
general happiness. In short, present day ideas are more 
in line with t he comments of Arthur Balfour in 1908; 
••• that the influence which a superior civilization, 
whether acting by example or imposen by force, may 
have in advancing an inferior one, though often 
beneficent, is not likely to be self-supporting; its 
withdrawal will be followed by decadence unless the 
character of the civilization be in harmony both with 
its Hcqulred te mp erament and the inn·ate capacities 
of those who have been induced to accept it. 
- 66 
The Bosnian annexation aroused British antagonisms but 
accusations of maladministration were not widespread. By and 
large, it was felt tha.t the people of the annexed land would 
receive fair political and economic treatment within the 
framellro rk of the Empire, bece.use for thirty years the British 
press had ca.rried glo'f;ing accounts of Austrian rule. The 
principal concern was peace in Europ e by preservation of an 
67 
uneasy truce. Britain traditionally revered written man-
made law almost to the same degree a.s unwritten moral law, 
and the f ury prompted by the annexation was based on a supposed 
violation of tre c. ty and legal obligations and unilateral action. 
Nevertheless, behind the obvious objection seemed to lurk deep 
65. May, QQ.cit., p. 409; also, A. J. P. Taylor, The 
Habsburg 1-fonarchy 1809-1918 (London: Hamish Hamil ton, ~8), 
p. 153. 
66. Arthur James Balfour, Decadence: Henry Sidgwick 
Memorial Lecture (C ambridge, at the University Press, 1908), 
pp. 58-5 9. 
67. J. A. Spender, The Public Life (New York; F,rederick 
Stokes Company, 1925), I, p. 112. 
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fear. Europe had been in a d.isturbed condition and the rash 
move very easily could have precipitated an outbreak of 
hostilities. It was believed that Austria-Hungary had unduly 
provoked Russia and Serbia by reopening old wounds not for a 
material gain but for the fatuous confirmation of a point 
already settled. 
Sir Edward Grey stated, 11 to us the territorial changes 
were indifferent: It mattered not to us tha.t Austria should 
annex instead of merely occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina •.• " 
The reason for Britain 1 s firm stand, and the Foreign Secretary 
admitted a firm stand had been taken, 1-ras twofold.-- ( 1) a 
favorable inclination to the new liberal spirit within Turkey, 
and (2) i t was wrong for one Power to make alterations in a 
European treaty unless sanctioned by the other Powers which 
68 -
were parties to it. Edward VII likewise believed that 
69 
Au s trian action had endangered the peace of Europe. The 
press of Great Britain endorsed the official condemnation 
of Austria 1 s evasion of treaty ~bligations. Criticism was 
directed not so much at the annexation as the ma.nner in which 
it had been accomplished. The Suectator maintained that 
Austrie.- Hungary, by refusing to submit her action to a General 
Conference, not only had violated the public law of Europe 
68. Viscount Grey, TWenty-five Years 1892-1916 (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., l92~I, p. 175. 
69. Sir Sidney Lee, Kin~ Edward VII (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1925-1927 , pp. 649-650. 
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but, in fact, had denied the existence of any law at all. 
All trea.ties ana_ a greements became mere pieces of pe.per 
and could be broken at will unless she jus~ified herself 
and received t h e assent of Europe. 11 History of the Hague 
Confe rence and all its promises of more effectual measures 
70 
in the future will be wiped off the sla.te. 11 Howev~r, the 
weekly r eaa_ily acknowledged that no material harm had been 
done for the provinces belonged to Austria-Hungary already, 
71 
the harm was a moral one. It is interesting to look back 
some twenty-five yee.rs a.nd observe the comment in the 
Spectator at that time. 
'l'he occupation of those provinces was perfectly 
well understood to be permanent, and nobody has the 
smal l est interest in the maintenance of a very bad 
ad interim arrangement, under which the Bosnia.ns 
suffer all the disadva.nta.ges and enjoy none of the 
advantages of the Austrian federal system. 
72 
E. J. Dil l on of the Contemporary Revle\1, believed it was 
useless to patch to ge ther the torn treaty and hold it up 
for veneration, for nothing but large armies a.nd navies could 
fend off d.anger and wi thsta.no_ the onsla ught ; the Slavs had 
been defeated in the Ea.s t a.nd the Anglo-Saxons in the West 
70. "Austria-Hungary and the Public Law of Europe, 11 
Spectator, 101:618, October 24, 1908. 
71. 11 The Emperor Francis Joseph 1 s Jubilee, 11 Specte.tor, 
101:929, December 5, 1908. 
72. 11 'l'he Austrian Movement," Specte.tor, 551 :78, January 
21, 1882. 
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73 
were threatened by the same fate. The Labour Leader 
argued that Austria held Bosnia and Herzegovina 1n a tie 
closer than the one which linked Egypt to Britain, and the 
Imperial position had not been challenged. Her a.ctual aim 
had been to instigate a scramble in which the new progressive 
Turkish Government would d.isappea.r and Austria would emerge 
74 
at Salonika. The Nation reported that Sir Edwa1·d Grey 
alone had stood forth as the rallying point of European 
public opinion, for in varying degrees Italy , Germany, and 
Russia had been Austrian accomplices. The Tablet criticized 
Austria-Hungary for violating the Tre a ty of Berlin and the 
Protocol to the Treaty of London (1871), but admitte~ that 
Britain a.nd the other signatories would have to acquiesce 
75 
and ackno~ledge the fait accompli. 
Nonetheless some periodicals urged moderation. The 
Sa_turday Review and Truth observed the.t Bosnia. and Herzegovina 
had been occupied thirty years and it was generally acknowledged 
the.t they would not be returned to Turkey. The former weekly 
stated: 
But the British press has treated .•• the annexation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina as if it were on a par with the 
73. E. J. Dillon, "The Near Eastern Crisis, 11 Contemporary 
Review, 94:531, November, 1908. 
74. G. H. Perris, 11 'I'he Balkan Conspiracy," Labour Leader, 
5:673, October 23, 1908. 
75. "The Broken Treaty," Tablet, 80:561-562, October 10, 
1908. 
grossest breaches of public faith knol-m to 
history, such as Napoleon's seizure of the 
Spanish $overeigns. 
76 
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Sir Francis Younghusba.nd, in the National Review, re marked 
that the occupation of the two Eastern provinces generally 
was accepted to be permanent. Austria's rule had been on 
a par with Lord Cromer's in Egypt. She had not achieved 
popularity, but England had the same experience in India. 
"But she h ad creditably fulfilled her obligations to the 
77 
civilization of Europe and so deserved credit from Europe." 
Great Britain felt tha t backward colonial areas had not 
appreciated benefits derived from British administration. 
Therefore, it seems re a sonable that Bosnian objections to 
Austrian rule aroused. no deep sympathy among British 
imperialis ts who might refer to Kipling's lines: 
Take up the White Man 1 e burden--
And reap his old reward: 
The blame of those ye better, 
'l'he hate of those ye guard-
The cry of hosts ye humor 
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:-
"Why brougp.t ye us from bondage, 11 
"Our loved Egyptian night? 11 
78 
76. "The Balkan Situe_tion, 11 Sfl turday Review, 106: 
440-441, October 10, 1908; e_1so, 11 Turkey and Europe, 11 
Truth, 64:943-944, October 21, 1908. 
77. Sir :B,ranci~ Younghusband, 11 Nee.r East Questionings, 11 
National Review, 52 :731, January, 1909; also, Cecil 
Be_ttine, 11 The Power of Austria," Contemporary Review, 92: 
971, Dece mber, 1909. 
78. Rudyard Kinling, 11 The White !--Ian's Burden, . 11 
Woo<'ls , WRtt Rnd Anderson, 'I'he Lite r a ture of England (Revi sed 
edition, Chica go: Scott, Fore 8man and Company, 1941) , II, 
p. 979. 
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As Bosnia and He r zegovina had demanded a constitution, the 
question was posed whether Austria couJd ha.ve granted it 
while the suzerainty of the Sultan was still recognized. 
11 So, she did what she reminds us we ourselves have done--
79 
acted first and left permission to be granted afterwards." 
In 1909, Geoffrey Drage devoted an entire chapter in his 
book Austria-Hungary to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He found 
that the area had undergone great development and in 
narticular re ported abo u t advancement in industry, commerce, 
- 80 
public works, and agriculture. 
The annexation clearly showed the vi tal effect of public 
op inion on official policy. The Viennese Government resented 
the ant i -Austrian views in the British press and protested 
81 
to London. Public recriminations created bitterness. 
In summary, British attitude towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina ha d been conditioned and affected by various 
factors. Chief interest, however, centered on the achievement 
of stability in the Balkan Peninsula. Any movement that 
tended to disturb the picture wa s frowned upon. But regard.less 
79. Younghusband, loc.cit. 
80. Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (New York: E. P. 
Dutton and Comp e.ny, 1909), pp. .596-6.50. 
81. A. F . Pribram Aus t ria-Hungary and Great Britain 
1 908-1914, ( tra_nslated by Ian F. D. Morrow,Loliton: Oxford 
Univer s ity Pre ss, 19.5l) , pp. 120-121. 
of pro-Austrian or anti-Austrian sentiments, Englishmen 
sincerely desired the twin goals of peace and progress 
for the provinces and the rest of the Balkans. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
Austria-Hungary's Role In The Balkans 
'l'h ree conflicting idea.s confused and complicated the 
formation of public opinion toward Austria-Hungary's role 
in the Be.lkan Peninsula: Was the Habsburg Empire destined 
to unite the diverse ethnic groups of the area under one 
Crown and establish a peaceful region of Western culture and 
nineteenth cehtury mechanization? Was the Empire the great 
disturber of the Balkans that schemed for advancement 
unwsnted by the Orthod ox Slavs, and did it cause dissension 
and p revent the consolidation of natural ethnic lands and t h e 
cr e ation of a Balkan confeder atlon? Lastly, was the Empire 
merely a stopgap and in reality about to disinteg rate? 
Engl ishmen who desired the Empire to extend southward 
furnished specific reasons. Balkan peoples were judged to 
la.ck stability and capacity for independent rule, and if 
g ranted self-government probably domestic and foreign ctisputes 
would. become frequent. The Habsburg Monarchy was believed 
able to extend gifts of Western civilization to backward 
lands and to duplicate the ~chievement it had effected in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Christian population lying to the south-
east of Hungary are utterly incapable of governing 
themselves, and the task of their political 
reconstruction could be intrusted most properly to 
Austria. · 
l 
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It was believed the Slavic peoples could easily accommodate 
themselves within the Empire as it was already composed of 
heterogeneous groups. Some observers were convinced that 
either Russian or Austro-German influence should predominate 
2 
in the Balkans. Mountstuart Grant Duff pointed out that 
England's concern for the safety of Eastern holdings made 
her hostile to a Russian controlled Constantinople, but an 
Aus t ri a n expansion to the south \-Jas not consi dered potentially 
3 
da.ngerous. Immediately after the Austro-Prussian \Var the 
Spectator wrote that beyond a doubt German friendship and two 
decades of peace would be the means to establish a strong 
Habsburg state, 11 the destined and fitting inheritor of the 
Turkish domain." With the aid of France and England, Austria-
Hungary could conceivably arise as a vigorous nation and 
attract provinces about to drift from Turkish rule. It was 
essential that these particular areas have a strong government 
1. "Aus tria Since Sadpwa, 11 Quarterly Review, 131:112, 
July, 1871. 
2. Mo untstua.rt Grant Duff, El~in Speeches (Edinburgh: 
Edmonst0n and Douglas, 1871), p. 2 8. 
3. William Forsyth, The Slavonic Provinces: A Sketch 
of Their History and Present state in Relation to-the 
Ottoman Porte (London: John Murray, 1876), p. 179. 
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and. be free from fear of either Russian or Turkish povrer. 
In the Fortnightly Review, Adam Gielgud insisted that the 
4 
Balk~n peoples were too varied to form separate states, but 
a civilized and liberal administration, full enjoyment of 
national rights, and adequate protection would follow an 
Imoerial unification. "Austria it will be seen h a s a 
5 
splendid future before her. 11 After the Seven Weeks' War, 
it seems that British writers who were favorably inclined . 
toward Austria realized that she finally had been excluded 
from Germany, and they hoped for reestablishment of Habsburg 
p re stige by preeminence in the Balkans. 
Perhe.ps Austria desired to expand into the Be_lkans, 
but in the sixties Britai~ recognized that first of all the 
Dual Monarchy had to re main an integral unit in order to 
g ive direction to Eastern affairs. In 1866 Robert Marier 
was convinced that ·the Empire was a necessity for Europe. 
' Unless the Austrian Empire can remain intact 
(the utterly insoluble Italian element alone being 
removed) I am totally unable to see what is to 
become of the mosaic work of nationa.li ties which 
fills up the space enclosed by the frontiers of 
the Empire, and I see before me nothing but hope·-
less chaos and confusion, and nothing to help us 
out of it. 
6 
4. 11 'l'he Evil ·Results of the Austrian Collapse, 11 Spectator, 
392 :797, July 21, 1866. 
5. Adam Gielgud, ";European 'rurkey and Its Subject Races, 11 
Fortnightly Review, 6:619, October, 1866. 
6. Rosslyn Wemyss, Memoirs and Letters of the Right 
Honorable Sir Robert lvlorier (London: E. Arnold, 1911) 1 I 1 
p. 78. . 
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In the seventies, after Vienna had somewhat stabilized 
internal conditions, prominent Englishmen believed that 
control of the Balkan Peninsule. by Austria-Hungary would 
produce worthwhile results. W. J. Stillman thought that 
the re gion required harmony and a unification of nationalities 
which could be furnished by Austria's strong hand and her 
7 
s e ttled mechanism of government. The Spectator conceded 
that her security was imperfect but it ltlas superior to that 
offered by Greece or other Balkan countries; the suggestion 
was made that an Anglo-Austrian alliance would help the 
8 
Habsburgs obtain a share of the Balkans. Thomas Carltle . 
declared the. t the Russians were one of the · noble elements 
in Europe and a f air division of Balkan lands should be made 
between Aus tria and Russia. Reflecting a pro-German attitude, 
he proposed that Prince Bismarck, 11 a magnanimous noble, and 
9 
deep-seeing man 11 could be appointed arbiter. The Saturday 
Review saw no reason at all why Austria should not be allowed 
to dominate a railway system in the Balkans to Salonika and 
10 
Constantinople. 
7. W. J. Stillman, 11 Austro-Hungary , 11 Fortnightly Review, 
33:797, June, 1880. 
8. 11 'rhe Bribe to Austria, 11 Spectator, 51:4oo, March 30 1 1878. 
9. Letter to London Times, November 28, 1876. 
10. 11 Railway s in the Balkans, 11 Saturday Review, 51:329, 
March 12, 1881. 
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James Levds Fe.rley proposed a solution for the Eastern 
Question, viz., the formation of Turkish Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Northern Albania into a principality 
under an Austrian Prince. The same settlement wa.s suggested 
11 
for Buige.ria and Macedonia. Captain J. \'1. Gambier, a 
Brl tish naval officer v-1ri ting about Serbia in 1878, asserted 
that in a short time Austria would become a Danubian Kingdom 
. 12 
embracing the people to the south who had similar interests. 
In 1879 the Examiner wrote that only Austria was fitted 
to govern the Balkans; her rule would check Russia and also 
benefit the Peninsula. Austria had become more liberally 
governed than any other continental power and England was 
13 
a dvised to lend full supnort for maintenance of her strength. 
Again in 1880 the Examiner asserted that aided by France and 
England, the Empire had an obligation to spread free in-
stitutions into eastern Europe and save the area from the 
14 -
bruta). tyranny of Russia. 'I'he Economist, in the same year, 
11. James Lewis Farley, Turks and Christians: A Solution 
of the Eastern ~uestion (London: Simpkin, Marshall& Co., 
publishers , 187 ), 1). 181. James Lewis Farley was a prominent 
writer on Turkish affairs and was closely associated with 
British banking interests in Turkey. 
12. J. w. Gambier, Servia (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 
1878)' p. 124. 
13. "The Future of the Balkan Peninsula," Examiner, 
pp. 826-827, June 28, 1879; also, "The Mandate of the 
Country, 11 Examiner, pp. 45 5-456, April 10, 1880. 
14. "The Heart of Europ:e, 11 Examiner, pp. 712-713, 
June 12 , 1880. 
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thought the.t a federation of various national states under 
the Habsburg Crown would be a logical and likely out come 
15 
of the Balkan situation. Another commentator, H. o. 
Arnold-Forster observed that a.n Austrian rule was preferable 
no matter how deplorable, the only alternative was the 
16 
complet e despotism of Russia. The London Times in 1880 
commend.ed Austria 1 s rule in· Bosnia, but o"Qlj ected to a 
further extension of her power in the Balk ans lest it might 
stimulate he r embi tion and transform her into an aggressive 
17 
nation like Russia. However, two years later the paper 
maintained that "a great deal of annexation" was in store 
for Austria as t h e Wallachians, Bulgars, and Albanians were 
incapable of forming strong self-reliant states. The Balkan 
lands, t he refore, had to be divided between Russia and 
Au stria. Certainly Vienna could not stand aside and let her 
18 
Eas tern Neighbor take all. 
In 1879, the Pall Mal l Gazette firmly believed that 
Austria intended to dominate the Balkan Peninsula end showed 
15. "The Position of Austria in Eastern Europe," Economist, 
40:1614-1615, December 30, 1880. 
16. H. o. Arnold-Forster, 11 The Balkan Provinces," 
Contemporary Review, 45:416, March, 1 884. 
17. Editorial in London Times, January 22, 1880. 
18. Ibid ., December 27~ 1882. 
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no real objection to the idea. 
vi e do not know - that the world in general, or 
that England in particular, has any reason to be 
dissatisfied. with it, but it is well to recognize 
tha t it would produce the mightiest transformation 
of the face of Europe that this century has wit-
nessed. 
19 
After Gladstone's Midlothian attack on Austria, the paper 
declared t ha t a Serbian or Bulgarian who might find himself 
within an enlarged Austrian Empire could 
. •• peacefully ·pass his human existence in the 
discharge of civil and domestic duties, and 
in the enjoyment of tranquility and freedom--
in the sense of se.fety for the person and 
security in the possession of the fruits of 
labour. 
The daily explained that Serbia and Bulgaria had riot shown 
great ability to govern themselves because they were mere 
political embryos and the era of the small states was over. 
And a few years later a Pall ~~11 correspondent wrote from 
Ragusa, 11 the Austrian Court intends to go to Salonika, and 
21 
go to Salonika it will. 11 
Friends o~ Austria-Hungary who desired her internal 
structure strengthened and her influence extended in the 
19. 11 Lord Salisbury on the l<.,uture of the Sub-Balkan 
Provinces, 11 Pall Mall Gaz~tte, October 18, 1879. 
20. 11 Idealist Statesmanship, 11 Pall Mall Gazette, 
December l, 1879. 
21. 11 The Austrian Advance in the Balkans, 11 Pa.ll :Mall 
Gazette, January 2, 1882. 
20 
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Balkans found the decade 1880-1890 the brightest of any 
. ten year period down to 1914. She had made some recovery 
from the serious encumbrances of the post bellum period 
and the na t ionalities had. become somewhat quieter after the 
outbrusts that followed military defeat. The Austro-
German Allhmce of 1879 furnished support, and the acquisition 
an d_ obvious successful administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had increased her pre s tige. 
J ·a mes Jvlinchin, an Englishman, proclaimed a de s tiny of 
gr ea t attraction for Austria-Hungary. 
The · House of Habsburg has had an extraord.inary 
history, and it may yet prove an ark on the troubled 
waters of the East. The hi storia.n of the future may 
write the annals of a great confederatio~ that will 
st~Atch from Cracow t o Constantinople. Such a free 
confederation ·of SJ-avonic r a.ces, e a ch with a complete 
autonomy of its own , but having an army, a coinage, 
and c us tom duties ln common, would be in .Q.eed as well 
as in name an Eastern Empire. 
22 
J. D. Bourchier maintained that Aust~ia should group around 
herself the South Slavs and force Russian Pan-Slavism to 
wither a"'ray. He advocated that the small states of the Balkans 
place themselves under the headship of the Habsburg Dynasty 
which had fully accepted constitutionalism and resp ected the 
particular customs and sensibilities of many peoples. Such 
' 
a confide ration would be the best solution of the Eastern 
22. James G. ~4inchin, The Growth of :F'reedom in the Balkan 
Peninsul a: Notes of!! 'l'raveler in Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia, 
Bul garia, and Greece (London: John Murray, 1886)., p. 180. 
-360-
Question. The afterthought was, 11 of course such a progra.m 
cannot be carried out till the great war has come and 
23 
gone. 11 Edward Dicey, in 1894, was convinced that the days 
of Turkey were numbered. He had hoped that she could be 
replaced by Austria-Hungary, but had reluctantly decided 
that the concession of Home Rule to Hunga.ry had paralyzed 
24 . 
the Emoire 1 s future activities in the Balkans. Sir William 
Whit e, the English diplomat who held various posts in Eastern 
Europe {Belgrade and Warsaw), and who became Ambassador to 
Turkey (1886-1891), believed that the best solution for the 
Balkan s wa.s a confederation of the various states under the 
. 25 
pro tectorship of Austria. 
At t he close of the century and in the new years of the 
next, Austria 1 s domestic affa.irs were unsettled but some 
quarters still stressed her mission in the Balkans. A 
tre.veler familiHr with the Near East maint a. ined that although 
she mi ght not contempla.te an expansion, when the psychological 
moment arrived, political and commercial interests would force 
23. J.D. Bourchier, "A Heritage of the Hapsburgs, 11 
Fortnigh tly Review, 51:393, March, 1889. 
24. Ed~mrd Dicey, The Peasant State: An Acco1.m t of 
Bul garia in 1894 (London: John Murray, 1894T, p. 5. 
25. H. Sutherland Edwards, Sir \villiam White_, For Six 
Years Ambassador at Constantinople: His Life and Corr~~­
pondence (London: John Murray, · 1902), pp. 208 and 227. 
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her into t be Balkans. Of course, states composed of one 
ethnic groun and one religion would continue to exist 
independently, but probably a Great Power impartial in treat-
ment of diverse creeds would have to guide the destinies of 
regions· like Macedonia, where no single grou within the 
province was strong enough to rule effectively and 
nationality was confused. The writer declared that it was 
advisable for Austria to continue her march and establish 
herself at Salonika and become in actuality what Bismarck 
26 
had prescribed, a real Oesterreich. The Saturday Review 
reported tha t i mpartial observers believed it would be best 
for England, Europe, and the · Be.lkan Peninsula. if A us tria 
assumed predominance in Southeastern Europe. 'i'he Balkan states 
were not h omogeneous in languag e, religion, or nationality, 
and t herefore one of them could not absorb tho others; if 
they were to resist an aggressor they had to depend on one 
I 
of t h e Gre at Powers. The Habsburg realm would allOl.v 
independent existences to these states and would not attempt 
forcible assi milation. The choice wa s between Austria and 
Russia, and no matter how far .Austria extended Europe would • 
27 
not become upset, but the same could not be said for Russia. 
It we.s suggested in the Snectator that the Power which had 
26. vlilliam Miller, 'I' ravels and Politics in the Near East 
(Lond on: T. F. Unwin, 1898 ), pp. 338-389 and 501-503. 
27. 11 Auetria and the East, 11 Saturd.ay Review, 56:460-461, 
Octobe r lJ, 1898. 
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altered conditions in Bosnia might be able to transform 
Alba.nia into e.n orderly country. "Indeed the adequate policing 
of South-Eastern Europe is marked out as Austria's special 
work, and in carrying ths.t out she need not excite the 
28 
hostility or the suspicion of any of the Great Powers." 
Earlier in the eighties, the weekly had severely condemned 
her expansion into the Ba.lkane. Rowland Blennerhasset was 
convinced t hat Albanian Ca~holics desired Austrian rule; the 
Mohammedans concurred in the _ feeling for they readily 
obse r ved that their co-religionists in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
fared v ery well under the administrat i on of Baron Kallay. 
11
'l'here is no reason in the world why England should not 
29 
favour this policy." 
In 1902, G. P. Gooch, the well-knov-m historian, showed 
no antipathy to Austria's expansion into the Balkan Peninsula; 
i n fact he sanctioned it. He thought she should be persuaded 
t o assume control of Albania for such a settlement would p rove 
a boon to the distracted area. He hesitated to sponsor a 
similar arrangement for ]11acedonia principally for the ree.son 
30 -
that it couhl_ not be accomplished peacefully. Sir Thomas 
28. 11 The Austrian Paradox, 11 Spectator, 82:744, l'1ay 27, 
1899. 
29. Rowland Blennerhasset, 11 Great Britain and the Dual 
Mo narchy , 11 Nationa_l Review, 3.5:.5.56, June, 1900. 
30. G ~ P. Gooch, 11 The Problem of the Ne a r East, 11 Lectures 
On the History of the Nineteenth Century (F. A. Kirkpatrick, 
editor~ Lonclon: Cambridge at the University Press, 1902), 
PP. 293-29.5. 
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Comyn-Platt who toured Macedonia in 1904, reported that 
it was merely a ·matter of time before the map of Eastern 
Europe was "re-coloured." The situation would remain quiet 
until Ru s sia became re s tless and then Austris. would move; 
"a general advance all along the European line is inevitable 
with the result that r.faced.onia and Salonika will be the 
31 
spoil of the Dual Monarchy." Seton-Watson, known in Britain 
as a writer familiar with the Habsburg Empire, in March, 1908, 
vi~orously sponsored an expanded Austria. He believed that 
the solution for Ma.cedonia was an Austro-Hurgarisn protec-
torate, for the area could. not be divided among the Balkan 
states inasmuch as hardly a vilayet had a sufficiently 
pronounced national character; if allotted to one of the 
sta.tes probably a murderous struggle for the booty would 
result, and independence of !Jfacectonia wa.s impossible because 
t b e people of the.t region knevJ what separated but not wha.t 
uni t ed. The writer thought that a joint a.dministration of the 
Great Powers would be only a provisional s e ttlement and not 
a remedy. Aus tria-Hungary he d B. special interest in the fate 
of the area, and especia.lly in Salonika which would become 
increasingl y valufl ble to her when the railway from Sarajevo 
to UskUb was completed. 
'rhe la s t twenty-five years had proved that the 
Dual State is peculiarly fitted to rnanRge Balkan 
31. Thomas Comyn-Platt, The Turk in t h e Balkans, 
(London: Al ston Rivers, Ltd., 190~~ . 53. 
peoples; for the transformation wrought in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, though naturally distasteful to 
Belgrade and Cettinje, has no modern parallel save 
in the Egypt of Lord Cromer. 
32 
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Yet after the annexation of Bosnia in December, 1908, 
another prominent writer p resented a diametrically opposite 
picture of Austrian rule in Bosnia, from material tb,at he 
ha.d gathered in 1903. One critic concluded that the Bosnian 
trusteeship merited an enlargement while another branded it 
as a cause for Austrian retrenchment. 
I can only s ay t ha t when I was on . relief work 
in Macedonia after the revolution of 1903 I did 
not see so many half-starved wreteches as in Bosnia 
under Austrian administration ...• 
Let all who are lovers of fair play and justice 
take steps to see that she never returns, and to bar 
t h e r oad "nach Salonika" for her once an d for all 
effectively:--
33 
Geoff rey Dr age who wrote a commendable study of Austria-Hungary, 
stated that it would benefit Serbia to become a South Slav 
34 
province with in the Habsburg Empi re. 
'l'he views and sentiments set forth in the f ore going 
pages .substantia.te the fact that a considerable number of 
informed observers were favorably incl ined t o Austrian 
penet r ation .of the Balkan Peninsula. 
32. Scotus Viator (Seton-Watson), 11 Austria-Hu~ary, Italy, 
and t he Vi e s t Balkans, 11 Cont empo rary Review, 92:346, March, 1908 . 
33. Viator, "The Truth About Bosnia and Herzegovina 11 
Fo rtni,..,.h.t .J..l.. Review, 90:1014, December, 1908. ' 
' 
34 . Geoffrey Dr age, Austria-Hungary {New York: E. P . 
Dutton and Company, 1909), pp. 717-718~ 
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For fifty years prior to World War I the area had been 
a troublesome spot; turbulence and discontent seemed 
omnipresent and Britain sought a remedy for the region. 
Attachment to the Habsburg Empire wss a likely settlement. 
It was widely known, however, that certain regions of the 
Balks_ns, namely, Macedonia e_nd similar Orth odox areas would 
not welcome Austrian suzerainty. Therefore, the many ~<Triters 
who sponsored. extension of Austrian rule apparently believed 
that the establishment of a firm administration which would 
abolish brutality, murder, and massacre, was highly 
impo rtant. It was implied that democracy was feasible only 
for people at an s_dvanced cul ture.l level. Numerous Englishmen 
approached the situation very realistically inasmuch as their 
prime concern was to maintain peace, prevent Russian expansion, 
and secure their own outposts. Democratic shibboleths 
especially impressed members of the Liberl Party, f'or they 
believed democracy was the answer to Balkan troubles and 
eventually it would bring about a voluntary confederation of 
Orthodox Slavs. But sig-nificant sections of the country were 
riot affected by catch-phrases and ideal solutions; they 
placed the Balkan nationality problem in the context of over-
all European conditions and did not treat it as would strict 
democratic theorists. 
Critics of the Empire maintained that Austrian penetration 
of the Balkans would not help the small states, and in fact 
would bar development of various Slavic nationalities. The 
I 
peoples of the Peninsula, viz., Rumanians, Serbians, 
Bulgarians, Greeks and others, had a right to she.pe their 
own destinies and not be used as pawns. England would not 
have been suspicious if Vienna had treated the various 
' . 
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states as allies and not 88 dependents. But the Habsburgs 
' 
aspired for domination over ne.tiona l ietic regions which would 
be discontented within the Empire; Imperial control of Balkan 
countries would force the Slavs to appeal to Russia for 
35 
liberation, just like the Italiflns had looked to Frence. 
And. if Austria went forward to Salonika, the plight of the 
Balkans would be similar to that of Italy prior to unification. 
In order to obta.in more latitude in relations with Egypt, 
Lord Salisbury was accused of willingness "to greet with 
joy" Austrian intervention in sdutheast Europe. Gladstone 
had macle sacrifices to aid the various small countries and 
36 
therefore it was thought they should not be abandoned. 
Edward Freeman and Arthur Eve.ns felt we 11-disposed to 
the national aspirations of Balkans peoples andwere convinced 
that Austria was the great obstructionist. Free man believed 
thHt for Montenegr o , the period 1813- 1815 .had its counterpart 
in the years 1875-1878. In both epochs she had expanded her 
terri tory, reached the sea by honorable warfare and free 
commendation, and Austria then had cut her off from her 
35. "The Austrian Movement," Spectator, 551 :79, January 
21, 1882. 
36. "The Au s tro-German Alliance," Spectator, 581:1126, 
Aug:ust 29, 1885. 
-367-
acquisitions. Montenegro had been prevented from. a 
consolidation with kindred people but had been permitted 
to ·· expand by conquest into a region not inhabited by similar 
folk. She freed parts of Herzegovina, and also Spizza, 
Antivari, and Dulcigno, and then she was deprived of these 
areas not for the benefit of Albania but for the interests 
of Turkey and Austria. Dulcigno was returned to the Turks, 
Austria snatched Spizza, and Montenegro . was allowed only 
Antivari~ a ruined city. Freeman declared that Austria 
perpetrated the cheapest and most petty larceny when she 
37 
attached to herself the tiny Spizza. 
To despoil a weak neighbor without striking a 
blow was then the very height of Imperial, Royal, 
and Apostolic policy; it is so still. "Austria" 
poses- herself before the world as an · ancient, 
venerable, conservative power. In very truth no 
power has risen more steadily by setting its face 
as a flint against everything that was ancient and 
venerable, by trampling on ~very historic right 
and every national memory. · 
38 
Furthermore, Freeman believed that southeastern Europe bad to 
be liberated from both the Austrians and 'l'urks. In 1875 Austria 
might have e.risen as libera.tor of the area from oppressions of 
the Turks enc1 seized the staff of leadership from Russia. But 
Austria had become the anti-nationalist state, the disturber 
37. E. A. Freeman, "The Position of the Austrian Pov1er 
in South-Ea.stern Europe, 11 Contenmorary Review, 41:741-742, 1•1ay, 
1882. 
38. Ibid., p. 732. 
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of the peace in the Southeast; she had become the most 
dangerous enemy to freedom. The Slavonic nations hao. been 
cast do"m in favor of the most narro'lir. dynastic aspirations; 
11 it would be better for Europe and for the nations concerned, 
if 1 Austria 1 or 1 Austria-Hungary 1 were blotted from the map 
39 
of Europe." Another writer, John Mill, simileTly 
condemned Austria's Balkan policy. 
Count Andrassy :appears to have entered on the 
Eastern Question as certain gamblers known as 
bookmakers go on the turf •••• 'l'he Count is the 
political bookii18.ker who is always heo.ging. He 
holds '"i th the hare but runs with the hounds, and 
makes quite sure of being in at the death •..• Not 
oaring so much as to look over the hedge, much 
less steal a sheep from either Germany or Russia, 
she (Austria) turned her eyes on Turkey to see 
what mtght be had there. 
- 4o 
The Manchester Guardian, a strong voice of English 
Liberalism, was convinced that Austria retarded the 
development of Balkan states. As an example it was pointed 
out that jealousy caused her to deny Montenegro a second 
port on the Adria.tic; Dulcigno had to be surrendered to 
41 
Turkey. In 1882 the paper was encouraged by the belief 
that the Austro-German Alliance had become less solid, for 
39. E. A. Freeman, "The Austrian Power, 11 l''raser' s 
r·iagazine, 22:37-46~ July, 1880; also, 11 Fulfillment of the 
Berlin Treaty," Princeton Review, p. 60, January, 1879. 
40. John l-1111, The Ottomans in Europe or Turkey in the 
Present Crisis (London: Weldon & Co., 1876), p. 34. 
41. "The Occupation of Dulcigno, 11 Public Opinion, 38: 
675, November 27, 1880. 
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it wa_s thought the_t Germany hao_ provided Vienna with the 
backing necessary to extend to Salonika. 11 As the point of 
the German wedge Austria was a menace to the peace of 
Southeastern Europe. 11 Hostility was sho\-m to any future 
42 
control of the Balkan Peninsula by the Habsburgs. 
In the mid-eighties Vanity Fair repo rted that Austria, 
Germany, and Russia had piratical objectives as they 
schemed for disme mberment of Turkey. Austrian advance into 
Bosnia he_d been the initial step and Britain was criticized 
for being either an accomplice or a dupe i nl878; London was 
adviaed to draw Austria away from the . Russian and German 
conspiratorial plot in the Near East. It was predicted that 
ehoula. Austria continue her political and financial penetra-
tion ·of the Balkans she would reap the reward of her folly, 
because as the weakest of the three Empires she would fall 
victim to the stronger two in the first division of the 
43 . 
spoils. 
In 1888 voicing Liberal suspicion, William T. Stead 
declared that Austria wa.s the only Power which aimed to disturb 
the peace. He condemned the occupation of Bosnia and 
42. Article in Pall Mall Gazette, December 27, 1882. 
43. "Notes·, 11 Vanity Fair, 36:127, September 4, 1886; 
37:306, Nay 14, 1887; ano. 37:337-338, May 28, 1887; also, 
G. H. Perris, The Eastern Crisis of 1§21 and Britioh Policy 
in the Near East (London : Chapman & Hal l , Ltd., 1897), pp. 
278-279. 
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Herzegovina and declared that she had encroached upon Serbia, 
f o r King 1-Ulan t'fas merely a Habsburg satrap; likewise in 
Bul~aria she had interfered and had established her own 
ag-ent on the throne. 11 Hence the cond.i tion of pe acP i s an 
i r1peretive Halt! addressed to Austria. 11 In the opinion 
of Stead, her objective was domination of the Balkan 
Peninsula if possible through absorption otherwise by l'far. 
44 
For the mos t part, the Balkan Co mmittee, a powerful 
organization, objected to an Austrian or Russian penetration 
of the Peninsula. Th e group sponsored independent s tates or 
confederation. Its views h ad an i mpact on society as many 
of it s me mbers had attained renown in various fields, well-
known people like Professor vle stlak~, the Earl of Aberdeen, 
the Bishops of Birmingha.m, He reford, Lichf1eld, and Liverpool, 
Herbert Gladstone, Professor Jenks, G. K. Chesterton, G. M. 
'rrevelye_n, J. L. Hammond, H. N. Brailsford, and the Earl of 
4.5 
Lytton. In 1906, Bre.in sfo rd declared: 
It may be objected that the little states of 
the Balkans have given as yet few proofs of en-
lightenment or capacity. At least they have shown 
them selv es a s capable of parliamentary government 
as Austria ••• 
46 
44. Wi lliam T . Stee.d, Truth About Russia (London: 
Cassell and Company, Limited, 1888), pp. 63-74. 
45. Noel Buxton, Euron e and the Turks (London: John 
Murray, 1907). 
46. H. 1\1 . Brailsford, Hacedonia, Its Races And Their 
Future (London: Methuen & Co., 1906), p. 320. 
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Nonetheless, some writers belonged to the school which 
t hought that Eastern Europe inevitably would be divided 
between Austria and Russia., and they approached the situation 
dispassionately. In 1896, John St. Loe Strachey, the 
prominent journalist, felt that Germany could not be trusted 
but Austria wa.s .a friend of Grea.t Britain. He proposed tha t 
Russia be allowed to occupy Consta.ntinople end A us tria 
47 
gr e.nted the righ t to go to Salonika and absorb Macedonia. 
In Truth, in 1895, it ; was asserted that England had to 
accept the f act that Russia a.nd Austria would expand into 
Turkey if she became v1eak, and 11 wi th terri to rial change s on 
48 
the Continen t we should have nothing to do." 
In review, critics of Austrian expansion were in most 
c a ses politically Liberal, strongly moved by humanitarianism 
·' ·' 
and national self-determination, and imbued with a Victorian 
sense of responsibility for "benighted peoples." Many 
successful men in business and in th.e . professions se.w no 
' inconsistency in being cornpl 2..cent a bout slums in the homeland 
and. at the se.me time generous a.nd deeply concerned a bout 
foreign causes and missionary activities. 
Britain realized that only peace c ould strengthen and 
47. John St. Loe Str~chey, 11 'l'he Key Note of Our Foreign 
Policy," Na tional Review, 26:750, February, 1896. John St. · 
Loe Strachey contributed to the major periodicals and news-
papers; politically a Liberal Unionist; i n 1896 editor of the 
Cornhill; 1898-1925 editor of the Standard. 
48 . "Our Responsibilities Abroad, 11 Truth, 38:1199--1200, 
No ve mbe r 14, 1 895~ 
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bring health to Austria's strai?ed finances and troublesome 
domes tic conditions. She was not inclined to an ad.ven ture-
some foreign policy but h ad sought to increase her prestige 
in Eastern Europe so as to prevent expansionist d.esigns of 
49 
hostile competitors. 11 The hope for Austria is peace. Even 
.50 
. with peace . her difficulties are enormous." 
The new century confirmed and also changed preconceived 
notions. Dissolution was widely discussed in this period as 
internal frictions brought the subject to publ ic notice. 
Prince von Blilow, in his memoirs, claimed that Arthur Balfour 
in 1899 mentioned the possibility of Austria-Hungary 1 s 
disintegration. The gravity of the situation was recogni zed 
yet some Engl ishmen believed that c ohesive f &ctors still 
.51 
remained. It was suggested in the Q,uarterly Review that 
loya.l ty to both the Dyna s ty and Francis Joseph was a uniting 
bond. Besio.es there was reason to belive t he House of Habsburg 
ana_ Austria had H grea. t future and beneficent work to perform 
. .52 
in Albania and Jllacedonia. Two years la.ter, in 1899, the 
Qua.rterl y Review admitted that predictions of t he Empire 1 s 
49. Kurios (Sir Fitzgerald Law), 11 Current Influences On 
Foreign Policy," Blackwood 1 s Edinburgh Magazine, 146:7.51-7.52, 
Dece mber, 1 889. . 
.50. M. E . Grant Duff, "Eastern Affairs at the Close of 
the Session, 11 Contempo rary Review, 28:710, September, 1876. 
I 
51. Memoirs of Prince ~ Blilow (F. A. Voig t translator, 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1931-1932), I, p. 319. 
52. "The Eas tern Crisis," Quarterly Review, 186:28.5-
286, July, 1897. 
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dissolution at t h e demise of Francis Joseph might be 
exagg ere.ted, yet it ws.s undeniable tha.t the outlook was 
extremely a.ark; j ealousies and riva.l interests of Russia, 
.53 
Germa.ny 1 e.nd Italy could lead to a general complication. 
The aforementioned periodical voiced t h e sentiments of the 
Tory PB.rty, and so it can be deduced tha t the ardent 
Conservative desire for preservation of the Habsburg Empire 
ha d crystallized into an insecure belief that the realm 
would continue to exist in spite of all storms. 
An article in the Edinburgh Review prophetically stated, 
11 the breakup of the Au strian Empire would not only cree.te a 
general European war4 it would require a general European . .5 . 
war to produce it. 11 The Speaker wrote: 11 In spite of surface 
appearances, l'appaisement, not disruption, 1,>Ta s the goal of 
.5.5 
wa.rring !18tiona.li ties. 11 The Tablet believed that all Euro p e 
waited for the expected break-up of Austria-Hungary but 
actually it wa s not imminent; she could easily continue to 
exist for decades or longer because a certain force of inertia 
.56 
\lras present in nations. Ve.rious otl.:er commentators could 
could see no appreciable trends to su s tain the Empire. The 
53. 11 A Note On the Pee ce Conference 1 11 Quarterly Review, 190: .543-5441 Cct ob er, 1899. 
54. "Th e Int'ernal Crisis in Austrie.-Hunge.ry, 11 Edinburgh 
Review, 188:33, July, 1898. 
55. "The Austrie.n Electi6ns 1 11 Speaker, 23:395-396, Janua ry 
12' 1901. 
56. 11 Poli tice.l Prophets on the Future of Europe, 11 Tablet, 
66:521-522, October 5, 1901. 
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Saturday Review reported th8t the outlook wa s gloomy, to 
say the least. It was tru e n n revolutions had occurred 
within t he re alm durin~ the previous few decades "but it 
is well t c re~ember t~at what is aufgeschoben is not 
necessarily aufgehoben, 11 mere temporary meBsures h a d not 
brought the v exa.tious problems to a final settlement. 14any 
an Englishman failed to understand why democracy had not 
solved. AustriBn problems, e.nd one writer l<risely explained 
that f undamentPlly t h ere was no amicability among the 
ethnic g roups or e desire to vmrk together; 11 let us remind 
him of the millionaire who craved a recipe for English turf 
e.nd wa.s bid.den cut, roll and water durin12: a dozen centuries. 11 
'11h e Nationel Review brought forth the idea tta t in the 
ftrture Austria-Hungary would break up, and as she ~ould not 
dissolve peecefully the European continent faced the danger 
of vJs.r. Attention was CEtlled. to a speech by M. Deschanel, 
President of the F'rench Chamber, who revealed that the 
mem~ers of t h e Franco-Russian Alliance had discussed a fair 
cHstribution of the Austrian Empire when the inevita.ble 
58 
catastrophe carne. 'rhe Fortnightly Review listed factors 
11 hich made the state 1 s continued existence uncertain. First, 
there wes no real confid.ence in the heir who would replace 
the strong and venerable sovereign and, in addition, no 
57. 11 Austria Infelix, 11 SBtu-rday Hevievl_~ 31:653, July, 
1898. 
58. 11 Episodes of the Month 1 11 Na tiona.l Review 1 31: 65 3, 
July, 1898 . -
57 
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great etatesrnan like Metternich oo.d appeared on _the horizon, 
a minister \<.rho could provide ree.l Jee.dership. Secondly, in 
the past the Germans had teen the ascendent group in 
Cisleithania and had held the state together, but their 
59 
uosi tion haC!. crumbled. A writer for the Contemporary 
Review declared tha.t the ne.tion 't<ras an ill-assorted assemblage · 
of quarrelsome peoples who lacked a common bond of language, 
religion, na.tioneli ty, history, or policy, end. the time for 
60 
e. decisive ancl_ bold program for Austria-Hungary was past. 
In 1905, the Globe reported that her p osition we.s hopeless 
61 
and would lead to dissolution. In the closing d.e.ys of the 
same year, the London Times believed that nationa.listic 
movements in Austria-Hungary had been stirred up by the demand 
for universal suffrage and by the revolution in Russia. 
"Contemporary events in Russia have exercised their ne.tural 
influence over _this agitation, the end of which, in the 
complicated condition of the Dual Monarchy, it is difficult 
62 
to forsee • 11 · The Outlook expressed the view that Austria 1 s 
destiny would be toward F'edera.lism rather than disruption if 
59. Ve.tes, "The Policy of the German Emperor, 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 79:587, April, l90J. 
60. Quidem, "The Coming Struggle Between Slav and Teuton, 11 
Contemporary Review, 8J:66, January, l90J. 
61. 11 Public Opinion of Austria, 11 Public Opinion, 79:73, 
January 18, 1905. 
62. Ed.i to rial in Lonc_on Times, December JO, 1905. 
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63 
she 1-rere allo'lfred to work out her problems. In 1907, 
A. R. And E. Colquhoun, authors of one of the few English 
volum es. on Austria-Hunge.ry, observed that the probable d.is-
inte r-; r a tion of the Habsburg state he.d become a topic of 
~eneral interest. TwQ yeRrs later, Dr. Newton Marshall 
after a survey of pa.st and contemporary empires concluded 
thflt the Duel Monarchy would. break up and two imperialisms 
would be strengthened, the Slavic under the hegemony of 
64 
Russia e.nd the Teutonic under the control of Germany. 
All that has been so far said affirms that 
the world-process of the new era tends to the 
organization of humanity on the lines of 
imperialisms rather than of nationalities, 
while at the same time these imperialisms tend 
to be racial as against national. 
.. . 65 
British opinion of Emreror Francis Joseph (Chapter II) 
corroborates the strong belief t h at the Danubian Monarchy 
was on the verge of dissolution, which no doubt a.ffected 
. official policy. It would i ncreese fear of German expansion. 
Public opinion in Britain became rather confused. A 
strong feeling persisted. that the Habsburg realm was about 
to disintegrate. However, such a condition seemed difficult 
to comprehend, and the hopes for a continuation of the sta.te 
63. 11 The Vitality of Austria-Hungary," Outlook, 15: 
150-151, February 4, 1905. 
64. A. R. and E. Colquhoun, The vfuirlpool of Europe: 
Austria-Hungary and the Habsburgs-rNew York: Dodrl, Mead 
& Company, 1907), p. 329. 
65. ewton Marshall, "Empires and Races," Contemporary 
Review, 96:308-309, September, 1909. 
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sometimes rested on the fatuous reasoning tha.t it had become 
sempiternal because it was a European necessity, or, since 
it had flourished so many centuries an unspecified momentum 
would_ carry it along. The current and future Austrian role 
in the BAlkans we.s viewed e.s dependent upon many forces 
which coe.lesced e.nc'i mf!de the picture nrul tihued and affected 
jud.~ment. The internal organization, economic condition, 
relif,ious complexion,and netione.lity anta~onisms determined 
the particular part the nation played in the Peninsula. 
Russia 1 s contention for protectorship of the Slavs \'lfas a 
weip.:hty factor, a.s were the desires by Serbia, Montenegro 
and Greece for greater national existence. With the 
advant ages of h indsight, historians agree that a pacific 
Balkan policy we.s the course of action that might have 
p reserved t he Danubian Monarchy. The activa.tion of ambition 
and fea.r sealed the Empire 1 s doom. 11 In regard to national 
problems this meant transit ion from a. stat us of lingering 66 . 
disease to a suicidal policy. 11 No solution was found and 
the Balkan Peninsula performed the function of the Lorelei 
to the two great Eastern Houses, Romanov and Habsburg. 
66. Robert Kann, The Multinational Emoire: Na.tionalism 
and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 · 
TNew York: Columbia University Press, 1950), ~P:-235. 
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CHAPTER XIV 
Austria-Hungary and Germany 
The foreign B.ffairs of the Habsburg 1-ionarchy required 
rAe d justment as a result of military defeat in the Seven 
\'leeks 1 War. Austria-Hungary was unable to face any external 
thrA?t alone as her army was iri a disorgB.nizecl condition, 
her· financial structure weakened, and her internal reorganiza-
ti o n h amp ered by nationality conflicts. On one border 
victorious Prussia was in the process of consolidating Germany, 
and on the other Russia strained for a. p e rt of the Turkish 
Empire. In order to maintain its elf the Dual Monarchy h ad to 
reach a mod us vivendi with either Power, or both . Decisions 
in the Ba lkans had b een postponed but might demand attention 
at any moment. In such a conting ency Austria almost hy 
necessity ha0 to mend her fences, i.e., arrang e with Russia 
for a.n equitable division of Balkan land, sponsor independence 
for the Balkan nationalities, o r prolong existent condition s . 
In the sixties and seventies as Britain surveyed Europe 
her only t h r ea t carr!e from Russia. TherA fore, definite support 
arose for an Austro-German rapprochement which would be a 
central EuropeB.n bprrier to Russian desi{2;ns and a co unter-
poise to any future arrangements between Russie. and Fre.nce. 
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Esp ecia.lly did the Conse rva.ti ve Party welcome the cooperation 
of Ge r many and Austria. 
Ina smuch as Aus tria and Germany ad joined Russia it wa s 
thought they should deal with Russie_n ctesigns before all 
o ther state s . 
At any r a te, of this I f eel pretty sure that 
the r oute by the Suez Canal is not so near to us 
as, and no t dearer to us than, the Danube route 
to t he Ge r man s ; ••• I t hink, then, we migh t let the 
Germa n s settle the Danube question before we trouble 
ourselves very seriously about the canal. 
1 
Con s e quently in the decade after the Austro-Prussian v/ar, 
Austro-Ge r man frien dship was p roposed by responsible p eop le. 
He. r d ly had the guns of the Austrian and Prussian armies been 
s ilen ced. t han the London Ti me s in an editorial definitely 
s ta t eo_ tha t t he Ans tria.n-Germans, the natura.l ru l ers of the 
Hab sburg state, should become allied with Prussia wh o with the 
re s t of Ger many sho.uld protect Austria fro m Ru s sian desi gns. 
The writer be lieved Austria's duty was to interest Prussia 
in such a cours e, as well as develop h er own Teutonic stock , 
and -o reven t any further retraction of German influence along 
the bank s of the Danube. "Increase, invasion, colonization, 
2 
has be en the de s tiny of the Teuton from time i mmemoria l." 
1. George Campbell, A Handbook on the Eastern Q,ueetion: 
Be ing A Recent View of Turkey (Lo ndon : John Murray, 1876), 
p . 170. 
2. Editorial s in London Ti me s , August 4, 1866, a nd 
August 8 , 1866. 
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In 1869, the British Consul at Trieste wrote to the 
publieher of Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine: "Our policy 
now ought to be to reconcile Austria and Prussia at once, 
and prepare for the big struggle tha t is coming to undo 
3 
the result s of the Cri~ean War." In 1871, it was stated 
in Colburn 1 s United Service 1v1agazine that the new German 
Empire ancl Austria were natural allies, able to counteract 
the Pan-Slavic flood from Russia and enter into competition 
with her on a mission of civilization in the East. It was 
their de s tiny to penetrate the Balkans and Turkey, 
reinvi~orete , and form a new civilization. The Slav and Turk 
could not withstand the civilized pressure of an energetic 
4 
Tuetonic based alliance. It was stated in Fraser's Magazine 
that 11 after all, Emneror of Austria is a ••• position of great 
present and a l most incalculable future import ance; allied to 
5 
Prussia and Italy, he would be invincible.~.~~ The Saturday 
Review mainta ined it wps perfectly clear to farsi ghted 
statesmen tha.t the safety and nni ty of Austria required an 
nnderstanding with Germany. Alliance of the two would not 
3. Edmund Downey, Charles Lever: His Life in his Letters 
(London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1906)~,-p-~6. 
4. An ex-diplomatist, 11 A Few Word.s on France and Germany 
Relative to the Eastern Question," Colburn's United Service 
Magazine, pp. 373-374, lv~rch, 1871. 
5. "The War ano_ Its Poli ticBl e.nd 1-1ili tary Bee.rings," 
Fraser's Magazine, 74:276, Augu s t, 1866. 
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only deter aggre s sion a v,ainst the Habsburg realm but would 
6 
prevent a bree.k..;;up of the Empire. The Edinbu'rgh Review 
sta ted that it was the duty of Germany to ba.r a Russian 
advance and stand as defender of the German peoples within 
her own bord.ers and in the Austrian Empire; such a policy 
7 
't'rould give her a moral influence "'hich she lacked. The 
ioea we.s suggested that Austria could not participate in a 
division of the spoils in the rlalkans unless she acted as 
executionery of German desires. If actually or by 
implication she beca.me a ps.rt of Germany, then she would have 
a strong and energetic government which could gua.rantee her 
continuance and eliminate the separatist tendencies of various 
racial group s. An empire that reached from the North Sea to 
'l'rie ste "'ould th1•!art any movement of blavs toward Russ is, 
8 
in other words, Slavs governed from Vienna. 
Britain 1 s desire for an Austro-German allianc e was caused 
by her fear of Russia and the necessity for revitalization of 
Austria-Hungary. The Habsburg Monarchy needed a buttress and 
many Englis_hmen thought it should be Prussia; an Austro-
Prussian alliance would reestPblish the balance of power in 
Europe. 
6. 11 The Crisis in Austria, 11 Saturday Review, 32:669, 
November 25, 1871. 
7. 11 Article I, 11 Edinburgh Review, 134:42, July, 1871. 
8. Ralph Earle, 11 The Eastern Situation, 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 26:665-666, November, 1876. 
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In 1876, the Economist stated that Germany alrea_dy 
cotmted the Austrian-German provinces as her own, 11 eno_ no 
9 
doubt somehow or other they will be hers ere long." 
The Austro-German Alliance was concluded in 1879 
and Lord Salisbury, the Conservatiye Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, rejoiced at the news as 11 good tidings of great 
joy," and Queen Victoria gave her approval-- 11 I am naturally 
pleased at the prospect which a cordial defensive alliance 
between Germany and Austria offers in the interests of 
10 
peace ••.• 11 
In 1880, after the Congress of Berlin and format ion of 
the Austro-G·erman Alliance, a shift in British political 
powe r occurred; the Liberals t oppled the Conservatives from 
power. An oninion of a typical Conservative was that 11 the 
peace of Europe he.d been secured mainly by the energetic 
~ction of England a t the Congres s of Berlin; it had been 
ce mented by the Austro-German Alliance. 11 The combination of 
the t"t>lo Greet Powers of Central Europe hao. provided the 
continent with a new balance of power, for they were strong 
enough to withstand any attack from Fran~e, Russia, or I t aly, 
but this held. true because Britain maintained the balance in 
9. 11 Lord Derby on the Eastern Question, 11 Economist, 34: 
1081-1082, September 16, 1876. 
10. The Letters of Queen Victoria: _ A Selection from Her 
Ma~esty 1 s Correspondence and Journals B~tween the Years 
18 6-1885 (George Earle Buckle, editor, London: John Murray, 
1928), III, p . 53. 
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the West. Austria could keep order in the Balkans, and with 
her ebility to ~overn diverse peoples possible she could take 
the pl t? ce of the declining oo"1er of Turkey; but Britain had 
to adhere to a pro gram of vigilance in order that the tide 
would no t swing agBinst the GermB_n states. 11 l-1r. Gladstone 
is the mas ter mind of the new situation .•• his first thought 
is rot t h e p e ace of Europe, but the freedom of small 
11 
nationalitie s ." The Tablet gave full endorse ment to the 
preceding Tory views. British Liberals were severely 
criticized for hostility towe.rd Austria-Hungary and approval 
of Balkan nationalis~ because such sentiments encouraged Pan-
12 
Slavism and Russian ambitions. The Times reported thEt the 
defensive alliance between Germany and Austria caused no 
al arm among the peacefully disposed powers and even the most 
13 
timorous politicians could detect no reason for panic. 
The Daily Telegraph in August, 1879, maintained that the 
Alliance of Austria-Hungery and Germany aroused no real 
apprehension or dissatisf&ction in Europe, instead it was a 
11. 11 Article IX, The Conservative Defe 2.t, 11 Quarterly 
Review, 149:553, January-April, 1880. 
12. 11 The Meeting of Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy: 
The Count's Successor, 11 Public Opinion, 36:285, September 6, 
1879; also, "The Foreign Policy of the Liberals, 11 'I'ablet, 
55:581-582, May 8 , 1880. 
13. Ed.itorial in London Times, October 28, 1879. 
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14 
guarantee of harmony, order and progress. The Pall Mall 
Gazette was concerned about the Austro-German Alliance lest 
Russia would discover that she had been excluded from Europe 
and would expand into Asia and thereby encroach upon the vital 
15 
interests of the British Empire. The Spectator also was 
a.pprehensi ve because the ne't·l e.rrangement of power would 
isolate Russia and she rni@',ht turn to Asia for expansion. 11 An 
16 
isolated man in a community is often a very formidable man." 
The Standard countered this idea with the allegation that a 
halt in Russia. 1 s European expansion was beneficial as England 
could deal more effectively with a Russian thre a t in Asia. 
Mos cow could pour large masses of troops into Europe while 
Britain would have greett transportation difficulties. 0 n the 
other ha.nd, in Asia, Russia's transportation system wa.s 
17 
extremely poor and England probably would have the advantage. 
In 1880 the Examiner s tated~, "we belie ve that alliance (Austro-
German) whatever its immediate objects, to be a. guarantee for 
18 
the peace of Europe." 
14. Editorials in Daily Telegraph, August, 1879; also, 
Pall 11all Gazette, September 20, 1879. 
15. "Enough, -.t\nd. Too Little, 11 Pal l Mall Gazette, October 
31, 1879; a;Lso, 11 The l-1ean ing of the A us tro-German Alliance, 11 
Pall Mall Gazette, October 23, l879. 
16. "Prince Bismarck's Visit to Vienna," Spectator, 
52:1209-1210,September 27, 1879. 
17. Articles in Pall ~Iall Ge.zette, September 26, 1879, 
September 29, 1879, October 21, 1879, and October 23, 1879. 
18. 11 Tbe Mahdate of the Country," Examiner, pp. 455-456, 
April 10, 1880. 
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The Saturday Review was confident that the equilibrium 
in Central Europe 1>Jas mainta.ined by the Austro-German 
Alliance as it checked the ambitions of Russia and the dis-
rup tive tendenci es of the small Balkan states. "We can only 
wish for the sake of the peace and civilization of Europe, 
19 
that this alliance may prove dura.ble. 11 In 1879, the 
Morning Post declared that any understanding between Austria 
20 
and Germany would be a guarantee of stability in the East. 
And eight years later the paper noted that the Triple 
Alliance aimed at preservation of the status guo in Europe 
and Dreven ted any one or more Powers .from creating a European 
conflict. "This pea.ceful league has been rendered as powerful 
as possible to impress upon the war p3.rties of' bellicose 
countrie s the folly of attempting to carry out their foolish 
21 
aims." 
In 1882, the Standard again insisted that the Austro-
German Alliance was most valua.ble in eliminating threats 
of war on the continent; both French and Russian designs had 
22 
· b een thwa rted. . A short time later the London Times 
expres s ed perfect security in the peaceful intent of the 
Austro-German Alliance: 
July 
The tone of the public mind in this country 
is confident ••• people have come to feel a perfect 
19. 
28, 
20. 
21. 
22. 
11 Austria and Germany," Saturday Review, 56:100-101, 
1883. 
Article in Pall Mall Gazette, August 18, 1879. 
Public Opinion, 52:788, December 16, 1887. 
Article in Saint James's Gazette, December 19, 1882. 
trust that the two Minieters do not meet to plan 
any policy of surprise, but honestly to insure 
p eace by increasing the guaranties for its main-
tenance. 
23 
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On the visit of the German Emperor to Vienna in 1888, the 
Times correspondent stated that the Alliance of Germany and 
Austria aimed to prevent the outbreak of strife in Europe, 
and apparently he made the following ste_tement without any 
misgiving s : 11 Tonight the German and Austro-Hungarian 
24 
armies were melted into one." Or, as the European Mail 
remarked i n 1887, 11 the preservation of European peace is 
gen erall y admitted to be dependent on the predominance of 
25 
Germany , as a military Power upon the continent ••• "; this 
observation was a repetition of its view in 1879. 11 A cordial 
understanding between Germany and Austria is the best 
26 
security Europ e could have for the maintenance of peace. 11 
Sir Charles Dilke clearly analyzed the Austro-German Alliance--
it was not a matter of choice for Austria but of absolute 
nec e ssity; even though she might app ear tQ gain little direct 
27 
advantage, the association would continue. 
23. Article in London Times, Sep tembe r 17, 1888. 
24. News di spatch in London Time s , October 5, 1888. 
25. Article in European Mail, Vol. 70, February 4, 1887. 
26. "The Situation in Europe," European Mail, Vol. 62, 
October 1 , 1879. -
27. 11 Sir Charles Dilke, The Present Position of European 
Politics or Euro pe in 1887 (London: Chapman ana_ Hall, Ltd., 
1887) , p . 184. 
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The Economist, in 1887, concluded that the Austro-German 
Alliance would continue for ctecades, perhaps endure as long 
as the Family Pact among the branches of the House of Bourbon, 
beca.use it was of mutual benefit to both Empires. It was the 
28 
sheet anchor of Austrian safety. 
Some quarters regarded the Austro-German Alliance even 
in its inception es a danger, for Bismarck was characterized 
as a leader who would not maintain peace at all costs. 
Disraeli hed been suspicious of Bismarck's dominance over 
Austria in 1877. "You know what a state we · find ourselves 
(in) Austria is dying for peace but Bisma.rck who does nothing, 
and suffers nothing, is complete master, Andrassy only his 
29 
Viceroy ••• 11 The Statist saw that union of the Empires 
(Hohe nzollern a.nd Habsburg) was beneficial to them, but might 
30 
be d.B.ngerous to Europe. 
Germany became suspect chiefly to the LiberB.ls. The 
~J!anche ster Guardian, a Li berB.l organ, reported that \<'lar was 
imminent if Austria, rrith the connivance of Bismarck, had 
decided to play a grand ge_me in the East. 11 If Austria had 
resolved upon a great extension of the f <V rward policy there 
28. "The Permanent Position of Austria," Economist, 
45:1526-1527, December 3, 1887. 
29. Monypenny and Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 
Earl of Beaconsfield (New and Revised edition, New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1929), II. 
30. "Prince Bisma.rck 1 s Visit to Vienna," Public Opinion, 
36:409-410, October 4, 1879. 
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31 
is, of c ourse, no houe for pea ce." The Fortnightly Review, 
·unc1er t he edi t ori shi p of the Liberal John }<farl ey, decla.red 
thet war between Austria and Russia was just a matter of time 
bu t it vJ' B.S admitted that the Alliance '"as inevitable as . Germany 
and Aus tria were the natural enemies of Russia. Criticism was 
leveled aga inst the British policy of 11 pulling the chestnuts 
out of the Russian fire for the benefit of Austria immediately, 
and indirectly of Germany." And it was suggested that when 
Bismarck had drawn ·Austria into his protective policy against 
English good s, "people at Manchester will be less re ady to 
32, 
cheer panegyrics on Au stria." Reference to a German economic 
threat to Britain tended to have special significance during 
the mid-seventies, for Britain had uno.ergone a trade d.epression 
1874-1879 and despere.te and unsuccesf?ful strikes directed publi c 
attention to the situation. Seemingly, the sta tement by the 
Fortnightly Review foreshadowed fear of Germanic economic 
competition that beca.me so preva.lent in the decad.e prior to 
1914. William L. Courtney showed a marked dislike of the Aus tro-
German Alliance and ste.ted that it wa s a blow to the democratic 
i d ea of commerce and amity, and Austria. 11 may possibly find 
the fate of the earthenware pot floating with the vessel of 
31. "Disunion Amongst the Powers," Public Ooinion, 38: 
411, October 2, 1880. -
32. 11 Home and Foreign Affairs, 11 Fortnightly Review, 32: 
758, No vember, 1879. 
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33 
brass." The editor of a Liberal news orge.n stated that 
Bismarck he.d thrust Austria southv1ard "hanging around her 
neck the mill-stone of the Bosnia Provinces." The German 
lea.der held out to Austria the dream of an Ea s tern Empire 
and. deceived the Magyars with thoughts of vengeance. Viennese 
34 
foreign policy had been directed from Berlin. In 1879, 
Punch with biting wit spoke out concerning Germany 1 s leader 
and his future plans, and the view seemed to complement 
Liberal ideas. 
German Grab-Verein (Unlimited) 
'rhis Association ha.s been formed for the purpose 
of affording its Sha.reholders the maximum of profit 
with the minimum of payment •••• r4oney obteinable on 
false pre tences e.t all hours of the d a y and night. 
Bargains ma.cle and repudiated with punctuality and 
dispatch. Sovereigns deposed a.nd robbed of their 
private property neatly and expeditiously. Treaties, 
whether of old or recent date, effectually broken 
at a few hours• notice. Newspapers bribed and 
gagged in the most effectual style. Conveyancey 
executed on the largest scale, and in all its branches, 
Political and Diploma. tic. · 
Sole Acting Manager Prince von Bisma.rck, 
Heed . Office, Berlin, 
35 
33. William L. Courtney, "Carlyle's Political Doctrines," 
Fortnightly Review, 32:823, December, 1879. William L. 
Courtney, a foremost British journalist, in the nineties · 
Literary Editor of the Daily Telegraph, in 189L!· editor of 
Fortnightly Review, and. Chairmen of the Publishing Ftrm of 
Chapman and Hall. 
34. William T. Stead, 'l'ruth About Russia (London: 
Cassell and Company, Limited, 1888), p. 88. 
35. 11 German Grab-Verein," Punch, 76:76, Februsry 22, 
1879. 
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Gladstone, the leeder of the Liberal Party, voiced 
distrust of the Alliance because it had expansionist designs 
anct 'l(l R.s n o t dedicated. to the maintenance of pee.ce. In 1880 
he st;:~ted that the En~lish nation had been invited to accept 
the Austro-German Alliance, but before approv~l a s given 
, 36 
it would be well to know more of its purposes. In 1883, 
l;-J l1en he ha.d been in control of the Government for three 
years he traced out this ideB in definite terms, that is, 
Austria ha d been taught to turn her eyes eastward and 
Bisme.rck "t<Tai teo_ only to urge her onwa.rd in that direction. 
11 0n the vJhole, any fear 'I have of Austria is in the main 
37 
fe a r tha t Bismarck may think fit to propel her. 11 Gladstone 
apparently felt tha.t any extension of Austria-Hungary could 
be accomplished only through German support. It wa.s implied 
that Germany was the dominant partner. 
In 1885, it was recor-ded in Ma.cmillan's £..1a.gazine, (John 
1-forley editor 1883-1885) that the union of interests loudly 
proclaimed between Germany and Austria in 1879 was the first 
ex-ore ssion of the Drang nach Osten. Bismarck had. tried to 
hicl. e his pretensions behind the Pomera.nian grenadier, and. 
Britain's feEJ.r of Russia had beenplayed upon with the result 
that a Russia.n Constantinople had become a. nightmare. 11 It 
36. W. E. Gladstone, "Russia and England, 11 Nineteenth 
Century, 7:550, Harch, 1880. 
37. Paul Knaplund, Gladstone's Foreign Policy (New York: 
Harper ano_ Brothers, publishers, 1935), p. 157. 
PUNCH, OR THE LONDON CHARIV ARI.- SEPTE)tuER 6, 1890. 
ANOTHER · VICTiiVI. 
WrLLU.ll THE IRREPRESSIBLE. " NOW THEN, COUSIN AUBTR.U., PUT ON A UNIFORM, AND COME AND 
PLA.Y AT SOLDIERS I " 
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has been ueed to pervert · the moral sense of her people and 
her rulers till she has come now to be almost invariably 
found on the side of the oppressor a.gainst the oppressed. 11 
The article added that the sa_me forces were at work grinding 
out the opinion that the only alternative to Russian 
despotism W&s tne blessing of an Autre-German rule for the 
nationalities of the East. Events of the previous six 
years showed how things had progressed, such as establishment 
of Austro-German predominance over southeast Europe end. a 
penetrfltion to the Bosphorus and Aegean See_s. Austria on 
the Aegean Sea, with Germany as her ally, would signify the 
creation of a new naval power. These Powers had for their 
objective t h e subjection of Turkey, and they would not be 
satisfied until t hey had Greece under their influence. 
With control of the countless islands of the Aegean Sea they 
could descend on Britain's flank, on her path to India, and 
38 
deny her the use of the Suez Ca_nal. 
Rising hostility, however, between Great Britain and 
Germany at the end of the nineteenth century emphasized the 
portentous me~ning of the Austro-German Alliance. In the 
early years of the next century, the Habsburg Empire W8.s torn 
by internal strife and presented a scene of parliamentary 
turmoil tbat affected its Great Power standing. This situation 
increased the Empire's reliance on Germany. To the British 
38. "Austria's Policy in the Eest, 11 :r.-1e.cmillan 1 s Magazine, 
53:25-27, November, 1885. 
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public Austrian depend.ence· on Germany \va s not e. mere phantom; 
it was often suggested that Austria-Hungary could become a 
satellite and not an equal partner. Lively fears arose at the 
thought of a et~erstate directed from Berlin that would 
stretch from the Baltic to the Adri a tic Sea, penetrate commer-
cially and meke economic dependencies of the Balkan princi-
palities, Turkey, anq the land that extended to the Per~ien 
Gulf. In the East e.nd. in the Mediterranean area German 
commerce obvious ly had ma de gain!!, end e.t lea.st one period.ice.l 
writer thought it improbable that the Germans would. be satisfied 
'"'i th the extremely cumbersome waterway of the North and Baltic 
Seas. Constriction of twelve million Austro-Germans to 
39 
Germany would necessitate an outlet on the Ad.ria tic Sea. 
In the National Review, . it was suggested that Archduke 
F're.ncis Ferdinand championed the Catholic School movement 
becau s e he realized that Pan-Germanism had become a great 
thre2 t to the Emp ire. Ae a loyal Austrian, he did not want 
the government transferred - from Vienna to Berl in; although 
11 some of our lee.ding statesmen ha ve been hypnotized by the 
German Emperor, it is inconceivable to us that t h is country 
40 
ehould support Germany in her ultimate designs on Austria." 
, 39. "The Trad1t1onBl Policy of Germany In Re spect to 
Austria and Turkey,'' Harper's Nel<J Monthly Magazine, 96: 
578, March, 1898; also, Malcolm MacColl, The Sultan and the 
Powers (London: Longmens, Green & Co., 1896), p. 20-.-----
40. "Episodes of the Month, 11 Na tional Review, 37:326 
:t-.1ay , 1901. 
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Sir Horace' Rumbold, a former British AmbB esador to Vienna 
and a devoted friend of the Habsburg state, feared that 
Pan-Gerrne.niam was a great danger for it me ant either outright 
disme mberment of the Empire or economic and political 
41 I 
subjugB tion . 
Ho'\'J fe.r Pruseie.n Prepotenz can go was exempli-
fied a few months back on the occasion of the return 
of one of the German battalione from China •••. the 
battalion was marched from the terminus, headed by 
its band, through the streets of the Austrian 
capital to the venera ble Fofburg •••• An old retired 
genere.l stood outside the Imperial Palace. 11 Ach! 11 
he said to a friend, 11 das ist ·!U::!r. die Generalprobe. 11 
--It is only the- dress rehearsal! 
42 
A British journe.list explained that AustriB.-Hungary was in 
a helpless and precBrious position and therefore had become 
a truRt\-Jorthy ally o.f Germany ·and her ever-obedient 
43 
sa.telli te. The same idea wa s expressed by another writer 
'\vho added tha. t aa long es the Habsburg state experienced 
domestic conflict German influence could not be shaken off, 
and the time ha.d come when Austrian wishes were not considered 
in in te rnational affairs once those of Berlin were stated. 
A Consti tutiona.l Alliance and Customs Union between Austria-
Hungary ana. Germany were prime three te to Europe; German 
41. Horace Rumbold, 11 An English Tribute to the Emperor 
Frsncis Joseph, 11 National Review, 40:371, November, 1902. 
42. A Free Lance, 11 The Problems of Vienna, 11 National 
Review, 38:870, February, 1902. 
43. Quidam, 11 The Coming Struggle Between Slav and 
Te uton, 11 Contemporary Review, 83:67, January, 1903. 
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influence would Axtend from the North Sea to Trieste and 
would be able to penetrate into Asia Minor and reach the 
Persian Gulf. The writer contended that the Slavs, by 
resisting the Greater Germa.n idea, helped the cause of 
44 
liberty and the struggle aga inst materialism. Germany 1 s 
strength and her energetic policy increased speculation 
that she might absorb Austria-Hungary and it was freely 
suggested. tha t the Austro-Germen areas would welcome the 
move. Moreover, a military thruet into the Habsburg state 
was regarded a s a very feasible maneuver for the German 
4.5 
a.rmy. In 190.5, 'w-ill ia.m L. Courtney, the. editor of the 
Fortnightly Review, suggested that Germa.ny was ready to 
expand a.nd incorporate the western half of Austria-Hungary 
46 
into her Empire. 
1-1any British writers insisted that A us tria was just a 
catl!lpaw in the hands of the Germans. In the Balkans she 
wa.s seen as the a dvance guard of a German penetration and 
dynasty, tradition, and alliance had fitted her for the task. 
Many believed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
1878 had made A us tria into a Balkan po"tr.rer, and she was ready 
44. Rowland Blennerhasset, "The · Austrian Problem," 
Fortnightly Review, 77:606 , April, 1905. 
45. 11 The Continental Ga.1ms ana_ the British Fleet, 11 
Fortnigntly. .H.Avlew, 85:679, April, 1906. 
46. William L. Courtney, 11 The Foreign Policy of 
Germany, 11 Fortnightly Review, 84:1021, Dece mber, 1905. 
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to go for¥Jaro_ to Ss.lonika and thus establish herself in · 
complete control of the Peninsula. In addition, she wae 
a.ccused of expanding her economic and political ties with 
Serbia. and Albania by German methods. 
The Economist asserted that the Pan-German League 
promoted German control of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
and it \vas dangerous because 11 just now the Gerrr.a.n Government 
is aggressively self-assertive. and that nationalism ••• is 
- , 47 
likely to be actively manifested and \o!elcomed. 11 In 1905, 
Valentine Chirol maintained tha.t Germany wished to drive 
Austria to the East eo as to compensate the Habsburgs for 
a probable loee of their German 4aovinces and prepare the 
way for future German expansion. Any intimation that the 
Germane planned to use both the Turks and Austria.ns for 
creation of a Fatherland, with boraers on the Baltic Sea and 
49 
Indian Ocean, caused real apprehension. John Foster 
Fraser, a writer on the BalkRne who later became special 
ParliR.mentary Correspondent for the Standard, mainta.ined 
that Germany approved Austrian a.cquisition of Salonika in 
the expectation that she would inherit the port when the 
47. "German and Pan-German," Economist, 6):1026-1027, 
June 24, 1905. 
48. Valentine Chirol, "The Attitude of the Powers," 
The Balkan Question (Luigi Villari, editor, Ne\'l York: 
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1905), p. 258. 
49. Anonymous, An Observer in the Near East (London: 
Ev~leigh Nash, 1907), p. JOB. 
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50 
Habsburg Empire broke up. The Tablet asserted that the 
'rriple Alliance dragged Austria--Hungary into quarrels and 
problems which were not her concern. She faced dangers 
51 
because European politics had become world politics. 
Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 increased 
British suspicions. Austria displayed a new aggressiveness 
which could have easily upset the delicate balance in the 
Be,lkans, and Germany had stood firmly behind her ally. 
Furthermore, it was felt that unless German sanction had. been 
given, Austria mi~ht have hesitated and abandoned the project. 
German approVB.l confirmed the suspicion that Austria had been 
urged onward to prepare the way for her stronger ally. Roy 
Trevor, an Englishman who toured the Balkans, wrote . that few 
realized the significance and future consequences of German 
support for annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria 
had five seaports. a. coa.st line on the Adriatic and new naval 
forces, and Trevor thought German aid could result in her 
mastery of the :t-fediterra.nean, the Italian coast, and the Suez 
Canal. He believed a journey through Austria 1 s new 
clependencies by English diplomats would be beneficia.l if they 
learned tha t A,~ tria "ras ready to burst the heavy cloua. that 
hung over Europe. The promise to the area was t he p romise of 
52 
wa.r. H. Charles vloods, a British officer familiar with the 
50. John Foster Fraser, Pictures From the Balkans 
(London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 19~ p:-4. 
51. 11 The Nemesis of the Triple Alliance, 11 Tablet, 
107:285, February 24, 1906. 
52. Roy Trevor, ~ Balkan Tour (London: John Lane, 
1911), p. 22. 
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Balkans, asserted that the Dual Monarchy had been completely 
53 
brought into the Germa.n fold. Also, after the Austrian 
coup, a writer on Forei@:n Affairs for the Conterrn:>orary 
Review wrote: 
Henceforward the Hohenzollerns and the Haps-
burgs row in the same boat. In fact, it was the 
reliance which he knew he could place in Germany's 
support that inspired Baron Aehrenthal to move 
with so sure e. step. Their co-partnership is self-
evident... · 
54 
It was reported in the National Review that Austria had 
become a satellite and thereafter would have to play the 
part. She wa.s used by Germany to pull the chestnuts from 
the fire and then hand them to her, that is,--Austria as . 
a Slav power was used by Berlin to lead the southern Slavs 
in Germany 1 s d.irection. The Empire obtained economic 
control of the South Slav states, and economic possession 
55 
was nine-tenths of political control. The Morning Post 
in 1907 reported that Germany intended to follow an 
expansionist program, like Spain in the sixteenth century 
56 
and France in the two following centuries. The Nation 
53. H. Charles Woods, The Danger Zone of Europe: 
Changes and Problems in the~ar East (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Company, 19llT; p:-320. ----
54. E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs, 11 Contemporary 
Review, 94 : 758, December, 1908. 
55. Enquirer, 11 Austria 1 s Next Move in the Balke.ns, 11 
National Review, 512 :893, August, 1908. 
56. Editorial in Morning Post, September 2, 1907. 
remarked that England considered Asia Minor an area where 
races were slaughtered and Macedonia a province which 
seethed with human misery, but to the Bulows and the 
Aehrenthels they were simply roads tha t led to Salonika 
57 
a.nd Bagdad. In 1909 the insepara.bili ty of Germany and 
Austria l'lae declared a prime threat to Europe. 
The Habsburgs are irretrievably oledged to 
the Hohenzolle rn hegemony; Slavs, throughout 
Europe, are being goaded afresh into national 
consc lou snese ~ 
58 
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However, a current historian· asserts tha.t Berlin and Vienna 
h2.d no definite policy to cooperate closely in all inter-
national disputes, and he uses as substantiation Au s tria's 
59 
failure to fully support Germany in the Moroccan crisis. 
After the Bosnian annexation the spirit of England was 
voiced by Sir Cecil Spring Rice, a diplomat stationed at 
Stockholm. He was alarmed by the fact that Austria had 
become a bitter enemy for earlier her friendship had been a 
guarantee of peace; she had been relied upon to offset German 
rashness: 
Our turn will come. Another moral is that 
Germany went far beyond the J.e tter of the treB.ty 
57. 11 The Austrian LeB.d in the Ba.lkans," Nation, 2:697, 
Februa.ry 15, 1908. 
58. Archibald Colquhoun, "T!E Near EB.stern Question, 
Au s triR-Hungary, 11 Quarterly_ Review, 210:673, April, 1909. 
59. A. J. Hay, The Ha psburg Mona.rchy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951), p. 455. 
in order to help Austria in the South. It is 
clearly to be expected that Austria will go 
far beyond the letter of the treaty in order to 
help Germany in the North, and. Austria is ship-
build.ing ha.rd. 
60 
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Sir Horace Rumbold felt that . the hue and cry raised by 
Loncton at the annexa.tion had driven Austria into complete 
dependence on Germany and hastened a new Central European 
union under the hegemony of Berlin. "Austria, it is to be 
feared, has now been driven for good into the a.rms of that 
61 
Power. 11 In 1910, Robert Crozier Long, an Englishman 
familiar with German affairs, commented upon the possibility 
of a.n orga.nic union of Aus tria and Germany so as to create 
a United States of Central Europe to counterbalance the 
British Empire. He realized, however, that the Austro-Slavs 
were an inevitable obstacle and the achievement of a union 
i'rould require the services of an astute statesman~ The 
more obvious remedy was a destruction of any anti-German 
62 
combination by force of arms. In 1913, H. W. Steed 
declared thet Germany had used Austria-Hungary to economically 
and politically penetrate the Near East. 11 A main object of 
60. The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring 
Rice: A Record (Stephen Gwynn, editor, London: Constable 
and Company, Ltd., 1929), II, p. 135. 
61. Sir Horace Rumbold, Francis Joseph and His Times 
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1909), p. 391.------
62. Robert Crozier Long, 11 Germany and the New Reign: 
A Letter from Berlin," Fortnightly Review, 94:183-184, 
July, 1910. 
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this penetre.tion is to give Germany comme.nd. of the route 
63 
to Trieste and, through the Adriatic to the Mediterranean." 
The British representative at Constantinople, Edwin 
Pe a rs, maintained that Germa.ny contemplated a very wide 
scheme, a grandiose project by which sh e and Austria would 
assume control · of Serbia, extend to Salonika, and use the 
latter city as a basis of operations a.gainst •rurkey, a 
6!-} 
proposed tributa.ry state. 
Many in Bri ta.in therefore looked upon Germe.ny e s e 
sini s ter pBrtner who urged Austria fonrard, took adve.ntage 
of her dependence, and prepared for a vast continental 
empire. Th is was a. fe.r different interpretation of Gerrna.ny 1 e 
role in the Balkans than that envisioned a few years earlier 
by responsible people of Britain and that foreseen by 
Richa.rd Cobd.en in the rnid_-years of the century. "Now here 
' 
are grounds for believing that for the future, Germany may 
be reckoned upon by Western Europe, as a. bulwark Hgainst 
65 
Russian aggression. 11 But the Russi8.n Empire had receded 
from a menacing position, and Germany had become the 
63. H. W. Steed, The Habsburg Monarchl (London: 
Constable and Company, Ltd., 1913), p. 294: 
64. Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople: The 
Recollections of Sir Edwin Pea.rs 1873-1915 (New York: 
D. Appleton and Company, 1915), p. 375. 
65. 11 \<ihat Next-And Next? 11 The Political i'lri tings of 
Richard Cobd.en (London: William Ridgway, 1878), p. 298:-
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prospective threat to Britsin. Austria-Hungary appeared as 
a key factor in the intensification of Anglo-German 
hostility; she wee often chare_cterized as the first victim 
of Hohenzollern expans ion. 
Thie stuoy clearly shows that English rren very seldom 
tre ated Austria-Hungary as a separ&te and distinct unit. 
She was constantly being associated with either the Russian 
or German threat. In one respect her position was comparable 
to that of Italy prior to unification, i.e., she was almost 
unconsciously thought of as an adjunct to larger European 
relationships and problems. 
CHAPTER X:V 
The Liberal And Conservative Parties' 
Attitude Toward The Empire 
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British Liberals lacked confidence in the Habsburg 
Empire and Austro-Liberal relationship was marked by polite 
aloofness tinged with unfriendliness. As domestic trends 
and humanitarianism to a large degree shaped Liberal 
attitudes toward the Habsburg state, the background of 
persons '\'lho formed policy and were vleighty members in Party 
Councils assumes significance. Of co urse, this poll tica.l 
organ ization represented the newly enfranchised lower classes 
and many a r i s tocrats, but the essential part wa s prosperous 
middle class folk, successful entrepreneurs, and the s table 
elements of society so powerful in Victorian England. 
Public life wa.s based upon a strict code of conduct and the 
correlation of political action and foreign policy with the 
mores of the age. Current vogues were not separated from 
governmental policies; all merged into a system of behavior. 
In the sixties English enthusiasm for reform was 
rekindled and middle class Liberalism provided much of the 
impetus. Since Waterloo, reforms althoy.gh few in inception, 
inc r e a sed in number and importance until they seemed to come 
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forth in a flood. A humanitarian spirit had been clearly in 
evi<'tence. Slavery had been a.bolished, the labor of females 
and children had become regulated, capital punishment had 
been limited, and penal reform undertaken. Imprisonment for 
debt wa s abolished, and dueling and impressment were for-
bidden. Besides, the prohibition of cruel sports, the 
regulation of flogging, punishment for cruelty to animals, 
and a sensible treatment of the insane were manifestations 
of a new outlook . With such conditions reacting on the 
British public, it was natural that interest quickened in 
the nationalities of Europe and their struggles for identity 
and self-determination. Many people romanticized the hopes 
and plans of foreign groups; the Greek independence movement 
wa s 1-1armly applauded, and it was thought the inhabitants of 
Southeastern Europe yearned for the political goals that 
Britain ha.d already attained. The suffering of Balkan 
Christians filled Englishmen with a missionary zeal to 
alleviate their wretchedness. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the middle class in England played a 
predominant part in politics although the upper class still 
continued to conduct and almost entirely control foreign 
a f fairs . The link between the British middle class and the 
BRlkans therefore was ~hrough two channels,business interest, 
and relig ious zeal. The commercial link was stronger with 
the Greeks who were the leading mercantile people of the 
Lev8nt, but with the Slavs the relig ious link was more 
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imoortant. Anglicanism we.s friendly toward the Orthod.ox 
Church for both opposed the claims of the Roman Confession. 
Humanitarianism, a bottomless spring , poured f orth sympathy 
f o r the political ambitions of Slav nationalities. The 
Islamic authorities were looked upon as agents of the 
Satanic force. Gladstone effectively publicized conditions 
in Eastern Europe. Liberal circles were intensely concerned 
about Balkan peoples and advocated nationality programs for 
South ea s tern Europe--each racial group to be freed from the 
interference of any Greet Po wer and allowed a separate 
existence. In a fe\-.r lines Robert Browning captured the 
spirit : 
Who then, dares hold, emancipated thus, 
His fellow shall continue bound? Not I, 
Who live, love, labor freely, nor discuss 
A broth er's right to Freedom. 'l'hat is 11 Why. 11 
1 
Au8tria-Hungery was described as a Power that schemed 
to dominRte Balkan oeoples and prevent the development of 
independent stet es. The Balkan Slavs claimed a strong 
devotion to d emocratic principles so a dmired in Liberal 
circles. They possessed a religious belief that differed 
considerably from the overwhelming majority in the Habsburg 
Empire, and strongly rejected attachment to Vienna. So any 
Austrian extension to Salonika '\'las viewed in Party Councils 
as arbitrary penetration of the Peninsula by an alien Power. 
1. Robert Browning, 11 Why I Am A Liberal, 11 V/oods, Watt 
end And erson, The Literature of England (Revised edition, 
Chica go: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1941), II, 766. 
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The history of the Danubian Monarchy ha.d been threaded with 
absolutism and reaction,; its past arose as a repellent 
specter to Gladstonian Liberalism. 
The Economist clearly recognized that the Conservatives 
-vrere friendly to Austrian e.xpansion; they lacked faith in a 
federation of Balkan states as a barrier to Russie.n aggression. 
On the other hand, the Liberals thought a confederation could 
be formed, and consequently objected to Austrian penetra.tion 
2 
of Southeastern Europe. In 1877 the prominent historian 
J. R. Green concisely expressed the British Liberal view of 
Eastern Europe: 
I begin to see that there may be a truer 
wisdom in the "humanitarianism" of Gladstone 
than in the purely political views of Disraeli. 
The sympathies of peoples with peoples, the 
sense of a common humanity between nations, the 
aspirations of nationalities after freeom and 
independence, are real political forces; and it 
is just because Gladstone owns them as forces, 
e.nd Disraeli disowns t t. em that the one has been 
on the right side, and the other on the wrong in 
pa.rellel questions such as the up building of 
Germany or Italy. I think it will be so in this 
upbuilding of the Sclave. 
3 
Even if there had been a most cordial feeling toward the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, an Austrian alliance whenever the 
Liberals were in power was most unlikely unless the inter-
national situation assumed warlike overtones, for the leader 
who held the party completely in his control until the early 
2. "Austria and the English Government," Economist, 
38:554-555, May 15, 1880. 
3. Leslie Stephen, editor, Letters of John Richard 
Green (New York: The Macmillan Company, 190~p. 447. 
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nineties was not a person to favor or solicit alliances. 
My fourth principle is that you should avoid 
needless and entangling engagements. You may 
boast about them ••.• But what does all this come 
to? It comes to this, that you are increasing 
your engagements without increasing your strength; 
••• you a.bolish strength, you really reduce the 
Empire, a.nd do not increase it. 
As Gladstone '\vas the leader who towered above all others in 
the Liberal Party, it is fruitful to observe his feelings 
and thoughts concerning the Habsburg realm. In 1870 the 
Libera.l leader viewed the defeat of Austria in the Seven 
iveeks • "\liar as beneficial to her and to Europe. If she were 
to regain health the shackles which tied her to Germany had 
to be broken. Her interference in Germany had been 
unfortunate, because she had attempted to unite to that 
country non-Germanic races and impose absolutism which resul~ed 
4 
in prolonged and general - turmoil. But he proclaimed that 
the Empire finally ha.d repudiated extreme ultramontanism, 
abandoned the Metternich system which was an affront to 
morality, freedom, and nationalit7, and had established free 
government. 
In 1876, in the midst of the Balkan unrest, Gladstone 
enunciated the principles that guided his viewpoint of the 
Balkan provinces: If Turkish suzerainty lapsed the Peninsula 
should not be treated as plunder by Austria or Russia, for 
4. Outidanos (Glactstone), "Article IX, 11 Edinburgh Review, 
132:560, Octob8r, 1870. 
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.5 
the Slav peoples were entitled to shape their own future. 
They are not, as you have been unwisely and 
untruly told, savages. On the contrary, they 
are generally a well-conducted and industrious 
people, and they are people who know how to 
manage their own concerns ••• 
6 
At that time (1876), he felt that Austria would not oppose 
a grp._nt of constitutional freedom to the Danubian 
principalities as had been the c a se after the Crimean War, 
"for Austria herself is rejoicing in the youthful but 
vigorous exercise of constitutional liberty, and has taken 
7 
her renk definitely among the body Of free nations." J. L. 
Hammond made the keen observation that Gladstone's sense of 
nationalism h ad not merely governed his actions but had 
8 
created the atmosphere in which he thought and spoke. 
By the Spring of 1878, Gladstone had a ltered his views 
and shBrply criticized Austria. He explained that she had. 
a specific interest in the freedom of the Straits and Great 
Bri tB.in ha d a general interest 1 but a secret arrangement 
between the two Powers was entirely out of plBce as the 
question actually was the concern of all Europe. He suspected 
that Austria wa s opposed to the liberties, power, and 
.5. W. E. Gladstone, A Steech Delivered at Blackheath Qrr 
Sa turday, September 2, 1876London: John Murray, 1876), 
pp. 22-2.3. 
6. Loc. cit. 
7. Ibid., pp. 29-.30. 
8. J. L. Hammond, Liberalism and the Empire: Colonial 
and Foreign Policy (London: R. Brimely Johnson, 1900) 1 pp. 
1.58-211. 
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prosperity c,f the BB.lka.n states and that she desired to 
guide their domestic policies for her own · benefit. 
Furthermorel since 1815 her foreign policy had been based 
unon the prlnciple of interference in Southeastern Europe. 
It 1s the duty of Englishmen to be upon their 
guard; and if, and when, it shall appear that an 
evil b~::rgain is a.bout to be struck, and that 
England as a state is to support a crusade of 
Austria against the freedom of the Slavs ••• then 
it will be necessary fearlessly and unsparingly, 
to go "tack upon the long catalogue of her mis-
deeds, scarcely relieved by a solitary act done 
on behalf of justice and of freedom. 
9 
In June, 1878, Gladstone again censured the Habsburg state; 
he pointed out that Montenegro had defeated the Turkish 
enemy on the field but had an Austrian enemy within her 
cabinet. Ani Vienna with Britain's complicity had cruelly 
snatched Cattaro from Montenegro. He thought that Austria 
h ad outwittei herself inasmuch as she kept raising he~ 
terms to Rus sie, and. as a result Saint Petersburg made a 
settlement wlth England. 11 She is wounded by the shaft (to 
follow Lord 3yron 1 s metaphor) which is winged with her own 
fee ther. I ·v-ill not a tternpt to decide whether it is an 
10 
eagle's quill, or the quill of another bird. 11 Gladstone 
he d come to - ~he cone lusion that A us tria, after occupying 
9. W. E . Gladstone, "The Pe.ths of Honor and of Shame, 11 
Nineteenth CE~ntury, 3:601-603, March, 1878. 
10. W. E. Gladstone, 11 Liberty in the East and West, 11 
Nineteenth Cnntury, 3:1173, June, 1878. 
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Bosnia, had begun her Balkan advance and aimed at Salonika, 
and Germany actively supported her in this endeavor. At 
that particular time, he thought the Drang nach Osten of 
the military and clerical party might have been at a low 
ebb in Vienna, but significantly it also had become the 
11 
goe.l of the cabinet at Budapest. In the .Yee.r of the 
Congress of Berlin, Goldwin Smith, a scholar with Liberal 
sentiments, re m8rked that England's only foreseeable alliance 
would be miserable and curta.ilment of liberation would be its 
object. Austria had been rightly called the next Sick Man; 
11 she remind s us ra.ther of the Old Man of the Sea, throttling 
with the unrelenting grip of his withered arm the unhappy 
S1ndbe.ci ·of 1 iberty and progress. 11 Smith ad.ded that her only 
intere s t in the East had been to prevent the life and growth 
of Slavic Balk an states and she knew well that an English 
alliance would be of little use against Russia. He called 
attention to disunity in Conservative circles and pointed 
out that Lord Derby h ad taken issue with Salisbury on the 
12 
value of an Austrian alliance. 
The Earl of Selborne, Lord Chancellor under Gladstone 
in 1872, in a letter in 1878 exemplified the Liberal concern 
for the liberty of Balkan peoples. 
I think also, that the just and natural 
sympathies of this country should go with, and 
not against, the na tional and patriotic aspirations 
11. Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville, George 
Leveson Go111Ter, Second Earl Granviii'e"(l815-1891) (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1905), II, p. 202. 
12. Goldwin Smi t h, 11 The Eastern Crisis," Fortnightly 
Review, 29:652, Hay, 1878 . 
both of Greeks and of Slavs •••• If so, what am I 
to think of a policy which has at once trifled 
with and made fools of the· Greeke,--professed as 
one of its native principles, fear and opposition 
to Pa.nslavism--endeavored to substitute Austria 
(a Roman Catholic Power) for any and every form 
of Greek or Slavonic aecendency •••• 
13 
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William Vernon Harcourt, an important member of the Liberal 
high command, in a speech in 1879, by innuendo pictured 
Austria as a country which had come to the fore principally 
to share in the spoils. She received her 11 plunder 11 for 
stirring up insurrect ion and then remaining neutral. n She 
14 
had got her price and she is satisfied." 
The Marquis of Hartin~ton a.sserted that the Conservative 
Government's policy foreshadowed Austrian control of Turkish 
possessions if . the Porte proved unable to administer the 
lands. Hew as convinced that in the past Austria had shown 
an inability to perform such a task and her expansion into 
Slav and Greek areas would arouse discontent, upset the 
15 
delicate domestic balance, and perhaps result in her downfall. 
In his Midlothian Campai~n of 1880, Gladstone issued 
a direct indictment of Austria that caused diplomatic 
repercussions: 
13. Round.eil Palmer, Earl of Selborne, Memorials Part 
II Personal and Political 186,-~ (London: Macmillan and 
Company, Ltd., 1898), I, pp. 67=4b8. 
14. Speech of Sir William Vernon Harcourt at the Dinner 
of the Liberal AssoCiation, Oxford, January 14, 1879 (West-
minster: Liberal Central Association, 1879), pp. 9-12. 
15. Soeeches of the Marauis of Hartington and the 
Right Honorable John Bright Delivered at Ms.nchester, 
October 24-~, 1879 (London: H. J. Infield, 1879), p. 16. 
Austria has ever been the unflinching foe of 
freedom in every country of Europe. Austria 
tre.mplect under foot, Austria resisted the unity 
of Germany-- Austria has never been the friend 
even of Slavonic freedom. Austria did all she 
could to prevent the creation of Belgium. Austria 
never lifted a finger for the regeneration and 
constitution of Greece. There is not an instance--
there is not a spot upon the whole map where you 
can lay your finger and say, 'there Austria did 
good 1 • 
16 
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His verbal attack stemmed from reports that Emperor Francis 
Joseph had expressed the hope that the Beaconsfield Ministry 
would be retained in the elections of 1880. The Earl of 
Granville who had been Foreign Secretary in Gladstone's 
previous cabinet and assumed the post again after the Liberal 
electoral success, thought hie leader had made a mistake in 
making such violent statements. "Gladstone was quite wrong 
in his attacks upon Austria; it \'lras in opposition to what 
we a.greed ought to be our line with respect to Austria ••• 11 
However, basically Grenville was in accord with his political 
mentor and associate for he believed that Austria and Germany 
' 17 
had desired to goad Britain and Russia into a quarrel. After 
the Liberal electoral victory, Gladstone attempted to soothe 
Austrian ruffled feelings with the following words: 
Your Excellency is now good enough to assure 
me that your Government has no right whatever to 
extend or to add to the rights it has acquired 
16. The Annual Register for the Year 1880: A Review of 
Public Events at Home and Abr'OB:d (London: Rivingtons, 1881), 
p. 47. 
17. Fitzmauric~, QQ.cit., p. 203. 
under the Treaty of Berlin, and that any extension 
would be actually prejudiced to Austria-Hungary. 
Permit me at once to state to your Excellency that, 
had I been in possession of such an assurance as 
I have now been able to _ rec~ivi, I never would 
have uttered any one of t he words which your 
Excellency justly describes as of a painful and 
wounding character. 
18 
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Lord Salisbury used this occasion to criticize GlB.dstone and 
to express his own feelings; he believed the sentiments of 
his political ouponent did not apnly even to the old Government 
under Metternich and although Britain might not be bound qy a 
special alliance to Austria yet for every reason the two 
countries ought to be drawn tog8ther as their interests did 
19 
not conflict. And the incident concerning Austria was 
not forgotten by critics of Gladstone, for as late as 1899, 
a year after the Libere.l lee.der 1 s death, i'l illiarn Lecky 
referred to the verbal blast of 1880 as an outs t anding example 
20 
of the English leader's ineptness in foreign affairs. 
After the electoral victory of 1880, E. A. Freeman 
expressed the prevalent Liberal opinion, i.e., the official 
circles at Vienna and Pesth intensely disliked the assumption 
of power by English Liberals who were friends of the Balkan 
peoples and advocates of their liberty. But the second Gladstone 
21 
i'Unistry brought joy to the hearts of the Habsburg Sle.vs. 
18. The Annual Register for the Year 1880, QQ.cit., p. 64. 
19. The Hansard, 252:173-177. 
20. viilliam E. H. 'Lecky, Democracy and Liberty (New 
edition, New York: Longmans, Green and ~ 1899) , Introduc tion. 
21. E. A. Free ma n, "The Austrian Power," Freser'e 
Ma ga.zine, 22:46, July, 1880. 
Lack of faith in Austria continued throughout the 
Li beral tenure of power (1880-1885). In 1883, it was 
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clear that Gladstone still held misgivings concerning 
Austria-Hungary and her position in eastern Europe. Granville, 
the Foreign Secreta.ry, wrote to Gladstone as follows: 
••. our difference is this: that you are more 
afraid of Austria and I of Russia. I have no 
doubt of Austria having her ambitious views and 
particularly to have a share if there is a . par-
tition. But I believe she is at present sincerely 
desirous of things being quiet, and there is no 
concentrated national force as in Russia, pushing 
her forward. 
22 
Lord Salisbury stated he had impressed upon Karolyi, 
the Austrian Ambassador, that the return of the Liberals to 
po wer would not mean a resumption of their recent policy, 
instead the new program would resemble Lord Palmerston'a. 
In 1885 Bismarck disclosed to Sir Philip Currier that 
Gladstone's repudiation of the policies of his predecessor 
convinced Austrian statesmen that England was not to be 
trusted inasmuch as a similar event might occur again. Sir 
Philip explained that Gla clstone 1 s dislike of the Habsburg 
Balkan policy had shaped all of his attitudes toward Austria-
23 
Hungary. The same year Salisbury wrote to the Queen that 
22. Fitzmaurice, QQ.cit., pp. 205-206. 
23. Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marouis of Salisbury 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1921), III, p. 259. 
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Austria-Hungary had become suspicious of the intentions of 
the English Liberal Government and thought Britain intended 
to ally with Russia, therefore Vienna had tried to enter 
24 
into friendly relations with Saint Petersburg. It was 
obvious that the Austrian Government mistrusted the Liberal 
Party and particularly Mr. Gladstone. In 1889 Gladstone 
had not altered his opinion, for he wrote that the wisest 
Austrians knew inclusion of more Slavs within the Empire 
would disturb the balance that maintained the nation yet 
glaring f acts showed that Vienna had assumed a protectorship 
of Serbia. 
But it is the place to observe that both of 
these great Empires app.ear to regard the Balkan 
Peninsula as intended by Providence, not for 
independent enjoyment by its own inhabitants, but 
for the eventual aggrandisement of one of t h ese 
Powers, and for a field of present rivalry between 
the two. 
In the struggle for predominance Gladstone believed that 
Russia had the advantage because she was powerful, compa.ct, 
and had performed past services for Balkan peoples, whereas 
Austria did not ha ve a reservoir of friendliness and never 
could assume the role of liberator. Her institutions had 
a greater appeal than Russian absolutism, but as they had 
not affected her foreign policy they were not of pri~e 
consideration. Austria had a large Slavonic population but 
24. Ibi d ., p. 220. 
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its influence was not felt against rival forces; Russia 
on the other hand was completely Slavonic, with the same 
25 
religious creed, tradition, and rite as the Balkan peoples. 
Before the advent of the Rosebery Ministry, when a 
definite continuity was established in Liberal and Conserva-
tive forei gn policy, most Liberals viewed Austria-Hungary 
with suspicion and a rapprochement with her seemed unlikely. 
With the passing of Gladstone from the scene, the Liberals 
appe ared less inclined to picture her as a Machiavellian 
. type state. It was recognized tha t she would expand if an 
opportunity were presented, but the mora l condemnation was 
supplanted by a less emotional and more detached outlook. 
It is interesting to observe the advice of the Liberal 
leader Lord Kimberley to his Party in 1902: 
If ever there is another Liberal Government--
which is perhaps doubtful--Grey or you, or both 
of you, may have something to say to foreign 
affairs. Now, remember there is on no account 
to be quarrelling with Aus tria. She has been the 
only steady friend we have had in Europe--I mean 
since 1866. 'rhe Hunge.rians have always been our 
friends. So, I repeat, no qua rrelling with Austria. 
I have said the same thing to Grey. 
. 26 
However, the advice was not heeded; annexation of Bosnia and 
25. Out ida nos (Gladstone), 11 The Triple Alliance and 
Italy 1 s Place In It, •i Contemporary Review, 56:480-481, 
October, 1889 .• 
26. Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude Tuckwell, The Life of 
the Right Honorable Sir Charles Dilke (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1917), II, p. 509. 
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Herzegovina occurred when a Liberal Government was in power 
and Sir Edward Grey was at the Foreign Office. Britain 
sharply and firmly took Austria-Hungary to task for the 
annexa.tion and branded her a disturber of the peace which 
caused bitterness. Her dependence on Germany became more 
evident and complete. 
Thus, the Liberal Party was sort of an international 
conscience which did not hesitate to publicly indicate the 
areas where Austria-Hungary had failed to abide by the party 1 s 
conception of liberal, democratic, and humanitarian principles. 
The Conservative Party's attitude toward Austria-Hungary 
was subordinated to one basic idea which guided. the conduct 
of foreign affairs--preservation of Britain's prestige asa 
Great Power. The nation had to be consulted on changes all 
over the world which might affect its possessions or vital 
interests. Disraeli said: 11 So long as the power and advice 
of England are felt in the councils of Europe, peace, I 
27 
believe, v-rill be maintained, and. for a long period." In 
re gard to Eastern Europe, the major policy was to insure 
protection of the Suez Canal, keep open the · way to India, and 
prevent Russia from either controlling the Eastern Mediterranean 
28 
or extending her influence into regions contiguous to India. 
27~ Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern 
Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1935), p. 544. 
28. Alfred Austin, Russia Before. Europ e (London: Chat to 
and Windus, 1876) , Alfred Austin, journalist; associ~ted with 
the Standard, and Poet Laureate 1896-1913. 
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A balance of power would achieve a commodious outlook and 
prevent any one power or combination of them from attaining 
undue vJeight in Europe. Austria-Hungary was viewed as a 
solid ma.ss of terri tory between Russia and her expa.nsionist 
tendencies in the Southeast. Above all, it was for the 
welfare of Britain to have a strong nation, militarily and 
economically, in Eastern Europe, and therefore any factor 
that l~Teak ened the Habsburg state was not favored in Conserva-
tive circles. This view of Austria-Hungary remained in Tory 
thinking until Germany assumed the menacing pose formerly 
held by Russia. An Imperial theme tied Conservative policies 
together, that is, any course of a.c tion was closely examined 
in order to determine the effect on Bri ta.in am her Empire. 
Current humanitarianism within the country did not greatly 
affect the conduct of foreign affairs as was the case in 
Liberal circles. Conservative foreign policy became separated 
from internal programs and was somewhat self-centered. Certain 
principles were formed and persistently followed without 
rega.rd for personal inclina.tion. A foreign group or move-
ment might appeal but it was not a d.ecicUng factor in 
formation of policy. Consequently, the Conservative idea that 
Britain should not actively interfere or support the 
aspirations of subject peoples in the Balkan Peninsula is 
underste.ndable. Sa.lisbury stated in Parliament: 
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The duties of humanity I am very far from 
disputing, but I am not prepared to accept the 
ne'(l gospel which I understand. is preached--that 
it is our business for the sa.ke of any popula.-
tions whatever, to disregard. the trusts which 
the people of this country and our sovereign have 
repos~d in our hands. · 
29 
In short, official Conservative sentiments show a stark 
rea~ism; apparently personal inclinations were set aside 
in order to insure the undiminished health and welfa.re of 
Great Britain and her Empire. 
British Conservatives believed that Austria-Hungary 
should be cultivated a.s a friend in Eastern Europe for 
Anglo-Austrian intere sts were quite similar. However, they 
were aware that she possessed certain shortcomings. Their 
attitude was spelled out in deta.il <:luring the Disraeli 
Ministry when the Balkan Crisis occurred. They feared that 
in the Eastern turmoil Austria played a game of indecision 
and would accept diplomatic defeat rather than risk a 
mill tary engagement with Russia.. In September, 1875, Disraeli 
wrote-- 11Andrassy is quite undecided, or playing a double game; 
perhaps both. 11 In November of the same year he_ wrote agein--
11I know privately that Andrassy changes his mind. every week 
or d.ay, and has a dozen intrigues at work which will defeat 
30 
each other." Andrassy was mistrusted by the statesmen 
29. The Hansard, 237:54-56. 
30. The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady 
Chesterfield (Marquis of Zetland, editor, London: E. Benn, 
Ltd., 1929), I, p. 363. 
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of Bri te.in, for while he urged upon Britain a strong and 
independent action in relations with Russia it was thought 
that he cultivated Russia and attempted to form an alliance 
-vri th her. This supposed duality of purpose aroused sus-
31 
pic ion e.nd lessened confidence in the Habsburg state. In 
the Fa.ll of 1877, Layard wrote to Lord Derby that Andrassy 
was playing a double and dishonest game and he thought the 
Austrian leader had made a secret agreement with Russia for 
annexa.tion of Bosnia and Her·zegovina. "If Austria, cowardly 
and short-cighted, is read_j- to hold her tongue a.nd to gnaw 
the bone which will be thrown to her, there will be no means 
32 
of preventing the Turks acceding to anything. 11 In the 
Spring of the following yea.r, the :t>1arquis of .Sali.sbury · thought 
perhaps Austria might give up the idea of expansion into 
Bosnia for an agreement with Russia whereby both Powers 
would extend southward in parallel lines; Austria would 
advance toward Salonika. 11 In that ease he will throw us 
33 
over ••• " Throughout the period o~ crisis there was fear 
the.t Austria would not adhere to a forthright program and would 
compromise any time that Russia offered sufficient terms. 
However, from the inception of the Eastern Cri s is Disraeli 
had endeavored to revive the Tripartite Agreement of 1856. 
31. Cecil, QQ.cit., II; p. 178. 
32. Seton-Watson, .QJ?...cit., pp. 235-236. 
33. Cecil, QQ.cit., II, p. 248. 
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This secret alliance of Great Britain, France, and Austria, 
was concluded at the end of the -Congress of Paris to protect 
Turkish integrity. Joint action with Austria was desired 
to prevent Russian encroachment upon Turkish terri tory. In 
June, 1877, the Cabinet authorized Lord Derby to propose an 
active alliance, and a . joint expedition to Gallipoli was 
discussed. Count Beust apparently had been instructed to let 
England assume t he initiative and in January, 1878, a 
defensive alliance was suggested to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. No conclusive understanding vras ree.ched under Lord 
Derby, but Lord Beaconsfield carried on negotia.tions by 
personal communications with Andrassy; after Crown Prince 
Rudolph's visit to Britain in mid-February, Beaconsfield 
34 
reported to the Crown that negotiations had been completed. 
And so during these years the Conservatives expressed a 
definite wish for a close understanding with the Habsburg 
Empire. Evidently Salisbury had not been concerned about 
Austria 1 s expansion into the Balkans for he ha.d urged her 
to go into Serbia. "They did not go into Servia as I advised 
them just after Plevna--and. so they missed the joint 
35 
(juncture)." British repre sentatives at the Congress of 
Berlin formally suggested Austrian occupation of Bosnia and. 
Herzegovina. Salisbury declared: 
34. William Gould, 11 The Anglo-Austrian Agreement of 
1878, 11 Engl ish Historical Review, 41:109, January, 1926. 
35. Cecil, .Q.:Q_.cit., II, p. 282. 
••• Andrassy was in a coy state about Bosnia. 
He had the consent of everybody in his pocket; 
but he was shy of proposing to occupy it himself 
•••• so he we.nted us to do it. I consented 
naturally without difficulty--and found no dif-
ficulty with B. 
36 
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Disraeli clearly outlined his opinion-- 11 the occupation permits 
us to check ••• the.t Panslavist confederacy and conspiracy which 
has alree.dy proved so disadvantag eous to the happiness of the 
37 I 
world." Salisbury, in Parliament, fully endorsed the 
Eastern settlement. He judged Austria-Hungary to be one of 
the be s t administered countries of Europe which had almost 
solved the problem of governing diverse nationalities. Prior 
to the Congress, if Turkey fell apart it appeared that Russia 
would have been the sole inheritor, but with Austria at Novi 
BazPr all· was changed for she was on the high road to 
Constantinople; 
••• and her presence has announced to the world 
in general, and to intending aggressors in 
particular, that if either intrigue or violence 
should shake the Turkish Empire to pieces, it 
will not be Russia that will rule upon the 
Bosphorus. 
38 
Baron Ecke.rdstein, the Germe.n diploma.t, · reported that during 
his stay in Britain (1895-1905), Salisbury at various times 
36. Cecil, loc.cit. 
37. Seton-Watson, QQ.cit., p. 532. 
38. The Han sa.rd, 241: 1806. 
was well-disposed to a partition of the Ottoman Empire 
39 
among England, Germany, and Austria. 
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In 1879 when the Austro-German Alliance became known 
Salisbury gave it unqualified approval. The brightest hopes 
for peace in Europe resided in the strength and independence 
of Austria. The Foreign Secretary stated, "I will only say 
this to you and all who value the peace of Europe ••• that it 
is good tidings of grea.t joy. 11 In the same year Sali ebury 
no doubt believed that England was closely bound to the fate 
of Austria, for he stated, "it wi ll be very difficult for 
us not to go to Austria 1 s assistance if she is seriously 
40 
attacked by Russia--no me.tter h ow the attack comes about." 
Another leading Conservative Lord Stratheden, a few years 
later, remarked that the alliance of Germany and Austria in 
1879 ha.d been of great i mport because it v-.ras the germ from 
wh ich the European balance could be formed; it rekinctled a 
41 
hope that had become almost extinguished. In the campaign 
39. Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. 
James (George Young, translator and editor-,-London: Thornton . 
Butterworth Limited, 1921), pp. 57-59. 
40. Cecil, QQ.cit., II, p. 366. 
41. The Eastern Question: Speeches Delivered in the House 
of Lord s ~ \rlilliam Frederick, Lord Stratheden and Campbell 
ledi ted by Stratheden and Campbell, Lal'Jley and Cowper, Loncton: 
John Murray, 1894), p. 24o. . 
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of 1879-1880, the Liberals used as an issue the allegation 
th~. t the Conservative Party he.d endeavored to establish 
Austrian predominance in the Balkans at the expense of 
freedom. 
With the resumption of Conservative control in 1886, 
the old ideas of preservation of the British Empire and 
protection of' its life lines returned to the Foreign Office. 
Salisbury believed that with the exception of Britain, 
Austria wes the only nation that would object to Russian 
control of Constantinople. "Germe.ny is quite content that 
Russia should have Constantinople, Austria is not. I think, 
therefore, that 't'le ·ought to give our diploma tic support to 
42 
Austria for the present." The speech delivered by Lord 
Randolph Churchill at Dartford in 1886, before twenty thousand 
Conservatives, was regerded by Winston Churchill as the most 
important of his f~ther's career. The ideas of Gladstone 
. concerning Austria were, by implication, condemned. 
Those were the days of Lord Palmerston; but 
times have changed and the freedom and the in-
dependence of the Danubian Principalities and of 
Balkan nationalities are a primary and vital object 
in the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These 
things being so, it may well be that England can 
honorably and safely afford to view with satisfaction 
that power whose interests are most directly and 
vitally concerned, assuming the foremost part in this 
great interne.tional work. 
' 43 
42. Cecil, QQ.cit., III, p. 321. 
43. Winston Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (New York: 
The :Macmillan Company, 1906), II, p. 167. 
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The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 were the outcome 
of the friendly and cooperative program with the Habsburg 
Monarchy. In the eyes of the Conservatives it was advan-
tageous to maintain cordiality with the Triple Alliance so 
that in the event of hostilities with France or Russia a 
sp eedy arrangement could be macle with the Central Po\'Ters; 
yet by avoiding formal and official a.s socia.tion with this 
bloc France and Russia would not become antagonized. Britain 
had mi sgiving s about a full alliance with Germany and Austria 
becaus e Berlin, in an attempt to re ach desired goals, might 
involve GreB.t Britain in war. 
By 1900 the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary 
had become extremely necessary for both Empires, but a change 
had occurred in Britain. Germany had arisen as a serious 
competitor and rival while .French antagonism was on the wane 
after the Fashoda incident. The Triple Alliance no longer 
was consiclered a gre at d.esi gn for peace on the European 
continent. In the last attempt at Anglo-German reconciliation 
and formation of a definite understanding, Joseph Chamberlain, 
the British protagonist of the- policy, maintained that · 
inclusion of Austria in the alliance was impossible. Parliament 
would not sanction a guarantee of the Habsburg Empire for it 
would further embroil Britain and Russia. And so the sect1on 
of the British Government that had supported an agreement with 
the German Empire did not includ.e Austria-Hungary in any 
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compact. Obviously Lord Salisbury held a similar viewpoint, 
•for Baron von Eckardstein reported that the British leader 
was hesitant to conclude any alliance for fear England 
44 
might be required to assume responsibility for Austria. 
Furthermore, those in the Tory Party who were unfriendly 
' 
to Germany would be more then reluctant to approach her 
faithful ally, especially since Macedonia ha.d become a 
danger spot in Austro-Russian relations. England had lost 
confidence in Germany and also was unwilling to turn to 
Austria for an alliance because an understsnding with her 
might bring about involvement with Russia. In the first 
years of the new century, the period in which the Government 
was directed by Conservatives, although good-will was shown 
to Austria the closeness which had previously existed between 
Conservative England and the Habsburg Empire evanesced into 
the cloud_ of c'Ustrust that hung over Anglo-German relations. 
44. Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 
1871~1914: SammlunT der Diplomatischen Akten des 
Auswartigen AmtesJohannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, editors, Berlin: 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft flir Politik und Geschichte, 
1922-1927), XVII, Nos. 5005 and 5008. 
CHAPTER XVI 
The Future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
1914-1918 
Four years spent in the throe~ of World War I was 
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a p eriod of sufficient duration for ideas about the future 
of the Habsburg Monarchy to become crystallized. British 
opinions were not formed in a vacuum, but unquestionably 
were influenced and shaped by past knowledge of conditions 
in Eastern Europe. The public minc1 he.d been prepared for 
dissolution; the idea was not new, for at various times 
since 1866 responsible sources had predicted that the 
Empire wes reedy to disintegrate into ethnic parts. Within 
the memory of one generation, trouble arose first in one 
sphere and then in another and dark clouds of uncertainty 
lurked over the path of the nation. 
At the outbreak of hostilities Britain felt bitter to 
Germany, and yet there was an absence of real animosity 
toward Austria for it wes thought that she had become the 
1 
tool and dupe of a desip..:ning and expanding partner. 11 It 
1. C. R. L_ Fletcher, 11 The Germans, Part I. Their 
Empire: How They Have Made It 11 (Oxford Pamphlets, London: 
Oxford University Press, 1914), p. 26; also, [cont.] 
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a thousand pities the.t Austria has been dragged into this 
infamous war, for it seems to treat its provinces remarkably 
2 
well, and with it England has till now had no quarrel." 
Hilaire Belloc held Germany responsible for the conflict and 
was convinced that Vienna was a much more civilized center 
3 
than Berlin. People viewed Austria as somewhat of an 
anachronism in the modern world. Of course, there was a 
certain amount of harshness directed against the Austro-
Germans and the Magyars; against the former for disregard of 
Czech demands and for regulation of Austrian policy in 
accordance with German wishes; the Magyars were criticized 
for a reactionary rule which politically and culturally 
crushed the Slavs. In other words, the fate of Austria had 
become dark beca.use she he.d relied upon Germany and had 
neglected her own serious nationa.li ty problems. "No doubt 
Germany is the villain of the piece. No doubt Germany 
[ftn. 1 cont.] C. Chesteron, The Prussian Hath Said in Hie 
Heart (New York: Laurence J. Gomme, 1915), p. 134; also, 
H. H. Johnston, "Austria. and the Way Out, 11 New Statesman, 
7:367-368, July 22, 1916; also, J. w. Robertson, Britain .Y.§.. 
German~ (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1917), p. 96; alsoL 
J. W. eadlam{ The Dead Lands of Eurone (New York: George h. 
Doran Company}, pp. 27-28; also, J. W. Seddon, No. 22, 11 Why 
British Labor Sunnorts the War 11 (New York: The National 
Security League)~ · p. 4; also, Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: 
A Biography (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1929), p. 372. 
2. Sir Oliver Lodge~ The War and After (New York: 
George H. Doran Co., 191~), p. 33. 
3. Hilaire Belloc, The 1wo Maps of Europe (London: 
C. Arthur Pee.rson, Ltd., 1913T'; p. 30. 
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dominates, or up till now has dominated her partners and 
4 
led them just whither she would." Gil bert Murray stated 
thAt at the last moment Germany prevented Austria from 
5 
arranging a peaceful settlement. Also, E. J. Dillon '\orho 
was in Austria during the crisis that led to war, in 1916 
claimed that Germany for appearance sake assumed the role 
o f the disinterested peacemaker, but in truth she was the 
6 
chief protaf!;onist and Austria was merely the pawn. Even 
official circles maintained that Germany had pushed Austria-
Hungary to war. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview, stated: 
11 Germany decle.red r.1ar on Russia when Austria was showing 
7 
every disposition to come to terms ••• " So.r.J.ewhat similarly 
Prime Minister Asquith in a speech at Dublin on September 25, 
1914, declared 
There was nothing in the quarrel, such as it was, 
between Austria. and Servia that could not, and would 
not, have been settled by pacific means. But in the judgment of those who guide and control German policy 
the hour had come to strike the blow ••• 
8 
4. "Austrian Possibilities," Soectator, 118:37, January 
13' 1917. 
5. Gilbert Murray, Feith, War and Policy (Bo s ton: 
Hou gh ton, 1-iifflin Company, 1917},pp. 21 and 27. 
6. E. J. Dillon~ England and Germany (London: Chapman 
and Hall, Ltd., 1916J, p. 101. 
7. Edward Price Bell, A Free Eurooe: Being An Interview 
With Sir Edward. Grey (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd .• , 1916), 
D. 5. 
8 . Herbert Asquith, The \var Its Causes a.nd Its 1'1essage 
(Fifth edition, London: Methuen & Co., 1914), p. 38. 
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And almost three years later David Lloyd George, who had 
become Prirr:e Minister in 1916, at Glasgow e.sserted: 
... I remember the earnest endee.vors we made to 
persuade Germe.ny and A us tria not to precipi ta.te 
Europe into this welter of blood •••• Germany knew 
that, so she rejected the conference. Although 
Austria was prepared to accept it ••• 
9 
It seems strange that Germany was so widely accused of 
the greater guilt in the causation of war and so bitterly 
and harshly censured by politicians and public figures, for 
t h e obvious conclusion \'Te.s that the Habsburg Empire had 
caused the final call to arms and Germany had assumed a 
supporting but secondary role. Unquestionably the strong 
anti-German feeling can be ascribed to the British frame of 
mind. in the first decade of the century. In that · period 
Germany rose as a competitor in ~ndustry, colonial ventures, 
and naval expansion, and. Bri ta.in became antagonistic even to 
Austrians of Germanic . descent. (Compare Chapter VII). Perhaps 
the extreme bitterness toward Germany also reflected British 
r ealization that she possessed a mighty war-ma chine and 
Austria-Hungary would play a subordinate military role; 
consequently, hostility was stronger toward the Pow·er more 
difficult to defeat. For a. decade prior to 1914 man;y 
Englishmen he.d. been convinced that Vienna was a mere outpost 
9. David Lloyd George, The Greet Crusade (arranged by 
F. L. Ste venson) (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), 
D. 141. 
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of Berlin, and therefore the pl a cement of war guilt on the 
Hohenzollern Empire was simply intensification of a senti-
ment al r eady present. Underlying antagonisms appear to 
have exercised a greater influence on public opinion than 
obvious events which led to the actual outbrea.k of 
hos tilities. 
The remBrkP.ble ineffectiveness of Austria's armed 
forces and her reliance on German direction and aid 
strengthened the conviction that she was not an ally but 
a satellite, and confirmed the belief that the two Empires 
had become a single grea~ Germanic fatherland directed from 
Berlin. L. B. Namier, the historian, was certain that 
through the necessities of vmr the Austrian-Germans readily 
ackno"rledged that Mittel-Europa was their sa.lvation; they 
had accepted both German nationalism and imperialism and 
desired unification of the two Empires so that a dominion 
could be exercised over the peoples of Central and South-
10 
eastern Europe. He stated that it might. be difficult to 
prevent Germany from being mill ts.ristic, but her reservoir 
of men and money in eastern Europe would be cut off if the 
non-German subjects of Austria-Hungary were set free. 11 Who 
wills the end, should will the means for there are no other 
means of destroying the power of Prussian militarism than to 
10. L. B. Namier, 11 The Haps£urg and 1-11 ttel-Europa, 11 
Nineteenth Centu~ and After, 80 :189, July, 1916. 
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deprive it of the instrument and weapons that have mad.e it 
11 
strong." A one time London Times correspondent at Vienna 
agreed that the powerful German financial and economic 
organization which controlled the life of the Balkans had 
12 
to be broken. Frequently Germany was depicted as the evil 
genius of the Habsburg Empire. 
Again, if one remembers that, after the defeat 
of the Austrian Army in 1866 at Sadowa by Prussia, 
Bismarck instead of asking a territorial indemnity 
from Austria, decided to use her as a catspaw in 
the Balkans in Germany 1 s interests .•• 
13 
In the l~rning Post as early as August 17, 1914, Spenser 
14 
Wilkinson advocated the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 
And three years later the same idea was cur~ent; the New 
Statesman declared that as long as Austrie.-Hungary survived, 
no matter how constituted, she always would depend upon 
1.5 
Germany. Since it was a common belief that Germany had used 
the Empire to mtlitarially penetrate the Balkans and obtain 
11. L. B. Namier "Danzig: fol.and 1 s Outlet to the Sea," 
Nineteenth Century and After, 80 :305, February, 1917. . 
12. H. W. Steed, "Austria and Europe," Edinburgh Review, 
22.5:2, January, 1917. 
13. Joseoh Froman "The Future of Bohemia: The Liberation 
of the Czecho~Slovaks,~ Nineteenth Century and After, 81:.574 
March, 1917. 
14. Article in Morning Post, August 17, 1914. 
1.5. 11Auetrie-Hungary: A Summs.ry of the Position, 11 New 
Ste.tesman 9:1.51-1.52, May 19, 1917. 
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economic concessions, dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy 
appeared as the logical solution. 
In Parliament, James Bryce outlined what German control 
of the Habsburg state mee.nt to the Bri tieh Empire • 
••. it is not only in the interests of the peoples 
of the Austrian Empire who are now suffering under 
tyre.nny, that it is necessary to break up the 
Austrian Empire; but it is in the interests of the 
world at large •••• The control of Germany over the 
way of the east must be ended, for to the British 
Commonwealth it means the course to India and to 
Egypt. 
- 16 
Willia.m Barry and A. F. Whyte, M.P., warned that Austria-
Hungary under German tut.elage endangered British possessions 
in the East, Barry stated: ui conclude, then, by the words with 
which I began, 'Break Austria'. For in breaking Austria you 
defeat the Pan-German Empire; you safeguard your Indian 
17 
empire." 
Many varied solutions were suggested for eastern Europe 
and. one idee. seemed to be in all of them, namely, independence 
for the ethnic groups of . the Habsburg realm. 
The editor of the Edinburgh Review noted that the northern 
boundary of Italy appeared to have been designed to keep the 
na.tion at the mercy of Austria. And the wedge of the Trentino 
16. The Hansard, 96:1828. 
17. William Barry, "Break Austria," The Nineteenth Century 
and. After, 82:4.53, September, 1917; also, A. F. Whyte (M.P.) 
'The Outlook of a Good European, 11 For the Right: Essa1 s and 
Addresses ~,Members of the Fight for Right MovementLondon: 
G. P. Putnam s Sons, 191~ pp. 16.5-199. . 
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provided. an ideal route by which armies could be poured into 
the pla.in of Italy tha.t extended from Milan to Turin. Con-
sequently, it wa s essential the.t Italy possess. a strategic 
frontier that could withstand any Germanic invasion; the 
Allies should gre.nt her a boundary drawn through the middle 
of the Austrian Tyrol and through northern Carinthia. The 
na tura.l border line from Switzerland extended from the 
Weisskugel to the Bremer, the Tre Signori, the Gross Glockner 
18 
and east to the Katschberg Pass. The Spectator believed 
that every Englishman and Italian should fervently pray that 
the people of the Trentino 
19 
and Trieste be fully emancipated. 
In reference to the Austro-Italians of the Trentino it was 
stated: 11 Annexe.tion to the Kingdom is their only chance of 
freedom. Austria has adopted a policy of crushing their 
national aspirations, and is now apparently condemned to 
20 
p ersevere in e. course of oppression." The Quarterly Review 
remarked that unquestionably the land along the Adriatic 
would be divided between the Slavs and the Italians. The 
latter probably would receive the greater share on account of 
t heir higher education and aptitude for the sea. Trieste was 
18. Harold Cox, "Italian Achievements and Aspirations," 
Edinburgh Review, 224:401, October, 1916. 
19. 11 The Crumbling of Austria-:-Hungary, 11 Spectator, 
115:38, July 10, 1915. 
20. Algar Thorold, 11 Italia Irredenta, 11 Edinburgh Review, 
221:44, January, 1915. 
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definitely an Ite.lian city, but any attempt by Rome to gain 
all of Dalmatia would simply foster an irredentist movement. 
11 Perhaps the frontier might be that indicated by Dante, 
viz., the Quarnero, 1 che Italia chiude ~ 1 suoi termini 
21 
bagna 1 • 11 
Justice to the Czechs, Poles, ·and Rumanians was believed 
essential to any lasting settlement, and peace had to be 
insured by the satisfaction of the South Slavs and the crea.tion 
22 
of an independent Southern Slav Kingdom. George M. 
Trevelyan vigorously maintained the.t this re.cial group had. 
to be liberated from the oppressive rule of Vienna and 
23 
allowed to unite with its Serbian brethren. Another 
commentator reported that Serbia could view her future with 
satisfaction if the Allies were victorious. A Balkan state 
second to Rumania would be created by Serbian annexation of 
e.ll Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia (except the Montenegrin 
area), plus all of, Bosnia and a large section of Herzegovina. 
On the n.orth Serbian botmderies would be the Danube and. the 
Drave, and on the northwest, the Croatian frontier from the 
24 
DrFve to Flume. _Serbia had. been a ·small state, yet by the 
21. 11 Italy and the Adriatic," Qua.rterly Review, 224:342-
343, October, 1915. 
22. 11 The Future of Austria-Hunga.ry, 11 Snectator, 119:483, 
Novemher 3, 1917. 
23. G. M. Trevelyan, 11 The Servians and Austria t" No. 11 
(London: Wyman & Sons Ltd., for the Victoria. League), pp. 6-8. 
24. "The Final Settlement in the Balkans~ 11 Quarterly 
Review, 228:366, Uctober, 1917. 
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addition of various Austro-Hungarian Slav areas it probably 
25 
would comprise at least fifteen million inhabitants. 
'rhe federation, then of Yugoslav States power-
ful enough to resist German aggression will 
probably resolve itself into the following combina-
tion: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Southern Styria, Southern CarinthiaJ. with possibly 
a part of Carniola, and the Austro-.H.ungarian p ro-
vinces south of the Drave (Slavonia and Syrmia) 
may combine to form a single . nationality ethnically 
homogeneous inspired with the same ideals and 
p rinciples of nationa l development, ••• 
26 
In the proposed division of Habsburg lands the Rumanians 
were not forgotten. It wa.s pointed out tha.t an attempt had 
b een made to dene.turalize and crush them in all areas of 
private and public life. Magyar promises meant nothing, 
f or equal rights had been guaranteed in the Constitution but 
they had n ot been respected. "The creation of a Greater 
Rumania by the unification of the Rumanian race is in the 
. 27 
intere s t of all Europe." J. A. R. Iviarriott, the English 
historian, maintained it was well known that before Rumania 
25. Politicus 11 The Future of Serbia," Fortnightly 
Review, 103:1023, june, 1915. J. D. Bourchier advocated 
the joining of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia,Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; also, Lady Grogan, The Life of J.D. Bourchier, 
(London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., {n:cf:l, ;p . 280; also, 
concerning the break-up of the Empire, J. W. Headlam, The 
Peace Terms of the Allies (London: Richard Clay & Sons, Ltd., 
1917), p. 29. 
26. Thomas Holdich, 11 Jugo-Slav Federation," Fortnightly 
Review , 108:193, Augus t, 1917. 
27. Suum Cuique, "Hungarian Tyrflny and Roumanian 
Suffering, 11 Contemporary Revie1-r, 106 :774, December, 1914. 
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entered the war, the Allies had approved her occupation 
and future retention of Habsburg provinces with a predominantly 
Rumanian population, namely, Transylvania, Bukovina, and the 
Banat of Temesvar. URumania was perfectly justified in 
28 
putting a high price upon her services •..• 11 An account 
in the Fortnightly Review declared that it was patent to 
intelligent Rumanian statesmen, politicians, and officers 
that fraud and deception were behind the proposal by the 
Austro-Germans to establish under the Habsburg Crown a united 
Rumania possessed of self-government. But Rumania would have a 
bri~ht future if she annexed the Habsburg province of Traneyl-
Vania composed of five hun~red thousand Rumanians, plus two 
million ~~gyars and others. Annexation of Transylvania would 
29 
make the Rumanian state a compact whole. 
Bohemia had long clamored for autonomous status. It 
was an economically advanced area, had undergone a cultural 
renaissance, and had able propagandists like Thomas Masaryk; 
consequently, British observers were not adverse to Bohemian 
independence. A merger of the Czechs and Slovaks into a 
single state was discussed as a logical solution. It was 
recognized that the Slovaks had been miserable under Hungarian 
28. J. A. R. 11l.B.rriott, "The Roumanian Factor in the 
Problem of the Near East," Edinburgh Review, 224:169-170, 
July, 1916. 
29. Politicus, 11 Roumania 1 s Attitude and Position," 
Fortnightly Review, 104:1075-1076, December, 1915. 
tutelage and therefore had to be liberated • 
••• Magyar and Slovak cannot be expected to dwell 
together in amity under a single flag; and the 
maintenance of Hungarian integrity would be 
equivalent to the condemnation of the Slovaks to 
perpetual serfdom--cannon-fodder for any future 
militarism which may arise in the years to come, 
in Central Europe. 
30 
Furthermore, as the Slovaks were a compact body easily 
separated from Hungary a.nd desired unification with an 
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independent Bohemi a , Me_gyar and German objections were not 
considered valid and Britain was advised to disregard them. 
The Slovaks had been oppressed by the Magyar ruling caste, 
and the Czechs were judged to have suffered disabilities 
at the hands of the German minority--discrimination in both 
the use of ne.tive l anguage and in administrative positions. 
HoYTeve r, the Czechs were thought able to assimilate the 
31 
minority Germans. 
And conversely, the Allies, if triumphant, will 
secure no peace in Central Europe until the gratitude 
and friendship of Bohemians are obtained by the re-
establishment of their kingdom and national life. 
32 
The Spectator indicated that the Czechs were vigorou s , well-
educated, with industrial know-how, and possessed an area 
30. Francis Gribble, "The Future of Bohemia, Czech 
Cliims and Magy a r Intrigues," Nineteenth Century and After, 
81 :590, :t-farch, 1917. 
31. Loc.cit. 
32. M. J. Landa, "Bohemia and. the War, 11 Contemporary 
Review, 108:101-104, July, 1915. 
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rich in natural resources. Under the proper aegis their 
numbers could increase from twelve million to twenty 
million. The lack of an outlet to the sea wa·s not believed 
33 
an insurmountable barrier. 
The .Tablet sympathetically viewed the aspirations of 
the Catholic Slavs for self-determination outside the 
34 
Empire. "When territorial concessions have been made, as 
promised to Poland, Italy, and Rumania, the problem of 
maintaining the integrity of Austria-Hungary will become a 
35 
little complicated.M The New Statesman declared that the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire should be dissolved into its 
national components, and the Entente Powers should announce 
as a war aim self-determination for every national~ty. 
The whole poll tical world 6 f Austria is 
tumbling into chaos and darkness ••• there is 
only one solution of the problem ••• the complete 
dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
37 
36 
The Outlook also sponsored liberation of the various peoples 
33. "The Crumbling of Austria-Hungary," loc.cit. 
34. "Austria and Her Catholic Slavs," Tablet, 131:36-37, 
November 2, 1918. 
35. 11 Anglo-Americe.n War Aims, 11 Tablet, 131:36-37, 
January 12, 1918. 
36. 11 An Allied Peace: V. The Destruction of Prussian 
Mili yarism, 11 New Statesman,-8:29-30, October 14, 1916. 
Also, "Austria-Hungary: A Summary· of the Position, 11 loc. 
cit. 
37. 11 The Crisis in Austria, 11 New Statesman, 9:52-53, 
.Apri l 21, 1917. 
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J8 
from the Habsburg scepter. H. G. Wells supported 
<'Us solution of the Dual Monarchy. 11 The break-up of the 
Austrian Empire has hung over Europe like a curse for forty 
years. Let us break it up novr and have done with it. 11 He 
advocated rearrangement on general ethnic principles, 
Transylvania united to Rumania., a confed.era.tion of Serbian 
39 
areas, and Trieste a.nd the Trentino jointed to Italy. 
Professor Ramsay Muir declared that no lasting settlement 
'\vas obtainable until the national principle had achieved 
4o 
victory in the Balkans and in the Austrian Empire. 
The death knell of the Habsburg Empire was sounded by 
men like Henry W. Steed and Seton- Watson who had. become 
identified within Britain as professional experts on the 
Austro-Hungarian state. Steed pointed out the advantages of 
dissolution and outlined the following program for Eastern 
Europe: The Western portion of Galicia joined to a resurrected 
Poland, and the eastern half or the Ruthene area assigned to 
Russia; Bohemia, 1-ioravia, and the Northwestern Slovak areas 
of Hungary granted independent existence perhaps in union 
with Poland, the Italian areas by necessity merged with 
Italy, and the Magyars freed from their oppressive nobility 
38. 11 Not Our Principa.l Enemy," Outlook, 40:170, August 
25' 1917. 
39. H. G. Wells, The War that Will End War (New York: 
Duffield_ & Company,· l9ffi, pp. 50-5r:;:- - - -
40. Ramsay Muir. 11 The Desire of Civilization for the 
Reign of Law," For the Right: Essays and Addresses_ ~ 
Members of the Fight fQ!.: Right Movement (London: G. P. 
Putnam's-sons, 1918), p. 112. 
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41 
left with t h e central Hungarian plain. Seton-Watson also 
sponsored a new national system for Ea stern Europe, that is--
Poland, Bohemia., and Serbia formed into separa.te entities, 
Poland constructed into a state of twenty millions, Bohemia 
created as a. bulwark aga.inst the incur sions of Pan-Germa.nism, 
and Serbia transformed into a powerful Adria.tic state 
composed of all the South Sle.vs. He insisted that Hungary 
should be reduced to a small state of Magyar areas freed 
from an oppresive oligarchy. Finally, Greater Rumania. 
42 
should possess both Bukovina and Bessarabia. 
In the autumn of 1918, the London Times declared that 
any a ttempt to create four national states within the existing 
Austro-Hunp:arian Empire appeared very much like the constitu-
tional p roposals of 1867 which were insincere; actually the 
German minority in Auetria and .the 1·fagyar oligarchy in 
43 
Hun~ary aimed to perpetuate their control. A proclamation 
of Emperor Charles promised creation of a Federe.l state, and 
the Times spoke thus: 
The proper response to the Austrian Emperor 1 e 
manifesto would be a definite assurance to all the 
peoples of Austria-Hungary of t heir place among the 
41. H. Y.i . Steed, "Austria a.nd Europe, 11 oo.cit., p. 22. 
42. R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Pan-German PlP..n and Its 
Antidote," Contemporary Review, 101:424, April, 1916. 
43. Editorial in London Times, October 18, 1918. 
free nations of the world and of their right 
to enter into union wi th their kindred bejond 
the present boundaries of the Monarchy. 
44 
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English commentators and writers suggested but one way to 
preeerve the Habsburg Empire--complete reconstitution based 
upon union of Austro-Germa.n areas with the Catholic Germa.n 
r egions of the South Hohenzollern Empire and Silesia. By 
this arrangement there would be two German s·ta.tes, one 
45 
northern and Protesta.n t, and the other southern and Catholic. 
But suppose the Allies say frankly to the 
Habsburgs ••.• Though it is impossible for us to 
reverse our policy as regards nationality, for 
that is what we have been fighting for •••. We 
will este.blieh a Federal State which shall in-
clud.e Upper Austria, Lower Austria, Carniola, 
Carinthia, Styria, Salzburg, Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, 
Saxony, Bavarie., Baden, Wurttemberg, Silesia and 
the Rhine Provinces ••• 
46 
A new emphasis appRared in British views. Prior to the 
war, it had been generally agreed that the peoples of Austria-
Hungary were deeply atte.ched to the Empire and for the most 
44. Editorial in London Times, October 19, 1918. 
45. v. 11 Wha.t Will Be Au etria 1 s Future? 11 Fortnightly 
Review, 104:56-59, July, 1915;. e.lso, Politicus, 11 Austrie.1 s 
Hour of Destiny 1 " Fortnightly Review, 108:294, August, 1917; 
also, Lady Pe2e"(;, "Austria and Prussia, 11 Nineteenth Century 
and After, 81 :1106-1107, May , 1917; also, Sir Oliver Lodge, 
QQ.cit., p. 220; also, C. Chesteron, ~.cit., p. 210; also, 
H. H. Johnston, loc.cit.; also, Ramsay Muir, "The National 
Principle and th~a~ Oxford Pamphlets, N?• 19, p. 31. 
46. "Austrian Possibilities," _QQ.cit.,p. 37. 
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part were loyal to the Habsburg Dynasty. But the prevailing 
opinion had undergone a change; everywhere it was either 
explicitly sta.ted or clearl y implied that the racial groups 
were eager to form independent entities. The majority of 
British writers throughout the war f avored independence and 
separa.te na.tional states for the people of Austria-Hungary, 
but the Slavs of the Empire as a ma.tter of fa.ct had not 
decioed upon such a drastic progre.m. In late May, 1917, at 
the reopening of the Austrian Parliament, the Czech repre-
centatives demanded simply a federalized Austria based on 
ethnic principles. It was not until Epiphany (-January 6th), 
1 918, that the Czech parliamentary deputies proclaimed 
independence as their goal. The Poles desired an Austrie.n-
Polish solution, perhaps unifica.tion of all Poles under a 
Habsburg Prince. The Ruthenians also 
47 
were not irreconcilable. 
Unquestionably, the enthusie.stic support for partition 
of Austria-Hungary into separate national states had a 
doctrinaire and me.terial basis. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the British often pointed out that 
inasmuch as democre.tic standards had successfully guided their 
own domestic policies they eagerly awaited the day when con-
ctitutionalism and national self-determination would become 
universe.lly accepted. Ae the peoples of Austria-Hunga.ry 
47. R. Kann, The ?-1u l tinational Empire: Nationalism and 
National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-191~ (New ---
York: Columbia university Press, 1950), II, pp. 2 0-261. 
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became restive, it was in conformity with democre.tic theories 
to f!re.nt them national states if it were the desire of the 
majority. British national vanity would be bolstered by the 
fact that VBlua.ble assistance had been extended to those who 
strove for independence, and to the world at large it could 
be announced that the nation's foreign policy had been based 
on altruism. But more significantly the motive for dissolu-
tion of the Dual Monarchy had a realistic baee in power 
politics. Disa.ppearance of Austria-Hungary would isolate 
Germany and prevent her future allia.nce with a Great Power 
ruled by a German family and based on a German bureaucracy. 
Teutonism would be confined to its historic lands, deprived 
of strength which would accrue from an economic penetration 
of Asia Minor, cut off from the Mediterre.neen Sea, and no 
longer e threat to the Suez Canal. Germany would be check-
mated by Latins on the west and a:mth and a Slavic confederation 
on the ea st. 
Support for maintenance of the Austro-Btin gerian Empire 
was not large, and emanated from an unsuspected quarter 
composed of people whose political persuasion at that juncture 
could have been adjuged left of center. Usually they had 
advocated neutrality for Great Britain, and after the nation 
Joined the 1-rar they agitated for a negotie.ted peace. There-
fore, attention can be directed principally to the leaders 
end to the views of two organs, the Union of Democratic 
-444-
Control and the Independent ·Labor Party. The U.D.C. or the 
Union of Democra.tic Control was one of the sev eral pacifist 
orgenization s formed during the war, sp ecifically Augu s t, 
1914, by four people, Ramsay MacDonald, }1 . P., Charles 
Tre ve lyan , ) . P., Norman Angell, and E. D. Morel. Arthur 
Ponsonby joined the group at a later period. The Entente 
Powers and their participation in the war lt.rere criticized, 
and many of the U. D. c. contended (1) Britain had no valid 
rea.son for going to war, ( 2) Russia caused the war by 
declaring general mobilization ard (J) military victory was 
v ery unlikely, but if Germany were vanquished, peace would be 
48 
i mpo s sible beca.use of the resulting bitterness. Before 
a gitation by the U.D.C., the I .L. P. was the organ through 
which anti-war agitation wa s propagated. The se two organi-zation s 
48. 11 The Union of Democratic Control, 11 Industrial Peace, 
1:28, September, 1918; also , C. H. Norman, Brltain and the 
War, A Study in Diplomacy (London: The National Labour Press, 
Ltd.), pp. 1-22. 
The four cardinal points of the U.D.C. were 
{1) no p rovince shBll be transferred fro m one gov:er.nment to 
another without the consent of its popula tion; (2) no 
treaty or arrangement sha ll be und.ertaken in the name of 
Gre a t Britain without sanction by Parliament; (J) the 
Foreign Policy of Gre a t Britain she.ll not be aimed at 
creating alliances to preserve a Balance of Capital Power, 
but for concerted action between the Powers and the crea tion 
of an Internationa l Council with machinery for securing 
interna tional agreement; (4) Great Britain shall propose as 
a part of t he Pea ce Settlement, the drastic reduction of 
armaments and the nationalization of the manufacture of 
arme.ments. 
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were closely connected; the leaders of one group were in- · 
fluential in the other. 
The Spectator commented upon the political allegiance 
and proclivities of circles which advocated continuance of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The weekly observed that it 
wa s strange indeed to see British Liberals doggedly supporting 
preservation of the Habsburg Empire; the motto "Hands off 
the Austrian Emnire, 11 had become almost a sloge.n to be 
- . 49 
inscribed upon a radical banner. 
It must be delineated for clarity's sake that the great 
majority of the Labor Party did not follow the lead of either 
Ramsay MacDonald or ' Philip Snowden, in their programs con-
cerning the war or in rega.rd to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
The Labor Party had forty-two members in the House of Commons, 
of which number approximately four had supported parliamentary 
motions for opening ne gotiatfone, for approval of the principles 
of no ind.emni ties and no annexations issued by the Russian 
Revolutionary Government, and for conclusion of . an early peace. 
And so the great number of Labor representatives did not 
accept pe.rt i al victory. In Parliament in February, 1917, a 
member of the Labor Party challenged Mr. Snowden and stated 
that Snowden's proposals ror a negotiated peace did not reflect 
the views of the majority of the Labor Party. 
49. "The l''uture of Au.stria-Hungary, 11 .QQ..cit . , p. 482. 
I speak as a member of the majority of the 
Labour Party, who hold strongly to the view that 
the first object that this House and country 
should have in view is the winning of the war •••• 
I am prepared to challenge the hon. Member for 
Blackburn (MrA Snowden) to this extent ••.• Let him 
go into any of the large workshops in this country 
and_ place before the men there the view to which he 
ha·s given expression •••• Let him allow me the 
privilege which he claims for himself, and I will 
undertake that the vast body of these men will 
support most enthusiastically and vigorously the 
prosecution of this war to a finish. 
50 
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The majority view of the Labor Party was expressed in 
the labor organ Railway Review, dated June, 1916, which 
deplored division in the ranks of the labor movement; 
supposedly members of the same party opposed each other by 
voice and vote. 
The Independent Labour Party is utterly out of 
touch with the main currents of the 'I'rade Union 
opinion, but it refuses to secede. This group 
refuses to ebide by the decisions of the Trade Union 
Congress or Labour Party Conference but associates 
with a group composed of Mr. Ponsonby.t Mr. 'I'revelyan, 
Mr. Lief Jones, and Sir John Simon. ~he Labour 
Party conference utterly refused to agree to enter 
into peace negotiations sponsored by the I.L.P. 
51 
A year later this same weekly insisted that peace secur~d 
at that time, on the basis of the status ouo !ill.ll bellum, 
would be a victory for the Central Powers and result in an 
52 
unstable settlement. 
50. The Hansard, 90:1264-1265. 
51. Editorial in Railway Review, June 9, 1916. 
52. Ibid., May 25, 1917. 
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In 1917 a few labor representatives and Liberals made 
a determined effort to bring about a negotiated peace. In 
this championship of peace, the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
appeared as a key or as the means through which it could be 
secured.. In October, 1917, Philip Snowden enthusiastically 
greeted the acceptance of international disarmament by 
Count Czernin, the Foreign Minister of Austria. Snowden 
believed tha t Czernin 1 s views were clearer and more definite 
than simi lflr et a tements by President Wilson. J;....,urther, he 
declared that a.s a result of the Foreign 1\f inister 1 s remarks 
the Habsburg Empire had accepted the Allied conditions for 
53 
peace. The sustained drive for peace was accompanied by 
a p 2rallel theme, namely, war should not be continued merely 
for dismemberment of the Habsburg state. 
c. P. Trevelyan argued that if one discus sed freedom 
for the Austro-Hungarian nationalities, why not independence 
for the nationalities of Rus sia, for Ireland, and Finland? 
He suggested that Home Rule for the Czechs and others of the 
54 
Habsburg Emp ire wo uld be an equita ble settlement. This 
opinion was supported by Noel Buxton, a Liberal M.P. and 
Chairman of the Balkan Committee, and therefore receptive to 
the claims and desires of the Balkan nations. Some revisions 
53. Philip Snowden, 11 Review of the Week, 11 Labour Leader, 
14:3, October 11, 1917 • . 
54. Trevelyan, "Great Peace Debate in ParliHment, 11 Labour 
Le ader, 14: 3, March 1, 1917. 
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in the Habsburg domain might be made such as cession of the 
Trentino to Italy, 11 but the plans of the Yug-oslavians are 
purely doctrinaire taking no account of facts." He stated 
Home Rule had been the solution suggested by friends of the 
South Slavs prior to the war; absorption into Serbia would 
be a dire fate. Small independent states would not guarantee 
a.n anti-German feeling- or prevent German penetration into 
the area, consequently dismemberment of the Austrian state 
was solely for self-interest. Minorities found such a prospect 
unpleasant as it would arbitrarily commit them to an unwanted 
.5.5 
settlement. Yet in 1917 Buxton 1 s opinion apparently was at 
odds with his view of 191.5; in the latter year he wrote that 
prior to the war many relieved Yugosla.via was destined to be 
' 
a third kingdom within an Austro-Hungro-Slav Empire. But the 
outbreak of hostilities ended any such scheme. 11 It was a 
policy which might have grown out of peace; it is not one 
.56 
which could emerge from war. 11 Buxton had stated that a 
Greater Serbia would consist of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
together with the seaboard of Southern Dalmatia the great 
ideal of a Southern Slav Kingdom. Also Serbia would have to 
annex the Hungarian areas of Croatia, Slavonia, and the Slovene 
.57 
parts of Carniola, Carinthia, Sytria and Istria. Another 
55. The Hansard, 96:1176-1179. 
56. Noel Buxton and Charles Roden Buxton, The War and 
the Balkan s (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1915), 
p. 43. 
57. I bid., p. 92. 
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member of the so-called peace bloc , the Liberal member of 
Parliament, E. D. Morrel, declared that nothing would be 
more fatuous, i mpolitic or foolish ' than to stir up trouble 
by dismemberment of the Austrian state. He posed the 
question, what would dismemberment or attempted dismemberment 
mean, and answered tha.t it would weld together in in-
dissoluble unity the German and Austrian Empires and result 
58 
in a struggle for vengeance. 
The Herald, the National Labour l'l'eekly, the organ of 
the I.L.P., sponsored preservation of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. H. N. Brailsford, its editor, had been long 
prominent in journ~listic circles, having been the editor of 
the Daily News and the . Nation. He contrasted Austria 1 s 
treatment of minorities with Russia 1 s program. Austria had 
pursued a far more enlightened policy, yet the same could 
not be said for Hungary which had been less liberal. He 
pointed out that Austria had provided a much better economic 
system, roads, schools, social legislation, and milder 
administration the.n her Eastern Slav neighbor. She had shown 
a tolerant spirit toward her nationalities, had recognized 
eight dialects, and had given her provinces varied degrees 
of Home Rule. 'rhe Czechs had a university at Prague, t .he 
Poles at Cracow and Lemberg; the Ruthenes had a faculty at 
Lemberg, and the Italians h~ld chairs at Vienna. Britain, 
58 . Ibid . , :P. : 93. -
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with her own problem of nationality in Ireland, wa.s advised 
by Brailsford to be cautious in suggesting a proper solution 
for Austria-Hungary. Independence of the Czecho-Slovak 
state sounded well and good, but what was to become of the 
German and Slovak minorities under Czech aacendency? 
Moreover, he thought it was a flagra.nt violation of nationality 
for the Rumanians to propose the annexation of an area where 
sixty per cent of the people were Magyars, Slavs, and Germans, 
in order to gain the forty per cent of the population that 
wa s Rum anian, and besides, this latter group did not look 
59 
favor~ bly on the !'eud.al condi tiona in Ruma.nia. 
The alternative of reforming Austria-Hungary 
is not merely easier than these schemes. It is 
ideally the better plen. What one hopes to see 
is an honest adoption of the federal principle, 
so that there shall be full Home Rule, not merely 
for Poles and the South Slavs, but also ·for the 
Czechs, and,above all, for the subject races of 
Hungary, whose case is far worse than that of the 
Slav minorities in tolerant Austria. 
60 
Again, in the summer months of 1917, the Herald editorially 
raised. its voice in behalf of Austria-Hungary and maintained 
tha.t if the Allies guaranteed her territorial integ~i ty 
without doubt she could prevail upon the Junkers to conclude 
61 
a peace without conquest. Further, it was observed that 
11 Austrie.-Hungary, under the leadership of the present Emperor, 
59. H. N. Brailsford, 11 The Austrian Riddle, 11 Herald, 
D. 8, April 28, 1917. 
60. Loc. cit. 
61. 11 The Germa.n Internal Crisis, 11 Herald, p. 4, 
July 21 ' 1 91 7 • 
seems to be embarked upon a career which must lead to 
62 
satisfaction of Slav claims without disruption." 
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The Labour Leader, a paper that voiced the opinions of 
trade union members of the socialist persuasion, suggested 
a Federa l solution for the Habsburg Empire. As the Austrian 
Emperor appeared sympa thetic to proposals for governmental 
reform, it was claimed that the Dual Monarchy could be 
replaced by a Multiple Monarchy, with the Czechs and South 
Slavs at least forming separate autonomous states similar 
to Hungary and German Austria. 
The Nation, ano t her weekly with tendencies to the left 
of center, urged the Allies to support Federalism as the 
solution for the Imperial nationality question. It Britain 
desired to reach an early peace and bring about democracy, 
"it is plain that we must indicate our readiness to _accept ••• 
the fed eral solution ••. by which the claims of nationa.li ty 
63 
shall be satisfied. 11 In September, 1918, this magazine 
thought that Vienna had a true and sincere wish for peace 
and was willing to undertake basic reforms; a remodeled 
Aus tria whos e influence stretched from Trieste to a free port 
of Danzig \oiOUld counterbals.nce a.ny d.enger of a Berlin to 
. . 64 
Bagdad line. The Nation t hought the proposals of the 
62. 11 The Programme of t he Peoples• Pe a ce, 11 Herald, p. 6, 
August 4, 1917. 
63. 11 \'ianted a Policy Toward Aue.tria, 11 Nation, 21:86, 
April 28, 1917. · 
64. 11 The Meaning of the Austrian Note," Nation, 23:642, 
September, 1 918. 
Imperial Government would settle a situation which had no 
ideal solution. Bohemia, German-Austria, Illyria 
(Yugosle_via) and Ukraine (the Ruthene area) would receive 
autonomy. They would be entirely separate except for a 
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common customs system, foreign policy, and defense arrange-
rr.ent. The Poles_ of the Empire could_ join with kinsmen in 
65 
an independent Poland. 
The group which favored retention of the Habsburg 
Empire was engrossed with the idea of a negotiated peace; 
and the question arises whether the territorial integrity 
of the Empire was supported because t he state was thought 
to be a benefit to Europe and the Austro-Hungarian people, 
or, whether the primary consideration was a swift conclusion 
of war, and Austria being weak mi v,ht forsake Berlin for an 
a.llied guarantee of her own terri tory. Apparently, some 
British quarters felt that maintenance of Austria_-Hunga.ry 
would shorten the war and prevent further British bloodshed. 
Pacifist feelings also seemed_ to anime_te many circles left 
of center. Certainly, before the ''rar the Ha.bsburg Empire 
had not been considered a pro~ressive state, and social 
welfare activities were not compa.rable with British or 
German. British Socialism was not extremely radical since 
leading members of that persuasion approved retention of a 
conservative Empire. Possib l y rapid growth of Socialism in 
certain industrial areas of Austria. and in discontented 
65. "The Doom of Austria," Nation, 24:95, October 26, 
1918. 
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regions of Hungary, aroused. hope that in El reconstituted 
Empire forces left of center would obtain prominence in the 
direction of affairs. 
In the event of an Allied victory, the future of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire was not clear to the British public. 
At various times throughout the war members of the Government 
issued statements with double meanings; in truth they 
practised artful eva.sion. Sir Edward Grey in September, 1915, 
stated that it was the policy of the Government to secure 
not only independence for the Balkan states, but also a 
brilliant future through territorial and political union of 
like nationalities. The legitimate aspirations of the 
Balkan nations had to be satisfied. In Parliament in July, 
1917, Sir Robert Cecil, Minister of .Block·a.d-e - stated: 
When the Hon. Member goes on to discuss how 
far we accept the doctrine of the Yugoslav move-
ment, I admit that is a point on which it is 
dangerous to go further, as I think, than the 
position we occuped when the Government made their 
reply to Mr. Wilson's Note. They then said that 
they were there to liberate Slav nationalities, 
among others, who were oppressed and dominated by 
other races from whom they desired to be free. We 
did not go any farther than that. We did not pledge 
ourselves to the particular form of liberation which 
we should a.dvoca.te at the Peace Conference when it 
carne off. 
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At this sa.me period Sir Arthur Balfour refused to say whether 
the Government would favor any definite breakup of the Empire. 
66. The Hansard, 96:1201-1202. 
The Minister maintained it was his belief, as well as that 
of the legislative body of Britain, that the Austro-Hungarian 
nationalities should progress along their chosen path and 
form their own civilization. Yet he utterly refused to make 
any specific suggestions how the areas of the Monarchy could 
attain the above-mentioned objectives, whether through 
independence or no. "Surely it would be folly for a Foreign 
Minister, dealing with events which are still distant I 
fear--I mean the peace discussion--to discuss details of 
67 
that sort. 11 But evidently in December, 1917, Lloyd George 
hacl been willing to accept federation for the Austrian 
Empire, for in that month a.n abortive peace attempt ha<;l been 
mac.e. At Geneva, General Smuts met Count Mensdorff and 
presented a plan for a federated Austrian Empire. The meeting 
came to naught because Austria insisted on includ.ing Germany 
68 
in any peace talks. On January 5, 1918, Lloyd George stated 
British war aims to a trade union deputation and added tha.t 
they had been formulated after consultation with dominion 
representatives, labor leaders, Mr. Asquith, and Viscount 
Grey. The Prime Minister affirmed that the war was pursued 
not for the break-up of the German state or the disruption 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but for positive_ benefits 
67. Ibid., 96:1848-1849. 
68. Lord. Hardinge, Old Diploma.cy, The Reminiscences 
of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst (London: John Murray, 1947), 
p . 221. 
cuch as Belgian, Serbian, and Montenegrin independence, 
comple te evacuation of France, Ita.ly, and Rumania, and 
a ree.sonable measure of autonomy for the various ethnic 
69 
group s within the Austro-Hungerian state. Publicly, 
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d.uring the first three years of war, the British Government 
vacil lated in regard to the future structure of the Habsburg 
realm. However, by January 1918, the Government agreed to 
a continued existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire if a 
Federal system were adop ted. Governmental. policy trailed 
behind pub lic opinion for political leaders were reluctant 
to support dissolution. 
Fra.nce obviously concurred with the British Prime 
Minister , for Clemence a u congre tula ted Lloyd George a.fter 
hie speech of January 5, 1918~ Within a few months, however, 
the whole p icture changed; the exposure of the Sixtus 
letter by the French Premier in April shattered French 
intere s t in the maintenance of the Habeburg Empire. Benes 
said, 11 we brea thed again and were fra.nkly deli ghted. For 
Fr a.nce the Habsburg empire had finally become a matter of the 
70 
pe_st. 11 Ancl so by the Spring 1918, French support for 
retention of a feder e.lized Austria_- Hungary appreciably declined 
69 . 11 Where Does Lloyd George Stand?" Herald, p. 8, 
Septe mber 21, 1918. 
70. Kann , QQ.cit., II, pp . 271-272. 
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which in turn affected British attitudes. 
In summary, most news organs were in general agreement 
that in the event of an Allied victory the various racial 
groups of the Dus.l Monarchy would. form independent states. 
The segment of society ths.t favored maintenance of the 
Habeburg state, albeit in a Federa.l form, could be called the 
ra.dical fringe, tha.t is--labor leaders who veered toward 
socieli sm e.nd so-called ra.ctical Liberals. The group was not 
large in number but was vociferous in Parliament and in Labor 
circles. The Ha.bsburg Empire as it ha.d been known was seen 
to crumble away ; the predictions and fears that h ad spanned 
half a century were at · the point of fulfillment. 
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SUMMARY 
Austria-Hungary 1 s ethnic, economic, and. poll tical 
problems, her vital position in continental politics, and 
the cross-currents which resulted from her heterogeneous 
compo sition were clearly reflected in British public opinion. 
English people approached the Austro-Prussian War with 
diverse feeling s; contemporary trends and past events con-
tributed to the formation of opinion. It was obvious t hat 
Prussia hE!.d preclpl tated the call to arms and therefore 
Austria received sympathy from large numbers, but many people 
were indifferent concerning events on t h e continent~ for 
Vienna had deviated from the British norm of morality by 
sha ring in the spoliation of Denmark (1863-1864) and by 
retention of Venetia. A ma j or conflict was anticipated 
inasmuch as Au s trian armed strength was judged to be of high 
quality and able to withstand Pruseian forces. Total Austrian 
defeat had immediate consequences. Public opinion endorsed 
the victor and, seemingly, Social Darwinism and the realities 
of power politics were weighty factors in shaping sentiments. 
In the main, the Austrian Empire had been based upon 
absolutism, hence con s titutional governmentestablished in 
the aftermath of war won hearty approval; new progressive 
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le~islation was endorsed while reactionary tendencies were 
criticized. Attention turned to freedom of the press, 
speech, and. the like, end especially to the d.emocratic 
franchise of 1907. Britain wanted to be reassured that 
autocracy haa been completely abandoned and the State based 
upon constitutional monarchy. 
As the Crown was the agency through which constitu-
tionalism had been launched and maintained, the majority of 
Englishmen felt that Emperor Francis Joseph was an en-
li~htened ruler who evinced dignity, re s traint, and dutifully 
adhered to agreements. In the late nineties and early 
twentieth century his popularity increased markedly; he was 
repeatedly referred to as the gree.t pre server of the Empire. 
When dissolution seemed a threat, constitutionalism was not 
as i mportant as maintenance of the Empire and responsible 
people advised the Crown to assume full power. There was 
a lack of confidence in Francis Ferdinand, the heir, because 
of his clerical and militaristic tendencies. 
Austrian high society and its chief component, Viennese 
aristocracy, were considered reactionary and a vestige of the 
past. The role of the Roman Catholic Church in the political 
life of Austria-Hungary was placed in the same category as 
po l ite society. 
Nationality turmoil was one of the most disturbing 
situations. lvlany Englishmen thought that the status of the 
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various ethnic groups was not clearly defined; claims were 
confused and overlapped. Ideas about ethnic problems were 
determined by several circumstances. The Empire was 
believed necessary for European peace and its preservation 
naturaliy was a foremost consideration. There was a dis-
agreement, h owever, as to the method of preservation, 
whether by retention of Magyar and German dominance which 
held the state firm and bound many racial groups together, or 
through equitable division of power among the various peoples. 
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century 
Britain believed the.t Russia, the major Slav state, vias a 
threat to her possessions. As the Slavs in the Habsburg 
Empire outweighed both the Germans e.nd Jvlagyars, and, in fa.ct 
were a majority, fear existed that a mighty Slavic conficlera-
tion might be formed under Russian guidance upon the ruins 
of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, some people judged Germanic 
culture to be a higher expression of life which should prevail 
for that reason regardless of opposition. But British 
devotion to justice and majority rule also shaped public 
opinion, for the Slavs in many areas lacked the administrative 
and political power that was rightfully due the majority group. 
While Germany was looked upon as a bulwark of European peace, 
it was pointed out that the Austro-Gerrnans had the ability to 
elevate and_ orient the Habsbur·g Empire to the West; but when 
Germany arose as e. menace, t hey were rega.rd.ed as an ethnic 
group which might embra.ce Pan-Germa.nism and. create a vast 
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fatherland that would. economically a.nd politically penetrate 
the Balkans. 
Internal conditions in the Dual Monarchy convinced many 
Englishmen that the Hungarian kingdom had toppled Austria 
from the premier position. The Magyars were frequently 
accused of excluding other nationalities from participa-
tion in the Hungarian gqvernment and, indeed . of forcible 
cultural Magyarization. Criticism mounted to its height in 
the o.eca.de prior to World War I; notwithstanding this fact, 
the Magyars were admired for physical bravery, dash, pleasing 
manners, and their determined struggle for just rights. 
Dualism received its greatest support at the time of its 
adoption; any step toward constitutionalism tended to be 
accep ted. As Slavic groups pressed for revision of the 
governmental structure, enthusiasm for Dualism declined for 
obviously it was not a panacea. Federalism found much favor 
in 1866 as a rival solution and through the years was often 
recommended as a means to eliminate discontent, especially 
a.t the turn of the century when the Czechs became most 
vocif erous in their demand.s and when Hungarian racia.l 
antagonisms were emphatically impres sed on the British reading 
public. 
Gr.eat Britain observed that Austria-Hungary ha.d a 
fluct ue.ting economy, a debt-ridden fina_ncial structure, and 
currency troubles -which affected her military preparedness 
and. maintenance of her Grea t Power standing. 
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With the Russian threat always imminent, the Austrian 
. l 
armed strength was of special interest. Deficiencies were 
noted, logistics were thought poor, and some questioned the 
capabilities of a multi-national army, but hope was ever 
present that the armed forces were in suitable readiness, 
allied with others, to face any threat. 
In 1878, proposals for Austrian occupation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were fairly well received and after the 
Congress of Berlin the occupation was accepted with little 
protest. Throughout a thirty year trusteeship, an over-
whelming majority of British writers and travelers were 
satiefied with the administretion, and the storm of protest 
which acCO I11panied the a.nnexation resulted. primarily from 
fear that it might provoke war. 
Austrian stewardship of the Balkans was a much discussed 
possi bill ty and British reaction to 1 t v:as conditioned by 
wha.t was believed necessary for the Peninsula, namely, 
independence and self-determina.tion for Slav peoples, 
sta.bi,lity and Western civilization, or a block to Russian or· 
German expa.nsio n. But the Empire 1 s Balkan policy depended on 
whether the mtion was in · the process of dissolution or its 
prospects bright, and as the century closed the continued 
existence of the state was regarded by many observers ae 
d.oubtful. 
In the main, the Conservative Party showed a friendly 
spirit toward. Austria-Hungary; on the other hand, the Liberal 
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Party viewed her with suspicion. Tory England was interested 
in preservation of the sta.tus guo on the continent and 
maintenance of the balance of power, and a strong Habsburg 
Empire appeared as a requisite. The Liberals thought that 
Vienna opposed freedom and_ self-determination in the Balkans. 
During World War I, Great Britain was intensely bitter 
toward the German Empire but hostility to Austria-Hungary was 
much less pronounced. She was recognized a.s the unfortunate 
partner, yet the general public was convinced that she had 
to b e broken up so that each nationality could either become 
independent or join confreres in existing states. Dissol~ 
tion was acclaimed both for consolidation of natural ethnic 
a:reae and as a block to future German expansion. The group 
which sponsored preservation of the Empire was not large and 
surprisingly left of center, tha.t is, composed of certain 
Labor Party members, Soctalists, radical Libera_ls, and usually 
ttiose who approved a negotiated peace. During most of the war, 
the British Government's public policy was indecisive con-
cerning the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was not 
until early in 1918 that officia.l circles consented to a. 
continua.tion of the state based upon a Federal system. 
Comment on certain over-all trends is required to complete 
this study of public opinion. Britain was aware that momentous 
problems and grave dangers faced Austria-Hungary. Conditions 
were impressed upon the public by periodicals and newspapers 
but complete, detailed, and analytical stuclies were lacking 
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until the twentieth century. In spite of this deficiency 
a flow of short articles kept the public fairly well-informed. 
In the late sixties Baron Henry de Worms, a . close friend of 
Count Beust, wrote a volume of limited scope concerning 
Austria-1-Tungary which somewhat lacked objectivity; but during 
the crucial last third of the nineteenth century no extensive 
study appeared. In 1893 Sidney Whitman brought forth a brief 
analysis of ethnic groups and social classes; the work gave 
some insight into the hume.n factor which had become so 
important since the establishment of constitutionalism. In 
1907 the Colquhouns, British travelers, wrote The Whirlpool 
of Europe which was a readable survey of conditions in the 
Dual Monarchy but not a scholarly work. Geoffrey Drage's 
volume in 1909 wa~ a more weighty contribution. It 
conta.ined considerable background material and . presented 
the economic history of the na.tion as well ' as reference to 
dieruptive influences, such as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. 
In this same period R. w. Seton-Watson furnished the public 
with a series of excellent studies of racial discrimination 
and forcible Magyarization in Tra.nsleithania. In the yea.r 
prior to the War, Henry W. Steed, a former London Times 
correspondent, g at .h ered me.teria.l from first-hand knowledge 
and wrote a penetrating account of conditions. 
Inasmuch as the importance of Austria.-Hungary was 
realized, it seems strange that comprehensive studies of the 
nation were neglected until the twentieth century. Unquestion-
ably, a thorough penetration of the state 1 s modern hi story 
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would have required an uno.ersta.nding of Slavic tongues, 
acquaintance with the claims and counter-claims of the 
va.rious peoples, a grasn of economic problems, and a know-
ledge of Balkan affairs; it was a task of overwhelming 
magnitude. 
Problems and prospects of Britain and her own Empire 
shaped the ideas ana_ attitudes of the genera.l public. 'I'he 
security of British possessions guided opinions toward 
foreign nations. Until 1907 Russia wa.s consic1ered a menace 
to the Suez Canal and India, and the Danubian Monarchy was 
thou@:ht a barrier to aggression in the Near East. For 
thirty-odd yeers a Russian threat had been keenly felt and 
yet panic and ill-advised rashness did not envel op the 
Briti sh nation. An atmosphere of sobriety and l 'evel-
hea.dedness characterized public opinion . The problem was 
faced with political maturity, or perhaps middle class 
prosoerity stifled explosive nationalism. In judging the 
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina writers tended to use 
as a basis of comparison, administration with in the British 
Empire. Int Arest in Federa lism as a solution for racial 
dissensions reflected a trend in the British Empire, for 
during the late nineteenth century self- government had been 
granted to colonial dependencies. Dominion status in many 
way s was similar to Federa.listic pro posals for Austria-
Hungary. 
Na turally, po"VTer politics shaped a ttitudes. Austria-
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Hungary was considered by many as the fulcrum of the balance 
of power in Europe, and therefore some Englishmen desired 
her continuation mainly because a dissolution would 
nece s sitate a drastic readjustment of power. Feelings of 
the general public concerning the Dual Monarchy were governed 
to some extent by prevailing views toward other European 
countries. Judgments of the Austrian scene became closely 
interrelated with the larger continental picture. The 
Austro-German Alliance was well received during the years 
that Russia appeared likely to upset the balance of power 
on the continent, yet it aroused open fear when German 
dominance of Europe seemed possible. Many times it was not 
appreciated that the Empire had no alternative; its 
existence d.epended on a bulwark of strength and German 
support was all that had been offered. 
Another important ingredient in the forma.tion of public 
opinion was British sympathy to nationalism, or lack of it. 
Any observer's jud.gm.ent of Austria-Hungary 1 s future course 
in the Balkans was conditioned by his respective attitude 
toward Slav self-determination. Was the principle of 
nationali sm de s tructive or constructive? In the opinion 
of Elie Halevy, it we e the infectious spirit of nationalism 
flourishing in the Balkans that attre.cted the national ities 
1 
of the Habsburg state and ultimately resulted in catastrophe. 
1. Elie Halevy, The World Crisis of 1914-1918: An 
Interpretation: Being the Rhodes Memorial Lectures Delivered 
ill l2.G..2_ (Oxford, at theGlarendon Press, 1930), 57 pp. 
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l'laterial which appeared in the English press made 
political leaders aware of the manifold problems and dangers 
that faced Austria-Hungary. It is difficult to fully estimate 
how much influence was brought to bear on governmental policy 
by current opinion. However, in the eighties an Englishman 
felt that it had considerable impact. 
In the United Kingdom ••• the force of public 
opinion ultimately inspires, directs, and in all 
respects governs. It quickly makes its impress 
apparent in the conduct of all departments. 
2 
And. Spencer ~falpole in 1882 declared that "there is a 
growing tendency in the people of this country to assert 
3 
its control over the foreign policy of the State." Also 
a modern authority seems to substantiate the foregoing views: 
Democratic government acts upon public opinion 
and public opinion acts openly and continually 
upon government. The open interplay of opinion 
and policy is the distinguishing mark of popular 
rule. 
4 
At certain times public opinion and policy seemed rather 
closely related. The English public had no desire to enter 
2. Democracy in the Old World and the New (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench~ Co.,-r884), pp~4-95.---
3. Spencer Walpole{ Foreign Relations (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1882J, p. 1 1. 
4. Harold D. Lasswell, Democracy Through Public Opil}ion 
(Menasha, Wisconsin, George Banta Publishing Company, 19 1}, 
p. 15. 
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the Seven Weeks' War which without doubt was partially 
responsible for the neutral atti tud.e adopted by the Ministry. 
The press placed much confidence in Francis Joseph and 
thereby created faith in. Austria 1 s peaceful intentions. The 
governmental proposal for an Anglo-Austrian Alliance in 
1878 was paralleled by a trend in public thought. Austrian 
financial weakness and nationality conflicts often referred 
to by well-informed observers, impressed some political 
leaders who deprecated Austr1a 1 s worth as an ally. Bosnian 
occupation was sponsored by British leaders who knew that 
their nation had been prepared for the move by news organs. 
Thirty years later at the annexation, the press embittered 
official Anglo-Austrian relations. In the decade prior to 
1914, the common assumption that Austria had fallen prey to 
German expansion i'ncreased anti-German sentiments. During 
World War I policy trailed behind public opinion; although 
there was considerable support for dissolution, the 
Government as late as 1918 approved a Federal solution. 
If an over-all observation may be ventured--prior to 
1914 p:ood-will toward the Dual Monarchy outweighted adverse 
feelings. Writers pointed_ out flaws in the social, poll tical, 
and economic fabric of t h e · nation, but it was hoped that 
corrections could be made e.nd a vigorous and energetic 
Habsburg Empire would . emerge in Eastern Europe. Current 
trends and philosophies such as laissez-faire, Social 
Darwinism, humanitarianism, and devotion to democracy, molded 
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and affected judgments. Laissez-faire was suggested as a 
method to invigorate the economic climate of the Empire. 
Social Darwinism can be detected in opinions concerning 
many subjects, in ideas about the Slavic racial- groups, and 
most clearly in the change of sentiment at the end of the 
Austro-Pruesian War. At the death of Darwin, the Pall Mall 
Gazette cogently presented the effect of his doctrine on 
English life: 
Trickling and. filtering down to the masses, 1 t 
permeated even the daily press the current 
poll tical and social ideas ••• .ft runs through 
almost all the best thought of our time; it tinges 
our unformed public notions; 1 t reappeers under a 
hundred. disguises in works on law and history, in 
political speeches and religious discourses, in 
artistic theories and vague social speculations. 
5 
Humanitarianism was a guiding principle to many in the 
Liberal Party, consequently, sympathy l-ras extended to the 
Balkan Slavs and objection made to Austrian expansion in 
the Peninsula. Britain was devoted to democracy and she 
therefore approved the Austrian constitutional system and 
any liberal steps taken by the Monarchy. 
Editors, staff writers, correspondents, and occasional 
contributors to periodicals were in many . cases well-rounded 
persons whose ideas were not circumscribed by a limited 
outlook. Although the potential reading audience may not 
5. · "Mr. Darwin 1 s Influence on Modern Thought, 11 ~ 
Mall Gazette, April 26, 1882. 
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have been as large as after World War I, yet in many 
in s tances the material presented seemed more analytical 
and detailed than in the present era of compressed news. 
There is much substantiAtion for the theory that the 
educated En~lishman of the late nineteenth century who had 
a commanding voice in world events possessed a more compre• 
hensive knowledge of foreign affairs than a similarly 
educated American of the past few decade s who has rep laced 
him in global leadership. Britain's enthusiasm and· pride 
in he r far-flung Empire, her large overseas investments, and 
the po pularity of reading combined with the more limited 
mediums of entertainment, in many ways supuort the foregoing 
idea. 
At the completion of this study the t hought occurs, 
whether a r approchement between. Britain and .Austria would 
h a ve changed the destiny of Eastern Europe. It remainsa 
moot auestion, whethe r the Empire's problems would have been 
settled and the na tion preserved if war had been averted. 
By 1908, the second major crisis, the Bosnian annexation , 
was at hand, and the fourth significant episode at Sarajevo 
signaled the outbreak of world conflict. When the war ended , 
the Austro-Hungari an Empire had disappeared in a surge of 
nationa.lism. The Peace of Ver sailles p laced the victor• s 
seal on its dissolution. 'l'he Habsburg Dynasty, a venerable 
House which personified Europe 1 s pa.st, a link with the 
forma tive centuries of We s tern c-ulture, fell quickly e_nd 
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without lament. During the entire nineteenth century the 
nationalities had pleaded for self-determination and in 
1918 they ge.ined a hearing and a favorable verdict. •r h.e 
variou s ethnic aree.s were buoyantly launched upon new 
careers as sovereign states which fully guarded all the~r 
p rerogatives and were intent Upon independent action not 
tinged with the ideal of c onfederation. Austria had 
become a truncated and economically depressed state. Vienna, 
i t s capital, was dotted with the phy s ical remain s of a 
former glory which served as reminders of the richness of 
the past and harbingers of the di smalness 6f the present 
and f uture. The Habsburg Empire was simply a memory, a 
co mpleted chap ter in the ever-lengthening record of mankind. 
All empires tumble - Rome and Greece -
Their swords are ru s t, their altars cold! 
6 
6. Andrew Lang , 11 Ballade of the Southern Cross," 
Woods, Watt and Anderson, The Litera ture of England 
(Revised edit'ion, Chicago : Scott, Foresman and Comp any, 
1941), II , , p. 1087. 
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ABSTRACT 
Austria_-Hunga.ry '"'as the first major power to be 
destroyed by nationalism which triumphed in Europe between 
the two World Wars and now app ee rs a.s a. determining force 
in Asia and Africa. Today friction among ethnic groups in 
all parts of the world, financial burdens resulting from 
military preparedness, threats of Russian expansion, and the 
obstacles to any poll tica.l or economic European union renew 
interest in similar difficulties which -confronted the 
Habsburg Empire. 
Great Britain's reaction to conditione in Austria-
Hungary vividly illustrates the multiplicity of factors in 
public opinion--the constant struggle between emotion and 
considered judgment as well e.s the importa.nce of basic 
cultural, religious, and poll ti ce.l beliefs which color all 
ideas and attitudes. 
Thi s d.1ssertat1on has been based upon a_ study of 
s1 p.:nif1ca.nt periodical material, parliamentary debates, and 
books published from 1866 to 1918. Considerable a ttention 
has been given also to newspaper comment; the London Times 
has been thoroughly examined and other newspapers have been 
referred to in key years. The course of public opinion has 
been indicated by using material which the average Englishman 
read from week to · week and from month to month, and by 
referring to views of leading politicians, contemporary 
celebrities, and literary people. 
The quarrel between Austria and Prussia in 1866 did 
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not produce a uniform reaction in Great Britain; a large 
segment of public opinion cond.emned Prussia e.nd supported 
the Habsburgs, but Austria's participation in the spoliation 
of Denmark (1863-1864), and her Italian policy caused many 
Englishmen to feel indifferent about the continental 
struggle. A major conflict was anticipated since Austrian 
armed strength was eva.luated highly. The rapidity and 
completeness of Austrian defeat had an immediate effect. 
The general public as well as political leaders almost 
unanimously became Prussophile, and Social Darwinism together 
'\<T i t l;l Realpolitik seemed responsible for the new attitude. 
For about thirty years(l866-1896), interest centered 
upon the firm establishment of a constitutional monarchy; 
it was generally accepted. that Emperor Francie Joseph was a 
sincere constitutionalist who strove for domestic harmony 
and external peace. In the late nineties, as nationalistic 
agi te.tion intensified, there wes a sharp upswing in his 
popularity a.nd he was almost universally considered the 
great preserver of his Empire. Some well-informed observers 
even · sponsored a return to absolutism under the "benign 
Emperor. 11 In sharp contre.st, .Fntncis Ferdinand was mistrusted 
because of his clerical and. mill taristic tendencies. 
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Two pillars of the Habsburg state were severely 
criticized. Austrian high society and its chief com-ponent, 
Viennese aristocracy, were jud_ged to be reactionary, 
exclusive, and intellectually d.ull. And the political 
ac t ivity of the Roman Catholic Church was considered a 
hindrance to progress. 
Imperial nationality problems were recognized as 
affecting the very existence of the state. · Division occurred, 
however, on the method of solution. Pro-Slav circles felt 
that majority rule should be the guiding principle, but 
another group maintained that the Germane and Magyars 
were the natural leaders. Moreover, personal convictions 
about basic political, cultural, and even religious matters 
shaped views on this subject, i.e., centralization vs. 
decentralization, Western culture vs. Ea. stern, and 
clericalism vs. liber~lism. 
In the sixties and seventies the primacy of the Austro-
German s was emphasized, but at the close of the century it 
was generally admitted that their ascendency had been 
de s troyed. The potentialities of the Austrian Pan-German 
movementwere observed as early as 1866, but criticism of 
the movement closely paralleled Anglo-German hostility. 
Attitudes regarding Dualism and Federalism were 
interwoven with the nationality question. Dualism found its 
~reates t support at i t s adoption; it was not unreasonable 
to expect tha t the minorities would find a satisfactory 
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cultural and political modus vivendi within the dual 
s tructure. Ae the Slave pressed for governmental chan~es, 
support for Dualism declined. Federalism was strongly 
app roved in 1866 as a rival solution and seemed to gather 
streng th with the passing years. 
It was often suggested that the Hungarian Kingdom had 
rep laced Austria a.s t he dominant area. Although British 
writers fr equently accused the Magyars of political and 
cul tural oppression, a forceful expo s~ did not appear until 
ear l y in the twentieth century. 
From 1866 to 1914, leading newspapers and periodicals 
commented upon Austria's currency troubles and debt-ridden 
financial structure which affected the maintenance of her 
Great Power standing and her military preparedness. 
Deficiencies were noted in the Austrian armed forces, for 
l ogis tics were considered poor and the effectiveness of a 
multi-national army was a subject of controversy. However, 
a strong feeling existed that the Ha.b sburg army was 
prepared for action. 
The Austrian occupation of Bosnia was widely accepted 
a s t h e most s ensible settlement. Throughout the thirty 
y ear trusteeship, writers and travelers commended the Austrian 
administration. Vi gorous protests against the Bosnian 
annexation were based more upon fear of war than upon the 
que s tionable tactics i nvolved, a.nd certainly not upon 
mala dministration. 
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British reaction to Austrian stewardship of the Balkans 
was conditioned by what was believed necessary for the 
Peninsul~, viz., independence and self-deter~ination for 
Slav peoules, stabi l ity and \'!estern civilization, or a 
block to Russian or German expansion. Austria-Hungary's 
Balkan policy was recogni zed to be dependent on her. prestige, 
and as the century closed dissolution of the state was 
widely d iscussed. 
In the main, the Conservative Party was frtendly to 
Austria but British Liberals were suspicious of her. Tory 
England aimed to preserve the statue guo on the continent, 
and maintain the balance of power in which a strong Habsburg 
I 
Empire was the keystone. Gladstonian Liberalism, somewhat 
I 
scornful of power politics and zealous for national self-
determination, charged the state with expansionism and 
opposition to Balkan nationalism. 
The general public felt intensely bitter toward Germany 
in lvorld War I, but hostility to Austria-Hungary was much 
less pronounced. for she was thought to be the unfortunate 
partner of Berlin. Nonetheless, it was generally agreed 
that she had to be broken up so that each nationality could 
either become independent or join confreres in existing 
countries, and German expansion could be forestalled. The 
group which sponsored preservation of the state was not 
large and, as a rule, was politically left of center, that 
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is, composed of certain Labor Party members, Socialists, 
radical Liberals, and usually those who approved a 
negotiated peace. The -British Government's public policy 
concerning the fate of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was 
indecisive; it was not until early in 1918 that official 
circles openly consented to a continuation of the state 
based upon Federalism. 
This study would not be complete without emphasizing 
the close interplay between public opinion and contemporary 
En~lish life. The problems and prospects of Britain 
largely shaped the views of the general public. 
The external security of British possessions guided 
attitudes toward foreign nations. Austria was closely 
associated with current continental conditions, that is, 
first the Russian threat and then the German. The Austro-
German All iance was well received by a large percenta~e of 
Englishmen during the eighties, yet it aroused open fear 
when German dominance of Europe seemed possible. Many 
times it was not appreciated that the Empire's existence 
depended upon a bulwark of strength and German support 
was all that had been offered. 
In evaluating the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
administration within the British Empire was used as a basis 
o·f comparison. Interest in Federalism as a solution for the 
Austro-Hunga.rian nationality question reflected a trend in 
British Imperial relationships. Dominion status we.s similar 
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to federalistic proposals for Austria-Hungary. Irish 
Home Rule became very much associated with the ethnic 
and. governmental problems of the Habsburg Empire. Sympathy 
for nationalism, or ls.ck of it, shaped attitudes tov1ard 
Habsburg expansion in the Balkans. In other words, was 
the principle of nationalism d.estructive or constructive? 
Contemporary economic, political, and social trends and 
philosophies, such as laiseez-faire, Darwinism, Social 
Darwinism, Liberal humanitarianism, and devotion to 
poll tical democrs.cy shaped the personal approach to a 
variety of subjects. 
Public opinion ~nd policy cannot be correlated 
completely but at certain times a relationship can be shown. 
The general public had no desire to enter the Seven Weeks' 
War and the Ministry, dependent upon the electorate, would 
not have dared to intervene. Undoubtedly the British press 
built up the prestige of Francis Joseph and created confi-
dence in the peaceful intentions of the Habsburg state. 
Disraeli 1 s proposal for an Austrian Alliance in 1878 wae 
not a mere governmental program, but represented a trend 
in public thought. British political leaders snonsored 
- . 
Austrian occupation of Bosnia, firm in the knowledge that 
their nation had been prepared for the move by the press. 
And thirty years later, at the annexation of the area, the 
wrath of the Government was paralleled by denunciations in 
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Br i tish news organs. Unquestionably in the decade prior to 
1914, the widespread assumption that Austria was the first 
victim of German expansionism served to increase Anglo-
German hostility. During World War I official policy 
trailed behind public opinion. Even though the Engli sh 
public supported dissolution of the Habsburg Empire , the 
Ministry as late as January, 1918, was willing to accept a 
federali zed state. 
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